""HC ; 



UC-NRLF 




PMMERCE 

BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE 

B. S. CUTLER, Chlf 



MISCELLANEOUS SERIES- No. 61 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR 

COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
IN WAR TIME AND THE FUTURE OUTLOOK 



CHAUNCEY DEPEW SNOW 

..-. "AND--' . 

J, J, KRAL 




PRICE, 2S CENTS 

Sold b? the Su9e>luten<ieut of Documents, Qoverumut Pdottof 
Washington, D. C. 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1918 



DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

II S BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE 

B. S. CUTLER, Chief 



MISCELLANEOUS SERIES No. 65 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR 

COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
IN WAR TIME AND THE FUTURE OUTLOOK 



BY 

CHAUNCEY DEPEW SNOW 

AND 

J. J. KRAL 




PRICE, 25 CENTS 

Sold by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C. 

WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1918 



tf 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Letter of submittal ........................................................ 9 

I. German commercial aims in war policy ................................ 11 

Plans for commercial expansion .................................... 13 

Forcible annexation one of the war aims ........................ 13 

Position of dictator in commerce desired ....................... 14 

Failure of commercial aims ........................................ 14 

Secretary Redfield 's summarization oi: future trade ................. 15 

II. German economic life in war time ____ . .............................. 17 

Lack of efficient administration .................................... 17 

Obscurity of internal policies ....................................... 18 

Measures of economic defense ...................................... 19 

Industrial changes to war footing .................................. 21 

Civic and industrial truce ......................................... 22 

Currency inflation and fall in exchange ............................ 22 

Trade in war time ................................................ 23 

Circulation of money in trade ...................................... 24 

The desire for peace ............................................... 26 

Summary of the situation .......................................... 26 

III. German foreign trade in war time .................................... 27 

Losses in over-sea trade ........................................... 27 

Trade with the Netherlands ........................................ 28 

Trade with Switzerland ........................................... 29 

Trade with Scandinavia .......................................... 29 

Government control of foreign trade ............................... 31 

IV. German industries in war time ........................................ 32 

Manufacture largely confined to war needs .......................... 32 

Effects of coal shortage ........................................ 33 

Metals and machinery ............................................ 33 

Activity of the Krupp factory ................................. 34 

Profits of iron and steel companies .............................. 34 

The copper companies ....................................... 36 

Agricultural and other machinery ....................... , ..... 36 

The electrical industry ........................................... 37 

Chemicals ....................................................... 38 

Firms making coal-tar products ................................. 39 

Potash ...................................................... 39 

Coal mining ....................................................... 40 

Shortage of labor and equipment ............................... 40 

Regulations governing output and distribution ................. 41 

Other mining ..................................................... 42 

Aeroplanes ............. ........................................... 42 

Automobiles ..................................................... 43 

Motors ........................................................... 43 

Sugar .................................................. . .......... 44 

Building trades ......................... ......................... 45 

3 



44949 



4 CONTENTS. 

IV. German industries in war time Continued. Pa^e. 

Cement 40 

Bricks 46 

Glass 47 

Paper 48 

Leather 48 

Toys 49 

Furniture 49 

Textiles 49 

Mills depend on substitute materials 50 

Jute manufacture suspended 51 

Use of paper as substitute for textile fibers 52 

Clothing 52 

Government requisition of clothing 53 

V. German cartels in war time ; 55 

Changas made necessary by war 55 

Bar-iron syndicate 56 

Dyestuff syndicate 56 

Silk syndicate 58 

Textile syndicates 58 

Tool and implement syndicate 59 

Prolongation of other syndicates 59 

Coal syndicate 59 

Steel syndicate 60 

Compulsory syndication 60 

Boot and shoe syndicate 60 

Federal control of all footwear manufacture 61 

Opposition to leather syndication 62 

Soap syndicate 62 

VI. The vital question of materials 64 

Sources of supply 64 

Foodstuffs 65 

Coal 66 

Iron and iron ore 66 

Manganese and wolfram 67 

Copper and nickel 67 

Tin and zinc 68 

Lead 68 

Aluminum 69 

Pottery clays Graphite 69 

Raw cotton _ 69 

Wool T. 70 

Silk 70 

Flax, hemp, and jute 71 

India rubber 71 

Hides and skins 72 

Leaf tobacco 72 

Oilseeds 73 

Petroleum , 73 

Fertilizers 73 

Wood and wood products 74 

Substitute materials 74 

Food and drink 75 

Tobacco . . 76 



CONTENTS. 5 

VI. The vital question of materials Continued. 

Substitute materials Continued. Page. 

Sugar 77 

Copper 78 

Graphite 79 

Lycopodium 80 

Cork 80 

Textile fibers 80 

India rubber 82 

Leather 83 

VII. German labor conditions in war time '. 84 

Readjustment in all industries 84 

Strikes suspended by agreement! 84 

Shortage of factory labor 86 

Law against voluntary idleness 86 

Establishment of arbitration boards 87 

Activities of labor unions 88 

Decline in membership of labor organizations 89 

Woman labor 89 

Large increase in number of women employees 90 

Women in transportation and metallurgical industries 90 

Wages of men and women compared 91 

Working conditions injurious to women's health 92 

Possible future effects on family life 92 

Importation of foreign laborers 93 

Growth of population less than economic expansion 93 

Occupations of imported laborers 94 

Discrimination against Polish workers 95 

Importation continues during war 95 

Prisoners of war 95 

The future a topic of speculation 96 

VIII. German land and water transportation 97 

The railroads 97 

Increases in equipment 98 

Changes in operation as result of war 98 

War demands paramount 99 

Finances of railroads 100 

Inland waterways 101 

Central European waterway system 101 

Plans for future extensions 102 

Connecting navigable rivers by canals 103 

The merchant marine 103 

Proposed Government recompense for losses 104 

Ships under construction at beginning of war 105 

Reports on present shipbuilding activities 106 

Transactions in capital stock of existing companies 107 

IX. German money and banking in war time 108 

First effects of the declaration of war 108 

Legislation for stabilizing monetary conditions 109 

Large issues of paper currency 109 

Regulation of foreign exchange 110 

Restrictions on exportation of funds 110 

Efforts to maintain foreign value of the mark Ill 

The Imperial Bank 112 

Imperial Bank notes in circulation 112 



6 CONTENTS. 

IX. German money and banking in war time Continued. 

The Imperial Bank Continued. Page. 

The gold reserve 113 

Statement of total transactions 113 

The Prussian Government Bank 114 

Assistance given to Government and industries 115 

Private banks in 1916 116 

Effect of changed conditions on banking 116 

Financial condition of principal banks 117 

Bank profits generally increased 118 

Consolidation of banks 119 

Financial operations do not indicate increase of wealth 120 

Bank clearings 121 

Mortgage banks in 1917 121 

X. War loans, taxation, and proposed monopolies 122 

Financing the war 122 

Revenue raised by bonds without increased taxation 122 

Fiscal policy weakens national credit 123 

Enactment of special tax laws 124 

Warning sounded by a German economist 124 

Limits on future taxation 126 

Estimates of needed new revenue 127 

Government monopolies 128 

Government operation of certain industries advocated 128 

Monopoly of shipping under discussion 130 

Possible revenue from sugar, tobacco, and alcohol 130 

Manufacture of beer 132 

Coal offers opportunity for Government monopoly 132 

Colonial exploitation 134 

XI. Preparations for trade after the war 135 

Difficulties to be met 135 

Establishment of foreign credits 135 

Effect of general demand for materials 136 

Department of Economic Affairs 136 

Plans for reconstruction period 137 

Transition from war to peace conditions 138 

Importance of agriculture 138 

Chemical, paper, and leather industries 139 

Textile and clothing industries 139 

Optimistic views of German publicists 140 

Economic relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary 141 

Proposed customs union 141 

Free trade with Germany opposed in Austria-Hungary 142 

Promotion of trade with the Near East 144 

Trade with Latin countries 145 

The commercial invasion of Switzerland 145 

Recent German efforts to exploit Switzerland 146 

Importation of raw materials 146 

Government control may be exercised 147 

Import banks 148 

Inadequacy of existing foreign banks 148 

Export banks 149 

Proposed central foreign-trade bank 150 

Foreign trade institutes 151 



CONTENTS. 7 

Page. 

XII. Germany a formidable economic reality 153 

German dream of economic imperialism 153 

Important factor in world commerce 154 

Danger of German politics associated with commerce ] 54 

Appendixes 157 

A. German import trade 157 

B . Extracts from the President's addresses 177 

C. Pan-Germanism and Mitteleuropa 184 

D. The Leipzig Fair in war time 189 

E. Christmasin Berlin, 1917 191 

F. Interlocking of German banks and other corporations 194 

G. German methods in trade and industry described in official reports . 212 



LETTER OF SUBMITTAL. 



DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 

t BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, 

Washington, April 7, 1918. 
SIR: There is submitted herewith a report on German trade and 
the war, by Chauncey Depew Snow ^Assistant Chief of the Bureau 
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, and J. J. Krai, of the research 
division of the Bureau. This report takes up the question of the 
foreign trade of Germany where " German Foreign-Trade Organiza- 
tion," Miscellaneous Series No. 57, issued in 1917, left off. It dis- 
cusses industrial and commercial conditions in Germany since the 
outbreak of the war, covering the manufacturing industries, the 
supplies of raw materials, the development of substitute materials, 
labor, combination and syndication of industry, and present markets. 
It contains some information concerning transportation conditions, 
the railroads, rivers and canals, and ocean shipping. This report 
also touches briefly on some of the broader subjects of Germany's 
commercial aims in going to war, and aspirations and preparations 
for the period after the war. 

Whereas in the previous report, " German Foreign-Trade Organi- 
zation," detailed statistical and other information was given con- 
cerning the export trade, in the present report special attention is 
devoted to the subject of raw materials and the import trade. 

There are many topics here touched on which suggest the possibili- 
ties of future detailed treatment and very extensive research; for 
example, such topics as the effect of the war on the merchant ship- 
ping of Germany, and the extent of the loss to the German export 
trade by liquidation of German concerns in foreign countries. The 
facilities for such research and detailed treatment are not now avail- 
able. It is realized that some of the topics discussed are treated in 
a fragmentary fashion, and that the discussion of some topics, such 
as plans and preparations for the future, are little more than a re- 
production of the published views of some of the German economists 
and other men in public life. No apology is needed for the presenta- 
tion of the material in its present form. Mr. Snow and Mr. Krai 
have followed such important newspapers, periodicals, and books 
published in Germany and all the other European countries as have 
been available in the Department. The reports have been carefully 

9 



10 LETTER OF SUBMITTAL. 

sifted and checked one against another. American business men 
have shown an interest in the subject and this report is made to give 
them as comprehensive and suggestive a view as possible of actual 
conditions and ideas, plans, and preparations for the future in Ger- 
man industry, trade, and international commercial relations. 
Respectfully, 

B. S. CUTLER, 

Chief of Bureau. 
To Hon. WILLIAM C. REDFIELD, 

(Secretary of Commerce. 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 1 






I. GERMAN COMMERCIAL AIMS IN WAR POLICY. 

President Wilson, in his memorable speech before the annual con- 
vention of the American Federation of Labor at Buffalo, N. Y., on 
November 12, 1917, discussed the origin of the war and the German 
war aim of dominating the labor and industry of the world, 2 as 
follows : 

" You can explain most wars very simply, but the explanation of 
this is not so simple. Its roots run deep into all the obscure soils of 
history, and in my view this is the last decisive issue between the old 
principles of power and the new principles of freedom. 

"The war was started by Germany. Her authorities deny that 
they started it. But I am willing to let the statement I have just 
made await the verdict of history. And the thing that needs to be 
explained is why Germany started the war. Remember what the 
position of Germany in the world was as enviable a position as any 
nation has ever occupied. The whole world stood at admiration of 
her wonderful intellectual and material achievements, and all the 
intellectual men of the world went to school to her. 

" As a university man, I have been surrounded by men trained in 
Germany, men who had resorted to Germany because nowhere else 
could they get such thorough and searching training, particularly in 
the principles of science and the principles that underly modern ma-' 
terial achievements. 

" Her men of science had made her industries perhaps the most 
competent industries in the world, and the label ' Made in Germany ' 
was a guarantee of good workmanship and of sound material. She 
had access to all the markets of the world, and every other who 
traded in those markets feared Germany because of her effective and 
almost irresistible competition. 

"She had a place in the sun. Why was she not satisfied? What 
more did she want? There was nothing in the world of peace that 
she did not already have in abundance. 

" We boast of the extraordinary pace of American advancement. 
We show with pride the statistics of the increase of our industries 
and of the population of our cities. Well, those statistics did not 
match the recent statistics of Germany. 

" Her old cities took on youth, grew faster than any American city 
ever grew, her old industries opened their eyes and saw a new world 
and went out for its conquest, and yet the authorities of Germany 
were not satisfied. 

1 The series of 20 articles by Cyril Brown on " Present Economic Conditions in Ger- 
many," appearing in the New York World when the present publication went to press 
(Apr. 1, 1918), gives much information on the topics herein treated. 

2 See also Chapter XII, p. 153, Appendix B, p. 177, and Appendix C, p. 184. 



12 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

"You have one'parl of the answer to the question why she was not 
satisfied in her methods of competition. There is no important in- 
dustry in Germany upon which the Government has not l^id its hands 
to direct it and, when necessity arose, to control it. 

" You have only to ask any man whom you meet who is familiar 
with the conditions that prevailed before the war in the matter of 
international competition to find out the methods of competition which 
the German manufacturers and exporters used under the patronage 
and support of the Government of Germany. 

" You will find that they were the same sorts of competition that 
we have tried to prevent by law within our own borders. If they 
could not sell their goods cheaper than we could sell ours, at a profit 
to themselves, they could get a subsidy from the Government which 
made it possible to sell them cheaper anyhow, and the conditions of 
competition were thus controlled in large measure by the German 
Government itself. 

" But that did not satisfy the German Government. All the while there 
was lying behind its thought, in its dreams of the future, a political 
control which would enable it in the long run to dominate the labor and 
the industry of the world. They were not content with success by 
superior achievement ; they wanted success by authority. 

" I suppose very few of you have thought much about the Berlin- 
to-Bagdad railway. The Berlin-to-Bagdad railway was constructed 
in order to run the threat of force down the flank of the industrial 
undertakings of half a dozen other countries, so that, when German 
competition came in, it would not be resisted too far, because there 
was always the possibility of getting German armies into the heart 
of that country quicker than any other armies could be got there. 

"Look at the map of Europe now. Germany is thrusting upon us 
again and again the discussion of peace talks about w r hat? Talks 
about Belgium; talks about northern France; talks about Alsace- 
Lorraine. Well, those are deeply interesting subjects to us and to 
them, but they are not talking about the heart of the matter. 

" Take the map of Europe and look at it. Germany has absolute 
control of Austria-Hungary, practical control of the Balkan States, 
control of Turkey, control of Asia Minor. I saw a map in which 
the whole thing was printed in appropriate black the other day, and 
the black stretched all the way from Hamburg to Bagdad the 
bulk of German power inserted into the heart of the world. 

" If she can keep that, she has kept all that her dreams contem- 
plated when the war began. If she can keep that, her power can 
disturb the world so long as she keeps it, always provided for I feel 
bound to put this proviso in always provided the present influences 
that control the German Government continue to control it. 

" I believe that the spirit of freedom can get into the hearts of 
Germans and find as fine a welcome there as it can find in any other 
hearts. But the spirit of freedom does not suit the plans of the Pan- 
Germans. Power can not be used with concentrated force against 
free peoples if it is used by free people. 

" You may know how many intimations come to us from one of 
the central powers that it is more anxious for peace than the chief 
central power, and you know that it means that the people in that 
central power know that, if the war ends as it stands, they will in 
effect themselves be vassals of Germany, notwithstanding that their 



GERMAN COMMERCIAL AIMS IN WAR POLICY. 13 

populations are compounded of all the peoples of that part of the 
world, and notwithstanding the fact that they do not wish in their 
pride and proper spirit of nationality to be so absorbed and domi- 
nated. 

"Germany is determined that the political power of the world 
shall belong to her. There have been such ambitions before. They 
have been in part realized. But never before have those ambitions 
been based upon so exact and precise and scientific a plan of domina- 
tion." 

PLANS FOR COMMERCIAL EXPANSION. 

In 1913, as his contribution to a symposium of tributes to the 
Kaiser at the celebration commemorating "the peaceful and pros- 
perous reign of the present German Emperor" for the period 
1888-1913, Dr. Karl Heliferich, director of the Deutsche Bank, and 
later Vice Chancellor of the German Empire, presented a rosy pic- 
ture of Germany's economic progress and national wealth for the 
25-year period. Then, in time of peace, he stated the great problem 
of economic policy and commercial policy of Germany in its rela- 
tions with the rest of the world as follows: 

* " But however firmly our foreign commerce is based upon our 
home labor, it has proved equally important and necessary to create 
for it permanent and well-anchored supports beyond our frontiers. 
The limitation of German territory and the restrictions imposed by 
our climatic conditions, in connection with the growth of our popula- 
tion and its increasing and more refined requirements, compel us to 
import enormous quantities of raw materials, foodstuffs, and luxuries 
which we must pay for with our labor and particularly through the 
export of our manufactured goods. These circumstances raise the 
problem of guaranteeing, so far as possible, our supply of the neces- 
sary raw materials from abroad, as well as the marketing of our 
manufactured products in foreign countries. 

" That problem lies partly in the domain of our economic policy, 
particularly our commercial policy. 

" The problem is to combine the preservation and encouragement 
of our productive forces at home with securing the most favorable 
and constant conditions possible for our foreign trade, especially for 
marketing our manufactures and procuring the necessary raw 
products." 

This brief statement of what Germany had to have, what she 
actually had achieved to a surprising extent, by peaceful, if also, fre- 
quently, by questionable methods of procedure, is a partial statement 
of what Germany expected to get as a result of making war on her 
European neighbors. The completion of the 25-year period 1888- 
1913, celebrated in the latter year, marked the conclusion of " the 
peaceful and prosperous reign of the present German Emperor." 
The following year witnessed a change of tactics which followed the 
aspirations of the 25 years preceding, and openly began the colossal 
attempt at political domination of the world. 

FORCIBLE ANNEXATION ONE OF THE WAR AIMS. 

Dr. Helfferich mentioned " the limitation of German territory and 
the restrictions imposed by our climatic conditions, in connection 



14 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

with the growth of our population and its increasing and more re- 
fined requirements." This is a statement, in other words, of the great 
German war aim of the annexation of territory. Germany wanted, 
as far as possible, to draw those " enormous quantities of raw mate- 
rials, foodstuffs, and luxuries," so necessary for her " increasing and 
more refined requirements," from territory under the complete domi- 
nation of Germany itself. Germany wanted, in addition to "pro- 
curing the necessary products," to attend to the marketing of her 
manufactures, to as large an extent as possible, in German-controlled 
territory. She wanted to knock down territorial, political, and cus- 
toms barriers in all directions. Germany undoubtedly expected to 
accomplish these ends by annexations; she expected to' add territory 
possessing the desired wealth of raw materials and offering an ex- 
tended market for German manufactures. She expected to carry out 
the Berlin-Bagdad project at the expense of her friends and allies, 
as well as at the expense of her enemies. She expected to add greatly 
to her territory in western Europe by conquest of war. She expected 
to realize her dreams of a colonial empire. 

POSITION OF DICTATOR IN COMMERCE DESIRED. 

Germany, as Dr. Helfferich pointed out, appreciated the import- 
ance of " securing the most favorable and constant conditions possi- 
ble for our foreign trade." Germany did not forget, in going to war, 
the importance of commercial treaties. Germany expected confi- 
dently to be in a political position at the close of the war to enable 
her to exact commercial treaties making far more secure than ever 
before those desired " favorable and constant conditions " for for- 
eign trade. Germany had not counted on awakening the distrust 
and hostility of the entire world; she expected to be in a position 
immediately to enforce her demands upon the limited number of 
warring enemies against whom she expected the armed conflict to 
be confined. She had expected, by virtue of her victorious position 
in Europe and by unlimited propaganda efforts in neutral countries, 
to be able to negotiate commercial treaties which would guarantee 
well into the future foreign sources of supply and outlets for exports. 

Germany had, to be sure, certain other ambitious aims concern- 
ing which Herr Helfferich could not well advert in his tribute to the 
Kaiser, written in 1913. Germany confidently expected as a result 
of this war to get huge indemnities, which, like the great indemnity 
exacted from France in 1871, would pay the bill of war, and would 
likewise clear the way for uninterrupted, unparalleled strides, leaps, 
and bounds in industry and trade. Germany unquestionably 
counted on the crippling of the resources and competitive power of 
her chief European commercial competitors. 

FAILURE OF COMMERCIAL AIMS. 

The gigantic failure of these commercial aims of Germany in going 
to war is already apparent. President Wilson has stated the attitude 
of the United States on the subject of the aims of annexation and 
indemnity. England and France have most effectively demonstrated 
the mettle of their competitive power in industry, and resources. 
When Germany attempts to resume trade, it will be with at least 



GERMAN COMMERCIAL AIMS IN WAR POLICY. 15 

18 countries that have actually been in a state of war against her, 
and at least 9 that have severed diplomatic relations with her. 

The following list (complete to December, 1917), is a very tangi- 
ble indication of where German trade and economic penetration will 
no longer receive the same friendly welcome as before; Belgium, 
Japan, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, China. Cuba, France, Portugal, 
Great Britain (and the vast British Empire), Roumania, Greece, 
Italy, Liberia, Panama, Siam, Brazil, and the United States; and 
(severed diplomatic relations) Bolivia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guate- 
mala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay. 

Other nations, too, while not on terms of hostility to Germany, 
have benefited from the light of publicity which the war has thrown 
on German aims and methods. German commercial policy and Ger- 
man traders and investors will henceforth have to face Governments 
and commercial publics in every country of the world which are en- 
lightened as to the German way of " doing things. Commercial 
treaties with the advantages all on the German side will be hard to 
negotiate. It will be a rare country where Germany may dominate 
trade, industry, shipping, and finance without local realization and 
opposition. 

SECRETARY REDFIELD'S SUMMARIZATION OF FUTURE TRADE. 

Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield. addressing the South- 
ern Commercial Congress in New York, on October 16, 1917, summed 
up the matter as follows : 

" When peace shall come and her mercnants take up the task of 
restoring Germany's ruined commerce they will find that it is a 
strange world which they seek to reenter. There will be difficulties 
in the path of future peaceful penetration of which they seem not 
to dream. Commercial frightfulness, like its military namesake, 
will have passed away. It will hardly be said again to any Secretary 
of Commerce of the United States that the German Dyestuff Verein 
will not ' permit ' the establishment of an American dyestuff indus- 
try. The monopolies on which German foreign commerce in large 
part seemed to rest secure have passed away. Our friends beyond 
the sea and we ourselves have learned the danger of having our in- 
dustries wholly dependent on foreign sources of supply which may 
become unfriendly. It is pitiful to read extracts from the German 
press which seem to show that they expect to take up the task of 
rebuilding their commerce where they laid it down. They reckon 
the world's demand for potash as a purely German asset. It was 
so, but it is so no longer. They were the world's source for dvestuffs. 
That opportunity has gone. It was they to whom the world looked 
for optical glass. We make it to-day as well as they. They had 
applied science to industry more than any other people and had 
built up industrial power by means others had neglected. We have 
learned that lesson also, and in the countries represented here to-night 
science speaks to and through industry with an authority and success 
which we did not know, which we have been glad to learn, and which 
we shall not set aside. Any thoughtful review of the past will show 
us the nature and extent of German commercial procedure. She was 
at once a competitor and, in no small degree, the source of supply 
of those with whom she competed. The world seems as we look 



16 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

Uick to have been industrially asleep while with cunning skill she 
pushed alike into the markets in which we sold and into our centers 
of production so that often using materials ' made in Germany ' we 
had to compete in the world's markets with the products of German 
factories. We have awakened to these facts. We shall not lazily 
fall asleep again. 

" I need not tell you of the commercial value of what we call ' good 
will ' or point the advantage of doing business as ' a going concern.' 
The great markets of the world have been and are to be found among 
the nations who have parted company with Germany in the present 
struggle. Her past markets have been found among them. The 
peoples of these lands are not likely by one common impulse to turn 
quickly to Germany for a renewal of the commercial intercourse 
which was broken by her act. The threads of that intercourse have 
been cut. It is idle to speak, as some do, as if all that were necessary 
were to pick up those threads again and commence to weave anew 
the commercial fabric. It will not be easily done. The conditions 
are not the same. The business sundered by the war is not l a going 
concern.' It must be renewed under circumstances of peculiar hard- 
ship. 

" Controlling minds in Germany know perfectly well what sepa- 
ration from the world of commerce for over three years means. They 
had no intention it should be so long. They would hardly have ven- 
tured on the struggle had they dreamed it would be three years. 
A memorandum officially attached to the German nav^l bill of 1900 
said: 

"An unsuccessful naval war of the duration of even only a year would de- 
stroy Germany's sea trade and would thereby bring about the most disastrous 
conditions. * * * 

" The destruction of our sea trade during the war could not. even at the 
close of it, be made good within measurable time, and would thus add to the 
sacrifices of the war a serious economic depression. 

" There is little doubt that the writer spoke the truth." 



II. GERMAN ECONOMIC LIFE IN WAR TIME. 

LACK OF EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION. 

In Germany at the outset of the war, however smoothly mobiliza- 
tion and the other strictly military measures were carried out, there 
was a period, lasting more than six months, of wild confusion in the 
trade, industry, and economic life of the country. After this period, 
when thoughts of a short war and immediate victory had been dis- 
pelled, the economic life of the country began to take on a new r , pro- 
gressively restrictive, and distressing routine, which gradually be- 
came accepted as the normal life of the country in war time. 
The vaunted German governmental administrative efficiency cracked 
under the strain. The administrative measures adopted to meet the 
new conditions at many points proved theoretical and inadequate. 
Maximum prices, as enacted and administered, filled volumes, but the 
objects aimed at in enacting them were not accomplished. More 
clearly than ever before, Germany appeared as " a land of damned 
professors." The employment of a thousand additional clerks for 
13 months on vouchers to straighten out the accounts of the Govern- 
ment with itself on railw r ay shipments for one single month was an 
eloquent testimonial of German administrative inefficiency in time of 
stress. The Government's hesitation and change of policy on sugar 
was typical of the faltering handling of the food crisis well into the 
war period. 1 

Profiteering was notorious and Government attempts to stop it 
were indirect and inadequate. Even in the manufacture of clothing 
for military purposes, subsequent exposures show that contracts were 
given out to building contractors, butchers, carpet cleaners, and ma- 
chinery manufacturers simply on the basis of money bids, and with 
utter disregard of the responsibility, facilities, and capacity for de- 
livery 01 the bidders. These irresponsible, inexpert contractors 
sublet their contracts, farmed them out to exploiters of household 
industries, and did all other manner of manipulation as if public 
interest were disregarded on their part and without protection on the 
part of the Government. 

The tradition of German administrative efficiency has been such 
that in this country many have thought that in handling munitions 
the German system operated like clockwork. Such has not been the 
case. The German Government suffered from the clashing of mili- 
tary domination, both with industry and labor. In general the manu- 

*At the end of 1917 the Frankfurter Zeitung, exposing the widespread extent of trading 
in foodstuffs at ten times the official maximum prices, deplored the lack of firmness on the 
part of the Government and the failure to exercise control at the point of production. It 
was openly asserted in Germany that the apportionment of potatoes and certain other 
foods was based on forged harvest statistics showing less than half the actual yield. The 
Prussian War Bureau was also accused of promoting secret trading with disregard of 
maximum prices as part of the policy of favoring munitions workers over the general popu- 
lation. While profiteering continued, the munitions manufacturers bought at the prices 
asked by the dealers and distributed to their workpeople. 

43339 18 2 17 



18 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

facturers and the labor leaders have cooperated well with the Gov- 
ernment, but there has been constant bickering and controversy in 
both quarters. The labor unions, particularly, had to assert them- 
selves continuously and forcibly in an endeavor to protect the inter- 
ests of their members. In addition to trouble in handling the gen- 
eral manufacturing situation in the munitions plants and the diffi- 
culties of military domination in the case of other industries, the 
Government has had a pretty hard time in connection with mining 
and the railroads. Far from having a machine running smoothly, it 
appears that in handling the heavy burdens imposed on the mines and 
on the railroads the German Government has repeatedly bungled. 
The British have every reason to compliment themselves on their 
administrative handling of the munitions, mining, and transportation 
problems of the war in contrast with the German handling of similar 
problems. 

The military authorities became more and more autocratic in their 
contact with industry and labor. Germany is divided into military 
districts (Armeekorps Bezirke), and the arbitrary administration of 
the military authorities, without regard to the rights and urgent 
needs of the individual industrial establishments: and of the laborers 
in them, was notorious. The manufacturers in the different districts 
became accustomed to have the commanding generals announce prices 
for their output, always with a specified penalty of imprisonment and 
fines for any breach of the orders issued. 

Reports have been published of complaints on the part of the Ber- 
lin Chamber of Commerce that hundreds of cases of compulsory con- 
centration were brought about by the district military commanders, 
without consulting the chambers of commerce or other such bodies. 
In order to economize in coal, transportation, raw materials, and 
labor, the military commanders have closed factories, ordered the fac- 
tory owners to release to other factories such workmen, supplies, and 
equipment as necessary, receiving a guaranty of a share of the profits 
in such concerns as are left going. The compulsory syndicates 
(Zwangs-Syndikate) have had to eliminate the middlemen and sell 
direct to the retailers. Loss in good will and depreciation necessarily 
ensue. Considerable hardship on the working people also results. 
In some cases notably in the case of the glass factories the com- 
pulsory syndication has brought about the closing of all the factories 
in certain industries in certain x ,owns, and th- working people have 
of necessity had to go elsewhere for employment. The shifting of 
the labor supply is very largely restricted by military orders. 

OBSCURITY OF INTERNAL POLICIES. 

One outstanding feature of the economic life of the war period in 
Germany is the paucity of the authoritative statements of policy on 
the part of the Government. The German professors are discussing 
every phase of the economic problems of the war period, as well as 
the period after the war. There is a continuous stream of articles, 
pamphlets, and dissertations on every topic in the fields of economics 
and governmental policy. There is even more conspicuous a lack 
of clear-cut, official announcements of policy on activities in war time 
than on the actual war aims of the German Government. The range 
of suggestions by the German intellectuals and theoreticians is some- 



GERMAN ECONOMIC LIFE IN WAR TIME. 19 

what staggering. The hesitation of the Government and the ob- 
scurity of what the Government stands for have been apparent, with 
all due allowance for the news censorship. 

In some of the following chapters plans and projects are set forth 
as expounded by prominent German writers and economists. What 
will actually be done remains for future settlement. The ideas and 
projects that are actually under discussion are given simply as such 
for what they may be worth. 

MEASURES OF ECONOMIC DEFENSE. 

The campaign for the subjugation of Europe was begun in the 
confident expectation that it would require but a few weeks, or a few 
months at the most. The people of the central Empires were led to 
believe that the German armies would overwhelm the enemy, and 
that a peace congress would assembly in November of 1914 at the 
latest. Their armies thrown back at the Marne, the people of the 
central Empires were disappointed. The campaign in neutral Bel- 
gium, as well as in Serbia, and the ruthless, wanton, repeated hostile 
acts against neutrals in general on the part of Germany challenged 
the world, and the Teuton, allied with the Magyar, the Bulgar, and 
the Turk, soon had to face the enmity of four-fifths of mankind. 

As the war progressed it became strikingly apparent that while 
the German army and German finance were well prepared for 
attack, economic Germany was not prepared for defense. When 
the allied blockade had reduced the central Empires to the conditions 
and privations of a besieged fortress, the economic life of Germany 
had to undergo far-reaching changes. The available supplies of 
foodstuffs and raw materials had to be conserved, new materials 
and substitutes had to be found, and the industries had to adjust 
themselves to the requirements of war, as war had again become the 
chief occupation of the Teuton. As the Allies destroyed the German 
illusion of a short and victorious war, Germany was able, despite 
administrative bungling, to demonstrate the fallacy of popular 
views in foreign countries that Germany would promptly collapse 
economically upon being isolated. 

On August 4, 1914, the Imperial Parliament passed a series of 
laws giving the Government ample power to deal with the exigencies 
of war. One of these laws authorized the Federal Council to pre- 
scribe maximum prices for articles of prime necessity, particularly 
for foods and fodder, raw materials for the industries, fuel, and 
lighting materials. In case the owner refused to sell, the Govern- 
ment was authorized to seize the goods and sell them for his ac- 
count. The administrative details were intrusted to the States. 
Under this law maximum prices were fixed, before the end of 1914, 
for wheat, barley, oats, rye, beans, potatoes, and potato spirit; for 
copper, nickel, aluminum, antimony, and tin. and their alloys, 
whether crude or manufactured; for sulphate of ammonia, and for 
wool and woolen goods. The decrees fixing maximum prices have 
since been successively revised and enlarged to include a vast number 
of products. Arbitrary prices have been prescribed even for articles 
comparatively unimportant, such as substitutes for tea, for example. 
An official publication, " Hoechstpreise," issued in 1917 at Berlin, 



20 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

giving an alphabetical list of articles for which maximum or other 
prices have been established, is a stout quarto volume of 148 pages. 

Under the provisions of another law, import duties on foodstuffs 
and mineral oils have been suspended or reduced. 

The decrees, rules, and regulations have been issued chiefly under 
the law authorizing the Federal Council, for the period of the war, 
u to adopt any legal measures which may become necessary as a safe- 
guard against economic damage." By July 1, 1916, the number of 
war laws and decrees issued had reached 1,932. Of first importance 
were the production and economic utilization of foods and the manu- 
facture of war materials. Maximum prices for grain failed of their 
object, as the dealers found a way of increasing the prices indirectly 
by making high charges for containers and delivery, office, and other 
expenditures. By a decree of January 25, 1915, all supplies of bread 
cereals throughout the Empire were expropriated, and the consump- 
tion of bread per head per week was definitely limited. Another de- 
cree of the same date required all communes with populations exceed- 
ing 5,000 to accumulate supplies of preserved meat ; all pigs were to 
be expropriated for that purpose. By a decree of June 28, 1915, 
an embargo was laid upon all bread grain reaped in the harvest of 
the year 1915. 

A central authority, called the War Grain Co. (Kriegsgetreide- 
Gesellschaft), was created to control, through the communal au- 
thorities, the distribution and consumption of breadstuffs; grain 
thus became a Government monopoly. The monopoly was estab- 
lished against the determined opposition of the grain dealers, who 
argued that freedom of the grain trade, with the resulting high 
prices, would automatically prevent waste by limiting consumption. 
By a decree of August 26, 1915, the sugar trade was regulated. The 
consumption of milk was restricted by a decree of October 22 ; con- 
sumption of meats and fats, by a decree of October 28, 1915. Prices 
of fish were regulated by a decree of December 5, 1915. In 1916 
decrees were issued forbidding the employment of vegetable and 
animal oils and fats for technical purposes; regulating the prices of 
sugar and sugar beets for the 1916-17 campaign ; conserving supplies 
of meat and a number of other foods. The control of foodstuffs was 
centralized in a war food bureau, established May 22, 1916, begin- 
ning with a staff of 200 officials, and nearly all foodstuffs were ra- 
tioned and made obtainable only on a card. Bread, meat, potatoes, 
sugar, butter, margarine, eggs, milk, soap, soap powder, semolina, 
groats, and pastry are obtained on cards only. 

The extent to which the rationing of foodstuffs and other neces- 
saries has been carried is illustrated in a sadly humorous recipe for 
a Sunday dinner, published in the Chemnitz Volksstirnme of Sep- 
tember 15, 1917. " Take the meat card." says the paper, " mix it well 
with the egg card and bake it with the butter card until a healthy 
brown crust appears. The potato card and the vegetable card should 
be steamed until they are tender, and then thickened with the meal 
card. After-dinner coffee is prepared by boiling the coffee card and 
adding the sugar and milk cards to the beverage. A very succulent 
confection is obtained by dipping the bread card into the coffee so 
prepared and partaking of it in small pieces. At the conclusion of 
the repast you wash your hands with the soap card and dry them 
upon the cloth purchase permit," 



GERMAN ECONOMIC LIFE IN WAR TIME. 21 

Five days after the declaration of war on Germany by the United 
Kingdom, Dr. Walther Rathenau, president of the Allgemeine 
Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, presented to Minister of War Falkenhayn 
a plan to safeguard -stocks of raw materials 1 for the army. On Au- 
gust 13, 1914. a special division for war materials (Kriegsrohstoffab- 
teihmg) was created in the War Ministry, with Dr. Rathenau as its 
first chief and a military man as first assistant. The new bureau was 
charged with the duty of obtaining the raw materials necessary for 
the conduct of the war. Thirty-six auxiliary bodies (Kriegsroh- 
stoff-Gesellschaften) were organized, and men prominent in science, 
industry, and trade were selected as advisers or directors of provin- 
cial organizations (Teilverbande). In a few months the new bureau 
developed into the greatest commercial enterprise known to history, 
the turnover of the hundreds of its warehouses reaching into the bil- 
lions. A census was taken of supplies available at home or gathered 
in the occupied territory of Belgium and northern France and neces- 
sary materials commandeered. The "military authorities were gen- 
erally more in evidence than the civilian officials. The war industries 
were thus assured an immediate regular supply of raw materials. 
The industries working for civilian needs suffered, as only limited 
quantities of textiles, metals, leather, and other materials were as- 
signed to them. 

INDUSTRIAL CHANGES TO WAR FOOTING. 

When the war broke out, the German industries were just recov- 
ering from the depression which had followed the period of pros- 
perity culminating in 1912. The great electrical and chemical in- 
dustries were enjoying continued prosperity, but the iron industry 
was suffering from overproduction; the textile industries were com- 
plaining more and more of foreign competition and the rise in the 
prices of raw materials ; and the building trades, always sensitive to 
economic changes, were extremely depressed. The war intensified 
the difficulties of the industrial situation. Large numbers of skilled 
workers had been called to the colors. The foreign sources of sup- 
ply of many important raw materials, as well as the over-sea markets 
for German manufactures, had been closed by the war. Substitutes 
had to be invented to take the place of raw materials formerly im- 
ported, and the industries had to adapt themselves to new conditions. 

The transformation of the implements of peace into engines of 
war was accomplished in a short time, however, and the loss of for- 
eign customers was compensated, for some industries at least, by the 
enormous war orders. Electrical works began to manufacture muni- 
tions; the manufacture of sewing machines and typewriters was 
abandoned for the production of small arms and grenades; boiler 
factories undertook the manufacture of field kitchens, and so on. The 
war industries prospered, while the exporting industries suffered 
heavily. The decline of the total industrial production in the first 
year of the war was estimated in the report of the Dresdner Bank at 
about one-fourth to one-third of the total normal output, In the 
second and third years of the war large numbers of women and 
prisoners of war took the places of the workers serving at the front; 

1 See footnote on p. 64. 



22 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAB. 

the profits of the war industries increased rapidly, while many mills, 
depending on foreign markets for their imports or exports, had to be 
closed. The necessity of husbanding the resources of the Empire led 
to the formation of many new syndicates, industrial and trade com-, 
binations, some being organized voluntarily and others by Govern- 
ment compulsion. 

CIVIC AND INDUSTRIAL TRUCE. 

Soon after the outbreak of the war a civic truce Burgfriede 
was proclaimed in politics and in the industries. The several polit- 
ical parties agreed to give up all political strife for the duration of 
the war. The relative strength of the parties in the Reichstag was to 
remain unchanged, and if a seat became vacant by the death or res- 
ignation of a representative, the candidate of that representative's 
party was to have a free field in the special election, unopposed by 
other parties. Questions of a strictly partisan character were not 
to be discussed, their consideration being postponed until after the 
war. 

Far more important for the economic life of Germany was the 
industrial truce. Employers and employees in numerous branches 
of industry agreed to work together for a common purpose the vic- 
tory of the German saber. The wage agreements concluded before 
the war were to remain in force, and the principles expressed therein 
were to govern in future negotiations. The cooperation of labor 
organizations with the employers made possible a regulation of 
employment and a distribution of labor so that the numbers of the 
unemployed were reduced rapidly. The truce did not include either 
agriculture or trade, however, and the labor organizations com- 
plained bitterly of the profiteers seeking to amass wealth and riches 
from the sufferings of the workers. In a review of the year 1915 
the Correspondenzblatt of January 1, 1916, remarks indignantly: 
" If the German workingmen had even for a moment thought of 
resorting, in the sale of their precious labor power, to such extortion 
as we have seen practiced in the food market, the glorious German 
Empire would have broken down miserably." But the 'Government 
continued to encourage high prices, hoping thereby to stimulate pro- 
duction. 

CURRENCY INFLATION AND FALL IN EXCHANGE. 

The upward trend of prices, due primarily to scarcity of products, 
and supported by the Government policy, was reenforced by specula- 
tion and currency inflation. Although the Imperial Bank increased 
its gold holdings from 1,170 million marks at the end of 1913 to 
2,405 millions by December 31, 1917, the amount of its notes in cir- 
culation increased more than fourfold in the same period, rising from 
2,593 to 11,468 million marks. In addition, between six and seven 
billion marks of loan-bank notes were in circulation. Exports de- 
clined to a minimum ; payment for imports from the neutral countries 
could not be made by merchandise, and exchange continued falling. 1 
In Stockholm the mark was quoted at a discount of 1.7 per cent at 
the end of 1914. The discount increased to 21.9 per cent at the end 

1 See also " Regulation of foreign exchange," pp. 110-112. 



GEfcMAN ECONOMIC LIFE IN WAfl TIME. 23 

of 1915, 35.9 in December, 1916, and 48.8 in July, 1917. In Switzer- 
land during the month of August of the last four years, 1914-1917, 
the mark was quoted at an average discount of 1.9, 11.9, 24.1, and 
36.3 per cent, respectively. The rates at which the mark was quoted 
in the neutral countries on November 8, 1917, showed the following 
decline in the exchange value of the mark : Amsterdam, 46 per cent ; 
Switzerland, 50; Christiania, 53.9; Denmark, 55.6; Stockholm, 62.9 
per cent. The situation improved in December; on January 2, 1918, 
the mark was quoted at discounts varying from 20 to 35 per cent. 
During January, 1918, the mark again declined somewhat, and at the 
end of the month was quoted at discounts varying between 29 and 
37.6 per cent. 

In Germany the decline of mark exchange was attributed, in part, 
to the financial policy of the Government. During the first three 
years of the war Germany was paying both the cost of the war and 
interest on the public debt from the proceeds of loans, and this, 
it is averred, made the neutrals distrust Germany's ability to meet 
its financial obligations in the future. 

TRADE IN WAR TIME. 

Although, as pointed out, many of the industries have succeeded 
in a large measure in adapting themselves to the new conditions, 
trade in Germany has found no opportunity for readjustment, and 
the merchant has suffered much more than the manufacturer. The 
former, as a class distinct from the producer, could be dispensed 
with, whereas the latter had indispensable work to perform for war 
needs. The Imperial Government and the State of Prussia are now 
the largest purchasers of goods, and they buy directly from associa- 
tions of producers, the middlemen having been eliminated in most 
cases ; many of them are walking the streets. The men who are sell- 
ing syndicated products are not merchants; they are officials or em- 
ployees of the producers, and protests have been made against their 
claiming membership on various boards as " representatives of the 
trade." 

When the war broke out, the German ships were driven off the 
seas, traffic with over-sea countries became difficult ; it was made im- 
possible later on by the allied blockade. Trade with neutral coun- 
tries was affected by numerous prohibitions against exportation is- 
sued both in Germany and in the neutral countries. Letters, news- 
papers, or other information from abroad could not be obtained 
currently, and thus a survey of market conditions became impos- 
sible. Domestic trade suffered when the public suddenly developed 
the practice of extreme thrift, some because their income had been 
reduced, others because the war had made them apprehensive and 
nervous. Trade also suffered from the irregularities of the trans- 
portation services, as all traffic would cease at times when large 
movements of troops were to be undertaken. The war, on the other 
hand, created an enormous demand for all goods serving directly 
or indirectly the purposes of warfare. The dealers in articles of 
luxury lost most of their customers, while the war trades prospered. 
Professional men saw their incomes dwindling. Raw materials and 
wares formerly imported on a large scale became scarce, and their 
prices rose, while the warehouses were filled with articles intended 



24 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

for exportation which could not be sold until later. Many firms 
suffered from their inability to collect claims due them from for- 
eign customers. As the war proceeded, and the prospects of victory 
diminished, the Government gradually extended its control over 
both industry and trade. 

Trade with neutral countries increased considerably for a time, 
as they offered the only available medium for trade with foreign 
countries. This trade was gradually restricted and cut off both by 
the allied blockade and the growing needs of the neutrals themselves. 
Germany continued as a buyer of foodstuffs and raw materials ; the 
neighboring neutrals required coal, iron wares, chemicals, and fer- 
tilizers from Germany in exchange. Domestic trade in Germany is 
largely war trade, and the war expenditures are constantly increas- 
ing. The industrial magnates who have reconstructed their plants 
for the production of war materials have not been actuated solely by 
patriotic motives; they expect profits, and the Government pays well. 

Experience has shown that the decrees establishing maximum 
prices were often followed by a disappearance of the goods from 
the market. A private purchaser may wait until the market condi- 
tions are more favorable, but the war administration must have the 
foods regardless of cost. Hence the Government has willingly paid 
igher prices as an inducement to producers. "The Army pays 
the highest prices, whether it is buying cattle or munitions," says 
Dr. Stillich. In this way an enormous sum of money has made its 
way into trade, and a state of things outwardly resembling a boom 
in peace time has been produced; employment is good, turnover 
lively, prices high, profits great. This is the state of things which 
Steinmann-Bucher in a pamphlet has described as follows : " There 
has come about an absolute war trade boom, during which the State 
and individuals do not merely pay their way, but actually thrive, and 
even do splendid business." Dr. Stillich (in the Europaische Staats- 
und Wirtschaftszeitung) answers: "This is a fallacy; a war trade 
boom is a mirage," for during a peace trade boom both the in- 
dividual and the national wealth increase, while at present, in spite 
of all the billions, the national wealth continuously declines. 

CIRCULATION OF MONEY IN TRADE. 

According to Dr. Helfferich (" Deutschlands Volkswohlstand ") , 
the aggregate amount of all savings of the German people deposited 
in commercial banks and in savings institutions, and not permanently 
invested, was about 30 billion marks before the war. The subscrip- 
tions to the first three war loans were aproximately 25J billion. 
Since about 5 billion were needed for current payments and unfore- 
seen expenditures, it will be seen that the liquid capital represented 
by past savings was exhausted by the subscriptions to the first three 
war loans, and that the amounts subscribed to the following loans 
have been taken from savings made during the war. The amount of 
annual savings available for investments prior to the war was esti- 
mated by Helfferich at about 4J billion marks. 

The statements of banks and savings institutions show that the 
deposits have increased considerably during the war. The annual 
increase of savings banks deposits prior to the war was about 700 



GERMAN ECONOMIC LIFE IN WAR TIME. 25 

million marks; in 1916 it exceeded 3 billion. "This may appear 
strange, but is true, nevertheless," says Dr. Alfred Ammon in the 
Europaische Staats- und Wirtschaftszeitung. It can be easily ex- 
plained by the circulation of money. The Government receives the 
money in the form of loans and pays it out for salaries, for the pur- 
chases of raw materials copper, tin, rubber, hides, wool, cotton 
and manufactured articles clothing, shoes, cars, guns, ammunition 
and for food, horses, etc. The money gradually reaches the ultimate 
producers, principally landowners, and flows as savings into the 
strong boxes of private establishments or the safes of banks and. 
savings institutions, to be invested in new war loans, and its circu- 
lation begins anew. 

Theoretically, nothing can be lost of the billions in circulation. 
In practice, however, a certain deduction must be made; as the 
prices are increasing, larger sums are needed than in times of peace, 
and a part of the money received must be retained for private pay- 
ments and is not available for war-loan purposes. Reckoning that 
sum at 5 billion marks, it will be seen that out of the 25 billions 
originally brought into circulation only about 20 billions were left 
for future war loans. Supposing that the turnover period of the 
20 billions is one year (it is now much shorter) and that two loans 
are to be made in a year, there will be 10 billion marks available for 
each loan, and the circulation can go on indefinitely. 

Money is important for the conduct of the war, but it is not of 
decisive importance. Commodities are much more important 
clothing, footwear, ammunition, automobiles, cars, cement, wire, 
horses, drugs, etc. Most of these materials and products are lost, 
and the loss represents part of the true cost of the war. Money is 
plentiful; the various kinds of paper in circulation on December 31, 
1917, totaled about 18,246 million marks, and the supply can be 
increased, as long as paper is available and the printing presses are 
working. 

Dr. Ammon proceeds on the theory that all the money received on 
loan subscriptions is spent in Germany. It has been estimated, 
however, that only about 90 per cent of the total is spent at home, 
the remainder going to neutral and (German) allied countries for 
food, horses, steel, silk, and other articles. The war trade boom is 
real, nevertheless, and if Germany could make peace and leave the 
rest of the world at war the German war industries would make 
enormous profits. Trade in articles of peace, however, is not boom- 
ing; it suffers from scarcity of products and has been characterized 
by the ominous word " Warenhunger," hunger for merchandise. 
The rich may buy wine, silks, or jewelry; they may make excur- 
sions by train, though that is discouraged by the Government, or have 
their pictures taken again and again. But it is impossible lawfully 
to obtain food exceeding the legal ration, or a substantial suit of 
clothes; illicit trade and stealing have become common. In some 
parts of the country the people have reverted to the primitive method 
of barter, the farmers selling produce in exchange for industrial 
products. This may likewise be due partly to distrust of paper 
money ; the Government has been compelled to take notice and issue 
strict regulations concerning barter. 



26 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

THE DESIRE FOR PEACE. 

The effects of the blockade and isolation of Germany have been 
more appreciable as the blockade has tightened, with no general 
relief from the pillaging of captured territory. On the other hand, 
Germany is not threatened with immediate or complete famine. But 
the enforced economy, undernourishment, inadequate shelter, lack 
of fuel, clothing, and shoes, and the sufferings by the war, have made 
the people restive, and the longing for the return of peace is general. 
There have been isolated riots and more or less general strikes 
and demonstrations early in 1918, but nothing suggesting organized 
revolution. The German people made their last attempt at revolu- 
tion in 1848, in what Dr. Lamprecht described as the " friendliest " 
revolution ever seen. 

It is pointed out by the Kommunist, the organ of the Russian 
socialists, that the social-democratic party of Germany has never been 
a revolutionary party. It has striven to improve the conditions of 
labor by peaceful and lawful means, preferring compromises to 
strikes, and discipline to action by the masses. There is no doubt 
that the governing classes want the return of peace as much as the 
masses ; they continue, however, to impress on all the people the need 
for world domination as a condition of peace. 

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION. 

The bureaucracy and the military autocracy of Germany are hav- 
ing ample difficulties in endeavoring to meet the military and eco- 
nomic crisis of the war itself; the business men are having a hard 
time, not only financially and in the matters of coal shortage, trans- 
portation difficulties, and shortage of materials generally, but like- 
wise with the bureaucratic and military authorities and with labor; 
the professors and other intellectuals are having an unlimited field 
for endless theorizing on the economic past, present, and future ; the 
great mass of the people are suffering physical and mental distress 
from the ever-increasing military burdens and economic hardships. 
In general, all classes have continued to devote all their energy to the 
work in hand; otherwise, the resources of the country could not have 
withstood the economic strain of years of enforced self-sufficiency. 



in. GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE IN WAR TIME. 
LOSSES IN OVER-SEA TRADE. 

Official statistics of German foreign trade end with June 30, 1914. 
For strategic reasons no data have been published during the war. 
Similarly no official data have been published by any of the allies of 
Germany. In 1913 the foreign trade of Germany totaled $4,966,- 
665,000, only 12 per cent of which was with the present allies of the 
Empire. Germany is still (February, 1918) receiving brown coal 
and foodstuff's from Austria-Hungary, principally from Bohemia; 
Bohemian schools have been closed for lack of fuel, while some six 
million tons of brown coal have been shipped annually to Germany. 
Carloads of eggs, poultry, and other foodstuffs are regularly sent to 
Germany. According to a report of the Weser Zeitung, arms, muni- 
tions, equipment, and medical supplies are being furnished to 
Turkey and Bulgaria by the Prussian War Office, and private firms 
are occasionally permitted to make contracts with the Turkish War 
Office for direct delivery of materials during or after the war. There 
are no data available on which an estimate of the total volume of the 
trade between Germany and her allies can be based. 

Trading with the enemy countries ceased on the declaration of war, 
and trade with neutral over-sea countries was stopped by the block- 
ade. The effects of the blockade are shown in the trade reports of 
these countries. Our own trade with Germany, imports and exports 
combined, amounted to $534,713,000 during the fiscal year ended 
June 30, 1914. It decreased to $120,236,000 in the fiscal year 1915, to 
$14,235,000 in 1916, to $3,724,000 in 1917, and has now ceased alto- 
gether. During the fiscal year 1915 the United States exported 
283,952 bales of cotton and 22,254,000 pounds of copper to Germany, 
but no copper or cotton has since been shipped to Germany. 

Germany's trade with Argentina, amounting to $124,705,000 in 
1913, declined to $68,252,000 in 1914, and has practically ceased since, 
although the Argentine statistics record imports of $5,455,000 in 1915, 
and $338,000 in 1916. 

The trade with Brazil declined from $101,572,000 in 1913 to $50,- 
394,000 in 1914. In 1915 Brazilian imports of German goods were 
valued at $2,260,000; in 1916 at $86,000. There were no exports dur- 
ing the latter two years. 

The statistics of Chile show trade with Germany of $60,351,000 in 
1913, S43,968,000 in 1914, and imports of $3,584,000 in 1915. 

Germany's foreign trade is now confined to the countries of central 
Europe: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and the five neu- 
tral countries of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden. German exports to neutral countries have been largely 
iron wares, coal, machinery, and glass; reports from some neutral 
markets have indicated that small quantities of artificial silk and of 
inferior mineral lubricants found their way out of Germany in 1917. 

27 



28 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

In 1913 the five neutral countries mentioned supplied 9.7 per cent of 
the German imports, and took 18.8 per cent of the German exports, 
their share of the total German foreign trade amounting to 14 per 
cent. The trade is no\v much smaller in quantity, but still consider- 
able in value, due to the high prices prevailing. 

Germany's foreign trade to-day is almost entirely restricted, in the 
matter of exports, to articles of luxury and articles of high value 
which serve no useful war purpose within the country but the sale of 
which will bring money into the country and help out in the exchange 
difficulties; further, exports of articles considered indispensable by 
the neighboring neutrals coal and iron wares, for example which 
are the only form of payment acceptable to these neutrals for the 
goods which Germany must get from them ; such shipments are made 
in jealously guarded quantities, usually determined by international 
agreements. In the matter of imports, present trade is confined to 
essential articles food and needed industrial supplies which the 
German Government is of course anxious to get wherever and when- 
ever and however available. 

The scarcity of foodstuffs and other important articles and the 
high prices prevailing led to extensive smuggling. Whole carloads 
of foodstuffs and other wares are reported to have been smuggled into 
Germany from neighboring neutral countries in violation of the 
laws of those countries. In some parts of the country the smugglers 
earned the thanks of the community by providing additional supplies 
of foodstuffs; in some instances the smuggling was for illicit trading 
and profiteering in Germany. 

TRADE WITH THE NETHERLANDS. 

In the general trade of the Netherlands with Germany, imports 
from Germany declined from 21,505,000 metric tons in 1914 to 10,- 
103,000 tons in 1915, and exports to Germany from 15,204,000 to 
5,090,000 tons. Owing to the Dutch method of valuation, a compari- 
son of values can not be made. The trade reports for 1916 and 1917 
show principal articles only. It appears that in 1916 the balance of 
trade was in favor of the Netherlands, and complaints have been made 
that the holdings of German paper in the country are too large. The 
principal articles exported to Germany in 1916 were foodstuffs but- 
ter, cheese, coffee, fish, potato flour, eggs, meats, and fruits. The 
principal imports from Germany were iron and machinery, coal, lum- 
ber, paper, cement. 

During the first half of 1917, Dutch exports of the principal arti- 
cles to Germany totaled $41,040,000 in value. Foodstuffs, tobacco, 
and flax represented the bulk of the exports, the chief items being 
cheese, $8,603,000; butter, $7,880,000; eggs, $6,088,000; tobacco, 
$5,422,000; pork and bacon, $3,327,000; fish, $2,436,000; flax, $1,773,- 
000. Other important articles of export were potato flour, mar- 
garine, fresh fruits, Peruvian bark, coffee, and linseed. Principal 
articles imported from Germany were coal, lignite, and briquets, 
$9,286,000; iron and manufactures of iron (incomplete data), 
$4,733,000; machinery and implements, $3,773,000; paper, $1.998,- 
000; lumber, $1,008,000; glass and glassware, $825,000. During the 
first quarter of 1917 the Netherlands sent almost twice as much to 
Germany as it received, but in the second quarter the imports from 
Germany almost balanced the exports. 



GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE IN WAR TIME. 29 

TRADE WITH SWITZERLAND. 

Switzerland's imports for consumption of German goods de- 
clined from $121,758,000 in 1913 to $92,848,000 in 1914 and $80,719,000 
in 1915, but rose to $91,158,000 in 1916. Exports of Swiss goods to 
Germany declined from $58,992,000 in 1913 to $52,977,000 in 1914, but 
increased to $88.262,000 in 1915 and $136,756,000 in 1916. At the 
same time the reexports of foreign merchandise to Germany increased 
from $1,563,000 in 1914 to $13,193,000 in 1915 and $27",661,000 in 
1916. The chief articles reexported in 1915 were cotton, breadstuff s, 
fruits, wines, and chemicals. In 1916 the chief reexports were fruits 
and vegetables, silk, wines and liquors, chemicals, and fats. 

In 1916 Switzerland's chief imports from Germany were coal and 
coke, iron and steel products, machinery, sugar, chemicals, books, 
and potatoes. Gold coin to the amount of $11,734,000 was received 
from Germany, as against $2,421, 000^ in 1915. Exports to Germany 
included the following principal articles : Silk and silk fabrics, $44,- 
320,000 (an increase of $22,741,000 over 1915) ; cotton fabrics, $19,- 
618,000 (an increase of $3,662,000) ; meat and dairy products, $11,- 
804,000 (an increase of $6,798,000) ; live animals (chiefly cows and 
heifers), $11,190,000 (an increase of $10,872,000) ; aluminum, $7,706,- 
000; watches and clocks. $5,682,000; wines and liquors, $3,341,000; 
machinery, $3,336,000: chocolate, $2,734,000; calcium carbide, $2,713,- 
000; ferrosilicon, ferrochrome, $2,208,000; bread, $1,213.000. 

The principal imports from Germany during the first half of 
1917 were coal and iron products. Switzerland imported 1,053,602 
tons of coal, coke, and briquets, valued at $11,829,000. Coal is im- 
ported under a special agreement with Germany. Some of the iron 
products imported have been pig iron and steel, 25,136 tons valued 
at $1,337,000; round iron, hammered or hot rolled, $1,691,000; blocks 
and blooms, $870,000; sheet iron and sheet steel', $1,766,000; pipes 
and tubes, $792,000; iron of special shapes, $1,138,000; machinery, 
$1,963.000. Other important articles were aluminum and chrome 
ores, $1,062,000; coal-tar derivatives and dyes, $757,000; glass and 
glassware, $947,000 ; leather (chiefly calf) , $1,000,000 ; books, $678,000 ; 
copper- (pigs, bars, sheet, wire, tubes), $789,000; zinc, $508,000. 

Silk was the leading article exported to Germany, where, it seems, 
silk is used as a substitute for cctton. The exports of organzine and 
tram silk alone were valued at $22.296,000 ; the total value of silk and 
silk fabrics exported was $33,954,000. Other important items of ex- 
ports were cotton fabrics, $9,598,000; aluminum, $3,619,000; ma- 
chinery (chiefly machine tools), $3.289,000; wine and liquors, 
$2,616,000; cheese. $2,279,000; watches and clocks, $1,657,000; choco- 
late. $1,440,000; cattle, $1,287,000; knitted goods, $1,209,000; cal- 
cium carbide, $1,152,000; meats, $1,058,000; automobiles, $807,000; 
condensed milk, $614,000 ; hides and skins, $587,000. 

TRADE WITH SCANDINAVIA. 

Denmark's imports from Germany decreased from $87,987,000 in 

1913 to $70,927,000 in 1914, while the exports to Germany increased 
from $47,890,000 to $80,782,000. The principal articles exported in 

1914 were live animals, $42,939,000; meat products, $6,567.000; dairy 
products, $6,378,000. Principal imports were iron and steel manii- 



30 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

factures, textile fabric, grain, chemicals, and sugar. Reports for 
later years have not been received. 

Norway's trade with Germany increased 43 per cent during the 
years 1913-1915, rising from $65,202,000 in 1913 to $93,246,000 in 
1915. Imports from Germany were valued at $47,185,000 in 1913, 
$40,547,000 in 1914, and $41.598.000 in 1915. Exports to Germany 
were $18,017.000 in 1913, $20,413,000 in 1914, and $51,648,000 in 1915. 
The principal classes of articles exported to Germany in 1915 were 
foodstuffs of animal origin (chiefly fish), valued at $20,197,000; oils 
(chiefly train oil), $14,316,000; raw metals, including 10,510 metric 
tons of pig iron and 1,445 tons of copper, total value $6,239,000; 
manufactures of minerals, including 19,837 tons of calcium carbide 
and 19,034 tons of Norway saltpeter, total value $4,351,000; and raw 
minerals, including 82,026 tons of iron ore, 41,109 tons of iron ore 
briquets, and 210,453 tons of pyrites, total value $3,542,000. The 
principal classes of articles imported from Germany in 1915 were 
metals, raw and semimanufactured, including 41,441 tons of bar and 
hoop iron, 43,841 tons of iron sheets arid plates, and 22,182 tons of 
zinc, total value $8,312,000; manufactures of iron and other metals, 
$7,535,000; textile fabrics, $6,381,000; machinery, ships, land vehicles, 
$4,938,000; sugar, 42,824 tons, valued at $4,371,000. Data for 1916 
are not available at the present writing. 

Sweden's trade with Germany in 1914 showed but a slight reduc- 
tion as compared with 1913. Imports decreased from $77,693,000 to 
$63,931,000, while exports declined but one million dollars, decreas- 
ing from $47,993,000 to $46,854,000. The loss in the exports of 
numerous articles had been made up by increased exports of war 
materials. The exports of copper, unwrought and scrap, increased 
from $776,000 to $2,018,000; horses, from $161,000 to $2,085,000; 
hides and skins, from $1,733,000 to $2,255,000; canned meats, from 
$20,000 to $680,000. In 1913 no cotton had been reexported; in 1914 
Sweden exported to Germany 9,174,000 pounds of cotton valued at 
$1,310,000. Detailed figures of trade for 1915 have not been received 
as yet, but there is no doubt that Sweden's trade with Germany was 
much larger in 1915, as the total trade of Sweden for 1915 shows an 
increase of 64 per cent over 1914 (imports 57, exports 70.5 per cent). 

Sweden is exporting to Germany chiefly iron ore, steel, horses, and 
cellulose. The importation of iron ore is carried on briskly, in spite 
of the difficulties due to the combination of sea and land route and 
the consequent necessity of transshipment. The freights for the 
whole distance from the Swedish mine to the German foundry, are 
very high, amounting at present to 50 marks per ton, barely one- 
tenth of which is for the German railway transit. Swedish iron and 
steel have increased enormously in price. The average export price 
of a metric ton of Swedish pig iron was $25.10 in July, 1914 ; it was 
$104.80 in July, 1917, and rose to $104.90 in December. The prices of 
cellulose have also increased. The average export price per metric 
ton of sulphate cellulose, first quality, f. o. b. Goteborg, was $35.64 in 
July, 1914. After considerable fluctuations, the price rose as high as 
$104.52 in July, 1916, but has since declined to $99.16 in April, 1917, 
and $88.44 in September, but rose to $91.12 in October. 



GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE IN WAR TIME. 31 

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF FOREIGN TRADE. 

The importation of raw materials * for the war industries of Ger- 
many has been centralized in a Government institution, the Central 
Purchasing Bureau (Zentral Einkaufs-Gesellschaft), organized in 
1915. Importation for private account is hampered by various 
difficulties. The troubles of an importer are thus described by Dr. 
Felix Pinner in the Berliner Tageblatt of August 18, 1917: 

" If anyone undertakes to import raw materials at present, as a 
private merchant, not as a representative of the Government, he will 
encounter many difficulties which may be compared to the various 
lines of trenches on the battlefield. When a merchant, attempting 
to import goods, takes one line of trenches, he finds a larger and 
stronger line ahead of him. First, he must obtain an import permit 
from the trade to which he belongs. Then he must apply to the 
Imperial Commissioner for the necessary import papers. If he 
obtains the latter often after a hard fight against bureaucracy he 
must begin negotiations with the Imperial Bank to arrange the means 
of payment. 

" Many merchants try to buy goods on condition that payment 
will be made after peace has been concluded. But here another line 
of difficulties confronts the importer. Section 3 of the Federal 
Council's proclamation in regard to payments to the enemy prohibits 
such payments even after the war. 2 If the Treasury authorities 
would limit the time after the war when their regulations shall apply, 
it would be of great assistance to commercial interests during the 
war, and the paying power of Germany abroad would be improved. 
By instituting prior arrangements for the purchase of raw materials 
for the first year much would be done for German industry after 
the war. Section 3 of the proclamation should be modified. Many 
private firms dislike to have difficulties with the authorities and 
consequently avoid trying to do business which falls in this cate- 
gory." 

The export trade is limited by numerous prohibitions, and permis- 
sion for the export of any product is only given when the shipper 
agrees to place the exchange received in payment at the disposal of 
the Imperial Bank. As the transfer of funds out of Germany has 
been prohibited, this regulation prevents any attempt to place tax- 
able German capital in neutral countries, through the transfer of 
an equivalent in merchandise. The Imperial Bank settles with the 
shipper at the official rate of exchange, which is adjusted by the 
bank itself from day to day. 

1 See also Chapter VI, " The vital question of materials," pp. 64-83, and pp. 146-148. 

2 Dr. Pinner ignores the difficulties in such a program that would result from the trading 
with the enemy legislation of other countries. 



IV. GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 

MANUFACTURE LARGELY CONFINED TO WAR NEEDS. 

There is probably no one aspect of German economic activity in 
the period since August 1, 1914, which is of more interest to Ameri- 
can manufacturers than the industrial situation. In some published 
material it has been stated that industry in Germany has been com- 
pletely paralyzed since the outbreak of the war. In other published 
material it has been stated that German factories are working con- 
tinuously in preparation for flooding foreign markets at the con- 
clusion of the war. As any serious student of the facts must realize, 
both these generalizations are inaccurate. Some German industries 
have been paralyzed by the war; other German industries have ex- 
panded and made fabulous profits on account of the war; and a few 
German export industries are undoubtedly prepared for after-the- 
war competition. 

Reports, based on vague rumors, have appeared in the press that 
the various German industries are working overtime to accumulate 
large stocks so as to be able to throw large quantities of manufac- 
tured goods on the market as soon as the war is over. There are sev- 
eral reasons why such reports can not be given credence. Millions 
of German workmen have been taken from the mines, shops, and fac- 
tories and are serving at the front or on police duty; the skilled 
workers have been replaced only partially by women, unskilled 
laborers, and prisoners of war. The productive capacity of the 
workers has been lowered by insufficient nourishment and nervous 
strain produced by the war. 

In a number of industries the raw materials available are insuffi- 
cient even for the domestic needs. The textile industries in particu- 
lar have been obliged to use various substitute materials which they 
shunned in times of peace. The German leather industries have been 
woefully short of their basic materials, and have certainly not been 
piling up stocks of any leather goods made of material which could 
in any way be used for harness, boots, or any other army needs ; 
their reported purchases of hides in Argentina for delivery after the 
war are only one indication of present shortage and lack of stocks. 
The metal and machinery industries are working not for the future 
but feverishly for the present, largely for the army. The stocks of 
copper in Germany were large, but by a recent order all objects of 
copper that are loose or can be unscrewed have been commandeered. 
As indicated elsewhere in this report, the raw material shortage is 
the subject of undoubted and general concern in Germany. The 
chemical industries and the great electrical industries are among the 
best situated, but they, too, are working for the army. 

32 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 33 

EFFECTS OF COAL SHORTAGE. 

The lack of coal is a serious hindrance to industrial activity. The 
production of coal has been decreasing, and distribution is made diffi- 
cult by lack of cars. The industries working directly for the army 
are the first to be provided with coal; those working for the army 
indirectly come next; those working for civilian needs are last. 
Owing to the insufficient supplies of coal many industries have been 
consolidated by the shutting down of some of the mills. Various 
measures have been taken to conserve and economize the supplies of 
coal, the consumption of gas has been limited, and the coal supply is 
rationed ; wood and peat have been much more extensively used than 
ever before. But all these measures can not increase the stocks. And 
thus, while the war industries are working at high tension and earn- 
ing large profits, other industries are suffering. The German indus- 
tries in general have suffered great depletion of stocks, depreciation 
of plant, and, in not a few instances," irreparable losses by financial, 
fuel, transport, and labor difficulties at home and the loss of their 
foreign connections and the forced liquidation of their branch estab- 
lishments in enemy countries. 

It must be recognized, further, that even the industries which dur- 
ing the war period have been most prosperous the great metal and 
machinery industries, the chemical industries, and the great electrical 
industries will have decided difficulties in attempting to resume 
their foreign business immediately after the war. They will not 
only have the difficulties (other than financial) common to German 
industries in general, which have just been discussed; they will fur- 
ther have the very real difficulty of converting their activities from 
war demands to the demands of peace, which will involve more or 
less reconstruction and replenishment of plants, reorganization of per- 
sonnel, and realignment of manufacturing processes. ^ It will not be 
simply a case of resuming the old work of manuf acturi tg for foreign 
and domestic markets right where such manufacture was cut off in 
1914; it will, in many instances, be a question of beginning all over 
again. 

METALS AND MACHINERY. 

The industries of iron and other metals are the principal exporting 
industries of Germany. The exports of metal wares and machinery 
in 1913 were valued at $615,175,000, representing 25.6 per cent of the 
total exports. On the outbreak of the war, the iron and steel indus- 
tries lost a large number of workmen, foremen, and officials by mo- 
bilization. During the first three weeks of August, 1914, the rail- 
ways and other transportation services were engaged in the carrying 
of troops and w y ar supplies almost exclusively, so that the mills could 
not obtain raw materials in sufficient quantities, and exportation was 
halted most completely. Mills working for the export trade had to 
limit their output ; some of those situated near the western border had 
to shut down. Another difficulty arose when the Government laid an 
embargo on the stocks of metals which formerly had to be imported 
in large quantities. These difficulties were reflected in the financial 
reports of the companies .for the first year of the war (1914-15) ; the 
gross profits of 14 ]arge foundries, capitalized at 592 million marks, 
had decreased from 163.1 to 121.2 million marks. In a short time. 
43339 18 3 



34 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

however, the mills succeeded in adapting their machinery, working 
methods, and .products to the new needs created by the war, and the 
last two years have brought them larger returns. In many cases the 
readjustment required considerable outlay on new buildings and ma- 
chinery. Plenty of iron ore was available. The hardening metals 
were scarce, but available for war purposes. Zinc was plentiful. 
Copper was requisitioned in vast quantities. In times of peace there 
were only 7 private factories manufacturing artillery ammunition 
in Germany ; now all the existing 150 steel works undertook the man- 
ufacture, and 70 new steel mills were erected. It is reported that at 
the beginning of 1916 more than 1,000 establishment? of the metal 
industry were manufacturing munitions (Stahl und Eisen, Feb. 17, 
1916). 

ACTIVITY OF THE KRUPP FACTORY. 

The Krupp company, the greatest of the German munition works, 
was faced at the outbreak of the war with the disappearance of its 
great international business, but this was amply compensated, for 
the time being, by orders from Germany and her allies, and the ac- 
tivity of the company has been greatly extended. The general meet- 
ing of December, 1914, voted an increase in the capital of 70,000,- 
000 marks, bringing it up to 250,000,000, and the new shares were 
taken up by the Krupp family, which owns the entire capital of the 
company. The gross profits of the company, amounting to 61,900.000 
marks in 1912-13, have been more than doubled during the war. The 
gross profits were 128,260,000 marks in 1914-15 and 143,360,000 in 
1915-16. A dividend of 12 per cent was paid in each of the two 
years, although 24 per cent might have been distributed in 1915. The 
family waived its claims, and 23,700,000 marks of the surplus were 
used for a Krupp foundation for the dependents of the fallen. Large 
sums have been written off ; 10,000,000 marks have been placed in the 
pension fund during the war, and 5,000,000 were appropriated for 
workmen's dwellings in 1915. Thirteen million marks have been de- 
voted to war assistance in the last three years. Of the employees of 
the company about 31,000 have been called to the colors. The assets 
of the company were valued at 967,000,000 marks at the end of 1916. 
The pension fund of 72,770,000 marks is administered separately and 
is not included in the assets of the company. 

For the year 1916-17 the company paid a dividend of only 10 per 
cent, but set aside 88,425,000 marks for depreciation. The annual 
report states that the increasing demands of the army authorities had 
compelled the company to build very extensive and costly buildings 
for war requirements. 

PROFITS OF IRON AND STEEL COMPANIES. 

The financial history of the Bismarckhiitte in Upper Silesia offers 
a classical example of the stimulus of war. These iron works, capi- 
talized at 16,000,000 marks, with a bonded indebtedness of 7,907.500 
marks in 1913-14, reported 3,912,000 marks of net revenue from oper- 
ation for that year, the last year of peace. During the three years of 
war the revenue increased successively to 8,077,000 marks, 11.805,000 
marks, and 16,994,000 marks. While the capital remained un- 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 35 

changed, and the bonded indebtedness was but slightly reduced, the 
dividends paid during the last four years were increased from 9 per 
cent in 1913-14 to 15, 25, and 30 per cent during the war. During 
the year 1916-17 the amount written off, chiefly on the works and 
plant account, was 10,553,000 marks, or nearly as much as the total 
set aside during the three preceding years. The turnover for that 
year reached a sum many times the amount of the capital. All the 
departments of the company were taxed to their utmost capacity 
during the year. The average number of operatives employed was 
11,500, of whom 8,336 were men and 3,164 women. The company 
invested 19,000,000 marks in the various w T ar loans. At the end of 
1916 the company's shares were quoted at 275, as against 144 at the 
end of 1913. 

During the year 1916-17 the Mannesmann Tube Works, of Dussel- 
dorf, earned a gross profit of 52,265,000 marks, or three times the 
average profit of the last years of peace. The company states in its 
annual report that for fear of coercion it disposed of its Italian 
works below their value, and that its English works have been com- 
pulsorily disposed of. As it is not known how much the mother 
company will receive from the transaction after the war, the amount 
has been written off. The sums written off total 12,821,000 marks, 
but even these large amounts can not cover the incalculable loss 
which the company's selling organizations all over the world have 
suffered from the war. After the conclusion of peace, much labor 
and a heavy outlay will be needed to reconstruct the former inter- 
national connections, and a sum of 4,000,000 marks has therefore 
been reserved for reconstruction. The company is capitalized at 
72,000,000 marks. During the last four years the dividend rates have 
been 7-J, 10, 15, and 18 per cent. 

The " Phoenix," a great mining and iron works company of West- 
phalia, capitalized at 106 million marks, has increased its earnings 
with each successive year of the war. In 1914-15 the gross profits 
from operation were 28,086,000 marks, 8 million less than in the last 
year of peace, but in 1915-16 the earnings rose to 46,790,000, and in 
1916-17 to 59,952,000 marks. The company's report points out, how- 
ever, that the profits have been made largely at the cost of a reduction 
of stocks and depreciation of the plant, which has been exposed to 
unusual wear and tear, while due care could not be paid to mainte- 
nance and renovation, so that a large outlay may be necessary when 
peace comes. Hence the company protests against any further fiscal 
burdens and pleads for a reduction of taxes, if the industries are to 
be enabled to win back the foreign trade. During the year 1916-17 
the company employed, on the average, 1,787 officials, 261 clerks, 
34,719 regular workers (including 3,730 women and an unknown 
number of prisoners of war), and 4,696 occasional workers. The 
average yearly wage of a regular worker was 2,235 marks, against 
1,936 marks in 1915-16. Three new furnaces were set in blast during 
the year. A dividend of 20 per cent Avas distributed in 1916-17, as in 
1915-16, as against 12 per cent in 1914-15, and 10 in 1913-14. The 
market price of the company's shares rose from 232 at the end of 1913 
to 245 at the end of 1916 and 266.25 at the end of 1917. 

The Becker Steel Works, at Willich, near Crefeld, paid a divi- 
dend of 25 per cent in 1916-17 ; the same rate was paid by the Kich- 
ard Lindenberg Steel Works of Remscheid-Hasten. The iron and 



36 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

steel works of Haspe, in Westphalia, capitalized at 13 million 
marks, paid 16 per cent in 1915-16 and 1916-17, against 4 per cent in 
1914-15 and 5 per cent in 1913-14. The United Steel Works van der 
Zypen and Wissener Iron Works, of Koln-Deutz, capitalized at 17 
million, paid 25 per cent in 1915-16 and 1916-17, against 8 and 12 
per cent in the two preceding years. The Vereinigte Konigs- und 
Laurahiitte, capitalized at 36 million, paid a dividend of 4 per cent 
in the two years 1913-15 ; 10 per cent in 1915-16, and 12 per cent in 
1916-17. The Hoesch Iron & Steel Works, of Dortmund, capi- 
talized at 28 million marks, has paid dividends at the rate of 15, 
12, 20, and 24 per cent during the last four years. 

THE COPPER COMPANIES. 

The copper companies have likewise been very active on war work, 
the Government turning over to them commandeered materials for 
such work. The Hirsch Copper Works extended its operations to 
many collateral lines iron, graphite, aluminum, and power. The 
copper companies are paying particular attention to the possibilities 
of hitherto unthought of uses of aluminum. 

AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER MACHINERY. 

Germany formerly imported considerable quantities of agricul- 
tural machinery, chiefly from the United States. During the war 
greater attention has been paid to the needs of the farmers, and 
the German manufacturers hope to supply the domestic needs in the 
future. They expect also to manufacture ships' anchors and chains 
which formerly were imported from Great Britain. A number of 
syndicates have been organized in the metal industries during the 
war. The supply and the distribution of iron and other metals are 
now under the control of the department for war raw materials in 
the War Office. 

The machine industries have in most cases gone over wholly or in 
part to the manufacture of munitions of war or supplies needed by 
the army, so that it has become difficult for private concerns work- 
ing for civilian needs to obtain machinery or parts. Many plants, 
have been enlarged, and some factories have been operating in two 
or three shifts. Dividends of 8 to 20 per cent were paid in 1915, 
and the financial returns of the two following years were even more 
satisfactory. The spinning of paper and other substitute materials 
created a demand for special machinery. 

The growing importance of ~>old storage increased the sales of ice 
machines and various appliances used in preparing and preserving 
food. The machine-tool industry adapted itself easily to military 
demands, and the output has consisted principally of war products ; 
in a few cases tool manufacturers have taken up the manufacture of 
projectiles. The manufacturers of instruments of precision have 
been more affected by the cutting off of the export trade than other 
branches of the industry. In the hardware trade the conditions have 
not been uniform. In many articles the Jovernment has found 
difficulty in equalizing its purchases between the manufacturers on 
the one hand and the dealers and traders on the other. Some articles 
of cutlery and all surgical instruments have been placed under em- 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 37 

bargo. Manufacturers of household and kitchen utensils report a 
considerable loss in sales; there are fewer households in Germany 
now, r,s many households have been consolidated, and the number of 
marriages has decreased. 

There is a very heavy demand for agricultural implements, as the 
lack of laborers has rendered improved methods of cultivation neces- 
sary. In many cases the farmers are buying motor plows and other 
machinery, not because they really need them but simply to invest 
their surplus earnings. The army, too, requires large quantities of 
spades, shovels, and similar articles. There is also a heavy demand 
for pens, screws, rivets, and other small articles. The railways are 
spending millions for cars. The prices of all manufactures of iron 
are rising, owing to increase in the cost of raw material and scarcity 
of labor. In the lock industry the prices have gone up about 200 per 
cent. The manufacturers of scythes complain that they have to pay 
about 100 per cent more for Swedish steel, while the prices of other 
raw materials have increased 300 to 400 per cent. Type foundries 
have suffered great losses, as more than 3,000 periodicals have stopped 
publication. The sales of phonographs and records have decreased 
heavily. 

THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY. 

The electrical industry is concentrated in the hands of a few 
gigantic firms or combines which are related or have working agree- 
ments, so that the exploitation of foreign business is greatly facili- 
tated. The Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, of Berlin, capi- 
talized at 155 million marks, has branches all over the world and also 
working agreements with large electrical undertakings abroad, and 
the other large concerns, Siemens-Halske and Siemens- Schuckert, 
have similar connections. In 1913 the exports of electrotechnical 
products from Germany were valued at $69,082,000. The chief prod- 
ucts exported were appliances for illumination, transmission of 
power, electrolysis, etc., valued at $17,623,000, and incandescent 
lamps chiefly metallic filament lamps valued at $11,451,000. In 
1912 Germany produced 97,161,000 incandescent lamps, imported 
2,294,000, and exported 58,339,000. The exports declined somewhat 
in 1913. The electric concerns have also worked for military needs, 
and the Allgemeine Electrizitats-Cresellschaft was able to increase 
its net profits during the first year of the war to 26,570,000 marks, as 
against 18,163.000 in 1913-14. The net profits for 1915-16 were 
26,487,000 marks, and for 1916-17, 29,574,000 marks. The capital of 
the company was increased to 184 millions in 1916-17. The shares 
of the company were quoted at 232 at the end of 1917. 

The electrotechnical factory Max Schorch at Rheydt, which had 
been paying 8 per cent during the years 1910 to 1913, increased its 
dividend to 12 per cent in 1914. The factories of the company were 
fully employed during the war, night shifts being necessary at times. 
In 1915 the turnover was five times as large as in the preceding years, 
and the company distributed a dividend of 20 per cent with a bonus 
of one new share for every two old shares, thus really paying a divi- 
dend of 70 per cent. It was stated in the annual report, however, 
that the new machines installed were used almost exclusively for war 
work and hence were booked as expenditure. The gross profits had 
increased from 386,000 marks in 1914 to 3,581,000 marks in 1915. 



38 GERMAH TRADE AND THE WAR. 

In Bavaria and Saxony steps have been taken to make the produc- 
tion of electric power a State monopoly. This action would seem to 
make impossible the institution of an imperial monopoly of elec- 
tricity, which has been the object of lively discussion. (See p. 129.) 

In December, 1917, the Government of Prussia announced its inten- 
tion to build a large central plant in Hanover for the production of 
electric current. The initial production is estimated at 50,000,000 
kilowatt hours. The State is ultimately to monopolize the produc- 
tion of electric current, though not the distribution. The existing 
private and municipal works may remain in operation, and the 
State is to seek close cooperation with them. It is expected, however, 
that such works will prefer to buy the current from the State, as 
the State promises to produce electric power much more cheaply. 
New private works may not be installed, nor the existing works 
enlarged, without special authorization by the State, and such works 
will not be permitted to deliver the current outside of specified 
districts. Manufacturers will be permitted, however, to produce 
current for their own consumption. Representatives of municipal 
electric works are protesting against the competition of the State, 
but it seems that the protests will be of no avail. 

CHEMICALS. 

In normal times, from one-third to one-half of the annual pro- 
duction of the chemical factories, estimated at about 1,800 million 
marks ($428,400,000), was exported to foreign countries. The dimi- 
nution of exports was felt throughout the industry, although the loss 
was largely compensated by increased domestic orders, particularly 
in the second and third years of the war. When the war broke out, 
the companies, as the " Agfa " report shows, did not know how to em- 
ploy their workmen; later on they could not obtain a sufficient sup- 
ply of labor. The interests of the German manufacturers in hostile 
countries have suffered greatly from the war. The coal-tar dye 
manufacturers, 1 for example, have been unable to safeguard their 
branches in the territories of the countries at war with Germany. It 
has not yet been possible to estimate the losses incurred in this way. 

The industry contributed liberally to the manufacture of ex- 
plosives and other products used in the war, and performed an im- 
portant part in providing various substitutes for products formerly 
imported. Albumen, artificial camphor, fertilizers, and oils have been 
produced by old and new processes; the food value of various plants 
has been tested; pharmaceutical products prepared for use at the 
front. The chemical industry and trade of Germany regard the 
success of Germany in getting nitrogen compounds and the sulphur 
needed for sulphuric acid as a great achievement of the war period. 

The chemical industry has long been favored by the Government 
and liberally supported by the great banks. By various practices it 
has smothered competition in foreign countries, chiefly by underselling 
local producers, or by establishing German factories in foreign terri- 
tory, notably in Russia and Italy. Owing to German domination of 
the Russian market for drugs and chemicals, no chloroform for nar- 
cotic purposes, it is said, could be manufactured in Russia after the 

1 See also " Dyestuff syndicate," p. 56. 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 39 

outbreak of the war ; in France, according to Hauser, German com- 
petition had made impossible domestic manufacture of carbolic acid. 
During the war the industry has been strengthened further by the 
formation of a syndicate including all the important firms. 

FIRMS MAKING COAL-TAR PRODUCTS. 

The industry adapted itself easily to the needs of the war, and 
the financial results of the principal companies have been extremely 
satisfying to the stockholders. The Badische Anilin- und Soda- 
fabrik make a net profit of 19,828,870 marks in 1915 and 26,442,647 
marks in 1916. In addition, unusually large sums were written off 
for depreciation, etc., aggregating 24 million marks for the two years. 
In 1916 the company placed 3 million marks in a special reserve fund, 
and set aside 2 million marks for the support of invalid soldiers. 
The shareholders received a dividend of 28 per cent. 

F. Bayer & Co., of Leverkusen^ increased its net profits from 
20,881,880 marks in 1915 to 26,760,403 marks in 1916. The latter 
figure includes the surplus of the preceding year, amounting to 
5,360.000, but is exclusive of the amount set aside for the war-profit 
tax. A dividend of 28 per cent was distributed in 1916 the same as 
in the years 1912 and 1913 and 5,400,000 marks placed in the reserve 
funds, which now amount to 33,720,000 marks. In 1915 1,000,000 
and in 1916 2,000,000 marks were set aside for the support of invalid 
soldiers. 

The net profits of the Hoechst company were 15,700,390 marks in 
1915 and 24,227.445 marks in 1916. More than 20 million marks 
were written off for the two years. The dividend was increased 
from 20 to 25 per cent. 

Each of the three corporations mentioned above is capitalized at 
54 million marks. According to a recent report, the companies will 
increase their capital to 90 million each, so that the combined capital 
of the works represented in the syndicate will be nearly 400 million 
marks. The companies are mobilizing to withstand foreign com- 
petition after the war. The public has great faith in the future of 
the industry. Even in the first year of the war, when the dividends 
were somewhat lower than in peace times, the snares of the chemical 
companies were quoted so high that the yield of most of the shares 
was but slightly above the yield of the war loan, while the shares 
of the Badische A. S. F. and a few other companies were sold at 
prices yielding considerably less than the Government bonds. The 
shares of the Badische were quoted at 384 in July, 1914, and at 490 
in December, 1916. The shares of the Hoechst company were quoted 
at 425 in June, 1914, and at 428 in December, 1916. 



POTASH. 



The potash interests have overlooked no opportunities for profit 
during the war and have made preparations for the after-war period. 
High prices for the securities of the potash companies have pre- 
vailed. In February, 1918, it was reported that the Deutsche Kali- 
werke (German Potash Works) Company had taken over the com- 
panies owning the Bernburger works, the Groena works, and the 
Erbprinz works and was negotiating for the control and absorption 



40 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

of other companies. The consolidations were undertaken in part 
to effect merchandising savings and in part to forestall suggested 
schemes of Government monopoly. 1 

COAL MINING.' 

Immediately after the outbreak of the war the mining of coal 
stopped almost completely for a time. When production was re- 
sumed, the output was considerably smaller than in normal times, as 
thousands of miners had been called to the colors. Imported work- 
ers, women, prisoners of war, and furloughed soldiers were sern^ to the 
mines, and me output increased gradually until it reached nearly 75 
per cent of the normal in July, 1915. The production of brown coal 
was about 90 per cent of the normal at the end of the first year of 
war, normal in the second year, and was later increased still further. 
The production in the first year of the war was hardly sufficient for 
the domestic needs, but Germany had to export coal to the neutral 
countries in payment for imports. Two central bureaus, one in the 
east and another in the west, were established to regulate the exports 
to neutral countries, which had been reduced 50 per cent. 

SHORTAGE OF LABOR AND EQUIPMENT. 

The production of coal is still below the output of peace times, and 
the mines are unable to satisfy the demand, which is very insistent, 
and larger than in peace time. The coal fields of Germany are exten- 
sive, but it is impossible to bring sufficient quantities of coal above 
ground. The coal deposits of the Ruhr district alone are so rich that 
with an annual production equaling that of 1913 the coal lying within 
a depth of 4,900 feet would not be mined in 700 years. At the present, 
however, the production is insufficient, and the available supplies 
have to be economized. The reduction in the output is due to three 
factors an insufficient number of miners and their helpers, a less- 
ening of the productive capacity of the labor force, and a lack of 
necessary equipment. 

The number of mine workers was increased in the summer of 1917 
by the furloughing of 19,000 soldiers who are miners or mine man- 
agers by trade or profession. This resulted in increased production, 
but the output was still insufficient. In July, 1916, the average out- 
put per man per shift was 1.01 metric tons of coal; in April, 1917, 
the Langenbrahm mine, working under favorable conditions, showed 
an average of only 0.9 ton, and its total daily production had declined 
in the meantime from 1,260 to 784 tons. During the summer months 
of 1917 shipments were somewhat larger than previously, June being 
a record month for the war period. A large proportion of those 
shipments, however, consisted of coke which had been held in stock 
and could not be taken into account in estimating production, which 
was still far below that of peace times. In individual mines the re- 
duction of output amounted to as much as 50 per cent. The ship- 
ments during the autumn months were smaller, owing chiefly to a 
lack of cars. 

The transportation problem is unusually important for both the 
mines and the coal market. A hard winter, locking the river ship- 

1 See also "Government monopolies," p. 128. 

2 See also production statistics, p. 66, and proposed monopoly, p. 132. 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 41 

ping in it's harbors, always renders the situation more acute. The 
winter of 1917-18 was very severe and suffering for lack of fuel was 
widespread. Some of the mines have their own harbors, but most of 
the coal, coke, and briquets is carried by railway and later shipped in 
part by river boats. The summer is always a dull season for trans- 
portation. The summer of 1917 was utilized for an early accumula- 
tion of supplies, the example of large dealers being followed by the 
public. Thus, the railways carried as much as could be shipped and 
yet the demand could not be satisfied. In this connection it must not 
be forgotten that very large quantities needed for war purposes have 
the preference over all other shipments. 

The manufacture of coke is of particular importance in connec- 
tion with the valuable by-products. The industries are extending 
their use of coke wherever it is possible, and the demand for this 
kind of fuel has increased considerably in consequence. Both the 
mines and the coke ovens are suffering from a lack of proper equip- 
ment, resulting frequently in a temporary stoppage of work. It is 
difficult and at times even impossible to replace worn-out parts with 
new ones, and repairs take too much time. Owing to the high 
prices of plant equipment and the high wages, which continue to 
register a steady increase, the cost of production has risen very 
considerably. For the Langenbrahm mine the cost of production 
per metric ton of coal was 8.69 marks ($2.07 at normal exchange) 
in July, 1916, and 16.16 marks ($3.85) in April, 1917. This led to 
an increase of prices, which were increased still further after August 
1, when the new tax on coal went into force. Higher water freights 
increased the cost of transportation. 

At a meeting of the Rhine-Westphalia Coal Syndicate, on June 
27, 1917, the rule limiting the output to 80 per cent of normal was 
repealed because production had not reached that figure in any of 
the mines. The chairman declared that the syndicate had to con- 
tend with unusual difficulties in order to satisfy the many demands 
made upon it, and that the mines must do everything possible to in- 
crease production. The mines had succeeded in increasing the out- 
put somewhat in May and June, although all the furloughed miners 
had not yet arrived. But even though the shipments for May and 
June were larger, the difference between production and the require- 
ments was still very great, the demand being much larger than an 
output which might be obtained by straining all forces to the utmost. 

REGULATIONS GOVERNING OUTPUT AND DISTRIBUTION. 

Preliminary steps were taken in June, 1917, for regulating the 
coal supply for the industries by imperial legislation. The imperial 
commissioner for the distribution of coal issued an edict requiring 
all individuals, firms, corporations, municipalities, and States, using 
more than 10 metric tons of coal per month for industrial purposes, 
to make detailed monthly reports of their stocks, receipts, consump- 
tion, quantities ordered, and quantities needed. Five equalization 
bureaus were established at Essen, Mannheim, Halle, Dresden, and 
Kattowitz, for the several industrial districts, the commissioner 
himself being in charge of the distribution of imported coal. It was 
stated in the edict that the reports would not affect the existing 
methods of obtaining coal but were required merely to enable the 



42 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

commissioner to order such changes as might appear necessary. 
Failure to make a report was made punishable by imprisonment not 
exceeding one year, or a fine not exceeding 10,000 marks, or both. 
The German press doubts the efficacy of the order, for even if demand 
and output are correctly estimated, there is transportation still to be 
reckoned with, and that depends on an adequate supply of railway 
cars and favorable conditions on the waterways. If one difficulty 
is solved, another frequently crops up and delays delivery. 

The present situation may be summarized as follows: There is no 
lack of underground supplies of coal^ production has decreased and 
will probably diminish still further rather than increase; distribu- 
tion suffers from difficulties of transportation; consumption has to 
be regulated. In some cities (Berlin) coal cards have been intro- 
duced, and coal is rationed. The navy is inactive; many industrial 
plants have shut down, and many others have shortened their work- 
ing hours, but the output of coal is still insufficient to satisfy the 
demand. Substitutes for coal have been used to the limit. Many 
industrial establishments have endeavored to secure their coal supply 
by purchasing mines, and when a mine has been placed on the market 
there has been lively competition for it on the part of industrial 
interests. 

OTHER MINING. 

Like the mining of coal, metal mining in Germany was seriously 
influenced by the lack of laborers and the difficulties of transporta- 
tion. Owing to war conditions, wasteful methods were resorted to in 
the mining of minettes, certain other iron ores, and the zinc ores of 
Upper Silesia, the size of the output being of primary consideration. 
In some iron mines and in one pyrites field the average yield was in- 
creased, but tho total production was supplemented by imports from 
Sweden. The ores of the rarer metals were exploited with greater 
intensity, high prices and technical improvements making possible the 
utilization of many low-grade ores. In many cases the limit of prof- 
itable exploitation was lowered considerably. The smelters of ferro- 
chrome now work up ores containing as little as 24 per cent of the oxide 
(Cr 2 O 3 ), whereas in former times only ores with 48 or 50 per cent of 
the oxide could be worked profitably. In the working of pimelite, 
a nickel ore, the limit of profitable exploitation was reduced from 2.5 
to 1.5 per cent. The Geological Institute is reported to have succeeded 
in extracting nickel and cobalt from mine springs containing these 
metals. Bauxite containing but 40 per cent of the oxide (A1 2 O 3 ) is 
now utilized for the extraction of aluminum. Experiments have been 
made 7 ith the extraction of aluminum from clay, and hopes are enter- 
tained that German industries will be independent of foreign bauxite 
in the future. In the exploitations of wolframite the limit has been 
reduced from 1 to 0.06 per cent, chiefly, however, under the stimulus 
of high prices. For copper schist the limit has been lowered from 2.5 
to 1 or even 0.7 per cent. The high prices of silver have made pos- 
sible the exploitation of certain abandoned silver mines. 

AEROPLANES. 

The manufacture of aeroplanes is an industry of very recent date 
which this war has made of great importance, the flying machines 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 43 

being the "eyes of the army." The annual report of the National 
Flugspende for 1914-15, an official publication, enumerates 19 aero- 
plane factories in Germany, 10 of which have been established since 
1910. In 1908 one flying machine was built in Germany; in 1909, 
four; in 1910, seventy-three, and in 1911, the Government ceased pub- 
lishing figures of production, for strategic reasons, as 99 per cent of 
the machines produced were intended for the use of the army and the 
navy. The industry has now become a war industry, and it is inter- 
esting to note that the official publication cited above does not furnish 
any data on production, although it is well linown that the aeroplane 
factories have increased in number and have been expanded and 
forced to capacity during the war. The real facts concerning this 
industry, as concerning the other strictly war industries, are not 
available ; like the munitions industry, the manufacture of aeroplanes 
is being discussed as a probable Government monopoly following 
the war. 

AUTOMOBILES. 

In 1907 Germany had 69 establishments manufacturing motor 
vehicles of all kinds. The factories employed 13,423 workmen and 
produced 3,887 automobiles, 1,264 chassis, 101 motor boats, and 1,980 
motors. In 1912 there were 124 establishments employing 35,877 
workmen; the aggregate production was valued at $52,741,000, as 
against $14,494,000 in 1907. The production in 1912 included 16,078 
complete automobiles, of which 14,296, or 89 per cent, were passen- 
ger automobiles. During the war the manufacture of passenger ve- 
hicles has been sharply restricted, but the production of trucks has 
increased to meet the heavy demands of the army. Large profits 
have been made, new factories established, and works manufacturing 
unsalable products reconstructed for the production of automobiles. 

According to a recent report, an organization of automobile build- 
ers and officials of the war office is to be formed to renovate the vast 
number of cars used and partially disabled in the war, and to sell 
them at prices arbitrarily fixed. The prices will be low, but not so 
low as to interfere with the production of new vehicles. The cost 
of producing new cars is to be lowered by standardizing certain 
parts which will enter into the construction of all German-made au- 
tomobiles, thus in effect standardizing the entire output of all Ger- 
man factories. Tariff restrictions are to be kept low, in order to 
avoid high reciprocal duties against the German products in coun- 
tries where the Germans hope by their own low prices to get a foot- 
hold. The low cost also is relied on to protect the industry at home. 

MOTORS. 

The motor industry is also a strong war industry and has been 
marked by technical progress in the lines that contribute chiefly to 
war purposes. The six largest motor companies in Germany are the 
Adlerwerke at Frankfort on the Main; Benz & Co., Mannheim; 
Daimler Motoren-Gesellschaft, Stuttgart; the Durrkopwerke, Biele- 
feld ; the Fahrzeugf abrik, Eisenach ; and the Motorenfabrik, Oberur- 
sel, near Frankfort. The combined capital of these six factories 
totals 52,750,000 marks ($12,554,000). The combined net profits of 
these six enterprises rose from 14,063,571 marks in 1913 to 31,417,192 



44 GERMAN TftADE AND THE WAR. 

marks in 1915, while the average dividend increased from 12.6 to 
25.3 per cent in that period. The Motorenfabrik at Oberursel, which 
manufactures rotary motors for aeroplanes and automobile motors, 
paid a dividend of 35 per cent in 1915. Several of the companies 
have enlarged their plants since the beginning of the war. At the 
end of 1916 the shares of the Daimler company were quoted at 630, 
an increase of 300 per cent since the end of 1913. 

SUGAR. 

During the last five years of peace German exports of sugar 
averaged above $48,000,000 annually. In 1913 the exports were 
valued at $63,004,000. During the war production has been restricted 
and exports reduced to a minimum. On September 14, 1916, a decree 
of the Federal Council was published regulating the disposal of 
sugar manufactured during the season of 1916-17. An Imperial 
Sugar Equalization Company was created to collect contributions 
from the factories and indemnify those with high production costs, 
and both production and trade were placed under Government con- 
trol. On August 1, 1917, the exceptional railway rates for sugar in- 
tended for export were abolished, and the discriminating inland rates 
suspended for the period of the war. In justification of these meas- 
ures it was pointed out at the time that the area planted with sugar 
beets had been reduced, while the consumption of sugar for both food 
and industrial purposes was increasing, so that no considerable quan- 
tities would be left for export for some years. In case sugar were to 
be exported, no special rates would be needed, as the prices would 
surely be high, owing to a world wide scarcity of sugar and the 
resulting demand for the German product. 

The production of sugar has been estimated at 2,600,000 metric 
tons for the season of 1914-15; 1,500,000 tons for 1915-16; 1,600,000 
for 1916-17. The production in 1917-18 is expected to reach 1,725,000 
tons. 

The Union of German Sugar Manufacturers has petitioned the 
Imperial Chancellor to take steps toward a renewal or continuation 
of the Brussels Sugar Convention. The German sugar producers are 
of the opinion that the convention which abolished export premiums 
and regulated import duties on sugar should be continued, provided 
Great Britain becomes a party to it under the conditions of the 
original treaty of 1902. Prior to the war large quantities of German 
sugar were marketed in England. Since the war England has been 
purchasing colonial and other cane sugars, and cane sugar produc- 
tion in the colonies has increased largely, owing to insufficient pro- 
duction of beet sugar. If beet sugar is not to be driven permanently 
from the British market, cane and beet sugar must be accorded equal 
treatment in the British tariff. 

The adherence of Russia to the sugar convention is held desirable, 
provided Russia abolishes the indirect premium on sugar exports and 
joins on the same conditions as the other countries. Should Russia 
join and England refuse, then the continuation of the convention 
would be of no interest to Germany. As certain neutral countries 
are also parties to the convention, it will not be possible to provide 
for a continuation of the sugar convention in the treaties of peace, 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 45 

but the belligerents may agree to join the convention under the old 
conditions. 

In commenting on this petition, the Berliner Tageblatt calls at- 
tention to the increased consumption of sugar in Germany and the 
probability that, owing to a scarcity of fats, the consumption may 
remain abnormally high for a number of years. Instead of export- 
ing sugar to England and buying it back in jams and marmalade, 
this paper says, the Germans ought to develop their own jam and 
marmalade industry. 

The earnings of the sugar factories and refineries have been highly 
satisfactory. The Zuckerfabrik Stuttgart paid a dividend of 25 
per cent in 1915 as against 20 in the preceding year; the Eheinische 
Aktien-Verein fur Zuckerfabrikation in Cologne increased its divi- 
dend from 7 to 16 per cent; the Zuckerfabrik Frankenthal from 
20 J to 30 per cent; the refinery of Tangermunde from 15 to 25, 
against 20 per cent in 1913. 

BUILDING TRADES. 

It is expected that in many cities and industrial centers there will 
be a scarcity of dwellings, particularly of small dwellings, after the 
war. During the transition period after the war labor and mate- 
rials will command high prices, and it will not be possible to borrow 
on mortgages at fair rates. For these reasons it can not be expected 
that the necessary dwellings will be built by private capital. The 
Imperial Ministry of the Interior has requested the governments of 
the federated States to consider and propose measures by means of 
which the construction of new dwellings may be hastened. 

A scarcity of small dwellings was noticeable in some industrial 
districts of Germany even before the war. The conditions prevail- 
ing in the Rhine Province and Westphalia were described as "criti- 
cal," and in Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein the conditions were 
little better. Germany needs about 200,000 new dwellings a year for 
its natural increase of population, and the need of new structures to 
replace old buildings is also large. Conditions in the building 
trades had been unsatisfactory during the last years of peace, and 
the war arrested all private building activities almost completely. 
The congestion of population was increased in some industrial cen- 
ters while in others temporary relief was brought by the war, as 
many women whose husbands had gone to the front gave up their 
dwellings for the time of the war and went to live with their parents 
or other relatives. But the scarcity of small dwellings was intensi- 
fied by the high cost of living, compelling many families, including 
some of the well-to-do classes whose fathers had fallen in battle, to 
quit their residences and seek smaller quarters. Thousands of Ger- 
man subjects returned from abroad and flocked to the large cities, 
and the cities also had to take care of refugees from the frontier dis- 
tricts. It is feared that the conditions will be much worse after the 
war, and that many cities may become the scene of riots, such as 
Berlin witnessed after the war of 1870-71. According to a police 
report of that time, there were 10,600 families without shelter in 
Berlin on October 1, 1871. They built themselves temporary bar- 
racks in the fields facing the Frankfort gate, and when the police 
ordered the barracks torn down and a poor cabinetmaker had been 



46 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

forcibly ejected from his hut a battle ensued in which 102 policemen 
and 158 civilians were wounded. 

During the war many new factories have been built, but the cessa- 
tion of building activities in other lines has had an unfavorable effect 
upon the industries supplying building materials, such as bricks, 
cement, window glass, sanitary wares, and builders' hardware. All 
ihese will have to meet an increased demand after the war. 

CEMENT. 

In times of peace Germany exported above a million tons of 
cement annually to all parts of the world, South America taking 
more than 30 per cent of the total. In 1913 the exports totaled 
1,129,563 tons, valued at $8,966,000. In 1912 the exports were 1,056,- 
622 tons, or 15.7 per cent of the production of that year, amounting 
to 39,626,548 barrels of 170 kilos (375 pounds). Cement is on the 
free list of the German tariff, but the imports are small 228,896 
tons in 1912 and only 168,449 tons in 1913. The increasing cost of 
labor has been met by the manufacturers by the installation of im- 
proved grinding machinery and modern rotary iron ovens. The in- 
dustry suffers from overexpansion. The old factories had enlarged 
their plants, and many new works had been founded ; in three years 
the Rhine- Westphalian Cement Syndicate of Bochum had increased 
the total production quota of its members from 9,000,000 to nearly 
21,000,000 bags, although there was no market for the surplus. In 
1915 the member firms were permitted to work up to only 12.6 per 
cent of their quota ; in 1916 the proportion was raised to 16.23, but 
the year was still regarded as unfavorable. As the works could not 
be occupied to their full capacity, the cost of production went up. 
Coal and other materials became dearer and wages were higher, 
while the difficulty in obtaining the necessary labor was very great. 
At the beginning of 1917 all the outstanding local cement works 
were induced to join the Rhine- Westphalian Cement Syndicate. 
The cement works of northern and central Germany and Silesia 
formed the North German Cement Syndicate, with headquarters at 
Berlin, and the two syndicates were united with the South German 
Cement Sales Office in the German Cement Union of Berlin. The 
Government came to the assistance of the cement producers by an 
order issued June 29, 1916, forbidding the establishment of new 
cement works. The war administration purchases large quantities 
of cement at the high rate of 58 marks ($13.80) per metric ton 
(price ruling during the third quarter of 1917). The maximum 
prices for deliveries to private parties range from 60J to 65 marks, 
but the cessation of building activities has made these prices il- 
lusory. High hopes are entertained, however, for the future of the 
industry, and shares of sound cement concerns, though they paid no 
dividends in 1916, are quoted at a premium of 50 per cent. 

BRICKS. 

Nearly five-sixths of all German brickyards were closed for lack of 
fuel, want of labor, and car shortage. The demand for military and 
industrial buildings almost exhausted the small stocks, so that by 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 47 

the end of 1917, the production of bricks was inadequate even for 
the demands of war time. In the Berlin district, according to the 
Deutsche Tageszeitung, only about 200 million bricks have been 
produced, as compared with 1,500 million in normal times. It was 
expected that stocks of bricks and tiles would be commandeered by 
the Government. 

GLASS. 

Prior to the war the German glass industry was an export indus- 
try. In the year 1913 glassware valued at $34,748,000 was sold in 
foreign markets. Since the outbreak of the war, however, the glass 
industry has been working under difficulties, and the very existence 
of some branches of the industry has been threatened. In the first 
months of the Avar, owing to the stoppage of exports, a majority of 
the giassworkers were thrown out of work. When the industry 
gradually recovered, thanks to the increasing demand of the military 
authorities and the preserved-food industries, a new menace appeared 
as a large number of the workers were drafted into the army. Work 
in the glass factories is very largely group work, and if but one mem- 
ber of a group is taken away it may be difficult to find a good substi- 
tute. When the supplies of soda were commandeered the factories 
had to seek substitute materials. The embargo on straw and the lack 
of freight cars have interfered with shipments, and now the glass in- 
dustry, always a large consumer of coal, has had its supply of fuel 
reduced to less than one-half. In order to save coal the factories are 
expected to consolidate, and as there are hardly any places with more 
than one factory, consolidation will mean a change of residence for 
the workers. 

The manufacture of plate glass has suffered greater losses by the 
war than the other branches of the industry. In the manufacture 
of window glass the turnover during the second year of the war was 
estimated at 65 per cent of the normal. The industry obtained army 
contracts and was also able to resume exportation; its selling prices 
had increased as much as 40 per cent during the first two years of 
the war. Conditions were most favorable for the manufacturers of 
hollow glass, as the consumption of bottles is large,, and the demand 
for prescription bottles and druggists' wares is increasing. The 
glassworks at Dusseldorf-Gerresheim, a bottle-manufacturing con- 
cern, distributed a dividend of 10 per cent in 1915, as against 8 per 
cent in 1914. The annual report of the company states that the pro- 
duction of bottles in 1915 was about two-thirds of the quantity pro- 
duced in 1913. This favorable result, the report says, was due to 
the employment of the Owens machines, which require but a small 
number of operatives. The machines were kept in constant opera- 
tion, while production by the less economical hand method was re- 
duced by about two-thirds. The Gerresheim company owns all the 
shares of the plate-glass factory at Reisholz, through which it is a 
member of the plate-glass syndicate. 

The glass industry was well represented at the Leipzig Fair in 
August of 1917, and hopes were expressed that the German factories 
would be able to compete with the foreign manufacturers of fine 
glassware after the war. 



48 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

PAPER. 

Owing to the exigencies of war, the German pulp and paper indus- 
try has become largely a war industry. At the last annual meeting 
of the Union of German Paper Manufacturers (June 13, 1917) the 
claim was made that the paper industry was of equal importance, 
for war purposes, with the machinery industry and the chemical 
industries. Pulp is used in the manufacture of munitions, paper is 
spun and woven into cloth, and the demands of the war administra- 
tion for both products are steadily increasing. As a result, the 
supplies available for ordinary uses are smaller, and the prices are 
high. More wood is being cut in the forests of Germany, wood is 
imported from Poland, and cellulose from Sweden, and hop vines 
and other substitute materials are used for the manufacture of paper. 
During the year 1915, the stock companies in the industry reported 
a deficit in the revenue from operation of 1.770,418 marks; in 1916, 
however, 45 companies registered a net profit of 17,279,526 marks, so 
that the average dividend of 7.4 per cent was about equal to the 
average for 1911. 

Newspaper publishers, on the other hand, are protesting against 
the intolerable rise in the cost of production. The Tagliche Rund- 
schau quotes the following increases: Wages, 25 per cent; paper, 
100 to 300 ; light and. power, 150 to 200 ; metals for machine typeset- 
ting, type foundry, stereotyping, and electrotyping, over 300 ; print- 
er's rollers, over 200; inks, 100 to 250; printer's varnish substitutes, 
500; lubricating oils, 400 to 600; cleaning waste, 100 to 150; adhe- 
sives, 300 to 500; soap, 800; thread, wire, etc., 200 to 300; packing 
materials, 260 to 500 per cent. And the prices are rising; even the 
inferior substitutes are becoming dearer. The paper manufacturers 
assert, however, that the publishers of daily papers, whether large 
or small, have made good profits. 

The distribution of the available supplies of paper is regulated by 
an Imperial Commission in the Ministry of the Interior. The prin- 
cipal task of the commission is to secure sufficient supplies for the 
military and civil authorities, and preach economy to private con- 
sumers. 

LEATHER. 

The leather industry was among the industries which profited most 
from the enormous military orders. The most important factories 
were well stocked with raw material at the beginning of the war. 
One leather company at Strassburg is said to have had over $3,000.000 
worth of skins on hand when war was declared. Exportation of 
hides and skins was forbidden, and, in spite of difficulties, consider- 
able quantities of skins were imported. The leather factories worked 
at high pressure and at very favorable prices, making army equip- 
ment, harness, saddles, helmets, knapsacks, and the like. Manufac- 
turers of fancy leather goods, however, suffered by the loss of a large 
portion of their export trade. In some cases plants were turned over 
wholly or in part to saddlery and other military supplies. As a re- 
sult the production of other leather goods was insufficient to satisfy 
the demand. Although a central official purchasing department was 
early created for the purpose of controlling the supply and price of 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 49 

hides and skins, speculation was not entirely eliminated, and prices 
rose sharply. 

Under the supervision of the military authorities, two organiza- 
tions were formed for the distribution of hides. The various 
branches of the leather industry have been organized into five groups, 
the wholesale dealers forming a sixth group. The former place their 
material at the disposal of the German Raw Hide Co., which turns it 
over to the War Leather Co. (Kriegsleder A. G.). By this arrange- 
ment a considerable saving in freightage is effected. The finished 
hides are delivered through the groups of the respective States. 
Small quantities of light upper leathers were exported during the 
first year of the war. 

TOYS. 

The toy industry was one of the important export industries of 
Germany, supplying the needs of a large part of the world market 
in times of peace. At least 100,000 persons were employed in the 
manufacture of toys, the Nuremberg and Sonneberg districts each 
employing about 30,000 operatives. The annual production was 
estimated at about $33,000,000. The exports in 1913 were valued 
at $24,594,000. The United States was Germany's best customer, 
taking nearly one-third of the total exports; the United Kingdom 
was second, taking one-fourth of the total. Less than 5 per cent went 
to Germany's present allies, and a little over 7 per cent to the Scandi- 
navian countries, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The industry 
suffered heavily by the war. The over-sea markets were closed, the 
exports to neutral countries declined, and the best that the report of 
the Sonneberg Chamber of Commerce could say about domestic trade 
w r as that it was " almost normal." In Sonneberg a company was 
formed to assist the destitute toy makers and small dealers by em- 
ploying them in war trades. The toy manufacturers have formed a 
syndicate under the title of " Verband der deutschen Spielwaren- 
Tndustrie," with headquarters at Berlin. Various means to improve 
the situation of the toy industry have been discussed, and the sug- 
gestion has been made that a special " day of gifts " be established, 
a children's day to be celebrated in the same fashion as Santa Claus 
day in midsummer, however. The toy industry was well repre- 
sented at the last Leipzig Fair, but clothing for the dolls was lack- 
ing. The industry will unquestionably have much more severe 
competition after the war than ever before. 

FURNITURE. 

By the end of 1917 a serious shortage of furniture was reported 
in Germany, as a result of conversion of factories to war uses, short- 
age of materials, and inadequate labor supply. Secondhand clothing 
having fallen under Government supervision, secondhand furniture 
became a popular line for profiteering among the small dealers. 

TEXTILES. 1 

As the German textile manufacturing had been largely for export 
markets, the stocks of raw, in-process, and finished goods for foreign 

1 See also textile fibers, pp. 69-71 and 80-82, and p. 139. 
43339 18 4 



50 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

trade became available for domestic use and helped to relieve the 
serious crisis in the textile trades caused by the stoppage of imports 
of raw materials from abroad. The Government nevertheless found 
it necessary to adopt various measures for conserving the stocks of 
both the raw materials and the manufactured products of the textile 
industries in order to insure a sufficient supply for naval and military 
needs, and by these measures the textile industries were by degrees 
brought under complete Government control. 

The shortage of raw materials did not reach proportions calculated 
to cause anxiety till about the middle of 1915. As regards the cotton 
industry in particular, a writer in the Frankfurter Zeitung of Jan- 
uary 11, 1917, stated that " when the war broke out there was no real 
shortage of raw materials, * * * large quantities of cotton con- 
tinued to enter the country, and army orders were so extensive that 
for a long period the mills worked overtime." 

With the tightening of the blockade the situation changed, and by 
an order dated August 12, 1915, the Federal Council limited the num- 
ber of workdays per week in textile factories to a maximum of five, 
while the daily working time was not to exceed the average daily 
hours worked in June, 1915, but in no case 10 hours. The factories 
affected by this order were those making articles of cotton, wool, 
shoddy, flax, hemp, and jute. A special inquiry made early in 1916 
showed that the majority of textile factories were working much 
shorter time than the permissible maximum, and that the factories 
not adapted for army work (embroidery, machine knitting, velvet) 
were almost at a standstill. A series of orders and decrees followed, 
and the distribution of all stocks of textile materials was brought 
under State control. Under the national civilian service law steps 
have been taken for the compulsory closing down of all except the 
largest factories in the textile trades and for the compulsory consoli- 
dation of the latter. 

Flax is now grown on a larger scale in Germany, but the other 
customary textile materials are scarce, and the mills that are work- 
ing are using largely substitute materials, about a hundred of which 
have been tested. 

MILLS DEPEND ON SUBSTITUTE MATERIALS. 

The conditions prevailing in the textile industries on the lower 
Rhine during the third quarter of 1917 were described by a corre- 
spondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung (Sept. 12, 1917) as satisfac- 
tory. The spinning and weaving mills as well as the related indus- 
tries, the writer said, were able to keep a large proportion of their 
machines going. The increased production of substitute materials 
has opened new fields of activity to the textile industries; the new 
articles have been received favorably by the public and have found a 
ready sale. During the report period trading in cotton yarns was 
comparatively brisk, although hardly any yarn of pure cotton was to 
be had; large sales of mixed or imitation cotton yarns were made, 
however. Prices were increased again on July 25. Trade in paper 
yarns was good, the demand for the finer sorts being particularly 
strong. Additional firms are constantly taking up the manufacture 
of paper yarns, but the demand continues greater than the supply. 
For the coarser yarns maximum prices have been established ; the de- 



GERMAN INDUSTRIES IN WAR TIME. 51 

mand was great in the spring, but slackened during the summer. Spin- 
ners of worsted yarns found it possible again to operate some of their 
machines by resorting to substitute materials. The manufacture of 
fine paper yarns has led to many changes and will employ the mills 
for many months. 

The situation of mills spinning mungp and shoddy was satisfac- 
tory throughout. The demand for substitute yarns of cotton waste, 
artificial cotton, and shoddy was so great that a majority of the spin- 
dles could be kept going. Imported rags were the chief raw material 
for a small quantity of yarns sold for private account. Trade in 
flax and tow yarns was dull. Orders could not be accepted until after 
the central bureau for linen yarns had taken over all production. 
Nettle cloth was made on army orders only, and a majority of the 
weaving mills took up the manufacture of cloth from paper and other 
substitute materials, with good results. Mills weaving cloth for band- 
ages had better sales after they had ..begun manufacturing paper 
cloth. Weavers of white and colored stuffs are still working chiefly 
for the army. All kinds of substitutes are used as raw material, but 
paper is the most important. Weaving mills which formerly manu- 
factured cotton suitings are now making paper cloth for sacks, tents, 
and workingmen's clothes. Weavers of buckskin, worsted, and cheviot 
fabrics have been busy. Orders for semiwoolen blankets and substi- 
tute cloths have enabled the mills to keep a large proportion of their 
looms in operation. These mills, too, are now manufacturing paper 
cloth on a large scale, which is a guaranty of future employment. 

The shortage of commodities, the lack of imports from other coun- 
tries, and the rise in wages have brought about an enormous increase 
in the prices of yarns and fabrics. According to Der Konfektionar 
of September 22, 1917, the cost of many articles has also increased 
as a result of speculation. People have become used to high prices, 
and buying proceeds, the point of view being that they can hardly 
become lower, and it is considered preferable to buy on the spot 
rather than wait with a false hope that they will be reduced. Pure 
worsted yarn, which formerly sold for 3 to 3.50 marks, is now 
quoted at 40 to 50 marks ; semiwoolen fabrics, formerly sold for 1.60 
to 2.50 marks, are now selling for 24 to 27 marks; the price of a 
dozen cotton stockings has risen from 3 to 48 marks ; a handkerchief 
that formerly could be had for 8 pfennigs is now priced at 1.25 
marks, and so on. 

JUTE MANUFACTURE SUSPENDED. 

The jute industry has been completely paralyzed by the war. The 
stocks on hand at the beginning of the war were exhausted in a few 
months, and as it was impossible to obtain new supplies from abroad, 
the mills were compelled to shut down or take up the manufacture 
of mixed or paper yarns and fabrics. The situation of the industry 
may be illustrated by the report of the Suddeutsche Juteindustrie, 
Mannheim- Waldhof, for the financial year ending June 30, 1915. 
In the preceding year, the last year of peace, the firm had manufac- 
tured 15,714,000 pounds of yarn and 14,206,000 yards of cloth. Fig- 
ures of production for 1915 have not been published. In the first 
months of the fiscal year 1915 the company had succeeded in obtain- 
ing small quantities of jute at high prices; when the visible stocks 



52 GEEMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

or jute had been commandeered, the company received a small allot- 
ment, and with these and some substitute materials the mills were 
kept in operation until November, 1914. Production decreased 
steadily after that, owing to lack of raw materials and loss of oper- 
atives who had been called to the colors. All the mills of the com- 
pany suspended operation about the middle of May, 1915. The 
workmen found employment partly in other industries, partly in 
agriculture. "A resumption of operations before the conclusion of 
peace appears to be impossible," concludes the report. The company, 
capitalized at $1,130,000, had paid a dividend of 9 per cent for the 
fiscal year 1913, 4 per cent in 1914, and 6 per cent in 1915. 

USE OF PAPER AS SUBSTITUTE FOR TEXTILE FIBERS. 

Jute and hemp have been replaced largely by paper products, and 
paper yarn later began replacing other textiles also, both in old es- 
tablished factories and in new mills connected with them. Strip- 
cutting machines, which are made almost exclusively in Darmstadt 
and Dusseldorf and are in great demand, cut up the paper roll, which 
is specially impregnated to prevent tearing. The strips or " slivers " 
are spun on specially constructed paper-spinning machines, but also 
in many cases on existing textile machinery, jute machines being bet- 
ter adapted for that purpose than flax or cotton machines. At first 
a mixed material exclusively was manufactured, but is now more and 
more replaced by pure paper, because the remaining stocks of vege- 
table fibers are also required for other military purposes. In the 
mixed processes the paper ribbon is spun together with cotton waste 
into " textilose, " according to the method of Claviez-Adorf , or with 
flax and jute waste into " textilit, " a method invented by the Aus- 
trian Steinbrecher. There is also mixed woven material where the 
warp is of paper thread and the weft of fiber thread or vice versa. 
The paper yarn and fabric industry has undergone an unexpected 
development. Many spinning and weaving mills which, with their 
former output, could only keep a small portion of their works going, 
have taken up the manufacture of paper yarn and fabrics. Accord- 
ing to the Boersen-Zeitung, 66 million pounds of paper yarn were 
manufactured in 1916, and the paper-spinning mills employed nearly 
16,000 operatives. The manufactures of paper yarn include cordage, 
belting, tent and sail canvas, sacks, tapestry, carpets, workmen's 
clothing, aprons, sporting attire, and surgical bandages. 

CLOTHING. 

The manufacture of clothing and the trade in clothing is under 
Government control. The war had been in progress a little more 
than a year when a shortage of clothing began to make itself felt 
among the civilian population. By a military order issued Febru- 
ary 1, 1916, a great part of the clothing industry was placed under 
State control and stocks were requisitioned at prices fixed, in case 
of dispute, by an Imperial Arbitration Office. Beside clothing suit- 
able for the army, navy, civil service, or prisoners of war, the requisi- 
tions involved blankets, bedding, household linen, handkerchiefs, etc. 
The issue of uniforms to many railway employees was at the same 
time stopped. An appeal was made to the patriotism of German 



GEKMAN INDUSTKIES IN WAR TIME. 53 

women to maintain a simplicity of dress "more in keeping with the 
seriousness of the times." A maximum length was prescribed for 
material to be employed in making each article of dress for women 
and children. 

By an order of the Federal Council, dated June 10, 1916, clothing 
was added to the large list of articles subject to rationing, and a 
system of clothing cards (purchase permits) was introduced. No 
standard of consumption was prescribed, but the local authorities 
were enjoined to grant permits for as much clothing only as might 
be considered a minimum for each class of population. As a rule, 
people were not to be permitted to go beyond 20 per cent of their 
normal requirements. Wealthy people were to be directed to pur- 
chase articles of luxury which had not been placed under embargo 
rather than goods that were in general demand. 

A census of the country's clothing supplies, taken in the autumn 
of 1916, showed that still greater economy would have to be enforced, 
and a long list of additional articles was brought under the card sys- 
tem. By an order of December 23, 1916, private trading in second- 
hand clothing, linen, and footwear was forbidden and the old-clothes 
business transferred to the local authorities. Secondhand clothing 
could only be sold by these authorities under permit. In February, 
1917, there was fresh evidence of the progressive exhaustion of the 
stocks of clothing materials and clothing in Germany. Purchase 
permits for underwear and stockings were obtainable only with great 
difficulty, not more than two pairs of stockings being allowed to 
any one person in three months. The wealthy were appealed to 
officially through the press to deliver up every article of clothing and 
footwear which they could spare. 

GOVERNMENT REQUISITION OF CLOTHING. 

By an order dated March 22, 1917, a general requisition of clothing 
and clothing materials for civilian use was instituted. On April 2 a 
series of drastic regulations prescribed the absolute maximum of 
wearing apparel for men, women, and children, and the local author- 
ities were prohibited from issuing purchase permits to any one al- 
ready in possession of the authorized maximum. New regulations 
were issued prescribing in minute detail the amount of material that 
might be used in any garment or article of household linen; and 
proprietors of hotels were warned that they could not be allowed to 
purchase additional supplies of bed and table linen. In May, 1917, 
the public was officially enjoined to use paper fabrics for shrouds, 
while the use of shoes and stockings for burials was forbidden. At 
the same time the Government started relief measures on a large scale 
by the issue of standard clothing to the poor. By an order of July 
23, 1917, one-third of the stocks of secondhand clothing collected by 
the municipal authorities was requisitioned for the men discharged 
from the army or navy. 

According to the British Labour Gazette, September, 1917, it would 
seem that much of the clothing now worn throughout Germany, in- 
cluding military uniforms, is made from materials diluted in varying 
degrees with substitutes such as paper yarns and cellulose, the 
warmth and wearing properties of which are doubtful as compared 
with materials spun, woven, or knitted wholly from wool and cotton. 



54 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

The central bureau charged with the task of supplying the needs 
of the people in textile materials, clothing, and footwear, is the Im- 
perial Clothing Office (Reichsbekleidungsstelle), a self-supporting 
institution with a capital of 16 million marks. The available goods 
are stored in 36 large warehouses, divided into lots, and distributed 
to the consumers. The communes are required to take an inventory 
of the available clothing and footwear on the first day of each month 
and report to the Imperial Clothing Office within five days. 

Clothing is so scarce that scarecrows have disappeared from the 
fields, and even the linen on which old maps were mounted is now 
used for linings. 



V. GERMAN CARTELS IN WAR TIME. 

CHANGES MADE NECESSARY BY WAR. 

A number of new industrial combinations or cartels have been 
formed in Germany during the war. In form of organization they 
follow the old established models; in objects and purposes the new 
cartels are somewhat different. These war combinations represent a 
new phase in the evolution of the cartel. 

The first German syndicates were formed for the purpose of regu- 
lating production and stabilizing prices in the home market. The 
syndicate of tin-plate producers of 1862, the cartel of rail manufac- 
turers of 1863, the salt-works combination of 1868, and the first pot- 
ash syndicate of 1870 were of that character. The German indus- 
tries of those times were not exporting industries, and the cartels 
were formed for mutual protection against unrestrained competi- 
tion, most of them being, as Riesser says, "the children of neces- 
sity." The war of 1870-71 was followed by unusual industrial ex- 
pansion and overproduction resulting in the crisis of 1873. Numer- 
ous factories had to be closed, and fierce competition ensued among 
the survivors, prices in many cases being reduced below the cost of 
production. Thousands of workmen were thrown out of employ- 
ment, and wages decreased nearly 50 per cent. Even the low prices, 
however, failed to increase consumption. 

In 1876-77 the coal syndicate for the first time reduced its produc- 
tion 10 per cent. Other industries gradually replaced competition 
by more profitable price agreements. A protective tariff was intro- 
duced in 1879 to check foreign competition. In the period between 
1880 and 1885 numerous syndicates were established, some with defi- 
nite export policies. The German factories equipped for production 
surpassing the domestic needs were obliged to seek foreign markets 
to dispose of the surplus. They might be forced to sell abroad at 
lower prices than at home, but compensation for the resulting loss 
of profits was found in the economy of production, as the mills 
were enabled to run without interruption and were employed to their 
full capacity. The stronger cartels, having the home market as- 
sured to themselves, regulated export prices according to the exi- 
gencies of each individual case, reducing prices to meet foreign com- 
petition and even paying bounties to exporting member firms. This 
second phase in the evolution of the cartel may be said to have 
ended with the outbreak of the war. 

The war, of course, brought about new conditions. Exportation 
to enemy countries heretofore the best customers of Germany 
was stopped, while coal and iron, the chief articles of export to 
neutral countries, were needed largely at home. It became necessary 
to husband all resources, and this necessity led to the formation of 
new syndicates. Fears were entertained that free operation of the 
various mills and factories would require excessive quantities of 

55 



56 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

coal and lead to waste and premature exhaustion of the meager 
stocks of important raw materials. Thus, a definite plan of consoli- 
dation of glass factories in order to save coal w r as announced in 
August, 1917. In some cases the new syndicates have been formed 
voluntarily, in other cases under compulsion. Many protests have 
been raised against compulsory combinations as destructive of in- 
dustrial autonomy; in some cases counter organizations have been 
formed, as, for example, in the leather industry, where 29 manu- 
facturers united to fight the proposed compulsory syndication. It 
does not appear, however, that the Ministry of the Interior or the 
military commanders paid any attention to the protests. 

BAR-IRON SYNDICATE. 

The Bar-Iron Syndicate is one of the most important of the new 
combinations. During the last decade several fruitless attempts 
have been made to organize the manufacturers of bar iron, and it 
is due only to the " gravity of the time" (Stahl und Eisen, July 19, 
1917) that the syndicate has at last been formed. The syndicate 
forms a part of the old Steel Syndicate. A central selling agency 
was considered impracticable, as it would have required elaborate 
arrangements and a large staff of trained officials. Instead, a pro- 
vision was written into the agreement making sales of syndicate 
products subject to the syndicate's approval. In accepting orders 
or making new contracts the member firms are obliged to inform 
the customer that the contract is not to be considered binding until 
approved by the syndicate. This provision, abrogating the inde- 
pendence of the members, delayed the formation of the syndicate. 
The preliminary agreement had been signed on July 13, 1917, but a 
number of large firms refused to join. By the middle of August, 
however, all the important producers, with the sole exception of the 
Sachsische Gussstahlwerke, had signed the syndicate agreement, and 
the agreement went into effect on September 1. 

The syndicate announced its policy to regulate production, sales, 
and the prices of bar and hoop iron and take special care of war 
orders. The agreement makes it a particular duty of the members 
to do everything in their power to supply the imperial and the state 
authorities with the needed quantities of bar iron a duty which it 
has been difficult enough to fulfill heretofore. 

DYESTUFF SYNDICATE. 

The combination of German dyestuff interests, effected in 1915, and 
in operation since January 1, 1916, is of special importance to Amer- 
icans, because it means a formidable competitor for our new dye in- 
dustry in every foreign field, as well as in our own domestic market. 
To a less extent it also portends future competition to the other 
chemical industries in foreign countries which have prospered during 
the war, as the syndicated German concerns are also producers of 
pharmaceutical and other chemicals. For 30 years the coal-tar dye 
industry of Germany has been dominated by five large establish- 
ments, veritable industrial giants, supplying about nine-tenths of 
the amounts required for domestic and a large part of the foreign 
consumption. The five are: Die Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik, 



GERMAN CARTELS IN WAR TIME. 57 

Aktiengesellschaft, Mannheim-Ludwigshaf en ; Farbenfabriken vorm. 
Friedrich Bayer & Co., Aktiengesellschaft, Elberf eld Leverkusen ; 
Farbwerke vorm. Meister, Lucius & Bruening, Aktiengesellschaft, 
Hoechst; Leopold Cassella & Co., G. m. b. H., Frankfort; Aktien- 
gesellschaft fur Anilinfabrikation (briefly, "Agfa"), Berlin. 

The power of these five establishments within the industry is over- 
whelming. Smaller works dating from the early years of the in- 
dustry have survived, it is true, but no new coal-tar dye factories 
can be established in Germany ; the " big five " crush all competition. 
In 1904 the Badische and the Bayer companies united for common 
protection against combinations of their suppliers as well as their 
customers ; a short time later the "Agfa " was invited to join. The 
three companies formed a syndicate, commonly known as the "Ani- 
line Concern," for mutual protection, Chough retaining their own in- 
dependent organizations. The agreement was to remain in force for 
50 years. Important questions common to or concerning all three 
were to be passed upon by a board of delegates. At the end of the 
year the profits were to be ascertained on a uniform basis of account- 
ing and the earnings distributed according to an agreed scale. 

While the syndicate was not a legal person, its members were 
jointly interested in various concerns and established a common 
branch factory in England. In the same year (1904) another 
combination, though much less close, was formed, when a "com- 
munity of interests " was established between the Hoechst corpora- 
tion and the firm of Leopold Cassella & Co., which was subsequently 
reorganized as a limited-liability company. The Moscow and Riga 
branches of the two companies were also parties to the agreement, 
and in 1907 the smaller company of Kalle & Co., of Biebrich, was 
received into the syndicate without a change in its management. 
The objects of the syndicate were stated to be: Protection against 
competitors, joint purchase of raw materials, interchange of prod- 
ucts, mutual support in matters relating to patents and licenses, and 
the establishment of branch factories abroad. The community of 
interests was maintained also by interlocking directorates. 

The two syndicates have accomplished their objects. By their 
formation the number of competing units in the industry was re- 
duced to two, for in comparison with them the other producers are 
of little importance. By making joint purchases the syndicates suc- 
ceeded in forcing down the prices of raw materials, thus reducing 
the cost of production. A great saving of time and money was made 
through an interchange of experiences acquired both in the techni- 
cal field and in trade, in the manufacturing methods, and in the 
search for and treatment of customers. In two years the Hoechst 
syndicate is reported to have reduced its expenditure for traveling 
salesmen and advertising by one-half. Of chief importance, how- 
ever, was the restriction of competition abroad, for the syndicates 
were exporting about five-sixths of their production, the value of 
the exports of coal-tar dyes alone being well in excess of $50,000,000 
in 1913. 

The two groups have now been combined into one syndicate, which 
includes also two smaller concerns, the Chemische Fabrik Griesheim- 
Elektron and the Chemische Fabrik vorm. Weiler-ter Meer, of 
Uerdingen, the latter being a consolidation of three firms. The 
syndicate agreement is to be binding for 50 years, beginning Janu- 



58 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

ary 1, 1916. The separate organization of production of each con- 
cern is to be retained; risks in business with foreign countries are 
to be jointly and proportionately carried by all members of the 
syndicate ; profits are to be distributed according to an agreed scale. 
Arrangements have been made for a mutual exchange of informa- 
tion as to factory methods and other matters tending to reduce the 
cost of manufacture and otherwise strengthen the industry as a 
whole. 

The rapid growth of the American dye industry during the war 
has been given serious attention by the German concerns that for- 
merly controlled our market, and has doubtless been one of the fac- 
tors which have hastened the union of the former rivals. The heavy 
losses due to interruption of business in hostile countries, the large 
outstanding accounts and property interests in those countries, and 
the efforts of other countries to establish the dye industry on a large 
scale, have been the other important factors. 

SILK SYNDICATE. 

The formation of a syndicate in the silk industry was announced 
in August, 1917. Owing to the partial stoppage of imports there is 
a dearth of raw silk in the country, and the Government has under- 
taken to regulate its consumption. A commission has been appointed 
to investigate the industry and decide for what specific purposes raw 
silk may henceforth be employed. It is expected that most of the 
silk factories will be forced to close. The manufacturers have been 
invited to join the syndicate voluntarily, those who may be forced to 
close their establishments being promised an indemnity payable after 
the war. Very little willingness to join was in evidence at first and 
it was reported that the Government might be obliged to resort to 
compulsion. That process, according to a correspondent of the 
Frankfurter Zeitung, is quite simple. A representative of the Min- 
istry of the Interior calls a confidential meeting of a few manufac- 
turers and informs them of the Government's wishes; a plan is dis- 
cussed and agreed on, and other manufacturers are then invited to 
join. The latter face an accomplished fact and usually do join to 
avoid the Government's displeasure and its consequences. 

TEXTILE SYNDICATES. 

During the war a number of new syndicates have been formed in 
the textile industries. The manufacturers of ribbons, braids, and 
trimmings in general, in the Barm en-Elberf eld industrial district, 
have formed a close syndicate in order to safeguard the interests 
of the industry threatened by the general economic conditions and by 
the whims of fashion. The Saxon mills, heretofore dangerous com- 
petitors of the Barmen firms, have joined the new syndicate on 
conditions which have not been made public. Another important 
syndicate has been formed in the knitting industry. The wholesale 
dealers in knit goods also have combined for the protection of their 
interests after the war. 

The cartel of plate glass factories, known as the Verein deutscher 
Spiegelglasfabriken, formerly dominated by Belgian and French 
capitalists, has been placed under Government supervision, and its 



GERMAN CARTELS IF WAR TIME. 59 

control has passed into German hands. The syndicate has made 
peace with its principal competitor, the Gerresheimer Glashiitten- 
werke. 

War economy naturally favors the creation of syndicates both 
local and national. The distribution of commandeered raw mate- 
rials, the assignment of production quotas, and the carrying out of 
various economic measures are often placed by the military au- 
tlforities in the hands of existing associations of manufacturers, 
which are thus enabled to extend their control over nonmember firms 
also. In order to carry out its tasks economically, speedily, and 
with the best results obtainable, the central authority in this case 
the directors of the association must know the working conditions, 
the equipment, and the productive capacity of the several mills. 
Nonmember firms are thus compelled to furnish information which 
they would never give in times of peace and are indirectly forced 
to enter the combine. The organizations will probably be continued 
after the war. 

TOOL AND IMPLEMENT SYNDICATE. 

On the initiative of the Arms and Ammunition Bureau at Berlin, 
the manufacturers of implements and tools have formed seven com- 
binations with headquarters at Remscheid and Solingen. Manufac- 
turers of files, cutlery, saws, and machine knives, parts of agricultural 
machines, sheet steel, small and large implements and tools, etc., are 
represented in the seven groups which, in turn, are united in a syndi- 
cate known as Werkzeug- und Stahlkontor Remscheid, constituted as 
a limited-liability company. The objects of the syndicate are said 
to be to ascertain the quantities of raw materials needed by the in- 
dividual members, make a proportionate distribution of the raw 
materials available, investigate the productive capacity of the several 
mills, and, in connection with large orders, insist on improvements 
in the quality of the product. 

PROLONGATION OF OTHER SYNDICATES. 

The war created many opportunities for large profits in the do- 
mestic market, which in turn led to the renewal or prolongation of 
many syndicates which, in times of peace, might have been suffered 
to lapse or would have been renewed only with difficulties. These 
opportunities have resulted also in the formation of new syndicates 
which can not properly be said to be " children of necessity." The 
Zinc Syndicate, for example, has been extended until March 31, 1918; 
the North German Car Works Union until January 1, 1918. The 
Brown Coal Syndicate of Central Germany, which had been dis- 
solved in April, 1913, and could not be renewed in peace times, was 
renewed in 1915, came to an understanding with the two syndicates 
controlling the production of brown coal in Upper Lusatia and in 
the Rhine Province, and immediately raised the prices of industrial 
coal. 

COAL, SYNDICATE. 

The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate was renewed under duress 
in October, 1916. The Government had threatened to establish a 



60 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

compulsory syndicate if the agreement were not renewed before 
January 1, 1917. The new agreement was concluded for five years, 
to date from April 1, 1917. All the producing coal mines of the 
Rhine-Westphalian district are represented in the syndicate, includ- 
ing the Westphalian mines owned by the State of Prussia, the State 
being a party to the agreement. The coal trade has been placed on 
a uniform basis through the organization of new coal trade associa- 
tions in districts where the trading heretofore has been free. There 
are now 15 such associations in the Empire. 



STEEL SYNDICATE. 



The Steel Syndicate agreement was extended for the period of 
18 months to December 31, 1918. New allotment figures, in force 
on July 1, 1917, have been published. They indicate a total produc- 
tion of 5,968,843 tons, as against 6,600,000 tons in peace time, the 
reduction being due to the elimination of two large establishments, 
one of which (Wendel & Cie.), abandoned by its French owners, is 
now in process of liquidation, while the other (Rhodingen), located 
in Luxemburg, has been shut down. Twenty-three companies and 
groups are now represented in the syndicate. 

COMPULSORY SYNDICATION. 

BOOT AND SHOE SYNDICATE. 

The first industry combined and centralized in a compulsory syn- 
dicate was the manufacture of boots and shoes. The syndicate was 
formed under a decree of the Federal Council issued on March 17, 
1917. The central authority is a supervisory committee (Ueberwa- 
chungsausschuss) of the boot and shoe industry, the members of 
which are appointed by the Imperial Chancellor. A representative 
of the Chancellor attends its meetings in an advisory capacity and 
may suspend its decisions for review by the Chancellor, who must be 
kept informed of all important events. The supervisory committee 
is kept in touch with the views of the trade and the public by an 
advisory committee of seven members, selected from the trade and 
the consumers by the Chancellor. It is a legal person. 

The supervisory committee determines in individual cases whether 
a firm comes within the rules requiring membership in the syndicate, 
and what shares are to be taken by each firm ; exercises supervision 
over the companies, appoints and dismisses their managing directors ; 
determines the kind and quantity of footwear to be produced by each 
member; prescribes the principles governing the purchase prices of 
the companies ; the conditions and prices of sale, and of the distribu- 
tion of profits; examines and approves their balance sheets; dis- 
tributes raw materials as well as army and navy contracts. Any dis- 
posal made by individual firms of materials supplied by the com- 
mittee, or goods made therefrom, is legally invalid, if the permission 
of the committee has not been obtained. The committee may requisi- 
tion for a syndicate company the plant, materials, and finished goods 
of any manufacturer of footwear. The committee administers an 
equalization fund ( Ausgleichskasse) , raised by contributions from 
the companies, from which indemnities are to be paid to those com- 



GERMAN CARTELS IN WAR TIME. 61 

panies whose dividends, when compared with the turnover of the 
members for the year ending June 30, 1914, are in consequence of 
its measures less favorable than the average for all the companies. 
The expenses of the supervisory committee are met by a levy upon 
the companies. 

FEDERAL CONTROL OF ALL FOOTWEAR MANUFACTURE. 

The individual firms were compulsorily combined to form com- 
panies under the title of "Footwear manufacture and sale com- 
panies," with a capital of 100,000 marks each. Areas were deter- 
mined by the Chancellor, for each of which a company was formed 
to include all the firms in the area. Eighteen such companies have 
been formed, and their combined areas of operations appear to cover 
the whole Empire. The companies are to enforce the orders of the 
supervisory committee upon the individual firms, and to conduct the 
greater part of the wholesale trade in" footwear. 

The individual firms must manufacture footwear as required by 
the supervisory committee, which determines finally their share in 
manufacture. They must obey the requirements of their company in 
the manufacture of footwear for sale, being answerable to it for good 
workmanship, etc., and, subject to an appeal for arbitration, they 
must sell their output to it at prices fixed by the board of directors 
in the manner prescribed by the supervisory committee. Two-tenths 
of 1 per cent of the monthly output of each firm (at least one pair) 
is released from this obligation. It is a criminal offense for the mem- 
bers of the company to manufacture footwear except by permission 
of the supervisory committee, or to destroy or otherwise use contrary 
to its instructions materials obtained from or through it. The output 
is sold by and for account of the company, in the manner and at 
prices prescribed by the supervisory committee. Disputes between a 
company and its shareholder firms or its customers as to delivery of 
goods are arbitrable before a special standing board appointed for 
the district by the State government. A company may enforce in 
the ordinary courts claims for damages against its members arising 
out of their default. 

The dividends of the companies, including profits from military 
contracts and indemnities (if any) from the equalization fund, will, 
it is stated, be distributed among their members in proportion to 
their production for the year ended June 30, 1914, irrespective of 
whether or not they are actually at work. For this reason dues must 
be paid to the company for plant, land, and buildings used otherwise 
than in the service of the company. For the protection of firms shut 
down, footwear sold through the companies must not bear any name 
or trade-mark. 

Compulsory syndication of the boot and shoe industry was soon 
followed by the compulsory syndication of the trade in footwear, by 
a decree of the Federal Council issued on July 26, 191 1. The organ- 
ization was similar to that created for the manufacturing industry. 
Dealers were ccmpulsorily formed into companies for the distribution 
of new footwear, particularly the output of the syndicate and im- 
ported footwear; retailers dealt only with those distributing com- 
panies of which they were members. 



62 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

According to a report in the Frankfurter Zeitung for January 28, 
1918, the Government was contemplating a further centralization of 
the trade by closing about three-fourths of the shoe stores in the 
country. Under the syndicate arrangement the footwear manu- 
factured, amounting to about one-third of normal peace-time pro- 
duction, is distributed among 35,000 dealers in proportion to their 
peace-time turnover. The result is that some dealers receive only a 
few pairs a month, some receive only slippers, some only small sizes, 
others only large sizes, and a customer has to make the rounds of a 
large number of stores before he can be fitted. The Government now 
proposes to close all stores whose annual orders amounted to less 
than 15,000 marks before the war. That would mean the closing of 
25,000 to 27,000 small stores which would probably never reopen. 
Hence the dealers are protesting vigorously against the Govern- 
ment's plan, although it is proposed to indemnify the sufferers to 
the extent of 10 per cent of their annual turnover. The small dealers 
are generally artisans to whom the moderate profits of the shoe 
trade represent a welcome addition in income. 

OPPOSITION TO LEATHER SYNDICATION. 

A determined fight against compulsory syndication was made by 
the leather industry. Representatives of the sole-leather industry 
were in favor of syndication at first, but joined the ranks of the op- 
ponents when they saw the disastrous effects of compulsory syndi- 
cation on the smaller establishments of the boot and shoe industry 
and the soap industry. At a meeting of a committee of the Central 
Union of the German Leather Industry, held at Berlin during the 
first week of September, 1917, a protest was made against both com- 
pulsory syndication and concentration of the industry. The question 
of concentration, which would make necessary the closing of 
smaller establishments, is of particular importance for the tanneries. 
It was pointed out at the meeting that the smaller and the medium- 
sized establishments had a large part of their capital invested in the 
tanning pits, which must be kept going ; stoppage of operations would 
mean an irreparable loss. The difficulties cauLed by the special cir- 
cumstances of the industry were finally recognized by the Govern- 
ment, and the proposed forced centralization was postponed for three 
months. 

SOAP SYNDICATE. 

The compulsory syndicate of the soap industry was established 
by a decree of the Federal Council issued on June 9, 1917, and an 
order of the Chancellor issued on the same date. The average price 
of ordinary laundry soap in Germany before the war was 7 to 8 
cents per pound. In June, 1916, the prices ranged from 47 to 83 
cents. The retail price of domestic toilet soap had been 2.4 to 11. 9 cents 
per cake ; in two years of the war the prices had increased 200 to 400 
per cent. German soap manufacturers have succeeded in producing 
small quantities of raw materials during the war, but there is an in- 
creasing dearth of such materials for the manufacture of soap. 
These materials include especially tallow, fats, vegetable oils, and 
rosin. 



GEEMAN CAETELS IN WAE TIME. 63 

Statistics of German imports show that 26,824 metric tons of beef 
and sheep tallow were imported in 1913, with a total value of $4,- 
341,000, and that imports for the first half of 1914 amounted to 
10,960 tons, valued at $1,774,000. These imports came principally 
from Australia, Argentina, and the United States, Great Britain, 
France, China, and Austria-Hungary, with small quantities from 
other nations. Imports of bone fat and other scraps amounted to 
4,332 tons, valued at $535,000, in 1913, and 1,912 tons, valued at 
$237,000, in the first half of 1914. These supplies came principally 
from the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, Great Britain, 
and France, in the order named. Early in 1916 a law was passed 
prohibiting the further making of soap by any except regularly 
licensed factories. The reason for the prohibition was said to be 
that in the modern process of soap making important quantities of 
glycerin are made as a by-product, whereas in domestic soap boiling 
the glycerin is wasted. And glycerin,. is an important raw material 
for the manufacture of explosives. 

By the orders of June 9, effective July 1, 1917, the manufac- 
turers of fatty washing materials (which alone may be described as 
" soap ") were united in a syndicate of the same general character as 
the compulsory syndicate of the boot and shoe manufacturers. By 
fatty washing materials is meant washing materials containing 
oleic, fatty, or resinous acids, their salts, or other organic acids 
which, either as acids or salts, have a cleansing or purifying effect. 
All such raw materials are now controlled by the War Committee 
for Vegetable and Animal Oils and Fats, and after August, 1917, 
only the larger soap factories were supplied, smaller concerns being 
left to find what compensation they could in the sale of soap supplied 
to them on special terms by the larger concerns. The new syndicate 
is known as the Soap Manufacture & Sale Co. The headquarters of 
the company are at Berlin; the capital is 40,000,000 marks. All 
soap manufacturers established before August 1, 1914, are compul- 
sory members unless exempted by the supervisory committee. Other 
manufacturers may be allowed to join on application from the State 
governments. The constitution of the syndicate is bureaucratic. 

It is reported that the brewing industry has been formed into 
a sjoidicate under compulsion, and that 50 per cent of the breweries 
have been closed. 

A decree of the Federal Council, issued August 4, 1917, authorized 
the State governments compulsorily to combine owners of graphite 
mines and graphite preparing works into companies, for the purpose 
of common administration of the mines and the works. 

Herring fisheries, sausage and canned-goods manufacturers, and 
margarine and edible-fat producers have formed combinations, and 
numerous other national combines, as well as a great many local 
amalgamations, have been reported. The important fact is that 
this movement of consolidation, either voluntary or compulsory, has 
swept through all branches of industry and many lines of trade. 



VI. THE VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 

SOURCES OF SUPPLY. 

The problem of obtaining sufficient supplies of raw materials for 
the industries after the war is receiving the earnest attention of Ger- 
man statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants. At the beginning 
of 1918 there were important conferences in Berlin as to the materials 
that might be obtained from a Bolshevik peace with Russia. 1 Metals 
and foodstuffs were prominently discussed, along with transporta- 
tion, financing difficulties, and the known shortages in Russia. Ger- 
many is rich in coal, iron, zinc, potash salts ; other materials, such as 
lead, wood, hides, china clay, graphite, though comparatively abun- 
dant, are not produced in quantities sufficient for the domestic needs ; 
and many important materials, such as cotton, silk, jute, india rubber, 
are obtained wholly from abroad. The great textile industries in par- 
ticular are dependent on foreign sources of supply. The domestic 
production of wool, flax, and hemp is limited by the more urgent de- 
mand for the production of grain. The demand for raw materials 
will naturally be great in all industrial countries after the war, and 
fears have been expressed in Germany that the mills of the central 
Empires will face great difficulties in replenishing their stocks; the 
fear has been apparent that the United States may withhold its cot- 
ton, and the other enemy countries may refuse to assist their competi- 
tors. Germany has imported more than a billion dollars' worth of 
raw materials annually, receiving only 7 per cent of the total from 
its present allies. It is a problem well worth reflection. 

The imports of raw materials into Germany in 1913 aggregated 
1,189 million dollars in value, representing 46.4 per cent, or nearly 

1 It is known that the Imperial German Government proceeded to confiscate any pri- 
vate property which it happened to want in conquered Poland, Roumania, northern Italy, 
Russia, northern France, and Belgium. The following item from the " War Cyclopedia," 
issued by the Committee on Public Information io January, 1918, throws some light on 
the workings of the Rathenau plan in conquered territory. It should be borne in mind 
that this plan refers not only to Belgium and conquered territory generally, but was 
intended to accomplish the mobilization of needed materials in Germany as well : 

" Belgium, economic destruction. The Hague Regulations, Article XLVI, say ' Private 
property can not be confiscated.' This regulation has been violated by the Germans in 
Belgium in conformity with the Rathenau plan, devised at the very outset of the war. 
Dr. Walter Rathenau, president of a great German electric company, proposed, in 
August, 1914, a comprehensive program for the mobilization and organization of the 
economic resources of the German Empire. Special stress was laid upon the necessity 
of obtaining raw materials, partly by purchase in neutral countries and partly by the 
seizure of all stores in the conquered lands. A new bureau, with 36 subdivisions, was 
created to carry out this plan, under the direction of the Ministry of War. As soon as 
Belgium was occupied this bureau began its work. By 66 separate decrees in less than 
two years the Germans have seized thousands of machines, countless machine tools, 
lathes, oils and fats, chemical and mineral products, wool, linen, jute, cotton, thread of 
all kinds, rubber, automobiles, locomotives, motors, hoises and other animals, hides, and 
many other products, completely stripping Belgium. The ultimate purpose of these 
seizures is disclosed in a speech of Herr Beumer in the Prussian Diet last February : 
' Anybody who knows the present state of things in Belgian industry will agree with 
me that it must take at least some years assuming that Belgium is independent at all 
before Belgium can even think of competing with us in the world market. And anybody 
who has traveled, as I have done, through the occupied districts of France will agree 
with me that so much damage has been done to industrial property that no one need 
b-i a prophet in order to say that it will take more than 10 years before we need think 
of France as a competitor or of the reestablishment of French industry.' " 

64 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 65 

one-half of the total imports of merchandise. The term " raw mate- 
rials" includes all articles recognized as such by the international 
statistical classification. More than one-half of the total value in 
1913 was represented by seven classes of articles : Cotton, hides and 
skins, wool, copper, wood, iron ore, and coal. Other principal raw 
materials imported in 1913 were, in the order of their importance, 
fur skins, Chilean saltpeter, silk, india rubber, tobacco, linseed, copra, 
mineral oils, palm nuts, jute, brown coal, tin, flax, and phosphate of 
lime. Seventeen countries furnished materials valued at 20 million 
dollars or more: United States, 170 million dollars; Russia, 125; 
British India, 96; Austria-Hungary, 76; Argentina, 75; United 
Kingdom, 65; Australia, 56; Chile, 46; Italy, 44; France, 44; British 
Africa, 42 ; Dutch East Indies, 41 ; Sweden, 28 ; Egypt, 27 ; Spain, 26 ; 
China, 24 ; and Brazil, 23 million dollars. The imports by continents 
were : Europe, 489 million dollars ; America, 354 ; Asia, 182 ; Africa, 
101 ; and Oceania, 63. 

The principal sources of the various raw materials imported will 
be indicated in the discussion of the several classes of imports. The 
quantities are shown throughout in metric tons of 2,204.6 pounds. 
The values are frontier values, representing the value of the article 
as it reaches the customs frontier ; they include freight and insurance, 
but not the duty. German statistics show countries of origin that 
is, countries where the goods have been produced, though in some 
cases the countries of shipment seem to have been recorded. 

FOODSTUFFS. 1 

In addition to industrial materials, Germany in times of peace im- 
ported large quantities of foodstuffs. Domestic production of bread 
grain sufficed for about 10 or 10J months, and the deficit had to be 
made good by imports. Rye alone was exported, in quantities repre- 
senting nearly 4J per cent of the production. For the leading cereals 
the annual averages for the five years 1909-1113 were, according to 
official German statistics, as follows: Wheat, production, 153,154.000 
bushels ; net imports, 76,767,000 bushels ; rye, production, 445,043^000 
bushels; net exports, 16,367,000 bushels; barley, production, 153,- 
529,000 bushels; net imports, 141,474,000 bushels; oats, production, 
591,996,000 bushels; net imports, 9,714,000 bushels; corn, net imports, 
32,159.000 bushels. These production figures are really estimates and 
are not the result of actual enumeration. 

Wheat was imported chiefly from the United States, Russia, Argen- 
tina, Canada, and Roumania; rye from Russia; barley from Russia, 
the United States, and Austria-Hungary; oats from Russia, Argen- 
tina, and the United States ; corn from Argentina, the United States, 
Russia, and Roumania. The net imports of rice were 293,252 tons in 
1913, the bulk coming from British India. 

Other foodstuffs imported in 1913 included 249,216 tons of beans, 
peas, lentils, and vetches, supplied chiefly by Russia, British India, 
and Austria-Hungary ; 382,050 tons of potatoes from the Netherlands, 
Russia, Belgium, Italy, and Austria-Hungary ; 314,696 tons of garden 
truck from the Netherlands, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Egypt, and 
France; 1,002,580 tons of fruits and nuts (apples from France, Italy, 

1 See also substitute materials, p. 75. 
43339 18 5 



66 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

Austria-Hungary, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United States ; 
oranges from Spain and Italy; plums from the United States; al- 
monds from Italy, Morocco, and Spain; grapes from Italy, France, 
and Spain; bananas from Spain and Colombia; raisins ^rom Turkey). 

Imports of colonial produce included 168,250 tons of coffee, valued 
at $52,259,000; 52,878 tons of cocoa, 4,290 tons of tea, and 11,019 tons 
of spices. Coffee came principally from Brazil (115,949 tons) and 
Guatemala (21,536 tons) ; cocoa from British and Portuguese West 
Africa, Ecuador, and Brazil ; tea from China and the East Indies. 

The imports of meats in 1913 were 68,425 tons and the exports 
4,686 tons. Beef and veal were imported chiefly from Denmark and 
the Netherlands; pork from the Netherlands, Russia, and Denmark. 
In that year Germany also imported 107,387 tons of lard, valued at 
$28,300,000, and 26,428 tons of oleomargarine. Nearly all the lard 
(101,182 tons) came from the United States, and likewise most of the 
oleomargarine (19,633 tons). The imports of poultry were also large, 
including 8,587,000 geese, 10,663 tons of chickens, 2,114 tons of ducks, 
and 373 tons of other fowls. The imports of eggs were 166,751 tons, 
valued at $44,788,000. Russia and Austria-Hungary furnished 84 per 
cent of the total. 

The imports of fish in 1913 were 386,496 tons, valued at $32,341,000. 
Herring was imported from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
and Norway ; salmon, from the United States ; other fish, from Swe- 
den, Denmark, and the Netherlands; caviare, from Russia. 

Dairy products were imported chiefly from Russia, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands. They included 54,239 tons of butter, valued at $28,- 
252,000 ; 26,265 tons of cheese, valued at $9,054,000; and 44,375 tons of 
cream, valued at $8,174.000. 

The principal articles of fodder imported were bran and oil cakes 
and meal. The imports of bran in 1913 totaled 1,414,256 tons, valued 
at $31,020,000, the bulk coming from Russia, Argentina, and the 
United States. Rice bran and waste to the amount of 206,475 tons 
was imported, one-half of the total being supplied by British India. 
The imports of oil cake were 828,548 tons, valued at $28,217,000. Rus- 
sia furnished 320,173 tons; the United States, 215,236 tons; France, 
56,979 tons. 1 

COAL. 2 

Coal is produced in six large coal fields, the most important of 
which are the basin of the Ruhr, the Saar district, and Upper Silesia. 
In 1913 the quantity produced was 190,109,440 metric tons; imports, 
10,540,069 tons; exports, 34,598,408 tons. In 1914 production de- 
clined to 161,535,224 tons, and in 1915 to 146,712,350 tons. The pro- 
duction of brown coal or lignite averages above 80,000,000 tons a 
year; it was 87,233,084 tons in 1913, declined to 83,946,906 tons in 
1914, but increased to 88,369,554 tons in 1915. The excess of imports 
over exports of lignite has averaged between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 
tons a year. 

IRON AND IRON ORE. 

During the five years 1908-1913 the production of iron ores in- 
creased from 24.278,151 tons to 34,983,753 tons; imports increased 

1 See also " Oilseeds," p. 73. 

2 See also coal mining, p. 40, and proposed Government monopoly, p. 132. 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 67 

from 7,732,949 tons to 14,024,318 tons, while the exports decreased 
from 3,067,737 tons to 2,613,158 tons. Of the quantity imported in 
1913, Sweden supplied 4,563,635 tons; France, 3,810,887 tons; Spain, 
3,632,058 tons; Russia, 489,382 tons; Algeria, 481,157 tons. In addi- 
tion, 680,371 tons of manganese ores were imported chiefly from 
Russia and British India. 

The production of pig iron increased steadily until 1913, when 
17,513,819 tons were produced. In 1914 production declined to 
14,389,547 tons and in 1915 to 11,789,931 tons Imports in 1913 were 
124,316 tons and exports 782,911 tons. The production of 1915, by 
districts, was as follows: Rhineland- Westphalia, 5,165,618 tons; Lor- 
raine, 1,817,965; Luxemburg, 1,599,981; Saar district, 801,597; Sile- 
sia, 777,625; central Germany, 371,686; southern Germany and 
Thuringia, 234,669; northern Germany, 231,140. 

MAGANESE AND WOLFRAM. 

German manganese ores, found chiefly in Thuringia and the 
Harz Mountains, are generally poor in manganese contents. The 
production for 1910 included 2,634,451 tons of ores holding less than 
12 per cent of manganese; 266,825 tons of ores containing 12 to 30 
per cent, and only 166 tons of ores with manganese contents exceed- 
ing 30 per cent. During the last five years preceding the war the 
average net imports per year were 492,125 tons. In 1913 the im- 
ports of manganese ores totaled 680,371 tons. Russia furnished 
446,942 tons; British India, 177,638; Spain, 27,467; and Brazil. 
21,873 tons. 

The annual production of wolfram or tungsten ores in Germany is 
about 5,000 tons. The imports in 1913 were 4,803 tons. British 
India and Australia furnished more than one-third of the total, the 
remainder coming from the Straits Settlements, Portugal, Argentina, 
and the United Kingdom. 

COPPER 1 AND NICKEL. 

The consumption of copper in Germany during the five years 
1908-1912 averaged 207,942 tons per year, Germany being, after the 
United States, the largest consumer of copper in the world. Do- 
mestic production of copper had increased from 30,001 tons to 45,465 
tons during that period, the average annual production being 35,806 
tons, or a little over one-sixth of the total consumption. In 1913, 
Germany imported 225,392 tons of crude copper, valued at $79,- 
795,000, besides 5,182 tons of scrap, coins, etc., and 14,588 tons of 
brass, bronze, and other alloys of copper. The bulk of the imports 
of crude copper 197,353 tons, or nearly 88 per cent of the total 
came from the United States. Australia furnished 13,343 tons and 
Belgium 5,523 tons; the United Kingdom, Japan, Serbia, Spain, and 
Sweden supplied between 1,000 and 2,000 tons each. During the war 
extraordinary measures have been taken to secure sufficient supplies 
of copper for war purposes. Under an ordinance of the Federal 
Council private stocks of copper and its alloys, exceeding a small 
minimum, have been commandeered; copper coins have been re- 
placed by iron disks and zinc tokens; and "the church bells have 

1 See also substitute materials, p. 78. 



68 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

gone to join the battle and now speak a different language " (Ham- 
burger Nachrichten, July 29, 1917). Even the celebrated "Kaiser 
bell " of the Cologne cathedral has been reported melted for its 20 
tons of copper. 

Germany produced 4,800 tons of nickel in 1912. The imports dur- 
ing that year, including scrap and nickel coins, were 2,027 tons and 
the exports 1,679 tons, indicating an annual consumption of 5,148 
tons. About two-thirds of the nickel imported comes from the United 
States, and the remainder chiefly from Belgium and the United 
Kingdom. In 1913 the imports were 3,315 tons, valued at $2,683,000. 
The principal countries from which nickel was obtained were: The 
United States, 2,157 tons; Belgium, 529; United Kingdom, 414; and 
Austria-Hungary, 60 tons. 

TIN AND ZINC. 

The annual consumption of tin plate in Germany is estimated at 
150,000 tons. About 44,000 tons of tin plate have been imported 
annually from the United Kingdom. It has been pointed out by 
German economists that the German mills manufacturing 106.000 
tons of the annual consumption might as well manufacture the re- 
maining 44,000 tons, but the difficulty lies in obtaining the neces- 
sary tin. In 1912 Germany produced 10,600 tons of tin, imported 
15,550 tons, and exported 6,368 tons (including scrap), indicating 
an annual consumption of 19,782 tons. In 1913 the imports were 
14,261 tons, valued at $13,840,000. The principal countries of origin 
or shipment were: The Dutch East Indies, 6,384 tons; the United 
Kingdom, 1,697 tons; Australia, 1,661 tons; British India, 942 tons; 
Straits Settlements, 941 tons. The exports were 6,437 tons, and 
domestic production has been estimated at 13,000 tons, indicating 
a consumption of about 20,800 tons. In addition, 18,727 tons of tin 
ores were imported, the bulk coming from Bolivia, which supplied 
15,831 tons. Australia furnished 1,001 tons, Chile 868 tons, Japan 
392 tons. 

Zinc is produced in Germany in quantities large enough to leave 
a considerable surplus for exportation after the domestic needs have 
been satisfied. The annual averages for the five years 1908-1912 
have been as follows: Production, 234,120 tons; imports, 46,070 tons; 
exports, 87,025 tons; indicated consumption, 193,165 tons. Produc- 
tion increased during that period from 216,490 tons to 269,161 tons. 
The principal countries from which Germany has been importing 
zinc, are Belgium, Austria-Hungary, Norway, and the Netherlands. 
In 1913 the imports totaled 55,964 tons, valued at $6,208,000, and the 
exports 105,244 tons, valued at $12,695,000. 

LEAD. 

Germany imports about one-fourth of the lead consumed by its 
industries. Domestic production of lead increased from 164,079 tons 
in 1908 to 176,633 tons in 1912. The annual averages for that five- 
year period have been as follows : Production, 165,986 tons ; imports, 
85, 
In 
eluding 




VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 69 

nished 42,793 tons, or more than one-half of the total. Imports from 
the United States were 16,273 tons, as against 35,843 tons in 1911. 
Smaller quantities were imported from Belgium, the United King- 
dom, and Australia. 

ALUMINUM. 

The aluminum industry is comparatively new, but the use of 
aluminum has increased considerably in Germany during the last 
two decades. In 1900 the imports of this metal were only 943 tons; 
in 1905 they had risen to 3,252 tons and in 1910 to 9,982 tons. The 
imports were highest in 1912, when 18,112 tons were imported. In 
1913 Germany imported 15,323 tons of aluminum, besides 38,452 tons 
of bauxite and cryolite. The principal countries supplying alumi- 
num in 1913 were: Switzerland, 6,064 tons; France, 4,165 tons; 
United Kingdom, 1,899 tons; Austria-Hungary, 1,257 tons; the 
United States, 837 tons ; Norway, 711 tons. Switzerland still is the 
principal source of supply, furnishing 9,261 tons in 1915 and 10,538 
tons in 1916. From Norway only 3 tons were obtained in 1915. 

Data on production of aluminum in Germany are not available. 
The high price of the metal has made possible the exploitation of 
low-grade bauxite, and successful experiments are reported to have 
been made in the extraction of aluminum directly from clay. As 
the future of the copper industry in Germany is regarded as highly 
uncertain, many large copper works are turning their attention to 
aluminum. The metal is largely used for war purposes. In Janu- 
ary, 1918, the imperial mint coined 1,842.800 1-pfennig pieces of 
aluminum. 

PO1TERY CLAYS GRAPHITE. 1 

China clay or kaolin is found in Saxony and Silesia, and consid- 
erable quantities are exported, but the imports are much larger. In 
1913 the exports were 42,058 tons and the import? 301,306 tons. Aus- 
tria-Hungary supplied 171,236 tons and the United Kingdom 118,203 
tons. 

Graphite is mined in Bavaria, the annual production being above 
12,000 tons, and 4,000 or 5,000 tons are exported annually. Larger 
quantities are imported, however. In 1913 the imports were 37.168 
tons, Austria-Hungary alone supplying 19,653 tons. The remainder 
came from Ceylon, Italy, Japan, and the United States. 

RAW COTTON. 2 

Cotton is the principal article obtained from over-sea countries, 
representing nearly 6 per cent of the total value of all merchandise 
imported. During the last three years of peace the annual consump- 
tion of cotton (including linters) in Germany was 474.915 tons, or 
about 2,094,000 bales of 500 pounds. The United States furnished 
more than three-fourths of the total. In 1913 the imports of raw 
cotton totaled 477.945 tons, valued at $144,496,000. The United States 
supplied 369,397 tons, or 77 per cent of the total; British India, 

1 See also substitute materials, p. 79. 2 See also substitute materials, p. 80. 



70 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

57,520 tons ; Egypt, 40,555 tons. Quantities of some importance were 
received from China, the Dutch East Indies, Turkey, and Brazil. 
German East Africa, where the cultivation of cotton has been en- 
couraged, supplied 1,279 tons, as against 296 tons in 1909. The im- 
ports of linters in 1913 amounted to 43,183 tons, valued at $5,036,000. 
The United States furnished the bulk of these imports also The 
necessity of purchasing large quantities of cotton in the United 
States has been a cause of irritation to the German mill owners, but 
no satisfactory substitute for American cotton has been found as yet. 

WOOL. 

Wool is also imported in large quantities, domestic production be- 
ing comparatively small. In 1860 Germany had about 28,000,000 
sheep; at the census of December 1, 1915, only 5,073,478 sheep were 
found in the Empire. During the last five years of peace, 1909- 
1913, the imports of wool averaged 445,000,000 pounds a year. In 
1913 the imports were 199,271 tons, of which 110,403 tons were 
merino, and 88,868 tons crossbred wool. Eighty-eight per cent of 
the wool imported was greasy wool. Of the raw merino wool 61,446 
tons came from Australia, 25,196 tons from British South Africa, 
12,342 tons from Argentina, and 5,814 tons from Uruguay. Cross- 
bred wool was supplied chiefly by the following countries : Argen- 
tina, 37,399 tons; Australia, 14,931 tons; Chile, 4,146 tons; Uruguay. 
3,552 tons; New Zealand, 3,062 tons; Morocco, 1,877 tons; Russia, 
1,235 tons. Washed merino wool came from Australia, British 
South Africa, and Belgium; washed crossbred wool from Belgium, 
France, and the United Kingdom. The total value of the raw wool 
imported was $98,216,000. In addition, 17,674 tons of carded and 
combed wool were imported, valued at $14,605,000, coming chiefly 
from the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. 

SILK. 

During the last five years of peace, the imports of silk (raw, arti- 
ficial, floss, and twist) into Germany averaged 10,166 tons, valued 
at $51,791,000. The imports of undyed raw silk, the product of 
the mulberry moth, totaled 3,895 tons in 1913, valued at $35,816,000. 
Italy furnished 2,706 tons, other important sources being France, 
Japan, and Switzerland. Floss silk came principally from France, 
Italy, and Switzerland; artificial silk, from Belgium. At various 
times attempts have been made to introduce silkworm culture into 
Germany but none has been successful. The war has revived the 
discussion whether it may not be possible to make the silk industry 
independent of outside supplies. It has been shown that the silk- 
worm and the mulberry tree both thrive in Germany, and it is now 
proposed to feed the caterpillars on the leaves of the comfrey 
(tiymphytum officmale), which grows readily in Germany. It is 
said four or five crops of cocoons could be obtained during one year 
instead of one, as with mulberry leaves. A company, the Deutsche 
Seidenbau Gesellschaft, has been organized, experiments are con- 
tinually being made, and good results reported; the worms seem to 
thrive on the leaves and the silk is said to be of an excellent quality. 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 71 

The technical difficulties, however, are not so easily overcome. To 
produce the cocoons necessary for the quantity of silk consumed 
would require the labor of 400,000 people, and the spinning of the 
cocoons would call for 20,000 to 25,000 more. The spinning requires 
much experience and skill, and it seems quite impossible that within 
a reasonable length of time a sufficient number of people could be 
trained for this work, and it is feared the product would cost more 
than imported silk. 

FLAX, HEMP, AND JUTE. 1 

Flax was formerly cultivated in Germany on a total area of about 
25,000 to 27,000 acres, most of these plantations being located in 
Silesia. In 1916 the area planted was 54,400 acres, and as the 
demand for flax has been increasing, the war administration re- 
quested that flax be cultivated on an area of at least 123,500 acres 
in 1917. The area actually planted in 1917 was about 111,200 
acres. In order to encourage flax growing, the War Association for 
Flax Culture has fixed fiber prices for growers which are consider- 
ably higher than in peace times, ranging from $2.15 to $3 per 100 
pounds. In 1913 Germany imported 71,633 tons of flax, chiefly from 
Russia (65,746 tons) and Austria-Hungary (3,785 tons), and 22,388 
tons of flax tow from Russia and Italy. The imports were valued at 
$17,681,000. 

Hemp is also cultivated in Germany on a small scale, and during 
the war experiments have been made in growing hemp on moorlands. 
The Hemp Growers' Association hopes to plant 30,000 to 50,000 acres 
in 1918, and expects within 10 years to grow enough to meet all re- 
quirements. In 1913 the imports of hemp totaled 48,651 tons, the 
bulk coming from Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. In addition, 
15,998 tons of hemp tow were imported. The value of these imports 
was $10,595,000. 

During the five years 1871-1875 the average annual consumption 
of jute in Germany was only 6,238 tons. In 1911 Germany had 38 
jute-spinning mills with an annual production of 148,520 tons of 
yarn. In 1913 the consumption of jute reached 154,241 tons, or 5 
pounds per head of population. The imports of jute and jute tow 
for that year were 162,063 tons, valued at $22,371,000. British India 
alone furnished 158,456 tons, or nearly 98 per cent of the total. 

The following quantities of other vegetable fibers were imported 
in 1913 : 2,396 tons of ramie from China ; 3,993 tons of manila hemp 
and tow from the Philippines ; 3,609 tons of sisal hemp, chiefly from 
German East Africa, with smaller quantities from the Dutch East 
Indies, the United States, and British East Africa; 12,199 tons of 
agave fiber, nearly all from Mexico; 2,115 tons of coconut fiber from 
British India and Ceylon; 3,341 tons of kapok, chiefly from the 
Dutch East Indies ; 6,613 tons of Indian and New Zealand hemp and 
other fibers, chieflly from India and New Zealand, with smaller 
quantities from the Dutch East Indies and British East Africa. 

INDIA RUBBER. 2 

The imports of india rubber into Germany during the years 1911- 
1913 averaged 20,340 tons. Owing to lower prices prevailing in 1913, 

1 See also substitute materials, pp. 81-82. 

2 See also substitute materials, pp. 75 and 82. 



72 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

the aggregate import value declined from $40,329,000 in 1911 to 
$29,973,000 in 1913, although the quantity imported in the latter year 
was somewhat larger, amounting to 20,497 tons, as against 19,959 
tons in 1911. The British Empire and Brazil furnished considerably 
more than one-half of the total imported in 1913, the former supply- 
ing 7,081 tons and the latter 5,556 tons. British India supplied 4,268 
tons; Ceylon, 1,125; the Straits Settlements, 689; the United King- 
dom, 497; British Africa, 502 tons. From the German colonies in 
Africa, 2,831 tons of rubber were obtained. The Belgian Kongo and 
the Dutch East Indies furnished more than a thousand tons each. 
In 1913, in addition to india rubber, Germany imported also 2,189 
tons of gutta-percha, chiefly from the British and the Dutch East 
Indies; 1,094 tons of balata gum, nearly all from Venezuela, and 
4,581 tons of scraps and waste. Numerous substitutes for india rub- 
ber have been tried; none of them, as far as is known, has proved a 
success. The hopes of the German economist Schulz-Mehrin that 
Germany might succeed, by the production of synthetic rubber, not 
only in making herself independent of foreign sources of rubber, 
but even in making other countries dependent on the German pro- 
duction of the substitute, as has been the case with the coal-tar dyes, 
appear to be somewhat premature. 

HIDES AND SKINS. 

The imports of hides and skins in 1913 totaled 251,467 tons, valued 
at $120,026,000. Cattle hides were imported chiefly from Argentina, 
British India, Brazil, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, and China ; 
calfskins from France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Denmark, and 
Sweden ; horsehides from the United Kingdom, France, and Austria- 
Hungary; lambskins from Austria-Hungary, Spain, Greece, and 
France; sheepskins from Austria-Hungary, Russia, Denmark, 
Algeria, France, United Kingdom, Morocco, and Spain; goatskins 
from British India, Russia, France, Algeria, United Kingdom, Mo- 
rocco, Austria-Hungary, and the Dutch East Indies. The exports 
of hides during the year were 67,803 tons, the net- imports being 
183,664 tons. 

The imports of raw skins for furriers' work, including skins of 
hares and rabbits, totaled 6,021 tons, valued at $31,014,000; of fur 
skins wholly or partly dressed, 2,144 tons, valued at $15,698,000. 
The United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom fur- 
nished the bulk of the fur skins. The exports of dressed fur skins 
were larger than the imports, amounting to 3,223 tons. 

LEAF TOBACCO. 1 

German tobacco factories consume about 100,000 tons of raw 
tobacco per year. In 1913 domestic production furnished 20,667 
tons; 83,075 tons of tobacco were imported and 344 tons exported, 
indicating a consumption of 103,398 tons for the year. Production 
has been declining of late, but is now to be stimulated by higher 
duties. By the law of July 1, 1916, the import duty on foreign leaf 
tobacco has been increased from $9.17 to $14.03 per 100 pounds, plus 
an ad valorem duty increased from 40 to 65 per cent. The tobacco 

1 See also substitute materials, p. 76. 






VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 73 

trade is now controlled by a Government corporation. The imports 
of leaf tobacco in 1913, totaling 81,400 tons, valued at $31,956,000, 
were distributed as follows: Dutch East Indies, 38,322 tons; Brazil, 
9,255; Turkey, 8,178; the Dominican Republic, 7,364; United States, 
7,311 tons. Smaller quantities were imported from Colombia, Greece, 
Russia, and Cuba. 

OILSEEDS. 1 

Germany imports considerably over a million tons of oilseeds and 
fruits annually, rapeseed alone being produced in larger quantities 
at home. In 1913 the imports of oleaginous fruits and seeds totaled 
1,747,388 tons, valued at $127,925,000. Linseed, copra, and palm nuts 
are the principal imports of this class. In 1913 Germany imported 
560.428 tons of linseed, chiefly from Argentina, British India, and 
Russia, Argentina alone furnishing 429,664 tons. The imports of 
copra totaled 196,598 tons, the bulk coming from the Dutch and 
British East Indies; the Philippines supplied 12,905 tons. The 
imports of palm nuts were 235,921 tons, of \\hich British West Africa 
supplied 206,145 tons and German Africa 17,167 tons. Cotton seed 
was imported chiefly from Egypt, with 10.062 tons from the United 
States, the imports totaling 219,797 tons. Rapeseed was imported 
from British India. Roumania, and Russia; peanuts, from French 
and British West Africa and British India; sesame, from China 
and British India. 

PETROLEUM. 

In 1913 Germany produced 120,983 tons of crude petroleum and 
imported 1,024,220 tons, exclusive of lubricating oils. The imports 
of kerosene were 745,466 tons, valued at $16,632,000. The United 
States supplied 574,466 tons; Austria-Hungary, 119,680 tons; Rou- 
mania, 33,336, and Russia, 17,493 tons. These four countries fur- 
nished the bulk of the lubricating oils imported. Heavy benzine 
came chiefly from the Dutch East Indies ; gas oil from Austria-Hun- 
gary; raw benzine from Roumania, Russia, the United States, and 
the Dutch East Indies. 

Germany is now receiving petroleum from Roumania and Austria, 
but the supplies are insufficient, as the Roumanian oil is utilized 
chiefly for gasoline for the use of aeroplanes and submarines and 
other war purposes. Petroleum for private use is obtainable only 
on cards, and the quantities available are wholly inadequate. Cards 
may be granted only to those who have neither gas nor electric light 
fittings. Farmers find it particularly hard to obtain any petroleum 
at all. 

FERTILIZERS. 

Germany is rich in potash salts and may almost be said to possess 
a monopoly of the potash trade. She has had to import large quanti- 
ties of nitrates and phosphates, however. The imports of Chilean 
saltpeter increased from 344,209 tons in 1890 to 774,318 tons in 1913, 
the imports in the latter year being valued at $40,912,000. In that 
year 66,065 tons of Norway saltpeter synthetic nitrate of lime were 

J See also fodder statistics, p. 66. 



74 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAE. 

imported from Norway and Sweden. The chemical factories are ex- 
pected to provide sufficient quantities of synthetic sulphate of am- 
monia and other nitrogen fertilizers, so that imported saltpeter may 
not be needed after the war. 

The imports of phosphate rock natural phosphate of lime in 
1913 were .929,560 tons, valued at $11,062,000. The United States 
supplied 421,212 tons; Algeria, 191,448; Tunis, 108,007; Christmas 
Island, 70,467; Belgium, 53,439 tons. 

The exports of potash salts (fertilizer salts) in 1913 totaled 1,676.- 
187 tons, valued at $15,152,000. The United States took 812,537 tons, 
or nearly one-half of the total. The Netherlands, the United King- 
dom, Austria-Hungary, and Sweden each took between one and two 
hundred thousand tons. The production of kainite and other raw 
salts in Germany increased from 1,351,100 tons in 1892 to 9,606,900 
tons in 1911. 

WOOD AND WOOD PRODUCTS. 

The imports of common woods timber and lumber for building 
and industrial purposes totaled 5,881,976 tons in 1913 and were 
valued at $74,105,000. Oak, beech, and other hardwoods were im- 
ported from Russia, Austria-Hungary, the United States, Japan, 
France, Switzerland, and Australia; softwoods principally from 
Russia, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Finland, the United States, and 
French West Africa. 

The cellulose and paper factories imported 1,284,873 tons of wood, 
valued at $9,480,000. Russia supplied five-sixths of the total and 
Austria-Hungary the remainder. 

SUBSTITUTE MATERIALS. 

Necessity being the mother of invention, numerous substitutes 
have taken the place of articles formerly imported. The substitutes 
are of two kinds, some representing new inventions, while others are 
simply adaptations of old materials to new uses. The chemical in- 
dustries are reported to have done wonders in preparing substitutes 
for foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. Some of these substi- 
tutes will probably continue in use even after the war, but a large 
majority will doubtless be discarded as soon as the customary prod- 
ucts become available. The manufacture of foodstuffs has become 
a " substitute " industry almost exclusively. Chickory, roasted 
acorns, and other substitutes have taken the place of coffee, and a 
new morning drink has been facetiously described by the Berlin 
Tageblatt as a " substitute for the coffee substitute." Substitute cof- 
fee can be made as hot as real coffee ; it has the same color ; only the 
taste is different. The Berlin Kreuz-Zeitung of August 28, 1917, an- 
nounced an epoch-making discovery in the realm of alimentation 
which " must surely bring to naught all starvation plans " of the 
enemy. Commenting on the news of this wonderful achievement of 
the chemical science, the Leipziger Volkszeitung of August 30, 1917, 
remarked skeptically : " We remember many such wonderful discov- 
eries made by the men of science. Especially do we remember the 
transformation of straw into flour and meal for human consumption. 
What a shame that with such wonderful discoveries no one is able 
to satisfy hunger." No satisfactory substitute has it seems been 
invented for either wheat or potatoes. 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 75 

According to an official report of the Food Administration to the 
Ministry of War, the chemical industries have created more than 
10,000 substitutes, including 7,000 substitute articles of food and 3,000 
substitute materials for military purposes. Most of these substitutes 
and imitations were invented or discovered during the year 1917, for 
at the beginning of that year the number of substitutes produced was 
given as only 2,000, including 1,200 articles of food. 

In the metal industries, iron and zinc have largely replaced the 
other metals. Zinc is much less valuable than copper as regards dur- 
ability, elasticity, and conductivity, and is more difficult to work. By 
extensive experiments the Germans are said to have succeeded in re- 
fining it so that it can be used as a substitute for brass for certain 
purposes, such as shell fuses. It has been employed in the manufac- 
ture of electric cables. Various zinc and lead alloys have also been 
utilized. One of the Breslau tin-foil factories is reported to have 
succeeded in providing a substitute for tin-foil by producing zinc 
foil. The new product is not to be distinguished from tin foil and is 
supposed to render the same services. Cardboard boxes have largely 
replaced tin cans. 

According to the Neue Ziircher Zeitung, systematic investigations 
into the properties of pit coal have been carried on by the Kaiser Wil- 
lielm Institut fiir Kohlenforschung and have yielded important in- 
dustrial results. The treatment of coal with liquid sulphurous acid 
at ordinary temperatures has produced one-half per cent, by weight, 
of viscous, golden-yellow mineral oils. A process has also been elab- 
orated by which through heating naphthalene under pressure, in the 
presence of aluminum chloride, an oil is produced that can be used 
for illuminating purposes in the same manner as petroleum. 

Benzol and mixtures of benzol with alcohol are employed as sub- 
stitutes for gasoline as automobile fuel. 

Cellulose, paper yarns, and nettle fibers are largely used as substi- 
tutes for textile materials which have been obtained from foreign 
countries heretofore. The uses to which paper textiles are put are 
constantly increasing, and qualities that are durable and will even 
stand washing are being produced. The Public Bureau for the 
Testing of Wares (Oeffentliches Waren-Priifungs-Amt, Berlin, Leip- 
zigerstrasse) is constantly making experiments with various substi- 
tute materials to ascertain their physical and chemical properties. 
In February, 1916, the director issued an appeal to the public asking 
all interested parties to communicate to the bureau their experiences 
and results of observation and experiments. 

In the German rubber industry the situation is said to have been 
eased by the progress made in rubber regeneration and by the substi- 
tution of mechanical spring wheels for pneumatic tires. The idea of 
exploiting Germaji caoutchouc plants has been given up. 

The substitutes for some of the more important articles and mate- 
rials are considered below. 

FOOD AND DRINK. 1 

The various substitutes for wheat and rye are divided by Prof. 
Jolles into two classes those that possess some food value and those 
that have none or nearly none. Barley, corn, oats, and potatoes are 

1 See statistics of domestic production and imports, p. 65. 



76 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

placed in the former class, while the latter includes straw, hay, wood 
meal, beets, and Iceland moss. Oats have failed utterly as bread 
grain and are no longer ground. By an order of the Federal Council, 
issued October 28, 1914, the percentage of the berry to be ground into 
flour was fixed at 72 for rye and 75 for wheat. An order of January 
5, 1915, increased these percentages to 82 and 80, respectively, author- 
izing the States to prescribe higher percentages. 

Under the order of March 31, 1915, " war bread " was to contain at 
least 10 per cent of potato flakes, starch, or meal, and 90 per cent of 
rye flour, or at least 30 per cent of crushed or grated potatoes and 70 
per cent of rye flour. Such bread was to be marked with the letter 
" K " (Kriegsbrod) . If the percentage of potato meal exceeded 20, or 
the admixture of crushed potatoes was more than 40 per cent in 
weight, the bread was to be marked " KK." Potatoes might be re- 
placed by ground soya beans or pulse, by barley or oat flour, finely 
ground bran, corn meal, manioc, tapioca, or sago. The war bread has 
been held responsible for the numerous cases of dysentery in Ger- 
many. Rye has been ground to yield as high as 94 per cent of flour, 
and the bran contents, not being easily digestible, are considered the 
principal cause of the disease. 

A substitute for meat used in the preparation of war sausages is 
made from the blood of cattle. It consists of coagulated blood albu- 
men bleached by peroxide of hydrogen. Vegetable meat, consisting 
of wheat gluten colored red, has also been placed on the market. 

Numerous egg substitutes are offered to the housewife. They con- 
sist, as a rule, of baking powder dyed yellow, with an addition of 
starch flour. They look yellow and make the dough rise, but have 
little food value. Those that are really useful consist of bleached 
and dried blood albumen or of casein preparations mixed with starch 
flour. 

The substitutes for coffee are also numerous. They include chicory, 
dandelion roots, shredded beets, buckwheat, various legumes, and 
residues of fruits; even the seeds of various weeds are roasted and 
sold as coffee substitutes. The use of roasted rye has been pro- 
hibited. Cocoa husks and ground roasted chestnuts are the chief 
substitues for cocoa. Strawberry leaves and various vines furnish 
substitutes for tea. 

Tartaric acid, diluted with water and colored with a yellow coal- 
tar dye, is used as a substitute for lemon juice. It is usually per- 
fumed with a few drops of lemon oil. 

The manufacture of artificial rum has been rendered difficult by 
the scarcity of alcohol. Hence a substitute for the rum substitute is 
prepared. It is a colored essence of rum, a few drops of which are 
sufficient to give flavor to tea substitutes. 

TOBACCO. 1 

Leaves of various trees and herbs, such as the birch, beech, cherry, 
and walnut, the blackberry, woodruff (Asperula odorata), the hop 
plant, and sweet clover (Melilotus officinalis), furnish substitutes for 
tobacco. Cigarettes are manufactured of tobacco mixed with large 
quantities of hops. Germany produces between 10,000 and 20,000 

1 See statistics of consumption, p. 72. 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 77 

tons of hops a year (in 1914 the crop amounted to 23,237 metric tons), 
and as one-half of the breweries are now idle, hops have become one 
of the principal substitutes for tobacco. About 3,500 to 4,000 tons of 
hops are to be set aside for the manufacture of cigarettes Alone. As 
late as December, 1917, the use of hops in the manufacture of tobacco 
products for the army was not permitted, but it was generally ex- 
pected that such use would soon be authorized. The demand for 
other substitutes is great, and very high prices are willingly paid for 
them, particularly for walnut and cherry leaves, as they can be used 
without any addition of tobacco. A recent report says that only the 
licensed manufacturers of tobacco will be permitted to use cherry 
leaves as a substitute for tobacco, and the mixing of cherry leaves 
with other materials will be forbidden. It is feared that otherwise 
large quantities would be lost to the industry and that the prices 
would soar. 

SUGAR. 

Introducing a sugar substitute into Germany might appear as 
futile a procedure as the proverbial carrying of coals to Newcastle, 
but the unexpected has happened. The sugar production of Ger- 
many, reckoned in terms of raw sugar, amounted to 2,706,327 metric 
tons during the year ending August 31, 1913, and 2,715,870 tons 
during the season of 1913-14. The production of refined sugar 
during 1912-13 and 1913-14 was 1,910,343 and 1,904,114 tons, respec- 
tively. The exports during the calendar year 1913 were 1,126,217 
tons, including 589,317 tons of refined and 527,135 tons of raw sugar 
besides 9,765 tons of other sugar products, the total being equivalent 
to about 1,184,787 tons of raw. Now there is no exportation what- 
ever, and yet the population has been reduced to using substitutes, 
the chief of which are honey and saccharin. 

At the beginning of the war Germany was " swimming in sugar," 
to use an expression of the Frankfurter Zeitung (May 22, 1915). 
Production had been greater than ever; large quantities left from 
the previous campaigns were still available; exportation had 
stopped. The Government, however, sought to limit consumption 
by a series of measures which enabled the speculators to make enor- 
mous profits. One of the 10 " war commandments," proclaimed on 
bills posted in all railway stations, advised the people : " Use plenty 
of sugar with your meals ; sugar is an excellent food." The various 
measures of the Government soon made it impossible for the people 
to follow that advice, and sugar became scarce in the market, al- 
though it was known that stocks were plentiful. 

By an order issued October 31, 1914, an embargo was laid upon 
the stocks of sugar ; only 25 per cent of the new production was 
released for consumption during the period ending January 15, 
1915, an additional 15 per cent for the following three months, and 
smaller quantities thereafter. The tax of 14 marks per quintal 
on sugar intended for human consumption was retained, but the 
farmers were permitted, by an order of February 12, 1915, to obtain 
sugar tax free for cattle feeding, and the distilleries were granted a 
reduction of the tax. Maximum prices having been prescribed for the 
sugar factories (originally 9.50 marks per 50 kilos of raw), but not 
for the trade, wild speculation set in. The Government permitted 
an increase in prices from month to month so that, for example, 



78 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

the legal price for August, 1915, was 1.20 marks higher than the 
price for May, and the result was that sugar was kept off the market 
until the higher prices could be obtained. The area planted to sugar 
beets during the season 1913-14 was 1,316,700 acres. For the season 
1914-15 the area planted was reported to have been reduced in order 
to obtain more land for the cultivation of bread grain, and further 
reductions followed later. The stocks of sugar in Germany doubt- 
less are still considerable, but the Government seeks to conserve 
them for fear of a continuing shortage of fats. The basic price of 
raw sugar was increased from time to time until it reached 23 marks 
for 50 kilos of 88-degree sugar in December, 1917, that price to be 
increased 15 pfennigs (3.57 cents) per month. The price of refined 
sugar was fixed at 36 marks, and the monthly ration at 800 grams, or 
about If pounds. 

Attention is now being drawn to the value of honey as a substi- 
tute for sugar, and the authorities are promoting beekeeping as an 
industry for producing more food with but little labor and no 
additional land. However, the present maximum price of 3 marks 
per kilo (32.4 cents per pound, at normal exchange) is somewhat 
discouraging. Several beekeepers in Bavaria have been fined for 
selling honey as high as 20 marks per kilo ($2.16 per pound). Arti- 
ficial honey in solid form is also produced. 

Saccharin is the latest substitute for sugar in Germany. It is 
sold in small bags under the title of " Kriegszucker," war sugar, 
under Government supervision. Saccharin is many times sweeter than 
sugar but has no food value, and in fact before the war was consid- 
ered by some German as by some American chemists to be injurious 
to the human system. It was discovered in 1879 by Prof., Fahlberg, 
who derived it from toluol, a product of coal tar. Pure saccharin 
is 500 times sweeter than sugar; the commercial product, containing 
about 10 per cent of soda, is 270 to 450 times as sweet as the same 
quantity of sugar. The product sold at retail is a compound con- 
taining but a small percentage of saccharin. In 1902 Germany had 
five establishments producing 290,000 pounds of saccharin annually. 
By the law of July 7, 1902, the manufacture of saccharin was placed 
under Government supervision, and importation was prohibited. 
Four of the five establishments were closed at the end of March, 1903, 
and only one, the Fahlberg factory at Salbke-Westerhusen on the 
Elbe, was permitted to manufacture saccharin for medicinal pur- 
poses. The prohibition against the sale of saccharin for nonmedi- 
cal uses has been repealed under the stress of the war. 

In an essay by Schulz-Mehrin " artificial sugar " is mentioned as 
a substitute for sugar. It is not clear whether saccharin or some 
other substance is meant. The hope is expressed, however, that Ger- 
many may be able to save the million acres now planted to sugar 
beets for the cultivation of cereals "if" the experiments with arti- 
ficial sugar shall prove successful. 

COPPER. 

Germany produces only a little over one-sixth of the copper needed 
by its industries. 1 When importation was stopped by the war it be- 
came necessary to construct electric conductors of other materials. 

1 See statement of quantities on p. 67. 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 79 

Iron and zinc are employed for that purpose with success, according 
to a report presented to the Society of German Machinery Engineers 
at Berlin. Aluminum also has been used for the purpose. The 
electrical conductivity of iron is only 10 to 18 per cent of that of 
copper; and an alternating current sent through an iron conductor 
flows chiefly through the layers immediately under the surface, thus 
increasing the total electric resistance. Iron conductors must, there- 
fore, be relatively strong, requiring strong supports. It is reported, 
however, that iron conductors have been produced which diner but 
little from copper conductors in appearance. 

Zinc has to be refined by a special spraying process, giving it the 
proper flexibility before it can be used for the manufacture of wire. 
The zinc wire must be protected against heat exceeding 130 C., and 
against air currents; hence it can not be used as a free conductor. 
In other respects the behavior of fixed zinc wires and zinc cables is 
said to be satisfactory. Zinc conductors also can be safely wound 
on dynamos or transformers. On a suburban line of the Berlin elec- 
tric railway zinc has been used to effect rail bond connections. In- 
stead of employing special copper bonds, the surfaces of contact 
between the fishplates and the rails are sprinkled with liquid zinc, 
which is said to give a better electric connection than has been 
obtained by the old method. 

The manufacturers of sheet-iron wares and aluminum wares have 
been kept busy to satisfy the demand for various utensils which 
formerly were made of copper or brass. Several cases of poisoning 
have been reported, due to cooking in pots of galvanized iron. 

GRAPHITE. 

Germany produced 12,532 metric tons of graphite in 1912, the 
consumption for the year amounting to 45,600 tons. More than 70 
per cent of the quantity consumed had to be imported. Production 
has been increased during the war and large quantities have been 
imported from Austria, while consumption has been reduced, largely 
through smelting without the use of crucibles. In normal times the 
consumption of graphite is distributed as follows: Manufacture of 
lead pencils, 4 per cent; manufacture of crucibles and other uses in 
the foundries, 35 per cent; manufacture of stove polish and paints, 
30 per cent. The remainder is employed for a large variety of pur- 
poses, even some dry lubricants, for example, containing an admix- 
ture of graphite. In Bavaria graphite is mined on leased proper- 
ties, largely in a primitive way. Improved methods have been intro- 
duced only recently. Experiments have shown, it is said, that Bava- 
rian graphite can be used in the manufacture of the finest crucibles 
for which the lump graphite from Ceylon and Siberia has been 
employed heretofore. 

During the war numerous substitutes for graphite, containing 39 
to 77 per cent of carbon, have been placed on the market. The man- 
ager of a large Berlin foundry reports that the substitutes have been 
used with success for mold facing. It has been found possible also, 
with the aid of hydrofluoric acid, to recover graphite from old, used 
crucibles. All used crucibles must now be returned to the manufac- 
turers, who extract the graphite. In the form of kish, graphite is 
also recovered inside and outside the furnace, in the production of 



80 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR, 

ferrosilicon in electric furnaces, and in the manufacture of soda. 
There is no serious danger of a scarcity of graphite, it is reported, 
owing to the limited consumption and the invention of substitutes. 
Some of these substitutes, however, contain as much as 1.1 per cent 
of sulphur and must be used with care, as liquid iron speedily absorbs 
sulphur from the molding sand. 

LYCOPODIUM. 

The spores of the club moss (Lycopodium clavatum) form a fine 
dust which is used in foundries for sprinkling the molds, so as to 
prevent the adhesion of sand. Prior to the war Germany imported 
lycopodium from Russia. A good substitute for lycopodium is re- 
ported to have been found in lignite dust, which settles down from 
the waste gases of the drying apparatus employed in the manufac- 
ture of brown coal briquets. The dust has always been considered a 
nuisance. By a sifting process the dust is reduced to uniform "size 
and made serviceable in the foundries. The dust particles contain a 
high proportion of paraffin and are said to behave just like lyco- 
podium. 

CORK. 

According to a report of the Deutsche Tageszeitung artificial cork 
is to be manufactured by a company, organized in October, 1917, 
at Raschau in Saxony under the title " Korkersatzgesellschaft Alsa, 
G. m. b. H." The well-known cork factory of Wilhelm Merkel, at 
Raschau, has taken a number of shares in the new undertaking. The 
company is to exploit a new process of utilizing the bark of domestic 
trees in the preparation of a substitute for cork. The factory is 
located in the wooded mountain range separating Saxony from 
Bohemia, where the raw material is plentiful. Details of the inven- 
tion are naturally lacking, but the preliminary experiments are said 
to have been satisfactory. If the invention proves successful, it may 
become the foundation of an important industry. During the last 
years of peace Germany imported annually over 20,000 tons of cork, 
valued at about two and a half million dollars, more than two-thirds 
of the total coming from Portugal, and the remainder from Algeria 
and Spain. 

TEXTILE FIBERS. 1 

Great energy has been displayed in hunting for substitutes and in 
encouraging home production of any suitable fibers. Wood fiber is 
now extensively used in place of cotton to make cellulose for ex- 
plosives. It is also made into paper, which is spun and woven into 
fabrics. The production of paper yarn is steadily increasing. In 
accord with the desire of various industries concerned, the paper 
yarns are now being numbered metrically instead of measured by 
the old English " count." This may be important for the future, 
when metrical numbering in Germany will also be introduced for 
cotton yarns. Table covers, napkins, aprons, hat bands, and even 
articles of underwear manufactured of mixed yarns, with paper as 
the chief constituent, were exhibited at the great Leipzig Fair in 

1 See statistics of consumption and sources of supply, pp. 69-71. 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 81 

August, 1917, and the imitations were reported to be so surprisingly 
successful that it was somewhat difficult for a layman to distinguish 
them from similar articles of the customary materials. Sacks, tents, 
and workmen's clothes are also manufactured from paper cloth, while 
nettle cloth is manufactured for the army. 

Nettle fiber is considered the best substitute for cotton that Ger- 
many has found. It is now being produced on a large scale exclu- 
sively for military use. Over 5,000,000 marks has been invested 
in nettle-fiber concerns. The nettle that is valuable for its fiber is 
the Urtica dioica, a plant growing wild in the meadows and woods 
of central Europe. It grows about 30 inches high. It is cut down 
when in bloom, dried in the sun like hay, stripped of leaves, and 
made up into bundles, and finally retted the same as nax, except for 
some minor details. It was found that the sugar in the plant would 
cause fermentation under the ordinary retting process, and for that 
reason the water must be changed to take away the sugar in solution 
before the retting process is complete., The leaves and tops of the 
plant are said to be good food for chickens. Yarns and cloths made 
from nettle fiber are said to compare favorably with flax products. 

Dr. Richter, of Vienna, who was the first to suggest the utilization 
of the nettle fiber, is quoted by a newspaper of Stuttgart as stating 
in the course of a lecture on the progress of his research that all the 
conditions for profitable production have been found, and that Ger- 
many and Austria by means of a systematic cultivation of the nettle 
can make themselves entirely independent of the cotton producers. 
The journal in its report of Dr. Richter's lecture says further: 

" Three conditions are necessary for a successful cultivation of the 
nettle sufficient moisture, shade, and enough nitrates in the soil. 
These conditions exist in the river valleys and deciduous forests of 
Austria and Hungary. Nor is there any necessity for the use of 
fertilizer, an important matter when the profitableness of the under- 
taking is considered. During 1915 and in the spring of 1916 ex- 
periments were made in the cultivation of the nettle in numerous 
districts along the Danube in Austria and Hungary, and all with 
splendid results. As a result of these experiments the question was 
taken up whether there was in Austria and Hungary a sufficient 
area of suitable soil which does not come into question for the culti- 
vation of other crops. Prof. Marchet has by thorough investigation 
established the fact that in the Niederwald in Austria there are 
10,000,000 acres splendidly adapted to the cultivation of the nettle, 
and which up to the present have not been utilized for any purpose." 

According to Dr. Richter's estimates, this is twice the area needed 
to produce sufficient nettle fiber to replace the cotton imports of both 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. Samples of cloth which were 
shown are considered by him as proof that fabrics can be produced 
from nettle fiber without any admixture of cotton and that they can 
be used for any purpose for which pure cotton fabrics have hereto- 
fore been used. 

Director Brickwedel, of the school for willow culture at Graudenz, 
is reported to have succeeded in obtaining valuable textile material 
from the bast of the willow tree, which has heretofore been looked 
upon as waste. According to the Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Textil- 
industrie, the bast is dried in the air, pressed into bales, and tied. 

43339 18 6 



82 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

The bales will keep for years without deteriorating. To obtain 
the fiber the bast is soaked in lye for five to eight h'jurs and then 
dried; the bark and the woody parts are removed by a mechanical 
process. The fibers are then broken and hackled, just like flax or 
hemp. The structure of the willow bast is similar to that of the 
linden bast; the fibers obtained are shorter, however. The fibers 
are nearly as fine as those of hemp, although not so strong. The 
raw material is cheap, the chemical treatment is not costly, and the 
fiber might be used as an independent product rather th~n as a mere 
substitute. In view of these advantages, it is rather surprising, says 
a correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung, that the manufacturers 
do not pay more attention to this material. 

Fibers of the willow rose, said to be a good substitute for jute, 
were exhibited at the meeting of the Union of German Jute Manu- 
facturers, at Brunswick, in July, 1915. The discovery was due to 
an accident. A man, it was stated, had used this plant as a roof 
covering for a wagon shed some years ago. Recently in removing 
this old roof he found that a certain rough, hairlike fiber could be 
peeled off of the stems or reeds. After a number of experiments with 
a quantity of these fibers it was further discovered that, on account 
of their age and the effects of the weather, they were too brittle, 
so several plants of that year's growth were tried, with the result 
that another useful textile fiber was discovered. 

Further investigations were made with various species of the 
Epilobium family, and it was found that all of them contained a 
fiber similar to hemp. The best ^results were obtained from the 
rough-haired willow rose (Epilobium hirsutum), followed by the 
narrow-leaved great willow herb (Chamcenerion angustifolium). 
All of these grow wild and in great abundance in Germany. The 
two species just mentioned have stems about 5 feet in length, require 
no particular soil, and produce a fine fiber. It is believed that by 
attentive cultivation a fiber as valuable as jute may be obtained. The 
quantity f these plants available in Germany might supply the jute 
manufacturers with fibers for a year. Government officials promised 
to organize school children for gathering the crop during vacation, 
and the manufacturers agreed to encourage the cultivation of these 
plants. It does not appear, however, that these fibers have been 
manufactured on an extensive scale. 

Twine and cordage have been manufactured from the fibers of turf 
plants. The fibers are derived from the sheaths of cyperaceous 
plants, principally the various species of the genus Eriophorum 
(cotton grass). The raw materials have been commandeered, and 
by an order issued July 7, 1917, 30 factories manufacturing peat 
briquets, peat coke, litter, and other peat products have been desig- 
nated as collection centers. Most of these works are in Oldenburg. 

INDIA RUBBER. 1 

Germany imports about 20,000 metric tons of india rubber an- 
nually. War has made importation impossible and the rubber indus- 
tries have been compelled to reduce their production. Large quanti- 
tie of old and scrap rubber have been utilized for the production 
of regenerated rubber and various substitutes have taken the place 
of pure rubber. Bicycle and automobile tires have been made of steel 

' See also sources of supply, p. 71. 



VITAL QUESTION OF MATERIALS. 83 

wire, leather, wood, prepared canvas, and combinations of these sub- 
stances, as well as of rubber mixed with large quantities of wood 
pulp. The first substitute to appear was a bicycle tire made of steel 
wire, about three-sixteenths of an inch thick, which was made up 
into a very close coil, the ends being welded together so as to give it 
the proper shape. The tire was retailed for 18 marks ($4.28). It 
failed of popularity, as the price was high, and the tire would rattle 
considerably and cut into the pavements. The most practical tire, 
from the point of view of both price and service, seems to be the sec- 
tional wooden tire. The wooden tires, the leather-covered, and the 
canvas-covered tires have to be reinforced by steel springs. 

For a number of years German chemists have been trying to find 
a workable substitute for india rubber, but have had no more success 
than the scientists of other countries, although several inventions 
of synthetic rubber have been advertised. Thus, the Frankfurter 
Zeitung of December 13, 1915, announced the successful manufacture 
of the first automobile tires of synthetic rubber by the Mitteldeutsche 
Gummiwarenfabrik Louis Peter A. G. at Frankfort on the Main, but 
the hopes aroused by the invention have not been fulfilled and the 
exploitation of synthetic rubber has been abandoned. 

LEATHER. 

Some fancy articles formerly made of leather are now manufac- 
tured from paper. Leather soles have become scarce and various 
substitutes have been placed on the market. In September, 1917, the 
Ersatzsohlen-Gesellschaft (Substitute Shoe Sole Co.) placed 1,000,000 
pairs of substitute shoe soles at the disposal of the poorer classes, 
the soles to be sold for about one-third of the regular retail price. 
These soles are of three kinds impregnated felt, wooden soles, and 
leather soles composed of small pieces of leather placed together. 
The impregnated felt soles have proven unsatisfactory, however. 
The wooden soles distributed by the Government to the shoe fac- 
tories are sold at prices ranging from 1.80 to 2 marks (43 to 48 cents) , 
but the wooden soles and sandals manufactured for the trade are 
sold at prices much higher. It has been reported that among the 
desperate substitutes for sole leather roofing paper has been exploited. 

The standard shoes recently placed on the market by the Govern- 
ment have wooden soles with metal protectors and uppers manu- 
factured of a combination of paper with fibers recovered from old 
sails, tent awnings, or military cloaks. The textile material is sup- 
ported by a slender strip of leather. The shoes are said to be heavy 
and uncomfortable. They retail at 17 to 22 marks. The soles are 
guaranteed for one month and may be renewed at a cost of 60 
pfennigs to 1 mark. The " flexible " wooden sole and " noiseless " 
wooden sole, various varieties of lattice and tongue-and-groove con- 
struction, are advertised in the papers. 

Machine belting is now largely manufactured of paper yarn reen- 
forced by a core of metal or textile fiber or some other durable ma- 
terial. Human hair has also been employed in the manufacture of 
transmission belts. 



VII. GERMAN LABOR CONDITIONS IN WAR TIME. 

READJUSTMENT IN ALL INDUSTRIES. 

At the beginning of the war the labor situation was extremely 
critical, thousands of workmen having been thrown out of work. 
By September of 1914, 27.7 per cent of the 2,500,000 organized work- 
ers had been called to the colors, and 21.2 per cent of the others were 
unemployed. Th> situation improved rapidly, however. The in- 
dustries adjusted themselves speedily to the new conditions, and 
the unemployed soon found work in the war industries or in estab- 
lishments which had undertaken the manufacture of such products 
as had to be imported from foreign countries prior to the war. By 
the end of October, 1914, the percentage of workmen drafted into 
the army had increased to 31.3, while the number of the unem- 
ployed declined from 370,000 to 175,000; that is, from 21.2 to 10.7 
per cent. 

The workmen, too, had to adapt themselves to new conditions. 
In many cases they had to work at new trades, and the places 
of skilled male workers were taken by unskilled workers and women, 
who had to familiarize themselves with the new work in the shortest 
possible time. The extent of the changes may be judged from the 
following data for the harness and saddlery industry: In times of 
peace that industry employed 1,500 to 2,000 male workers; by Jan- 
uary 21, 1915, according to the data published in the Soziale 
Praxis, the number of workers employed in the manufacture of car- 
tridge belts, helmets, saddles, harness, etc., had grown to 25,000. 
Many of these had formerly worked in other branches of the indus- 
try, and many others had been recruited from the ranks of book- 
binders, typesetters, woodworkers, and the metal trades. From a con- 
dition of unemployment the labor situation changed to a condition 
of labor shortage, which was in part met by the addition to the labor 
ranks of former nonproducers (women, children, and old men), 
utilization of soldiers behind the lines and prisoners of war, and en- 
couragement of foreign laborers. 

According to official statistics (Keichs-Arbeitsblatt, Jan. 27, 1917), 
the percentage of the unemployed had declined to 7.2 by the 
end of 1914. During the first three months of 1915 the proportion 
was reduced still further to 3.3, and by the end of that year to 2.6. 
At the end of December, 1916, only 1.6 per cent of the organized 
workers were unemployed, the percentage being the lowest for the 
last four years (since September, 1912). 

STRIKES fUSPENDED BY AGREEMENT. 

The relations between the workmen and their employers were de- 
termined by the principle of the " civic truce " proclaimed after the 
outbreak of the war, even the social democrats agreeing to suspend 

84 



GERMAN LABOR CONDITIONS IN WAR TIME. 85 

the class struggle for the duration of the war. Apart from the truce, 
however, strikes of any kind could only with difficulty be carried out, 
owing to governmental control under the " state of siege " and com- 
pulsory labor regulations. During the last five years before the war, 
the average number of strikes in Germany had been 2,595 per year, 
involving approximately 327,000 workmen. In 1914 only 1,233 strikes 
took place, with about 95,000 participants; only 24 of the strikes 
occurred during the five months of the war. In 1915 the strikes to- 
taled 137, involving 178 establishments and 47,000 workmen. Greater 
unrest was noticeable in 1916; the number of strikes increased to 
239 and the number of strikers to 420,000. In explanation of this 
increase the Soziale Praxis suggested that large groups of workers 
possibly had deemed it necessary to take advantage of the unusual 
prosperity of the employers in order to obtain higher wages so as to 
lessen somewhat the burden of the high cost of living. In addition to 
the strikes, the so-called " dry " movement workmen demanding 
higher wages without going on a strike -was also strong in 1916. 

A number of great strikes took place in the year 1917, though most 
of them were of short duration. They were caused largely by dis- 
agreements between the workers and the employers, and bore the 
character of protests against the food policy of the Government and 
of demonstrations in favor of peace. A number of serious strikes took 
place in Berlin about the middle of April, involving metal, wood, 
and transportation workers. A reduction of the bread portion was 
the principal cause of the strikes, the movement being further compli- 
cated by an act of the military authorities which the workmen de- 
nounced as ruthless. On the 14th of April, one of the leaders of the 
strike was suddenly drafted into the army. The strikers asserted 
that the man was in poor health and unfit for military service and 
that the Government was merely seeking to punish him. The central 
body of the workmen's federation, however, refused to countenance 
the strike, and it was settled in a few days by negotiations between 
the representatives of the workmen and the authorities. That the 
strike was considered a serious menace to the war industries is evi- 
dent from the fact that both Hindenburg and Gen. Groener, of the 
war department, deemed it necessary to address a very severe repri- 
mand to the striking workmen. 

An extensive strike movement, begun in the last days of January, 
1918, was brought to an early end by the military authorities. In 
Hamburg and Altona about 20.000 workmen employed in the prin- 
cipal shipyards (Vulcan; Blohm & Voss; Reiherstieg; Stiilcken & 
Sohn; Jansen & Schmilinsky) went on strike January 28, demanding 
an increase in the potato ration and in wages, better treatment of 
workers on the part of the foremen, a shorter work day, and sup- 
pression of illicit trade in foodstuffs. The workmen declared also 
that they were not willing to suffer any longer for the sake of an- 
nexations or doubtful indemnities, but demanded a peace based on 
conciliation. The commanding general placed the shipyards under 
military rule, and the strike -collapsed. In Berlin, where 150,000 
workmen struck, the committee of strikers, calling itself the work- 
men's council, after the Russian model, was dissolved by the military 
commander, and the formation of any new committees prohibited. 
Similar measures were taken in other cities, and the strikers returned 



86 GERMAN THA.DE AND THE WAR. 

to work. The strikers were accused by the pan-German press of 
being in the pay of the enemy, although the justice of their economic 
demands was admitted. 

SHORTAGE OF FACTORY LABOR. 

It would be a mistake to conclude from the small number of 
strikes during the war that the situation of German employers is 
satisfactory. War itself brought about a number of complications. 
Thousands of workmen had been thrown out of work at first, but 
wild competition soon arose among employers trying to obtain a 
sufficient number of workers. This form of competition was par- 
ticularly fierce in those branches of industry which had received 
large war orders. Increased wages were frequently offered by in- 
dividual manufacturers to attract workmen to their factories, and 
workmen began to migrate from place to place in search of better 
earnings. The measures by which organizations of employers at- 
tempted to put an end to such competition failed of their purpose 
in most cases, for it was difficult to enforce them against those mem- 
bers who found it more profitable to leave the organization than 
submit to its rules ; on the other hand, such measures tended to place 
the organized employers at a disadvantage in competition with 
employers outside the organization. 

In the metal-working and many other industries the employers 
finally succeeded in obtaining the intervention of the military au- 
thorities for the purpose of regulating the conditions of the hiring 
of workmen. Thus, for example, on January 11, 1915, the Master 
of Ordnance (Feldzeugmeister) at Berlin issued an order provid- 
ing that firms established at Berlin or in the vicinity working on 
war orders should not hire workmen who had worked on similar 
orders before, unless the applicants produced a certificate showing 
that they had left their former place with the employer's consent. 
The trade-unions protested vigorously against all orders of that 
kind as unwarranted limitations on the workingman's freedom of 
movement. They complained also that the military commanders 
issued their communications to the employers only, leaving the 
workmen in ignorance of the details of important orders affecting 
their welfare. 

LAW AGAINST VOLUNTARY IDLENESS. 

While the unions were fighting for the workman's right to work 
where he pleased, tendencies of an opposite character prevailed in 
some parts of the country. Thus : in the Rhine-Westphalian indus- 
trial district the employers found it impossible to obtain a sufficient 
number of operatives, as the workers would rather be idle than come 
to seek a job in another town. 

Such voluntary idleness was ended by the national civilian service 
law of December 5, 1916. The law provides that " every male Ger- 
man between the completed ages of IT and 60 years who has not 
been called up for service with the armed forces is liable for national 
civilian service during the war." According to section 2 of this law, 
persons will be deemed to be already engaged in national civilian 
service who are actually "employed in the service of the Govern- 



GERMAN LABOR CONDITIONS IN WAR TIME. 87 

ment or of a public authority, in war industry, in agriculture or 
forestry, in the care of the sick, in war organizations of any kind, 
as well as in concerns which are directly or indirectly of importance 
for the prosecution of the war or the supplying of the population 
with necessaries, in so far as the number of these persons is not in 
excess of actual requirements." 

The law makes labor compulsory and at the same time limits the 
workman's freedom of migration, for it forbids any person to take 
into his employment a national civilian service man who is, or dur- 
ing the previous fortnight has been, engaged in work coming within 
the definition of section 2 of the law unless the man shall produce 
a certificate from his last employer showing that he has left work 
with the employer's consent. Should the employer refuse to sign the 
required certificate the man may appeal to a district committee con- 
sisting of a nominee of the War Bureau (Kriegsamt) as chairman 
and three representatives each of the^ employers and the workers. 
If the committee, after investigating the case, considers that good 
grounds exist for leaving the employment, they will make out a 
certificate, which, for the purposes of the law, will take the place of 
the employer's certificate. It is to be noted that among the grounds 
which the committee will recognize as sufficient to justify the leaving 
of one employment for another in the national civilian service, the 
law specially mentions " a reasonable improvement of the conditions 
of labor." 

The military employment exchange (Militarischer Arbeitsnach- 
weis) was an official means of placing in the open labor market, for 
necessary industrial labor employment, soldiers fit only for limited 
military service, whenever the army could spare them. 

ESTABLISHMENT OF ARBITRATION BOARDS. 

Through the changes made in the Government bill by the Reichstag 
the labor organizations gained important advantages. In many 
industries the workmen had for years struggled in vain for the insti- 
tution of conciliation committees in large establishments that is, for 
the official recognition of such committees by the employers and now 
the law of December 5 expressly provides that committees of work- 
men and employers are to be set up in all establishments working " in 
the service of the fatherland " and employing regularly not less than 
50 workers, for the purpose of maintaining good relations among the 
members of the staff and between them and the management. 

The law further provides for the institution of arbitration boards 
which are to pass on all controversies concerning wages or other con- 
ditlons of employment. And while the decisions of these boards are 
not absolutely binding upon either party, they do not, in their conse- 
quences, differ much from compulsory arbitration decrees. In case 
the employer, for example, refuses to abide by the award, the law 
gives the workman the right to demand from the committee a cer- 
tificate permitting him to seek employment elsewhere. On the other 
hand, if the employees refuse to abide by the committee's decision, 
they forfeit their right to obtain such a certificate on the basis of 
the conditions which have been the subject of the controversy. The 
law provides, finally, that the workmen employed in establishments 
working in the service of the Fatherland are not to be hindered in the 



88 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

exercise of the right to assemble or to organize. The administration 
of the law is in the hands of a newly formed branch of the Prussian 
Ministry of War, known as the War Bureau (Kriegsamt). 

ACTIVITIES OF LABOR UNIONS. 

Various difficulties have been encountered in the enforcement of 
the law. The selection of labor delegates to the committees pro- 
vided by the law led to friction between the labor organizations, 
especially between the social-democratic or " free " unions (Gewerk- 
schaften), the Hirsch-Duncker unions (Gewerkvereine), and the 
" Christian " unions, on the one hand, and the so-called " yellow " 
unions, patronized by employers, on the other. The former would 
not recognize the delegates chosen by the " yellow " unions, assert- 
ing that they were in reality the representatives not of the workmen 
but of the employers. 

Much friction has also been caused by the provision requiring the 
workman to produce a certificate when applying for a new job. The 
law provides a penalt}^ of fine and imprisonment for an employer 
hiring a workman who has worked in a national-service establishment 
and left without a certificate, and as it is not always easy to deter- 
mine whether a given establishment is or is not within the scope of 
the law, it became a rule with many employers not to hire any work- 
men who did not produce the certificates. As a result, many work- 
men would be left unemployed for long periods. This development 
led to the adoption of a new rule, whereby an employer refusing to 
issue the certificate to a workman is obliged to keep the workman 
employed under conditions not less favorable than those prevailing 
at the time of his application for discharge. 

A workman liable to national service may also demand from the 
chairman of the committee passing on the question of the employer's 
right to refuse the certificate of discharge to the workman a declara- 
tion in writing as to whether or not the establishment he intends to 
leave is to be considered, under the law, as working for the national 
service. If the answer is in the negative, the workman may imme- 
diately be hired by a new employer. On the other hand, a workman 
appealing to the district committee on his employer's refusal to issue 
a certificate is bound to remain at work until a decision has been ren- 
dered, excepting, of course, cases where serious injury, danger to 
health, or similar conditions are the grounds for complaint. 

The law has also caused many doubts in regard to the limits of 
jurisdiction between the conciliation and arbitration committees 
provided by the law and similar bodies already existing on the 
basis of wage agreements. 

The law has not found unconditional sympathy among the em- 
ployers. In one of their organs, Der Arbeitgeber, of March 15, 1917, 
Dr. Tewe criticizes rather sharply the provision of section 9 of the 
law specifying " a reasonable improvement of the conditions of 
labor " as a sufficient ground for a change of employers. According 
to the construction given this provision in most cases, any prospective 
increase of wages that is not merely nominal is considered a sufficient 
justification for a workman to leave his old employment. Thus, 
according to the author, this provision nullifies the effect of the rest 
of the law, the chief object of which was to secure a steady supply 
of operatives. 



GERMAN LABOR CONDITIONS IN WAR TIME. 89 

DECLINE IN MEMBERSHIP OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS. 

The labor organizations, naturally, have suffered large losses in 
membership during the war. At the end of June, 1914, the social- 
democratic or " free " unions had 2,521,303 members, of whom 
2,300.298 were men. In the first nine months of the war 958,247 of the 
latter, or 41.7 per cent, were called to the colors, and many others 
withdrew from the unions for various reasons, so that, notwithstand- 
ing the addition of many thousands of new members, the number 
of members declined to 1,323,978 at the end of April and 1,180,489 at 
the end of July, 1915. The building trades suffered the greatest 
losses, owing to the cessation of building activities, but they were 
not the only losers. The union of the metal workers, for example, 
which had 543,076 members in June, 1914, was reduced to about 
234,000 at the end of 1915. 

While the unions lost in members, they gained in influence during 
the war. The Government sought and received the assistance of the 
labor organizations in the solution of numerous problems connected 
with the distribution of food and the supplying of the army. The 
unions thus obtained official recognition for the first time. The so- 
called " new orientation " in the internal politics of Germany has 
also contributed to strengthen the demand for the removal of all 
obstacles hindering the free development of labor organizations, for 
the alleged freedom of association granted by the factory act of 
June 21, 1869, had been found to be but an empty form. It is true 
that section 152 of that law does abolish all prohibitions and penal- 
ties which stood in the way of the formation of unions or conclusion 
of agreements for the purpose of obtaining higher wages or better 
working conditions, but the trade unions were deprived of all legal 
protection by paragraph 2 of that section, which provides that " any 
member of any such union, or party to any sruch agreement, may 
withdraw from the same without liability to answer in a civil or 
criminal action." Nor had the unions been able to take advantage 
of the right granted them by section 21 of the Civil Code to acquire 
the status of legal persons through registration, as that section ex- 
cludes organizations with political or social-political aims, and the 
German authorities always placed the trade unions in that category. 

A number of labor partnerships (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) between 
the workers and the employers have been established during the war. 
Most of these organizations were formed to take care of invalid 
soldiers. Twenty-three such bodies were in existence at the end of 
1916. 

WOMAN LABOR. 

The enormous increase in the number of women employed in the 
industries is one of the most serious of the many changes wrought 
by the war in the social and economic life of the belligerent coun- 
tries. It is highly probable that after the war the status of women 
in both the family life and the industries will be essentially differ- 
ent from what it had been prior to 1914. Large numbers of women, 
it is true, were employed in the industries during the last decades, 
but woman labor had been limited, as a rule, to trades requiring 
neither physical strength nor special skill. The bulk of the work 
necessary had been done by men, the women predominating in but 
few industries. 



90 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

When the men return from the war, says Adolf Braun (in Der 
Kampf, Vienna, April, 1917), they will face a situation altogether 
new ; they will find not only that the number of women employed in 
the industries has increased enormously, but also that woman labor 
has invaded a great many new fields. Women are now working 
in many trades which have been considered an exclusive domain of 
the men. The exigencies of war have made it necessary to admit 
woman labor even to those lines where, in time of peace, it might 
have taken- decades before women would have taken the place of 
men, since in peace times such social experiments are not neces- 
sary. In war time, however, these experiments have proved a success. 
Not only in the industries, commerce, and agriculture, but also in 
governmental and public, service generally, and even in such an ultra- 
conservative branch as the administration of justice, women are now 
doing work formerly performed exclusively by men. It may be ex- 
pected that, when peace comes, the women will not give up altogether 
the new fields of activity which they have conquered during the war. 

LARGE INCREASE IN NUMBER OF WOMEN EMPLOYEES. 

The following data will illustrate the expansion of woman labor 
in Germany during the war. In August and September, 1916, the 
number of women employed in the metal-working and machinery 
industries was 266,530., as against 116,298 in 1907. Between March 
1, 1914, and August 1, 1916, the number of women insured in the 
sick-benefit funds increased by 990,884. On April 1, 1916, the 
Krupp factories employed 13,023 women; that is approximately 12 
times as many as were employed there at the end of 1914, when only 
1,166 women were working for the firm. For the first time in the 
history of the sick-benefit funds the number of women insured ex- 
ceeded the number of the men on March 1, 1917; in 5,713 funds 
3,973,457 women were insured and 3,962,625 men. As early as the 
middle of 1916 more women than men were employed in the metal 
industries of Berlin ; on February 24, 1917, the 233 sick-benefit funds 
of Berlin and its suburbs had 1,190,599 members, of whom 721,130, 
or more than 60 per cent, were women. In 20 metallurgical estab- 
lishments the number of the women employed increased by 2,980 
during 1916; in 38 establishments of the metal- working industries 
the increase was 13,166 during the same period; in 76 plants of the 
machinery industry the increase was 10,030; and in 93 electrical 
establishments 3,202 more women workers were employed on Decem- 
ber 1, 1916, than in the last- month of 1915. The increases are most 
remarkable and most striking in the metal and machinery industries, 
in the public service and the professions, in transportation, and in 
the manufacture of foodstuffs. On the other hand, the number of 
women workers has decreased largely in domestic service and other 
callings heretofore considered as eminently feminine. 

WOMEN IN TRANSPORTATION AND METALLURGICAL INDUSTRIES. 

In the railway transportation service women workers are to be 
found everywhere. They work in the shops and in the warehouses; 
they act as conductors both on passenger and freight trains; they 
are employed as switchmen; they examine tickets; they perform 



GERMAN LABOR CONDITIONS IN WAR TIME. 91 

clerical work in the railway offices, operate the telegraph and the 
telephone, dispatch the trains, seal the freight cars, work as porters, 
etc. The railway administration is fully satisfied with their work, 
and the respective ministers of both Prussia and Bavaria have de- 
clared that the railways will continue to employ women after the 
war. It is well known that the Prussian railway administration has 
always been strenuously opposed to the employment of women. 

On the street railways women are employed in all the departments 
of the service throughout Germany. Large numbers of women are 
working in the postal service. In the plant of the great electrical 
concern the Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft the number of 
women employed at the end of 1916 was four times larger than before 
the war. In the forests of Prussia and Bavaria women are now 
working as woodchoppers and sawyers. 

The investigations of Mrs. Schuman-Fischer have shown that dur- 
ing the last six months before the war the number of women em- 
ployed in all the metallurgical industries of Germany, including the 
mining industry, which has ever been considered as preeminently 
a men's industry, stood in the proportion of 1:12 when compared 
with the number of the men. During the period April-September, 
1916, the proportion was 1:3; that is, the number of woman workers 
had increased about fourfold, relatively, if not absolutely. Women 
are now employed even in those departments of the industry where 
greater physical strength and greater endurance are required and 
where the employment of women formerly was deemed an impossi- 
bility. Their work has been carefully planned, and in many cases 
women working in groups now do work formerly performed by one 
or more men. 

WAGES OF MEN AND WOMEN COMPARED. 

It is to be noted, however, that the wages of woman workers, 
though higher than in peace times, have in most instances not kept 
pace with the increasing cost of living. In the munitions factories 
some skilled women workers have made earnings which would have 
been undreamed of in peace times. Their wages, however, continue 
lower than the wages of men. Even municipal street railways pay 
women conductors 20 to 30 marks ($4.76 to $7.14 at normal exchange) 
less per month than they pay men. Women filling the places of book- 
keepers and clerks called to the colors do not, in many cases, receive as 
much as one-half the salary paid the men, though doing the same 
work. In factories and shops working for the national defense the 
time wages of women are 40 per cent below the wages of men. In 
establishments where the piece rate prevails the conditions are even 
worse, a woman earning only 5 to 7 marks where a man will earn 8 to 
12 marks. In the transportation services a woman receives 2.50 to 4 
marks, where a man is paid 3.50 to 5 marks. Government bureaus 
are no exception ; they, too, pay the women at a lower rate. 

The chief cause that compels women in such large numbers to seek 
employment in all kinds of industrial establishments and public serv- 
ices is to be found in the fact that, as the men have gone to the front, 
the woman is in many cases obliged to support the family by her own 
earnings. " It is not the high wage," says the Holzarbeiter Frauen- 
blatt, " that draws hundreds of thousands of women heretofore eco- 



92 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

nomically dependent into industrial establishments, but only sheer 
necessity which compels them to earn a living and neglect the obli- 
gations of motherhood." It should be remembered also that the 
women, while receiving a much lower wage than the men, have to 
meet certain expenditures for the care of the children left at home 
and generally have to perform household duties after their return 
from work. The bodily vigor of the working women necessarily 
suffers from the unusual strain. 



The enforcement of many laws designed to protect the life and 
health of the laborer has been suspended for the duration of the war, 
and the women workers are consequently exposed to various dangers. 
The injurious effects of night and overtime work have been pointed 
out by physicians. Members of the Imperial Parliament and of the 
State diets have repeatedly called attention to the dangers inherent in 
the strenuous and enervating work now being done by women and the 
long working hours. It has been proposed to appoint women as 
factory inspectors in order to remedy the situation somewhat. 

The provisions of the national civilian service law do not apply to 
women. Since, however, thousands of women have been driven into 
the factories by want, a special division for woman labor Frauen- 
arbeitszentrale has been organized in the Kriegsamt. The new 
bureau is trying to improve the working conditions so that the health 
and the family life of the working women may suffer as little as 
possible. The bureau is preparing various measures to protect the 
health of the woman workers ; assure them suitable rest rooms, living 
and sleeping quarters; provide kindergartens for their children; 
supply the workers with food, etc., so that the women workers may 
be relieved of these cares. 

POSSIBLE FUTURE EFFECTS ON FAMILY LIFE. 

It is admitted that the influence of woman labor on the family 
life of the women, and family life in general, will deserve careful 
consideration after the war. Some uneasiness had been caused in 
Germany even before the war by the decline of the birth rate, which 
was particularly noticeable among the wealthy classes of the popula- 
tion. It is pointed out that, as woman becomes more and more inde- 
pendent economically, family life will appear to her more and more 
burdensome, and the birth rate will decline still further. Consider- 
able thought has been devoted to the problem in Germany, and some 
peculiar remedies have been suggested. Thus, a certain Mr. Zeiler, 
a lawyer, recommends that the Government pay each newly married 
couple a premium of 150 marks for each thousand of their income, 
and an appropriate subsidy for the maintenance of each child, for 
the dowry of each daughter, etc. Mr. Adolf Braun, author of the 
article previously quoted, does not reject the proposal in principle, 
but opposes it on the ground that it would bring too heavy a charge 
to the imperial budget. 

inhere is no doubt that the "problem" of woman labor will be 
acute, even after the war. Great numbers of men will have been 
killed in the war; the excess of women over men will be greater. 



GERMAN LABOR CONDITIONS IN WAR TIME. 93 

The hard times after the war will make men returning from the war 
hesitate about marrying. Thus, women will be compelled to work 
more intensively; the widows of soldiers, in particular, will have 
to work to earn a living for themselves and the children; and the men 
returning will face serious competition on the part of the women. A 
number of grave problems arising from the expansion of woman 
labor will have to be solved by the Government and the labor 
organizations. 

IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN LABORERS. 

Lack of room for economic expansion has often been cited by Ger- 
man economists in justification or excuse of the present war. Ger- 
many is fighting " for a place in the sun," as they say. The phrase 
has a touch of poetry and sounds well. The argument on behalf of 
Germany is presented thus by Arthur Dix (" Deutschland auf den 
Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs," 1901, p. 14) : 

" Because the German people nowadays increase at the rate of 
800.000 inhabitants a year they need both room and nourishment for 
the surplus. If we had limited ourselves to the territory formerly 
in our possession, we should have lost the larger part of our increase 
to foreign countries and the rest would have been without work. The 
increase in population would soon have come to an end, and our effec- 
tiveness in labor and in war, the dissemination of German speech, 
German thought and productivity over the world would not have 
been able to continue. The increase of population would have passed 
into the curse of overpopulation a superfluity of those without work 
and in misery. That, however, must never be. The rapid growth 
of the German people must continue to give it room, light, and air. 
As a world power in the world market, we must assert our place and 
make it secure in order that the younger hands may find room and 
opportunity for employment." 

Otto R. Tannenberg is more explicit. In his book, " Gross- 
Deutschland, die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts " (1911, pp. 74-75), 
he says : " Room ; they must make room. The western and southern 
Slavs or we. Since we are the stronger, the choice will not be diffi- 
cult. We must quit our modest waiting at the door. Only by growth 
can a people save itself. ' England has its Greater Britain and Amer- 
ica its ' America for the Americans.' " 

GROWTH OF POPULATION LESS THAN INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION. 

These, and other similar arguments, create an impression that 
Germany is an overpopulated country unable to employ a large part 
of its population. As a matter of fact, however, Germany is not 
overpopulated and there is no danger apparent that it will become 
overpopulated ; moreover, it is a pertinent fact that, during the last 
decade of peace, the Germans have been unable to till their farms or 
man their shops and mills without the aid of foreign laborers, about 
1,009,000 of whom have been hired annually. 1 

During the last 50 years the birth rate in Germany was highest 
in 1876, when it had risen to 42.6 per 1,000 of population. Since 

The Germans, on the other hand, claim that the depression of tLe birth rate has been 
the result of comparative lack of economic opportunity, and on this they base their claims 
of the need of territorial expansion. 



94 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

that year the rate has been decreasing gradually but steadily, ; 
until it reached the minimum of 28.3 per 1,000 in 1913 the last 
year before the war. Thus, in 37 years, or slightly more than a 
generation, the birth rate declined 33.6 per cent, or more than one- 
third. The decline was compensated for, in part, by a reduction of 
the death rate, during the same period, from 28.1 to 15.8 per 1.000 
of population, a decline of 43.8 per cent, the excess of births over 
deaths the natural increase of the population being reduced from 
14.5 to 12.5 per 1,000, or 13.8 per cent. The absolute increase was 
highest in 1906, when it amounted to 910,275. In 1913 the annual 
increase was 833,800, or less than it had been in 1901 and 1902, or 
even in 1898. In view of these facts the fears of overpopulation 
appear to be somewhat premature. 

During the war the birth rate has declined still further, while the 
death rate has increased. Polygamy is now openly advocated in the 
form of so-called secondary marriages to increase the birth rate. 
Special increased allotments of food to newly married couples, 
pregnant women, nursing mothers, and small infants are reported in 
the press during the war period. 

OCCUPATIONS OF IMPORTED LABORERS. 

The great industrial expansion of Germany had withdrawn large 
numbers of men from the farms into the mills and made necessary 
the importation of laborers from other countries for both farm 
and factory work. Eight hundred thousand foreign laborers were 
counted in Germany on June 12, 1907, the date of the last indus- 
trial census. They were distributed as follows : Agriculture, 274,233 ; 
horticulture, forestry, and the fisheries, 5,707; mining and metal- 
lurgy, 76,906 ; manufacturing industries, 239,249 ; the building trades, 
124,645; trade and transportation, 45,205; domestic and personal 
service, 33,918; total, 799,863. In Prussia alone 600,000 were found, 
two-fifths of whom were agricultural, and three-fifths were indus- 
trial workers. Russia and Austria-Hungary furnished 541,598 la- 
borers, including about 210,000 Poles; Italy, 125,520; and the Nether- 
lands, 52,039. The number of foreign laborers employed during the 
last years before the war is not known, but has been estimated at 
about 1,000,000. 

These workers are engaged because they are needed. Some Ger- 
man economists have pointed out rather regretfully that these for- 
eigners carry away millions of marks of German money; but the 
Government does not allow them an opportunity to spend the money 
in Germany, for they are mostly workers hired for the season and 
compelled to leave the country within a prescribed time. It is true 
that in times of general depression they might become dangerous 
competitors of the native workmen. For that reason the States and 
the municipalities usually stipulate in contracts for public works 
that the contractor shall not employ foreigners except when native 
workers are not to be had. For the building of railways and canals 
and similar works, however, the Prussian Government has, since 
1907, as a matter of principle, been recommending foreign laborers, 
principally Italians, because at times no German workers would 
apply for such jobs, and, on the other hand, it is not considered de- 
sirable to withdraw German workers from other enterprises. 



GERMAN LABOR CONDITIONS IN WAR TIME. 95 

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST POLISH WORKERS. 

The Polish workers are considered as undesirable, not for eco- 
nomic but for political reasons. The Government of Prussia had 
for years been carrying on a systematic campaign for the Germani- 
zation of the Polish Provinces, and fears were entertained that the 
Polish immigrants might stiffen the resistance of the Poles in Prussia 
to that policy. This view of the matter is illustrated by the follow- 
ing quotation from the Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften 
(Vol. Ill, p. 775, Jena, 1909) : 

" For Germany the great immigration of workmen is of impor- 
tance also from an anthropological or nationalist point of view. In 
some parts of the country the Germanic race represents such a small 
minority that it is no longer able to make good its cultural mission 
throughout the community. The nationalist side of the matter is of 
special importance in the case of foreign Poles, hostile to the Ger- 
mans, who are welcomed by their countrymen of like views in the 
Empire as a desirable reinforcement in this struggle for power. 
Beginning with 1885, the Polish immigrant workers were, on the 
advice of Prince Bismarck, subjected to strict supervision; workers 
hired for the harvest season were compelled to leave Germany in 
November. Under the administration of Caprivi this principle was 
not observed very strictly, but the strict regulations were revived 
under Hohenlohe, and many changes have been introduced recently. 
Foreign Poles are forbidden to remain in Prussia between December 
20 and February 1, but many of them, knowing how to conceal their 
citizenship, manage to remain in the country. In order to make the 
control more strict, the Prussian Government introduced, in 1907, 
obligatory identification cards for workmen coming from Russia or 
Austria-Hungary." 

IMPORTATION CONTINUES DURING WAR. 

The importation of foreign laborers has continued even during 
the war. Germany is now receiving large numbers of industrial 
workers from neutral countries, particularly from Scandinavia and 
the Netherlands. The iron and steel industries have increased their 
personnel by requisitioning large numbers of Russian prisoners of 
war and by importing labor from the occupied portions of Russian 
Poland. The Berlin Chamber of Commerce reported in 1916 that 
its assistance in obtaining foreign labor was particularly solicited by 
the local meat trade. 

PRISONERS OF WAR. 

The number of foreign laborers now employed in Germany is not 
known. It is doubtless below the average of the last years of peace, 
but the loss has been made good by the employment of prisoners of 
war. It was stated in May, 1916, that there were at that time ap- 
proximately 650,000 prisoners of war employed on the farms and in 
the industrial establishments in Germany, and the number was 
reported to be about 1,200,000 in 1917. 

The foreign laborers in Germany are under strict supervision. 
The Bremen Buerger-Zeitung of August 16, 1917, quotes a decree 



96 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

issued by the commanding general of the Ninth Army Corps in 
reference to the employment of foreign workmen. Under this de- 
cree a foreigner can riot change masters unless he produces a police 
certificate showing that he has left his last place of employment in a 
lawful way. When a new employer hires him, the certificate of dis- 
charge must be delivered to local police authorities within 24 hours. 
The certificate is not to be returned to the workman under any cir- 
cumstances. Violations of these provisions are punished by im- 
prisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Similar regulations 
are in force throughout Germany. 

In a session of the main committee of the Parliament on January 
17, 1918, two Polish representatives, Dr. Trampczynski and Dr. 
Seyda, protested against the unjust treatment of Polish seasonal 
workers. These workers, they said, were working under compulsory 
and therefore illegal wage agreements; they were under strict police 
supervision, were not allowed any liberty of movement, and were not 
permitted to join the trade-unions of (German) Polish workmen. 

The food shortage and inconvenience of life in Germany in war 
time have made difficult the recruiting and upkeep of good staffs of 
foreign workers. 

THE FUTURE A TOPIC OF SPECULATION. 

The future labor situation, with all the problems of the after-the- 
war period, demobilization, reconstruction, woman and child labor, 
wages, hours of labor, the relations of labor and capital and the Gov- 
ernment, emigration and immigration, is a topic on which specula- 
tion is rife and discussion among the intellectuals is plentiful in 
Germany. The limits of the present publication do not admit of de- 
tailed discussion of these matters here. 



VIII. GERMAN LAND AND WATER TRANSPORTATION. 

The various transportation services, railways, motor-truck lines, 
and inland waterways of Germany are to-day playing almost as 
important a part in war operations as munitions factories. Ger- 
many's ability to stand the terrific strain of war is largely dependent 
upon the ability of its railroads to meet the continually growing 
demands. The inland waterways have proved a valuable comple- 
ment of the railroads. They will be improved and extended after 
the war and possibly placed under a joint management with the 
railroads. The merchant marine is of present assistance only on the 
Baltic. 

THE RAILROADS. 1 

According to official statistics, of the 39,381 2 miles of railways in 
1913 in Germany, 36,385 miles were State railroads and 2,996 miles 
privately owned. The Prussian-Hessian State railway system in- 
cludes about two-thirds of all the State railways. The war has sub- 
jected the railroads to a terrific strain, and much of the rolling stock, 
roadbeds, rails, sleepers, and ballast w T ill have to be practically 
renewed. This will furnish iron foundries, manufacturers of rail- 
way material, and stone quarries with contracts for several years and 
provide thousands of skilled mechanics and laborers with employ- 
ment. In connection with such a thorough overhauling of the rail- 
ways the practicability of substituting electricity for steam as a 
motive power is already being seriously considered. As is well 
known, there are already several very important electrifications in 
Germany for handling both freight and passenger traffic, worked out 
with technical completeness. 

The mobilization of the army in August, 1914, stopped all private 
traffic. Thousands of summer excursionists were stranded; goods 
had to be unloaded at way stations and could not be forwarded to 
their destinations until later. In 19 days, however, more nearly 
normal conditions of traffic were restored everywhere except on the 
right bank of the Rhine and the Provinces of East and West Prussia. 
According to a declaration of the Minister of Eailwavs before the 
Prussian Diet on March 1, 1915, the schedule then in force retained 
about 70 per cent of the trains formerly in operation. Trains could 
not be dispatched more frequently, the Minister said, for lack of both 
locomotives and men. The railway administration had lost about 
80,000 employees, some of whom were called to the colors^ while 
others were employed in the occupied territory. The administra- 
tion had only 12 hospital trains at the beginning of the war; now 
there are 110 on the Prussian-Hessian State Railways, and about 20 

1 For proposed electrification, see p. 133. 

2 With 39,381 miles of line the German railways had 78,382 miles of all tracks, or about 
2 miles of track to 1 mile of line, whereas the railways of the United States in the same 
year had only li miles of all tracks to 1 mile of line, indicating the greater yard and 
terminal facilities of the German lines. 

43339 18 7 97 



98 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

or 25 on the other lines. Only fourth-class cars were used for the 
hospital trains, and about 4,000 cars had to be rebuilt for that pur-] 
pose. Track building was difficult, as workmen were lacking, and 
only small numbers of the prisoners of war could be employed on 
the work. Eolling stock was being renewed, but the capacity of the 
locomotive works was limited. 

INCREASES IN EQUIPMENT. 

According to the Berliner Politische Nachrichten, the total outlay 
on rolling stock for the business year 1917-18 is far in excess of the 
sum expended in any previous year. This increased outlay will 
make possible a considerable enlargement of the supply of rolling 
stock, notwithstanding the higher prices that now have to be paid. 
In 1916 deliveries were reported of 1,600 locomotives and about 
32,900 cars, of which 31,240 were freight and baggage cars. The 
orders placed for 1917 contemplated an addition of 1,854 loco- 
motives almost exclusively heavy freight engines and about 38,000 
cars. Including the additions of 1917, the total reported increase 
for the three years 1915-1917 amounts to 4,954 engines and 101,340 
cars. Germany in 1917 had 713,000 freight cars on its railroads, 
against 667,000 at the outbreak of the war, 1 and 4,253 more loco- 
motives than it had at that time. 

A representative of the Ministry of Railways stated in December, 
1917, that the railway authorities during the war had provided 4,900 
new locomotives and 120,000 cars. During 1918 a further 1,700 loco- 
motives and 29,000 freight cars were to be provided. The price of 
locomotives had gone up 54 per cent, and of freight cars 80 per cent. 

Considerable railroad material had been captured in Belgium, but 
comparatively little in Serbia and Roumania, and hardly anything in 
Russia, where the railroads are of a wider gauge than the German 
lines. On the eastern front there was considerable rebuilding of rail- 
roads to the German gauge, in order to enable the use of German 
rolling stock on all important lines. For strategic reasons there was 
extension work, double-tracking, and other improvement on the west- 
ern front as well as on the eastern. The construction of a four-track 
line into Belgium was reported. This work in Belgium, Poland, 
Courland, Lithuania, northern Italy, and Roumania accounts for the 
increased equipment and explains the labor and car and locomotive 
shortage in Germany proper. The wear and tear on rolling material 
in war time is increasing, as imiy be judged from the fact that, 
whereas in August, 1915, out of '21,294 locomotives, 18.8 per cent were 
under repair ; the proportion in December, 1916, was 29.5 per cent of 
20,876 locomotives, an increase of fully 50 per cent. 

CHANGES IN OPERATION AS RESULT OF WAR. 

Some light has been thrown on the working of German railways 
during the war by the official statistics of German railways. The 
business year of the railways is reckoned from April 1 to March 31, so 
that the figures for 1914-15 include eight full war months. As it 

1 In 1913 the German railways had 17 freight cars per mile of line against 9 per mile 
for the railroads of the United States, with three-fourths of a locomotive per mile of line 
compared with one-fourth of a locomotive for the railroads of the United States. On the 
other hand, the capacity of the German freight cars is far lower and the locomotives are 
lighter and less powerful (see also p. 133). 



GERMAN LAND AND WATER TRANSPORTATION. 99 

jhas not been possible to calculate the ton-kilometers for the whole 
|of Germany, comparisons have been made on the basis of the engine 
mileage and the axle mileage of the passenger and freight cars. The 
{engine mileage totaled 793.6 million kilometers in 1912-13 and 815 
imillion in 1913-14; during the first year of war it declined to 673, 
(and in 1915-16 increased slightly to 681.1 million kilometers. Com- 
pared with the last year of peace, the engine mileage was 18 per cent 
less in the first and 16.4 per cent less in the second year of the war. 
The decline -was greatest in the express and fast trains, the figures 
for the three war years being relatively as 100, 64, and 58.8. The dis- 
tances covered by ordinary passenger trains fell off 21 per cent in 
1914-15, but rose 13 per cent in 1915-16, so that in 1915-16 the 
freight trains ran only 8 per cent less mileage than in 1913-14, the 
mileage for the three years being 284, 225.1, and 261.9 million 
kilometers. 

These facts would seem to indicate that the war years have brought 
with them a noticeable diminution of traffic. This is not altogether 
the case, as the figures for the car-axle mileage give very different 
results. The axle mileage of passenger cars declined from 9,208 
million kilometers in 1913-14 to 7,942 and 8,034 million kilometers 
in the two following years, but the axle mileage of freight cars, after 
declining 10.4 per cent in 1914-15, increased so much in 1915-16 as to 
exceed the last peace year by 3.4 per cent, the figures being 23,033, 
20,616, and 23,791 million kilometers. The aggregate car mileage 
shows a decline of 11 per cent for 1914-15, but only 1.3 per cent for 
1915-16, and traffic in the latter year was actually 3.7 per cent higher 
than in 1912-13. 

The explanation of the fact that the car mileage (which represents 
the real economic contribution of the railways) did not decrease 
along with the decrease in the engine mileage lies in the circumstance 
that the trains were longer and more cars were drawn by a single 
engine. In the years 1912-1914 express trains comprised on an aver- 
age 30 carriage axles, and fast trains 24 or 25, whereas in 1915-16 
the figures were 37 and 29, respectively. Ordinary passenger trains 
averaged 22 carriage axles in 1912-1914, but 30 in 1915-16, while for 
the freight trains the averages were 73 and 77, respectively. This 
lengthening of the trains with corresponding increase in the carry- 
ing capacity has been paid for by a diminution of speed; for this, 
however, no statistical data are available. 

It is probable that during the year 1916-17 railway traffic was in- 
creased still further because of the large additions to track mileage. 
Passenger trains were running directly from Berlin to the occupied 
territories. For the western districts a new time-table went into 
effect on March 1, 1916. A fast train was scheduled to leave St. 
Quentin at 10.05 p. m., reaching Cologne at 6.35 a. m., and Berlin 
at 4.10 p. m. A direct connection with Constantinople had been 
effected earlier, the train leaving Berlin at 8.16 a. m., and reaching 
Constantinople at 2 p. m. on the second following day. The return 
trip was to be made in 58 hours. 

WAR DEMANDS PARAMOUNT. 

The railroads are needed largely for war purposes, and the Govern- 
ment has systematically discouraged civilian passenger traffic, though 



100 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

with but little success. 1 The passenger service has been cut down, 
however, to less than half of the peace mileage. " Besides the ter- 
rific strain caused by the continual movement of troops and the 
necessity for provisioning them and supplying them with ammuni- 
tion," says a correspondent to the Chicago Daily News, " the fur- 
loughed soldiers and officers require hundreds of trains daily, run 
entirely for their benefit from the various fronts. The German 
Army aims to keep 10 per cent of its men on two-week furloughs. 
And as some of them must travel all the way from Macedonia or: 
Roumania to the Rhine, this is no slight task. It means at least 
150,000 long-distance passengers daily, for each man must be figured 
twice, coming and going. It really is a far larger figure, because 
for thousands upon thousands of these men it means two-day trips 
each way. 

At the same time, freight traffic has increased along unexpected 
]ines. For instance, in peace times much of the grain traffic from 
the eastern provinces was sent by boat through the Baltic and North 
Seas and then up the Rhine. Now this is impossible. Before the 
war the railroads carried an average of 4,200,000 tons of potatoes 
yearly; in 1916 they carried 6,500,000 tons, and this year the amount 
will be much larger estimated as high as 10,000,000 tons. In Au- 
gust and September alone 108,000 more freight cars were needed for 
the potato traffic than a year ago." A similar demand for increased 
rail shipment of coal resulted from the cutting off of means of 
marine transportation. 

In December, 1917, the Under Secretary of State of the Ministry 
of Railways stated in the Prussian Diet that a further restriction of 
passenger traffic had been made necessary by the demands upon the 
railways for moving goods. Little more than half of the trains 
shown in 1914 time-tables were running. The express train traffic 
had to be restricted and fares raised in order to clear the way for 
freight traffic. 

FINANCES OF RAILROADS. 

Owing to the large expenditures of the railway administration, 
higher freight rates are expected after the Avar. A beginning was 
made by the law of April 8, 1917, which imposed a tax on all goods 
forwarded by rail or water, with the sole exception of coal, coke, 
and briquets. The tax amounts to 7 per cent of the total charges. 
Many products which were formerly carried at special reduced rates 
are now required to pay the regular rates, and the stamp tax on way 
bills has been increased. Representatives of the industries are already 
protesting against further traffic charges. 

The financial report of the Prussian-Hessian State Railways for 
1915-16 showed an operating income of 2,324 million marks, freight 
revenue amounting to 1,754, and passenger and baggage revenue to 
570 million marks. Revenue from leases and other sources increased 
the total income to 2,368,329,000 marks. The expenses totaled 1,826,- 
871,000 marks, the principal items being : Salaries, 368 million : wages, 
275 million; maintenance of rolling stock, 232; new lines, 3il; and 
new locomotives, cars, etc., 292 million. The surplus was 741,458,000 
marks, amounting to 5.57 per cent of the capital invested, stated at 
13,303,996,000 marks. The surplus was 53 per cent higher than in 

1 See Appendix E, " Christmas in Berlin," p. 192. 



GERMAN LAND AND WATER TRANSPORTATION j 1{)1 



J1914-15, and the deficit for the year, due to financial thar.ges^ ty&s* 
(reduced to 120 million marks, as against 350 million in the preceding 
year. 

INLAND WATERWAYS. 

The inland waterways of Germany are classified as open rivers. 
canalized rivers (rivers made navigable), canals, and navigable lakes. 
The total length of the navigable waterways of Germany is 8,570 
miles. In 1913, the last year of record, 56,674,000 metric tons of goods 
of all kinds were carried on the waterways in inland commerce and 
42,951.000 tons in foreign commerce, the total traffic amounting to 
nearly 100,000,000 tons. The experience of the war has shown the 
dependence of national life on a system of efficient transportation 
and demonstrated the great value of the inland waterways, and the 
improvement of rivers and development of canals will be one of the 
most important questions of commercial politics that Germany will 
have to face after the war. 

It is admitted by a writer in the Frankfurter Zeitung that great 
difficulty will be encountered in the matter of obtaining crews. The 
high price of materials will hamper the building of new craft, and 
many boats have been lost during the war from one cause or another. 
Apparently there will be a heavy demand for inland shipping space 
after the war. The demand for space on seagoing vessels will be very 
heavy, as Germany will have to restock the warehouses with raw ma- 
terials that have not been arriving during the past three years. Ger- 
many is confident that the whole world will be buying German pot- 
ash at the first opportunity, despite high freights, and that soon 
after the importation of raw materials has commenced the exporta- 
tion of finished products will begin. 

It may be fairly anticipated that the railway freights all over Ger- 
many will be greatly increased, partly because of the natural increase 
in all prices and partly on account of increased governmental taxes 
on freights and railroads. This is another reason why German 
waterways should be developed, for the rise in the cost of water trans- 
portation will not keep pace with the probable increase in railway 
freight rates. The writer advocates a tax on all ocean bills of lading 
as a means of raising money to improve and extend German water- 
ways. 

CENTRAL EUROPEAN WATERWAY SYSTEM. 

The central European waterway system consists at present of three 
principal parts, which are cut off from each other, leaving aside some 
smaller districts which are self-contained, such as the East Prussian 
and Swiss waterways and others. The three chief districts are as 
follows: The southern system, including all the Danube region, 
which, strange to say, is so far not connected with any of the neigh- 
boring rivers by a canal that is even approximately adequate; the 
northwestern system, consisting of the Rhine, Ems, and Weser dis- 
tricts, which has only been welded into a connected whole during the 
war by the completion of the Rhine-Hanover canal ; and the northern 
system, including the Elbe district and all Germany on the left bank 
of the Elbe and also Bohemia. 

These three regions are, as far as shipping possibilities are con- 
cerned, shut in from each other, so to speak, in " watertight compart- 



102 : > ; : QERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



v Apart imm, the quite unimportant connections, navigable 
by rafts only, which exist in the shape of the Hamme-Oste Canal 
between the Elbe and the Weser, and the Schwarzenberger Schwemm- 
kanal between the Moldau (Vltava) and the Danube, there remains asV 
the only connecting waterway of moderate navigability the long ob- 
solete and now scarcely used Bavarian Ludwigskanal, built in the 
years 1836-1845, which provides a passage from the Danube to the 
Main via Kelheim, Nuremberg, and Bamberg, but does not respond 
to the most modest requirements of the twentieth century, as the 
canal and locks permit the passage of only small boats of not more 
than 127 tons. The chief port of the Ludwigskanal, Nuremberg, had 
in 1910 a total traffic of only 27,000 tons, so that the <janal may be 
regarded as practically nonexistent, although during the war it has 
had a relatively busy traffic between the Rhine and the Danube, for 
want of better communication. 

PLANS FOR FUTURE EXTENSIONS. 

A series of ambitious projects has been elaborated. The principal 
plans contemplate a junction of the Elbe with the canal system of 
western Germany by means of canal between Hanover and Magde- 
burg, and a junction between the Main and the Danube. The former 
junction would have been of immense value in the present war, but 
its construction has been prevented by the fears of the agrarians that 
the canal would make possible the importation of foreign grain into 
the eastern districts. Inland shipping is now largely in the service 
of the military administration, and the owners of inland vessels in 
the several districts have been compulsorily organized into syndicates 
under an order issued August 18, 1917, in order that the transporta- 
tion of war materials may be made more efficient. 

The Elbe-Trave Canal and the Gross-Schiffahrt Berlin-Stettin 
have proved of importance in the transfer of goods from the North 
Sea to Lubeck and Stettin on the Baltic. Through the Elbe-Trave 
Canal freights of imported timber, various raw materials, cellulose, 
etc., have been shipped to the Elbe and thence to Saxony and Bohe- 
mia, while coal and other freight are brought down to Lubeck and 
Stettin. The advantages of lengthening the Rhine-Weser Canal 
(which ends at present at Hanover) and connecting it with the Elbe, 
have been frequently discussed; such an extension would be highly 
serviceable in bringing up supplies of provisions and fodder, as well 
as coal and other material from the Rhenish Westphalian mining dis- 
trict, thereby relieving the strain imposed upon the railroads. 

A canal connecting the Rhine-Weser Canal with the River Elbe 
would also be of no small importance to Saxony, for two routes 
would be open, the northern one via Fallersleben and Oebisfelde. a 
distance of 145 kilometers (90 miles), with an estimated cost of 
$42,500,000, and a southern route via Brunswick, Wolfenbuttel, and 
Aschersleben, a distance of 172 kilometers (i07 miles), at a cost of 
$34,000,000. The construction of a canal connecting the larger rivers 
of Germany with the Danube would be invaluable to the commer- 
cial interests of the country. A program drawn up by the Bavarian 
Canal Co., with King Ludwig as patron, for widening the present 
canal provides for boats of 1,000 tons. According to the Allgemeine 
Schiffahrts-Zeitung, of February 24, 1917, the plans for a series o* 



GERMAN LAND AND WATER TRANSPORTATION. 103 

canals to connect the Rivers Weser, Werra, Main, and Danube are 
nearing completion. The total length of the waterway will be 730 
kilometers (454 miles), and the final details as to the several sections 
will be settled in conjunction with the Bavarian Canal Co., of Nurem- 
berg. The costs will be borne in common, large contributions hav- 
ing already been given and further financial help promised by the 
States, districts, municipalities, trade associations, and private own- 
ers whose interests are affected. 

CONNECTING NAVIGABLE RIVERS BY CANALS. 

A plan for connecting the Elbe, Oder, and JDanube by canals was 
seriously considered as long ago as 1901, but was not executed, and 
was indefinitely postponed in 1912. The Oder is now navigable for 
freight boats of 500 tons as far up as Cosel, and from there it is 
now proposed to build a canal over Oderberg-Prerau (Bohumin- 
Prerov), joining the Danube near Vienna. 

Of the three schemes under consideration for joining the Elbe and 
the Danube by canal, the most practical from a technical standpoint 
is that over Melnik -Pardubice, in Bohemia, branching east from the 
latter to join the future Oder-Danube canal at Prerov. A shorter 
route would be along the Moldau over Budweis near Linz, and the 
other alternative a branch from Budweis joining the Danube at 
Kronenburg. The last two, however, are rendered impracticable by 
the difference of level to be overcome and the number of locks that 
would have to be built. Over Budweis-Linz the difference of level 
is more than 1,968 feet; over Budweis-Kronenburg, 1,706 feet; but 
only 1,312 feet over Melnik-Pardubice-Prerov. Fifty locks would 
be necessary for the last-mentioned route and double the number by 
that over Linz to Vienna. This is an important consideration, as the 
time taken on a journey depends very much on the number of locks 
to be passed through. 

For the larger districts of Austria and Hungary, Hamburg will 
retain its importance as a seaport. Since the foundation of the 
Empire in 1871, the traffic on the Elbe has increased tenfold. 
Freights brought to Hamburg from the Elbe Valley districts have 
increased as follows: In 1871 they amounted to 306,000 tons, with 
3,100 vessels; in 1901 to 2,677,000 tons, with 11,800 vessels; and in 
1913 to 4,650,000 tons, with 17,800 vessels. Shipments up the river 
from Hamburg amounted, in 1871, to 557,000 tons, carried in 5,000 
vessels; in 1901 to 3,568,000 tons, carried in 15,000 vessels; and in 
1913 to 5,762,000 tons, carried in 21,000 vessels. These figures do not 
include the cargoes of Bohemian brown coal (which in 1913 reached 
a total of 3,114,000 tons, only a small quantity reaching Hamburg), 
the traffic between Magdeburg, Saxony, and Bohemia, or the steadily 
increasing traffic on the Elbe-Trave Canal at Lubeck. The low rates 
charged on the cargoes of raw materials have done much to increase 
the output of factories in the river district, and the lengthening of 
the waterway to the east would open up new possibilities for trading 
with markets still farther afield. 

THE MERCHANT MARINE. 

The German merchant marine has suffered serious losses by the 
war. On January 1, 1914, Germany possessed 4,935 seagoing ships 



104 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

of all classes, with a gross tonnage of 5,238,937. When the war 
broke out about 2,000,000 tons of German shipping were in the ports 
or waters of countries which were at war with Germany, or which 
later joined the ranks of the enemies of Germany. Most of these 
ships have been confiscated, and their future disposal is uncertain. 
About 1,000,000 tons of other ships were locked in the ports of neutral 
countries or of the countries allied with Germany. German naviga- 
tion companies are in a critical situation; not only have they lost 
many of their best ships and the revenue from traffic, but they have 
also had to stand heavy expenditures for the maintenance of ships 
and crews blockaded in neutral ports. 

As some German writers view the situation, the prospects for the 
future are discouraging. Unless the treaty of peace assures Germany 
a restitution of the confiscated ships and an indemnity for the losses 
sustained, Germany will face a serious shortage of tonnage on the 
return of peace, when the need of tonnage for the importation of 
foodstuffs and raw materials will be particularly pressing. The 
construction of new ships, now or during the early period after the 
war, will be unusually costly, perhaps too costly to be undertaken 
by even the wealthiest companies. On the other hand, the navigation 
companies of neutral countries have earned enormous dividends dur- 
ing the war and strengthened their position, and their share of the 
international traffic after the war will be larger than before 1914. 

PROPOSED GOVERNMENT RECOMPENSE FOR LOSSES. 

The unfavorable situation of the merchant marine led the German 
Government to consider means and measures of assistance to private 
shipping. Early in 1917 a proposal was made that the Government 
should grant a loan of 300,000,000 marks without interest to the ship- 
owners for the construction of new ships to replace the lost tonnage. 
In view of the increasing cost of construction the suggested amount 
was deemed insufficient by the shipowners, and the plan was aban- 
doned when the United States and Brazil declared war on Germany 
and commandeered nearly 1,000,000 tons of German shipping in the 
harbors of the two Americas. Another measure, based on different 
principles, was prepared in July and became a law on November 7, 
1917. The Vice Chancellor stated in the Parliament that the Gov- 
ernment's intention was to reinstate the commercial fleet in its old 
strength, and that the purpose of the law was not to confer an 
advantage upon the shipowners alone, but to safeguard the general 
economic welfare of the whole country, whose future must depend 
on the early rebuilding of the foreign trade. 

Under the new law the owners of ships lost during the war will be 
compensated for these ships according to the pre-war value as of 
July 25, 1914, plus an addition which will depend on the promptness 
with which new ships are built. For ships built within four years 
after the war an advance of 50 to 70 per cent of the difference between 
the actual cost of construction and the pre-war price will be paid; 
and for ships built within seven to nine years 20 to 55 per cent. The 
amounts required for these subsidies are to be voted annually as a 
part of the budget. The total amount needed is estimated by the 



GERMAN LAND AND WATER TRANSPORTATION. 105 

Deutscher Oekonomist at 1,250,000,000 marks, but may reach as high 
as 2,000,000,000. The pre-war value of the ships owned by the seven 
largest companies was 583,000,000 marks. 

The subsidies are intended chiefly for the building of freight ves- 
sels; passenger ships will be subsidized only when adapted for the 
carrying of considerable freight. One-half of the pre-war value of 
a ship lost or greatly damaged is to be paid as soon as ascertained, the 
other half being payable after the rate of the additional subsidy has 
been established on the basis of the contract for construction, which 
must be presented within three years after the payment of the first 
half. The shipowners will also receive an indemnity for the cost of 
maintaining their ships and crews in foreign ports, and the members 
of the crews are to be indemnified for property losses according to 
their rank, a captain receiving 1,200 to 3,500 marks, a seaman only 
325 to 400 marks. 

The ships built with the aid of government funds can not be sold 
to foreigners or to Germans residing abroad within 10 years without 
a permit by the Chancellor. A permit will also be necessary in case 
the ship, or a large part of its hold, is to be chartered to a foreigner 
for the conveyance of freight between foreign ports. A violation of 
these rules is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
three years or a fine not exceeding 50,000 marks, or both. 

A shipowner accepting the subsidy surrenders to the government 
all his claims for indemnity against foreign governments or insur- 
ance companies. In case a confiscated ship should be returned, the 
owner will have the choice to place the ship at the disposition of the 
government, or repay the amount received with interest at 5 per cent 
per annum. 

The proposal to establish a government shipping monopoly, spon- 
sored by the independent socialists, was rejected. Dr. Richter, of the 
Interior Department, declared that, in view of the peculiar character 
and variety of the commercial intercourse with foreign countries, it 
was impossible for the Empire to build ships for its own account and 
charter or operate them. A motion was unanimously carried, how- 
ever, requesting the Imperial Government to make further investiga- 
tions and at a later time submit to the Parliament a measure which 
would determine the extent to which the Government shall partici- 
pate in the net earnings of the new vessels, and whether there should 
be any further restrictions as to their use. Some of the steamship 
owners appear to think that this paragraph will cause uncertainty 
and will be a disadvantage, because of the permission given the gov- 
ernment to interfere with the private rights of the owners. A law is 
to be passed later to assist the existing shipyards in their enlarged 
program. 

SHIPS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT BEGINNING OF WAR. 

Little information is available in regard to German shipbuilding. 
Twenty-one steamships, of 385,000 gross tons, nearly half of the 
German tonnage building at the beginning of 1914, were passenger 
steamships, including the following Hamburg- American and North 
German Lloyd liners for the American tourist and northern Euro- 
pean and Russian emigrant trades: Bismarck, Tirpitz, Vaterland, 
Zeppelin, Burchard, Hindenburg, and Columbus. These seven ships 



106 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

of from 18 to 24 knots speed, aggregating 236,200 tons, were building 
also as naval auxiliaries and commerce destroyers, but, so far as com- 
pleted, remain in port. The totals include also the Hamburg South 
American liner and commerce destroyer Cap Trafalgar, sunk in bat- 
tle by the Cunarder Carmania, and its sister ship Cap Polonio, 
launched in March, 1914, and reported still building. Smaller pas- 
senger ships were three for the German East Africa line (19,400 tons) 
and five for the Oldenburg line to Portugal (10,600 tons). 

The cargo steamers building numbered 83, of 425,000 gross tons, of 
which 6, aggregating 40,000 tons, were to be put in the Australian 
trade in 1914 by the North German Lloyd, and 7, of 8,000 tons each, 
in trade with East Asia, Japan, and Kiaochow. The Deutsch- Aus- 
tralia Line Avas building 7, of 36,500 tons in all ; the Hansa Line, for 
trade with British India and South America, 14, of 92,500 gross tons; 
and the Kosmos Line, 7, of 50,000 gross tons. Seven oil-tank steam- 
ers, aggregating 45.600 tons, were building for trade with America 
and Roumania. Excepting small cargo boats, the remainder of the 
cargo steamers were building for the Hamburg- American Co. Ex- 
cept the Vaterland, Cap Trafalgar, and cargo steamers completed 
before August, 1914, ships building or ordered in Germany on Decem- 
ber 31, 1913, as shown by the Germanischer Lloyd, Hamburg- Ameri- 
can, and North German Lloyd reports for 1913-14, were yet building 
in Germany on June 30, 1916, according to the Copenhagen cabled 
interview of that date with Mr. Ballin, general manager of the Ham- 
burg-American Co. 

REPORTS ON PRESENT SHIPBUILDING ACTIVITIES. 

In an article in the Frankfurter Zeitung, dated " German coast, 
summer of 1917," Adolf Koster, describing the development of Ger- 
man shipbuilding, remarks incidentally that there is a new building 
yard for standardized ships at Hamburg, but furnishes no other defi- 
nite information. " For three years," the article says, " our yards have 
not let their fires go out. Several army corps of German workmen 
have been employed since the beginning of the war in the yards on 
the North Sea and the Baltic. In spite of many natural difficulties 
they and German shipping have mastered a mass of work which in 
quantity and quality will astonish the world when, after the war, it 
becomes possible to speak openly about it." It is known that a num- 
ber of orders have been placed with the home yards, but compara- 
tively little is known as to the state of advancement of the orders. 
Hugo Stinnes has ordered five steamers from the Vulkan yard at 
Vegesack, three of 12,500 tons each, one of 5,000 tons, and one of 
4,000 tons. The Vulkan yard has six more steamers building, of 
12,500 tons each, most of which have to be ready within a year after 
the conclusion of peace. The Tonning shipyards has been converted 
into a company, with a capital of 1,750,000 marks, for building stand- 
ard steamers, and 15, of an aggregate tonnage of 55,000 tons, have 
already been ordered. A floating dock will also be constructed. In 
the interests of shipping, harbor extensions have been planned in 
several places. (London Engineering, Sept. 14, 1917.) 

In June, 1917, the British consul general at Goteborg reported that 
the larger Baltic shipyards were seeking capital for enlargement ; 
that a shipyard at Lubeck, another at Kiel, and one at Rostock, as 



GERMAN LAND AND WATEE TRANSPORTATION. 107 

well as two yards at Stettin, had increased their aggregate capital 
several million marks. New wharves had been built and unused 
wharves had again been brought into active service. 

At the beginning of 1916 there were in operation in Germany 18 
incorporated shipbuilding yards (for seagoing ships), capitalized at 
83.326.000 marks. In two years the number of companies increased 
to 24, with a nominal capital of 131,574,000 marks. The total capital 
invested, including bonded indebtedness and reserves, increased from 
136,018,000 marks in 1913-14 to 196,920,000 marks in 1916-17. Dur- 
ing the same period the net profits increased from 3,719,000 marks to 
16,056,000 marks, and the average dividend rate from 4.46 to 7.90 
per cent. (Hamburger Fremdenblatt, Jan. 29, 1918.) 

It was reported in January, 1918, that a syndicate headed by the 
Bleichroders of Berlin was going to build a big shipyard at Norden- 
ham. Another new shipyard is to be built at Lubeck by the firm of 
Orenstein mid Koppel, of Berlin, jointly with the Liibecker Mas- 
chinenbau Gesellschaft. The Elbewerft Aktien-Gesellschaft, recently 
organized at Hamburg, with a capital of 4,500,000 marks (formerly 
the firm of F. H. Schmidt, bridge builders), is to build a shipyard 
at Wilhelmsburg on the Elbe for the construction of ships of 5,000 
tons. 

TRANSACTIONS IN CAPITAL STOCK OF EXISTING COMPANIES. 

In the spring of 1916 a majority of of the shares of the Woermann 
Line, capitalized at 20,000,000 marks, passed into the hands of a 
group representing the Hamburg- America Line, the North German 
Lloyd, and the firm of Hugo Stinnes. The navigation companies 
thus established a shipping monopoly, for the Woermann Line also 
controlled the German East Africa Line. Since 1913 Mr. Ballin, gen- 
eral manager of the Hamburg-America Line, has been a member of 
the board of control of both the Woermann and the East Africa 
Lines, and the companies have been working under agreements. 

The revenue of the German navigation companies during the war 
has been insignificant. Only a small part of the Baltic has been open 
to their ships the proud motto of the Hamburg- America Line, 
" Mein Feld ist die Welt r ' (the world is my field), has become mean- 
ingless. But the hope of large earnings after the war and the promise 
of Government subsidies have kept up the price of shares. The Ham- 
burg-America shares were sold in 1913 at prices ranging between 
131 and 163 ; they were quoted at 112 in June of 1914, at 108 in De- 
cember, 1916, and at 136 in January, 1918. The market price of the 
North German Lloyd shares fluctuated between 114 and 126 in 1913 ; 
the shares were quoted at 115 in June of 1914, declined to 99 in 
December, 1916, and rose to 138 in January, 1918. Mr. Heineke, gen- 
eral director of the North German Lloyd and director of the Deutsche 
Bank, has expressed some doubts about the period of unbounded pros- 
perity that is to open for German shipping companies after the war, 
but has hopes that, with the helping hand of the Government, the 
companies will win back all that has been lost. 

At Hamburg a new ship mortgage bank has been organized and 
some of the big banking interests have planned a similar bank, 
specializing on ship loans, for Berlin ; others are contemplated. 



IX. GERMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. 

FIRST EFFECTS OF THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 

The financial circles of Germany had been expecting war as a 
certainty, and many of their peace measures were taken with a view 
to their operation "in war time. For a decade the Imperial Bank 
had been seeking to increase its stock of gold and extending its in- 
fluence over the private banks, enforcing a greater liquidity of re- 
sources. The bank had well-nigh monopolized the issuing of notes, 
and obtained their recognition as legal tender in 1909. The use of 
cash was discouraged and large amounts of bank notes almost forced 
upon the public so that more gold might be withdrawn from cir- 
culation. The cash resources of the Imperial Bank were strength- 
ened by the levy of the imperial defense contribution voted in 1913. 

Notwithstanding all precautions, however, the mobilization orders 
produced a violent currency panic. For some days before the private 
banks had been paying out no more than 20 per cent of deposits in 
gold, and on the declaration of a state of war stopped the payment 
of gold altogether. The doors of the Imperial Bank and the banks 
generally, were besieged by anxious crowds hurrying to convert 
their notes into gold. In many stores and restaurants notes of all 
kinds were refused or accepted only at a great discount, until the 
military authorities intervened. Many orders for goods were can- 
celed, payments of maturing obligations refused, commercial credits 
restricted. " The conditions prevailing during the first weeks of the 
war," says Dr. Otto Brandt (Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege, 
1914-15), "were the conditions of a general moratorium, although 
a moratorium had not been declared officially. An actual mora- 
torium, however, is no better than a legal one." 

The Government avoided the declaration of a general moratorium 
by issuing a series of ordinances tending to alleviate the situation. 
Private contracts for payment in gold, entered into prior to July 31, 
1914, were abrogated. The strict regulations of the law of negotiable 
instruments were modified to allow for delays caused by the war. 
A moratorium was declared for negotiable instruments executed 
abroad and payable in Germany. The courts were authorized to 
assist debtors by extending terms of payment or postponing execu- 
tion of judgments. Special provisions were made for the protection 
of debtors called to the colors. Enterprises threatened with bank- 
ruptcy were placed under supervision and allowed time for recovery. 

A state of war having been declared on July 31, 1914, in Ger- 
many, the Chancellor announced on August 2 that the " war treas- 
ure " of 120 million marks in gold, which had been kept locked in the 
Julius tower of the fortress of Spandau, as well as the special reserve 
of a like amount created under the law of July 3, 1913, had been 
transferred to the Imperial Bank. 
108 



GERMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. 109 

LEGISLATION FOR STABILIZING MONETARY CONDITIONS. 

The Parliament met in special session on August 4 and passed a 
series of financial measures, some of which had been prepared in ad- 
vance of the war. while the others were the result of the continuous 
deliberations of the great ban 1 - since the outbreak of the crisis. 

One of these measures modilied the provisions of the monetary law 
of June 1, 1909, by making silver, nickel, and copper coins redeem- 
able in Treasury bills and in notes of the Imperial Bank, instead of 
in gold. 

Another law made the Imperial Treasury bills legal tender and re- 
lieved the Treasury of the obligation to redeem them. The Imperial 
Bank was released from the obligation to redeem its notes, and the 
private banks of issue were allowed to redeem their notes in notes of 
the Imperial Bank. 

By a third law the public-debt administration was authorized to 
borrow money on notes (Wechsel) bearing the signatures of two 
members of the administration. The law formerly authorized only 
the issue of Treasury, bonds (Schatzanweisung) and obligations 
(Schuldverschreibung) . The new notes were exempt from the stamp 
tax. 

The fourth measure modified the banking law by repealing sections 
9 and 10 relating to taxation of uncovered notes of the Imperial 
Bank. Treasury notes and obligations maturing in three months at 
the latest were assimilated to private notes bearing two signatures, so 
that they might be discounted by the Imperial Bank and used as 
cover for the issue of three times their amount in bank notes. 

The fifth law authorized the organization of special loan banks 
in Berlin and those interior cities where the Imperial Bank had its 
branches or agencies. The banks were set up as war banks on the 
model approved in 1848, 1866, and 1870. The central administra- 
tion of the banks a special division in the Imperial Bank was 
authorized to issue notes to the individual banks, the notes to be 
loaned out on the. pledge of Government bonds, certain other securi- 
ties, or nonperishable merchandise. Loans on the security of mer- 
chandise were not to exceed 50 per cent of its market value ; loans on 
certain industrial stocks were to be limited to 40 per cent, and loans 
pn bonds to 50 per cent of their market value; 70 per cent was the 
limit for loans on German communal, provincial, and railway securi- 
ties, and 75 per cent for loans on obligations of the Empire and the 
States. The notes of the loan banks were to be taken at their full 
value by all public offices, but were not legal tender for private pay- 
ments. These notes, too, might be used by the Imperial Bank as 
cover for a triple amount of new notes. 

LARGE ISSUES OF PAPER CURRENCY. 

By these measures the gold standard of currency, established in 
Germany by the legislation of 1871 and 1873, was suspended, and a 
regime of irredeemable legal-tender paper currency introduced. The 
system was planned for a short and victorious war ending with a 
large indemnity. As the war proceeded, the issues of paper money 
increased at a rapid rate. The amount of the notes of the Imperial 
Banks in circulation increased from 2,593 million marks at the end 



110 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

of 1913 to 5,046 million in 1914; 6,917 million in 1915; 8,054 million 
in 1916 ; and 11,468 million at the emd of 1917. 

The maximum amount of the loan-bank notes to be issued was 
fixed at 1,500 million marks by the law of August 4, 1914; in No- 
vember of the same year the limit was raised to 3 billion, but even 
that amount has been largely exceeded. At the end of 1914 there 
were in Germany 99 loan banks with 127 agencies; their aggregate 
turnover by that time had reached 4,794 million marks. The note 
issue totaled 1,317 million, of which 446 million was in free circu- 
lation. In two years the circulation increased to 2,873 million marks ; 
on December 23, 1917, the notes in free circulation aggregated 6,098 
million marks, a total of 7,374 million having been issued. The 
loan-bank notes are issued in denominations of 1, 2, 5, 20, and 50 
marks, and the small bills have largely replaced subsidiary silver 
coins. The total paper money Treasury bills, notes of the Imperial 
Bank, notes of the private banks of issue, and loan-bank notes out- 
standing at the end of 1917 amounted to about 19 billion marks, 
with a gold reserve of 2,400 million. The German system of Avar 
finance, to quote the words of Prof. Jastrow, of Berlin (" Geld 
und Kredit im Kriege"), rests on no other foundation but confi- 
dence in the success of German arms. The professor is rather proud 
of the fact, although he admits that, as German credit rests on the 
people's temper (" Stimmung," a state of the mind), it may fall 
with it. 

The increasing issues of paper money have resulted in a deprecia- 
tion of the mark both at home and abroad. This depreciation finds 
its expression in abnormally high prices in the domestic market and 
in the fall of the mark in neutral countries. Some German econo- 
mists are now advocating the demonetization of gold, but the pro- 
posal has not found favor with the responsible statesmen. 

REGULATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE. 

For a year and a half of the war the foreign-exchange market in 
Germany was free, but the Government was finally obliged to take 
notice of the effects of the rise in foreign exchange upon the import 
trade when the mark declined in the neutral markets to about 75 per 
cent of its gold value toward the end of 1915. By an order of the 
Federal Council, issued January 20, 1916, the foreign-exchange mar- 
ket was placed under the control of the Imperial Bank. Notes, 
drafts, and other means of payment in foreign currencies coining 
into the country in payment for exported wares could be negotiated 
only through the Imperial Bank or one of 26 private banks author- 
ized to buy and sell foreign exchange. The regulation improved the 
position of the mark in neutral markets but slightly, as the control 
was limited to payments for exports of merchandise. Sales of for- 
eign securities in neutral markets and noncommercial transactions 
generally, as well as the exportation of German funds, were left free. 
The difficulty of obtaining foreign exchange compelled the private 
traders to export German marks and notes, the result being a further 
decline of the mark and new issues of notes by the Imperial Bank. 

RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTATION OF FUNDS. 

In December, 1916, individual remittances abroad by postal check 
or notes were limited to 500 marks for any one calendar day, and by 



GERMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. Ill 

I a military order of January 11, 1917, the exportation of German 
funds was restricted to 1,000 marks in any one day, and importation 
of goods without license was prohibited. The control over foreign 
exchange was finally completed and centralized by an order of the 
Federal Council issued February 8, 1917. All foreign exchange, in 
whatever way obtained, was placed under the control of the Imperial 
Bank; foreign moneys, bank notes, checks, short-term bills, claims, 
or credits could not be purchased, exchangee!, borrowed, sold, pledged, 
or loaned except through designated agencies. The export of mark 
currency, the creation of mark credits in favor of residents abroad, 
and the incurring of indebtedness abroad through purchase of goods, 
realty, or ships without the consent of the Imperial Bank were pro- 
hibited. The Imperial Bank was given a monopoly of trading in 
foreign exchange and the power to requisition foreign exchange at 
the current official rate for the mark. The Chancellor was empow- 
ered to demand reports on all holdings of foreign exchange and 
order their sale to the Imperial Bank. fc 

Trade in foreign securities was still left free, but foreign exchange 
obtained by their sale was placed under the control of the Imperial 
Bank equally with exchange obtained by the sale of goods. On 
March 24, 1917, the Federal Council issued a decree intended to 
mobilize foreign securities in Germany in the interest of the Empire, 
for the purpose of facilitating credit transactions abroad. The de- 
cree authorized the Chancellor to order any foreign securities, if not 
sold abroad before a specified date, to be turned over to the Gov- 
ernment in return for an equitable compensation. It was explained 
at the time that the transfer of securities to the Empire would con- 
stitute a temporary loan, the Empire pledging itself to return them, 
at the latest, three years after the conclusion of peace. One-fifth of 
thb yearly interest or profit accruing on the security, with a minimum 
of 1 per cent of its face value, was to be paid as bonus. The owner, 
of course, was to receive the interest or profit accruing, and was 
free, at any time after transfer, to require the Government either to 
return the security or to purchase it at the price then ruling on the 
foreign bourse concerned. The Government might take either 
course, and also reserved the right to return the securities at any 
time. 

EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN FOREIGN VALUE OF THE MARK. 

On August 31, 1917, the Chancellor exercised the authority granted 
him in February and ordered a census of foreign exchange hold- 
ings. Three classes of holdings were to be reported: Coined and 
paper money and bank notes of any foreign country exceeding 500 
marks in value; other means of payment, including drafts, checks, 
and notes, in the currencies of Bulgaria, Denmark, the Netherlands. 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkev, and the neutral States 
of South America, exceeding 1,000 marks in value; obligations of 
individuals or firms domiciled in those countries, whether expressed 
in German or foreign currency, amounting to 5,000 marks in value 
or more. Obligations maturing after January 1, 1919, were not to 
be reported. Failure to report was made punishable by imprison- 
ment for three months or a fine of 1,500 marks. 



112 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

By these various measures, by shipments of gold abroad, and by 
financial agreements with some of the neutral countries, the status 
of the mark abroad has been improved somewhat. The course of the 
mark exchange has been influenced also by speculation in Germany 
as well as elsewhere, by the fortunes of war, and by the probabilities 
of peace. " The sudden rise of the quotation for the German mark 
on the news of the peace proposal by Germany was very remarkable," 
says the report for the year 1916 of the Kotterdam Chamber of Com- 
merce ; " it can give matter for meditation to those who are too sure 
that it will be a long time before the central powers have recovered." 
In December, 1917, the position of the mark in neutral countries 
showed considerable improvement. At the beginning of 1918 the 
nfark was quoted rt a discount of 20.5 per cent in Amsterdam, 30 
per cent in Denmark and Switzerland, and 34.7 per cent in Stock- 
holm. 1 The limited amount of transactions and the prospects of 
peace with Kussia have been suggested as the principal causes of the 
rise. 

THE IMPERIAL BANK. 

In its report for 1916 the Imperial Bank (Reichsbank) gives a 
review of German economic life which, it is asserted, once more gave 
evidence of its power and soundness. Agriculture succeeded in 
saving Germany from being starved out (Aushungerung), while in- 
dustry and trade, cut off from foreign imports and restricted to their 
own resources, were able to procure and manufacture the materials 
and articles required for the prosecution of the war. The largest 
consumer of all products was the army administration. The great' 
sums which it disbursed served to swell the deposits in banks and 
other credit institutions and to diminish the demand for bank and 
bill credits in business circles. These sums, in turn, facilitated the 
further financing of the war, as they were first placed in the short- 
term obligations of the Treasury and later in long-term bonds of the 
war loans. The amount placed by the people at the disposal of the 
Empire, either permanently or for long terms, exceeded 47 billion 
marks by the end of 1916. The loan banks contributed only 2.35 per! 
cent of the amount paid on the war loans. The fall of German ex- : 
change in neutral markets is explained as due largely to the un- 
favorable trade balance and partly to speculation. 

As to the bank's activities in general, private demands for credit 
were in a large measure satisfied without its intervention, but the 
Government's demands on the bank continued to be large. 

IMPERIAL BANK NOTES IN CIRCULATION. 

Reference is made to the increased demand for currency which 
sent up the note circulation of the bank from 6.917 million marks 
at the end of 1915 to 8,054 million marks on December 30, 1916. 
During the same time the amount of the loan banks' notes in cir- 
culation had to be raised from 972 to 2,873 million marks. The 
increased demand for means of payment, as compared with peace 
time, is said to be due partly to the fact that the supply to enemy 
districts occupied by German troops demanded an additional 2 

1 See also " Currency inflation and fall in exchange," pp. 22-23. 



GEEMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. 113 

billion marks in notes of the Imperial Bank. In addition, large sums 
have gone abroad to pay for imports, and the internal business life 
of Germany requires larger and larger amounts, owing to the uni- 
versal rise in prices. Finally, the hoarding of coins, which is still 
widespread, plays a considerable part in increasing the demand for 
more means of payment. Among the measures adopted by the Im- 
perial Bank to reduce the demand for currency was the creation of 
a closer connection with the postal check system and reduction of 
charges on postal check business; for the payment of the Imperial 
Bank's checks no charge is made, provided the amount is not re- 
quired for paying or forwarding cash; the certified checks (be- 
statigte Schecks) issued by the bank are taken in payment by all 
credit institutions in cash transactions. 

The average amount of the bank's notes in circulation during 1916 
was 6.871 million marks as against 5,409 million in 1915, and 2,918 
million in 1914. The bank-note circulation was lowest on January 
22 and highest on December 3Q 2 the figures for the two dates being 
6,274 and 8,054 million, respectively. The circulation on December 
30, 1916, included the following proportions, by value, of notes of 
the several denominations : 1,000-mark notes, 19.2 per cent ; 100-mark 
notes, 43.5 per cent; 50-mark notes, 11.5 per cent; 20-mark notes, 
25.8 per cent. 

THE GOLD RESERVE. 

The bank's holdings of bullion and coin averaged 2,560 million 
marks during 1916, as against 2,405 million in 1915 and 1,716 million 
in 1914. The stock of gold averaged 2.475 million marks in 1916. as 
against 2,361 million in the preceding year. In 1916 the bank's pur- 
chases of gold were 113.25 millions marks and the sales 42.68 million. 
Gold was supplied to industry only in order to obtain indispensable 
articles or for the manufacture of export wares, through the expor- 
tation of which foreign exchange to an amount many times exceeding 
the value of the metal might be obtained. 

Since the beginning of the war, thanks to the giving up of gold 
coins, ornaments, and other gold articles by all classes of the popu- 
lation, the gold stock of the Imperial Bank was increased by 1,267 
million marks. It should be noted, however, that the collections of 
gold for the Imperial Bank have been very meager of late, notwith- 
standing the urgent appeals of the authorities. The total gold coin- 
age of the Empire, less withdrawals, down to March 31, 1915, was 
5,141 million marks, about a third of which was then in. the vaults of 
the Imperial Bank. Even with a liberal allowance for the amount of 
coins lost, melted, or otherwise withdrawn from circulation, it would 
seem that the German people are still holding and hoarding several 
hundred million marks in gold coin. 

STATEMENT OF TOTAL TRANSACTIONS. 

The total transactions of the bank in 1916 rose to 1,257,331,402,500 
marks, reaching for the first time the enormous sum of a million 
millions and exceeding it by an amount greater than the total turn- 
over of the bank in any year prior to 1906. In 1913 the bank's trans- 
actions totaled 422,340 million; in 1914 they were 521,775 million; in 

43339 18 8 



114 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

1915, 972,500 million. The business of the bank's clearing system 
(Giroverkehr) totaled 1,065,462 million marks, as against 831,979 
million in 1915, 464,834 million in 1914, and 379,157 million marks in \ 
1913. The number of accounts in the system increased from 29,260 in ; 
1915 to 31,160 in 1916. The average private credit balance was 
1,059.5 million marks. The credit balance of the Imperial and State 
Treasuries averaged 1,059.2 million. In 1916 the highest total of bills 
of exchange, checks, and discounted Treasury notes was 10,785 mil- 
lion marks on September 30, and the lowest 4,717 million on April 22, 
the average amount covered by the bank being 6,591 million. 

The profit on bills of exchange, checks, and discounted Treasury 
notes amounted in 1916 to 301,748,531 marks, the total gross profit 
being 325,609,600 marks and the net profit 96,289,545 marks. The 
dividend rate was 8.68, as against 8.97 in 1915 and 10.24 in 1913. 
The Imperial Government received 190,291,181 marks of the gross 
profits, as against 199,719,509 marks in 1915. Eighty million marks 
were set aside as a new reserve fund for war losses (Reserve fur 
Kriegsverluste) . The fund is not to be used for payment of ordinary 
expenditures in any case; even if no war losses should be incurred, 
the fund can not be used for any other purpose until 1920, when the 
charter of the Imperial Bank is to be revised. 

According to the weekly report for December 31, 1917, the Imperial 
Bank on that date held bullion and coin of a value of 2,588 million 
marks, including 2,405.6 million marks of gold, as against 2,520.5 
million at the end of 1916. Bills discounted totaled 14,601 million at 
the end of 1917. The deposits were 8,050 million. The amount of 
notes in circulation had increased to 11,467.7 million marks. 

Four other banks, besides the Imperial Bank, still possess the right 
to issue notes. These private banks of issue are the Bayerische 
Notenbank, the Sachsische Bank, the Wurtembergische Notenbank, 
and the Badische Bank. According to the financial press of Ger- 
many these banks have rendered valuable services to the country, 
particularly in the placing of war loans. An examination of their 
balance sheets for the last five years reveals no striking changes, 
however. The following figures, in millions of marks, show the 
principal items for July 31, 1914, and June 30, 1917: Cash, 67.11 
and 67.42; loans and discounts, 228.71 and 182.46; deposits, 92.46 
and 106.39; notes in circulation, 170.55 and 154.54 million marks. 

THE PRUSSIAN GOVERNMENT BANK. 

According to the Borsen Courier, of Berlin, the operations of the 
Prussian Government bank the Koenigliche Seehandlung under- 
went a striking change under the influence of the war. In times of 
peace the chief occupation of the bank was the issuing of Prussian 
Government and municipal loans and the placing, at short terms, of 
the free funds of the Prussian Treasury, particularly for the account 
of the State railway administration. Private accounts and the pur- 
chase and sale of securities played only a secondary role. As the free 
funds of the Prussian Treasury usually averaged several hundred 
million marks, the Seehandlung became the largest lender m the 
Berlin money market. The bank also assisted various public bodies 
of the State by short-term loans. The war put an end to these activi- 



GERMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. 115 

ties, as it became necessary to place the capital market at the service 
of the Empire. 

The Seehandlung now issued imperial war loans and sold Prussian 
5 per cent bonds. The Prussian Government had been obliged by the 
end of September, 1914, to mobilize the several hundred millions 
placed in the bank. The money was withdrawn from the market 
without any serious consequences, some of the debtors being granted 
an extension of time. The funds did not last long, and Prussia had 
to borrow large sums of the bank. The Seehandlung discounted 
Prussian Government three-month notes to the amount of 1,228 
million marks in 1914, 4,500 million in 1915, and 4,835 million during 
the 13 months ending January 31, 1917. On February 1, 1917, the 
bank held Prussian Treasury notes to an amount of 1,725 million 
marks. These notes were sold by the bank in the open market, where 
money was abundant, owing to the large issues of paper in payment 
of the growing war expenditures and to the reduction of ordinary 
commercial transactions. 

ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRIES. 

Money was flowing into all credit institutions, including the See- 
handlung, which was thus enabled to hold large amounts of Prus- 
sian Government securities at all times. In these operations it re- 
ceived the aid of the loan banks, but never sought the assistance of 
the Imperial Bank ; on the contrary, the Seehandlung often came to 
the relief of the latter by taking over large blocks of imperial bonds. 
The Seehandlung also found it possible, at the request of the Prus- 
sian Government, to advance considerable sums on the security of 
war materials and to lend money to public institutions. It financed 
the manufacture of food substitutes and various chemicals for war 
purposes, advanced money on Treasury warrants, and accepted bills 
of municipalities and districts issued in payment for supplies or for 
fiscal purposes. On February 1, 1917, such acceptances totaled 
422 million marks, one-half of that sum being financed directly by 
the bank. The Seehandlung also assisted numerous war corporations 
(Kriegsgesellschaften), Government commissions, military authori- 
ties, and the administration of enemy property. In 1916 it took part 
in the organization of a Joan bank at Kovno. 

In times of peace advances by the bank to private clients averaged 
40 to 60 million marks; in January, 1917, such advances had reached 
258 million. 

These operations were made possible by the enormous increase of 
deposits in current accounts. In peace time such deposits averaged 
80 to 100 million marks (not including the * deposits of the 
Prussian Treasury) ; in January, 1917, they totaled 850 million marks. 
In former times the bank would occasionally be obliged to pur- 
chase additional securities in order to keep up the price of its hold- 
ings; the closing of the Berlin Stock Exchange made such operations 
unnecessary and thus increased the free funds of the bank. Addi- 
tional funds were obtained by the sale of industrial establishments 
owned by the bank. 

Under the new conditions the turnover of the bank increased 
from 20.9 billion marks in 1914 to 57.8 billions in 1915 and 75 billions 
in the first nine' months of 1916. The profits for 1915 were in excess 



116 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

of 16 million marks, amounting to 16.14 per cent of the capital, and 
the profits of the last two years have doubtless been as large, if not 1 
larger. It is pointed out by the Borsen Courier that these large 
profits are due to war conditions and can not be expected to continue 
in peace times, and the directors are advised to establish a reserve 
fund. The Seehandlung, it should be noted, is the only one among 
the German banks that operates without a reserve fund. 

PRIVATE BANKS IN 1916. 

The external results of the financial operations of the German- 
banks in 1916, as expressed in figures, were splendid. The monetary \ 
turnover had been increased greatly by the war, and the banks made 
large profits. The men of finance, however, were not happy, not- 
withstanding the brilliant showing. Back of the splendor of the 
balance sheets was the darkness of the general economic situation ml 
Germany. The very tone in which the annual report of the Deutsche 
Bank, the greatest and most aggressive of the German banks, is 
written, says R. Kan in the Russian Vyestnik Finansov, of May 20, 
1917, betrays ill-concealed irritation and impotent wrath at the turn 
in the military fortunes of Germany. "We are now in the third 
year of this criminal (!) war which is destroying such masses of; 
human lives and material wealth," says the report. The compulsory 
liquidation of the London branches of German banks is denounced 
as a gross violation of international law and a return to medieval 
methods. " Roumania has received a well-merited punishment," etc. 
These and other similar expressions are of interest as showing the 
real views of the bankers. 

The money market in 1916 was in the service of the Imperial 
Government to a larger extent than in the preceding two years of 
the war. The industries suffered from the gradual exhaustion of 
supplies of important raw materials, and many mills, not working 
for the immediate needs of the war, were closed. The money flow- 
ing into the banks was employed chiefly in satisfying the needs of 
the Governments and in financing the war contracts. Subscriptions 
to the two war loans, issued in 1916, totaled about 20 billion marks. 
The money market being, so to say, monopolized by the Govern- 
ment, the municipalities were unable to finance their needs in the 
free market and were obliged to apply for funds to the banks. The 
item of bills discounted in the bank returns consists largely of short- 
term obligations of the Imperial and State Governments and various 
public institutions, the proportion of industrial and commercial 
paper being smaller than ever before. 

EFFECT OF CHANGED CONDITIONS ON BANKING. 

The report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft discussed the effect on 
banking of the stoppage of imports and the labor difficulties and the 
inadequacy of certain Government measures to relieve the situation. 
The war industries, the so-called heavy industries in particular, were 
very busy and their profits large. Thirty-seven of the largest coal, 
iron, and steel concerns, capitalized at 1,660 million marks, reported 
an aggregate net profit of 353 million marks in 1916-17, as against 
292 million marks in the preceding year, 171 million marks in 



GERMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. 



117 



1914-15, and 203 million marks in the last year of peace. Shares 
of the industrial corporations, working for the war, were in great 
demand, selling at high premiums, which would occasionally reach 
200 or 300 per cent. The stock exchange was officially closed, but 
continued its operations unofficially and its transactions would at 
times reach considerable amounts, as money was easy, and there were 
no new issues of industrial securities. 

The financial institutions and the journals continued their efforts 
to educate the public in the use of checks and other substitutes for 
money, and the campaign produced some tangible results; the num- 
ber of postal checking accounts, for instance, increased to 180,432 at 
the end of 1917, as against 148,918 in 1916 and 112,000 in 1915. The 
repeal of the stamp tax on checks was an important factor in this 
campaign. The stamp tax on foreign securities imported into Ger- 
many was likewise repealed to facilitate a speedy resumption of 
financial dealings with foreign countries after the war. The Gov- 
ernment's control over operations in foreign exchange was greatly 
extended by an order of the Federal Council, issued in February, 
1917. 

FINANCIAL CONDITION OF PRINCIPAL BANKS. 

The following table shows the principal items of assets and liabili- 
ties of five large Berlin banks Deutsche Bank, Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft, Nationalbank f iir Deutschland, Commerz und Disconto Bank, 
and Mitteldeutsche Creditbank and seven provincial banks Allge- 
meine Deutsche Creditanstalt, A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein, 
Rheinische Creditbank, Rheinische - Westf alische Disconto - Gesell- 
schaf t, Barmer Bankverein, Essener Creditanstalt, and Mitteldeutsche 
Privatbank : 



Items. 


Berlin banks. 


Provincial banks. 


1915 


1916 


1915 


1916 


ASSETS. 


1,000 
marks. 
1,159,881 


1,000 
marks. 
1, 522, 725 


1,000 
marks. 
268, 071 
511,786 
212, 070 
317, 202 
66, 040 

642,500 
149,070 
665, 259 
995, 182 
1,112,414 
224,827 
47. 201 
37, 962 
5.9 


1,000 
marks. 
379. 881 
728,294 
217. 124 
471,064 
56,875 

642, 500 
149,070 
880,830 
1,214.468 
1,062,339 
155, 195 
55. 658 
42,200 
6.6 


Bills discounted 


2,617,588 
318,219 
1,103 432 
308,038 

1. 255. 000 
455, 650 
3,057,099 
3,798,981 
3,229,845 
611,969 
128, 245 
94,075 
7.4 


4,092,755 
309, 729 
1,616,207 
266,888 

1,255,000 
459, 776 
4, 238, 777 
5, 157, 161 
3,368,707 
385, 404 
151, 587 
108, 600 
8.6 






Participation in syndicates 


LIABILITIES. 

Capital ... . 


Reserve 


Time deposits 


Current accounts 


Correspondents 


Acceptances 


Net profits .... 


Dividends amount 


Dividends, per cent 





It will be seen from the table that the time deposits in the eight 
large banks increased 1,182 million marks, and the demand deposits 
1,358 millions during 1916. It should be noted, however, that the 
time deposits in the Deutsche Bank alone totaled about two billion 
marks. The aggregate amount of time and demand deposits was 
9,395,938,000 marks at the end of 1916, as against 6,856,080,000 in 1915 



118 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

and 3,974,535,000 in 1914, showing an increase of more than 136 per 
cent in two years. Money was particularly abundant in 1916, but as 
private capital issues had ceased and industrial credits had been cur- 
tailed, active operations were limited to loans on securities and the 
discounting of bills and notes, chiefly Government notes, the amount 
of commercial paper in the market being quite small. The bill and 
note account of the eight banks increased from 2,618 to 4,093 million 
marks, the bulk of the paper discounted being represented by obliga- 
tions of the Empire, the several States, and various public bodies. 
Loans on securities and commodities increased from 1,103 to 1,616 
million marks, the increase being wholly due to advances made on the 
security of war-loan bonds, as the aggregate of loans secured by com- 
modities or commercial documents had declined. The figures include 
also advances to the communes and other municipal corporations. 
The reduced volume of industrial operations explains the decline in 
the total of acceptances from 612 to 385 million marks. The decline 
had begun in 1915. The account of securities owned by the banks 
shows little outward change, 310 million marks against 318 in 1915, 
but the character of the holdings changed radically in 1916. The 
banks had sold many securities acquired in previous years, including 
the shares of various industrial enterprises, and invested larger sums 
in war loans. About 75 per cent of the holdings represents interest- 
bearing Government securities. 

Thus, for the great banks of Berlin, the year 1916 was character- 
ized by two outstanding facts : First, the inflow of money was much 
larger than in the preceding years, resulting in a considerable ex- 
pansion of operations the turnover of the Deutsche Bank, for 
example, increased from 107 to 129 billion marks ; secondly, the needs 
of the Government and of the various public organizations absorbed a 
larger proportion of the available moneys than ever before. It may 
be said that in 1916 the German banks were working for the war al- 
most exclusively, as the industries working for civilian needs were no 
longer a factor in the money market. The importation of raw mate- 
rials had been stopped, old stocks had been used up, and production 
and the labor market were now under a strict control. All private 
demands for money r were subordinated to the needs of the Govern- 
ment. The remarkable discipline of the German people was shown 
in the readiness with which they offered their savings to the Govern- 
ment for each successive war loan. 

BANK PROFITS GENERALLY INCREASED. 

From the standpoint of the stockholders the year 1916 was very 
satisfactory. The net profit of the eight large banks increased from 
128 million marks in 1915 to 151 million, or 12 per cent of the capital, 
in 1916. The average dividend rate was only 8.6 per cent, the banks 
pursuing the same cautious policy as the industrial concerns in keep- 
ing the dividend rate rather low. The Deutsche Bank paid 12J per 
cent in 1916. as in 1915 ; the Disconto-Gesellschaft increased its divi- 
dend from 8J to 10 per cent, and the Dresdner Bank from 6 to 8J. 
The other banks paid dividends varying from 4| per cent for the 
Nationalbank f iir Deutschland to 7 per cent for the Berliner Handels- 
gesellschaft. It was pointed out by German newspapers that the 
banking business had been considerably simplified by the consoli- 



GERMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. 119 

dation of transactions which were mostly with the Government or 
Government commissions. 

The banks made their largest profits on bills and notes dis- 
counted 186 million marks in 1916 as against 161 millions in 
1915 the bulk of the paper discounted being short-term obligations 
of the Empire, the several States, and municipalities. Under the 
conditions described the shares of the great banks maintained their 
prices in spite of all the difficulties connected with the war. The 
quotations at the end of 1916 were little, if at all, below the level of 
1913. The shares of the Deutsche Bank were quoted at 248.75 at the 
end of 1913, declined to 223 in July, 1914, but rose to 225 in Novem- 
ber, 1915, and' to 244 at the end of 1916. The shares of the other 
great banks were quoted at the following prices on December 31, 
1913 and 1916: Disconto-Gesellschaft, 185 and 182; Dresdner Bank, 
150.25 and 151 ; Bank fur Handel und Industrie, 116 and 109. 

CONSOLIDATION OF BANKS. 

The process of consolidation, or rather of absorption of the smaller 
institutions by the great banks, continued during the war. By means 
of such absorptions the Deutsche Bank increased its capital and re- 
serves to half a billion marks, and the number of its branches to 102. 
It still retains the first place among the German great banks. The 
bank began the year 1914 with a capital of 200 million marks and a 
reserve of 115 millions; that is, with property of its own totaling 315 
millions. The fusion with the Bergisch-Markische Bank, accom- 
plished in April of the same year, raised the capital to 250 and the 
open reserves to 180 millions, so that at the outbreak of the war the 
bank had at its disposal about 430 million marks of its own funds. 
In 1916 the Deutsche Bank took over two big provincial banks, the 
Schlesischer Bankverein of Breslau and the Norddeutsche Creditari- 
stalt of Konigsberg, thus increasing its capital to 275 and its reserves 
to 225 millions, a total of 500 million marks. The bank plans to 
open a branch in Sophia, Bulgaria. The annual report states that 
the bank has continued to assist various financial institutions and 
railway companies in Turkey and Asia Minor. 

Construction work on the Bagdad Railway, the report says, is pro- 
ceeding in spite of enormous difficulties; but that enterprise will be' 
in need of substantial aid on the part of both the German and the 
Turkish Governments, as the railway can not be either built or op- 
erated under the conditions of the agreement of 1903. On the other 
hand, it will be impossible for some time even to think of marketing 
the Turkish 4 per cent bonds, by means of which the Bagdad Rail- 
way was to be financed. 

The Disconto-Gesellschaft completed the absorption of the A. 
Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein, the Konigsberger Vereinsbank, and 
five other provincial banks, increasing its capital to 310 million marks. 
Th ^ consolidation was approved at a general meeting of the stock- 
holders held in December, 1917. In his address to the stockholders, 
Dr. Salomonsohn, president of the bank, defended the consolidation 
against those who complained that it destroyed the independence of 
the small bankers and increased the financial preponderance of Ber- 
lin. Such complaints were unjustified, he said. They were as ground- 
less as the protests formerly made against the development of rail- 



120 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

ways. It was due to concentration, he said, that the great banks and 
the heavy industries had become the promoters of an economic prog- 
ress whfch made possible the great achievements of the war. It was 
true that in the process of consolidation many are ruined and the 
smaller establishments have to struggle much harder to maintain 
themselves, but no great changes in the corporate organizations can 
be accomplished without sacrifices. The expanding industries could 
not be financed by the small provincial banks, which were obliged to 
seek the help of the great banks or grant credits which were beyond 
their strength, and resulted in numerous failures. That time was 
gone, Dr. Salomonsohn said, and it was great good luck for Germany 
that her banking system had been placed on a solid foundation. 
Before the war the British banking system had always been praised 
in Germany as ideal, but now the British were adopting the German 
methods. The movement toward consolidation has been justified by 
its results and should not be discouraged, the speaker said, either by 
the lawmakers or by private citizens. 

The Deutsche Bank and the Disconto-Gesellschaft, as well as the 
Dresdner Bank, devote considerable space in their reports to the 
forced liquidation of their London branches. The liquidation is de- 
nounced not because of any financial losses which it may occasion, 
but because it put an end to the " peaceful penetration " which enabled 
the German banks to make an extensive use of the conveniences and 
the resources of the city for the benefit of German commerce and 
finance. 

German banking suffered also when the enemy took steps to keep 
all firms from dealing with the German over-sea banks in Asia and 
South America. The report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft admits that 
the over-sea banks lost a large number of their clients by reason of 
the enemy-trade regulations of the Allies. The over-sea banks, it 
seems, are in some important trade circles no longer considered de- 
pendable as promoters of foreign trade, and the organization of 
special export banks is advocated. (See p. 149.) 

The returns of the seven provincial banks show the same general 
tendencies prevailing as those of the Berlin banks growth of de- 
posits and increase in bills discounted and loans on securities. 

FINANCIAL OPERATIONS DO NOT INDICATE INCREASE OF WEALTH. 

" The results of the financial operations of the German banks in 
1916, as shown by the figures of their balance sheets, are very fine," 
R. Kan concludes his article in the Vyestnik Finansov, "but those 
results have been achieved almost exclusively by the financing of 
war needs, which hav.e produced a large monetary turnover, imposing 
by its size, but in reality representing a waste of national wealth. 
The whole financial apparatus of Germany in 1916 was almost com- 
pletely dominated by the Government, the communes, and similar 
organizations, and private initiative receded even more than in 1915. 
A similar state of affairs may, indeed, be observed in all the bellig- 
erent countries, but there is a difference between Germany and her 
opponents, for in the countries of the latter the war has awakened a 
mass of slumbering forces and aroused their industrial energy, which 
had been declining during the last decades (particularly in France 
and England), whereas Germany began the war at the time of the 
greatest expansion of her economic activities, and from the very 



GERMAN MONEY AND BANKING IN WAR TIME. 121 

first day of the war has been wasting her material wealth and losing 
international connections and sympathies, so valuable in the eco- 
nomic sense. These losses are felt very keenly even now, as witnessed 
by the irritation shown in the remarks quoted from the report of 
the Deutsche Bank ; nothing of that kind is to be found in the reports 
of French or British banks ; the latter, on the contrary, clearly show 
the joy aroused by the approaching liberation from the nightmare 
of political, financial, and economic domination by Germany." 

BANK CLEARINGS. 

Germany has 27 clearing houses, of which 23 were in operation 
during 1916. In 1913 the number of accounts settled was 15,590,000, 
and the total amount cleared 73,634 million marks. The number of 
checks, bills, etc., paid at the clearing houses decreased to 13,703,000 
in 1914, to 9,996,000 in 1915, and 9,859,000 in 1916. The average per 
bill, however, has been increasing, owing to the increase in prices. 
In 1913 the average was 4,723 marks ; it increased to 4,864 marks in 
1914, 5,813 marks in 1915, and 6,849 marks in 1916. The total amount 
cleared declined to 66,645 million marks in 1914 and 58,106 million 
marks in 1915, but rose to 67,515 million in 1916, although the number 
of bills was smaller. These figures do not include settlements effected 
by transfers or payments at the Imperial Bank. Owing largely to 
the steady increase in Government borrowings and disbursements, the 
total of such transfers has been growing at a rapid rate. The amount 
of business transacted at the clearing houses and the Imperial Bank 
together in 1916 reached the enormous figure of 1,133 billion marks, 
only 6 per cent of which was settled by cash, as against 9.6 per cent so 
paid in 1913. The total turnover of the Dresden clearing house in- 
creased 62 per cent during the war, and that of Posen 31J per cent. 
Large decreases, on the other hand, were shown at Elberfeld and 
Augsburg, centers of the textile industries, which have suffered 
greatly by the war. 

MORTGAGE BANKS IN 1917. 

The reports of 37 German mortgage banks, as summarized in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung, clearly show the influence of the war. Owing 
to the suspension of building activities, applications for new build- 
ing loans were few, while farmers sought to reduce their indebted- 
ness. The total of recorded mortgages decreased from 12,045 million 
marks in June, 1915, to 12,018 million in 1916. and 11,939 million 
marks at the end of June, 1917. Borrowers who had found them- 
selves in difficulties were granted extensions at a low rate of interest. 
The extensions were originally granted for a period ending six 
months after the conclusion of peace and not later than June 30, 1918, 
but the term was later extended to June 30, 1919, as it became evident 
that the war would not be ended so soon. 

The bank obligations outstanding totaled 11,578 million marks on 
June 30, 1917, as against 11.595 million in June, 1916, and 11,622 mil- 
lion in 1915. The abundance of money increased the demand for these 
securities, but the holders were unwilling to part with them, and sales 
were insignificant. New issues of mortgage-bank obligations during 
the war were confined to Bavaria ; in other States of the Empire the 
banks refrained from issuing new securities so as not to endanger 
the success of the war loans. 



X. WAR LOANS, TAXATION, AND PROPOSED MONOPOLIES. 
FINANCING THE WAR. 

German war finance has influenced industry and trade in many 
ways. War orders have stimulated the production and increased the 
profits of the war industries, while the commandeering of raw ma- 
terials reduced the output of the mills working to supply the needs 
of the civilian population. In three years the current expenditure 
for war purposes doubled; at the end of 1917 it was estimated at 
100 million marks per day. The debt charges are constantly grow- 
ing, but their burden has not yet been felt by the industries, owing to 
the German policy of financing the war exclusively by loans. The 
confident expectation of early and complete victory followed by the 
collection of an indemnity of 50 billion marks or more had as 
its corollary that the cost of the war was to be defrayed out of the 
proceeds of loans, the loans to be repaid out of the indemnity. War 
taxes might have aroused distrust and doubts concerning the promised 
victory, hence no war taxes were to be imposed. As a result of this 
policy the Imperial Government has been compelled to borrow money 
to pay the interest on its loans, and its debt has been growing at an 
increasing rate. 

REVENUE RAISED BY BONDS WITHOUT INCREASED TAXATION. 

This policy, which may finally lead to oppressive taxation, confisca- 
tion, and disaster, has been criticized by Dr. Kuczynski and other 
German economists, who demand the immediate enactment of a 
comprehensive system of war taxation. The annexationists, on the 
other hand, employ the results of this policy as an argument in sup- 
port of their aims. Germany, they say, can not bear the burden with- 
out annexations or indemnities. 

On the 4th of August, 1914, the German Parliament voted a war 
credit of 5 billion marks. On the 9th of September the prospec- 
tus of the first war loan appeared in 280 newspapers. At that time 
the imperial 4 per cent bonds were quoted at 94-95, so that the loan 
might have been issued at 4J per cent, but Secretary of the Treasury 
Kuhn fixed the rate at 5 per cent. The loan was a success; the sub- 
scriptions totaled 4,481 million marks. Dr. Karl Helfferich, director 
of the Deutsche Bank, declared that the amount subscribed was twice 
larger than had been expected, and that the Government would be 
supplied with funds well into the spring of 1915. Out of the proceeds 
of the loan the Government paid off its Treasury notes discounted by 
the Imperial Bank and other short-term obligations; but the re- 
mainder only sufficed to pay the current war expenses until Decem- 
ber, 1914. The Government resorted to new issues of Treasury notes 
and Treasury bills, while the cost of the war was steadily increasing. 
On the 26th of February, 1915, the Government issued a second loan 
122 



WAR LOANS, TAXATION, AND PROPOSED MONOPOLIES. 123 

to pay off its floating indebtedness and obtain fresh funds for the 
prosecution of the war. The loan aggregated 9,103 million marks. 

In the meantime, on January 31, 1915, Dr. Helfferich had suc- 
ceeded Kuhn as Secretary of the Treasury. The appointment was 
received with genuine joy and even enthusiasm by the public. The 
new Secretary was a scholar and a man of wide practical experience, 
gathered both at home and abroad ; he had been university lecturer, 
legation councillor, railway director, bank director ; he was certainly 
the right man in the right place. 

On March 10, 1915, the new Secretary proclaimed his policy in a 
speech before the Parliament. " The means of financing a modern 
war," he said, "are substantially the following: First, the issue of 
loans ; second, the use of the printing press for the issue of notes and 
paper money; third, a reduction of expenses and war taxation." 
The federated Governments of Germany, he added, would not impose 
new taxes on account of the war, because the war was not being 
waged for the sake of the present, but chiefly for the sake of the 
future, " and we have a firm hope that, after the conclusion of peace, 
we shall present to our opponents a bill for the expenses of the war 
forced (sic) upon us." In his speech on August 20, 1915, on the 
occasion of the third war loan, Secretary Helfferich again defended 
his policy of no war taxation, declaring self -righteously : " The in- 
stigators of this war have earned the leaden weight of billions ; they 
may drag it along for decades, not we." 



The war expenditure increased rapidly. In August and December 
of 1914 the Parliament had voted credits of 5 billion marks each, 
in March, August, and December of 1915 credits of 10 billion 
each, a total of 40 billion, while the three war loans had yielded 
about 25 billion. The Empire's revenue from customs, excise 
and stamp taxes was declining. By the end of 1915 the German 
mark was quoted at a discount of 25 per cent in neutral countries, 
but the demand for German bonds was small, notwithstanding the 
advantages offered to neutrals by the fall of German exchange. In 
the opinion of Dr. Kuczynski (Deutsche Politik, Aug. 17, 1917) the 
financial policy of the Government in renouncing all war taxation 
and resorting exclusively to loans, notes, and paper money to pay 
the expenses of the war in reliance upon future indemnities caused 
serious injury to the Empire's credit abroad. 

The Government was obliged at last to take notice of the dispro- 
portion between revenue and expenditure. In his speech before the 
Parliament on March 16, 1916, Secretary Helfferich declared that 
a the possibility of balancing our ordinary budget, including the debt 
service, without any new revenues * * * still existed when I 
spoke to you here a year ago. To-day this possibility exists no longer, 
and we must draw the consequences therefrom." But he failed to 
draw the consequences, although he declared expressly: "For the 
fourth time the people are, in patriotic confidence, offering their spare 
pennies to the Empire. We can not either demand or accept these 
loans of billions from the people unless we make a timely provision 
lor the payment of interest." The new taxation which he asked of 
the Parliament was very modest, however. It included a tax on Avar 



124 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

profits to be collected but once the yield of which was to exceed 
u only one billion," and a medley of small taxes calculated to yield 
half a billion marks, and thus, at best, only to make good the defi- 
ciency caused by the reduced yield from import duties, excise and 
stamp taxes. 

On May 22, 1916, Helfferich took charge of the Ministry of the 
Interior. As Secretary of the Treasury he had consistently followed 
the policy of his predecessor and had issued three 5 per cent loans, 
yielding about 31 billion marks. While the United Kingdom and 
other countries were collecting large revenues from war taxation, 
Germany was paying interest on its loans from the proceeds of new 
loans. When Helfferich quit the post of Minister of Finance, on 
June 1, 1916, 22 months after the outbreak of the war, .not a single 
one of the new taxes had become a law. And yet he had declared in 
Parliament on May 24 : " The leave taking has been made easy for 
me by the knoAvledge that the financial conduct of the war has been 
placed on a safe basis." 

ENACTMENT OF SPECIAL TAX LAWS. 

The Parliament passed the tax bills with a few changes. The 
provision taxing increased incomes of private persons was stricken 
from the war-profit tax bill. The stamp tax on receipts was rejected, 
and a tax on turnover of merchandise voted instead; the bills pro- 
viding for an increased tax on tobacco, an increase of postal fees, and 
a stamp tax on freight bills were adopted with certain changes in 
minor details. Whether these tax bills were improved by the 
changes or not, their estimated yield was raised from 500 to 650 
million marks, The bills were read for the third time on June 5, 
1916, four days after Count von Roedern had assumed the office of 
Secretary of the Treasury. 

When Count von Roeclern had been in office a few months longer 
than Helfferich, the financial policy of the Government had not been 
changed. He issued two new loans yielding, approximately, 24 
billion marks; a third loan the seventh German war loan was 
issued in September, 1917, the subscriptions totaling 12,626 million 
marks. He had three new revenue measures passed by Parliament 
a supplementary tax on war profits, a tax on coal, and a tax on 
freight. The Parliament made only slight changes in the bills. But 
the Empire had not, by the middle of August, 1917, received a single 
penny of the war taxes; the war-profit tax was still unpaid after 
three years of war. The supplementary tax to be collected but 
once is estimated to yield 450 million marks; the coal and railway 
tax is to yield 800 million, but a large proportion of this amount will 
have to be paid by the Empire in the form of higher prices for war 
materials and transportation, and the coal tax will be borne partly 
by the State and municipal establishments. 

WARNING SOUNDED BY A GERMAN ECONOMIST. 

The splendid success of the war loans, says Dr. Kuczynski, 1 has 
dazzled the Germans so that they do not see other tasks of war 

1 Dr. Kuczynski is one of the leading statisticians of Germany and has done Borne 
statistical work in this country. 



WAR LOANS, TAXATION, AND PROPOSED MONOPOLIES. 125 

finance which are not less important. In the last year of peace the 
imperial taxes yielded considerably over 2 billion marks. In the 
first two years of the war the yield was much smaller; in the third 
year it certainly was not larger. Not only the cost of the war 
but even current expenses are being paid out of the proceeds of 
loans, for the revenue is insufficient to pay interest on the public 
debts and pensions to invalids and survivors of soldiers, both of 
which must be paid out of the revenues in the future. Other coun- 
tries had made the necessary provisions in time; the United King- 
dom, for example, has provided an additional revenue equivalent to 
18 billion marks for the four fiscal years 1915-1918, as compared 
with 1913-14; in Germany the yield of war taxes for the same 
period including the war-profit tax and the supplementary tax 
amounted to only 1J billion marks. 

This critic admits that if anyone in England should say that Eng- 
land was unable to pay interest and pensions without foreign aid 
that is, without a war indemnity lie would be laughed out of 
court, for England is actually collecting the necessary revenue. In 
Germany however, many voices are heard that Germany is unable 
to do so. And they are the voices of men who have full confidence 
in the military situation, such as Count von Reventlow, Prince 
Lowenstein, Baron Kerckerinck-Borg, Judge Fischer, and others. 
It is no wonder then that the mark depreciated 50 per cent in neutral 
countries and that there are no purchasers for German bonds in those 
countries. The military leaders of Germany have been learning from 
the enemy; they adopt every useful innovation introduced by the 
enemy commanders, but the financiers will not learn. 

The British act swiftly in financial matters; the Germans are ex- 
ceedingly slow. The war-profit tax was agreed on at a meeting of the 
finance ministers of the several States on June 10, 1915. The law 
concerning the preliminary measures for the assessment and collec- 
tion of the tax was passed on December 24, 1915, and the tax was 
voted on June 21, 1916. However, it was not until July, 1917, that 
the prospective contributors received their assessment sheets. The 
coal tax, which is to be levied on about 500 mine owners, was voted 
on April 8, 1917, but did not go into force until August 1, 1917. It 
has been the same with other taxes. Secretary Roedern declared, 
furthermore, that only such taxes will be introduced " as do not re- 
quire a difficult organization of the service." There appears to be a 
lack of capable officials. Nevertheless, it was found possible to ap- 
point 1,000 new clerks to keep the accounts between the military 
administration and the Prussian State Railways, and let them work 
13 months on vouchers covering but one single month. 

It is high time for a change, declared Dr. Kuczynski. A financial 
program must be worked out to bring to the Empire a steady addi- 
tional revenue of about 8 billion marks per year, and it must 
become a law forthwith. That is the only way to silence the voices 
heard both at home and abroad doubting the ability of Germany to 
fulfill her financial obligations. Otherwise the Empire may be com- 
pelled to borrow 10 to 20 billion marks after the conclusion of peace 
in order to pay interest on the public debt and pensions to disabled 
soldiers and to surviving families of soldiers. 



126 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAB. 

LIMITS ON FUTURE TAXATION. 

The argument against war taxation is presented by Friedrich, 
Prince zu Lowenstein, in an essay ^n " Future Taxation and its 
Limits" (Das Grossere Deutschland, Sept. 22, 1917), as follows: The 
national wealth of Germany, says the author, has been estimated to 
increase annually by about 10 billion marks. It is said Germany 
possesses inexhaustible resources, industry, and energy. Many men 
have been killed, however, and many values destroyed. The natural 
resources are not inexhaustible; iron ore would be exhausted in 60 
years if none were imported. The land is not as fertile as in the 
neighboring countries, and the large harvests have been made possible 
only by intensive labor and the application of scientific principles to 
agriculture. Loss of men has placed Germany at a disadvantage as 
compared with those countries which have suffered but little or not 
at all by the war. The possibility of emigration is an important 
factor to be considered. " Germany exports merchandise or men " 
is a true saying. During the years 1881-1890 Germany was losing 
134,000 men annually; during the last years before the war the 
average loss was only about 20,000 per year. But Germany can re- 
tain its labor force to the full extent only on the condition that the 
standard of living shall be higher at home than elsewhere. 

By closing the world market to Germany the war has shown how 
difficult it is for the country to obtain sufficient food and even more 
difficult to manufacture certain important articles when relying on 
home production alone. The suffering caused by the war has taught 
the value of foreign trade statistics. The bread card has shown 
what it means to import enormous quantities of grain, butter, lard, 
eggs, and coffee, these five items totaling 1,467 million marks in 1912. 
Germany must have world trade. The country suffers from lack of 
foodstuffs and also of raw materials. The latter are necessary not 
only for domestic needs but also to help pay for the imports. Wares 
are paid for with wares ; even coined gold is only merchandise in a 
foreign country. Money, in the true sense of the word, exists in 
the domestic market only where it serves as a medium of exchange. 
There is no international money. Domestic merchandise is sent in 
payment for foreign merchandise, although the exchange is no longer 
made directly by barter ; even the calculations of monetary exchange 
represent but an exchange of merchandise in reality. 

Large importations into Germany have been made necessary by the 
increase of population. In 1816 Germany had 24.8 million inhabit- 
ants; in 1913 the population was estimated at 66.8 million. If the 
number of the people had not increased, the resources of the country 
would be sufficient. Germany exports chiefly manufactured goods, 
the principal exceptions being coal and potash salts. The principal 
exports are iron wares, machinery, cotton and woolen fabrics, sugar, 
paper and manufactures, silk fabrics, chemicals, clothing, leather, 
copper wares, toys, books, yarn, musical instruments, etc. These 
wares derive their value chiefly from the labor and skill spent upon 
them. But production for export can continue only as long as the 
costs are not in excess of the corresponding costs elsewhere. Italy, 
for example, exports maccaroni made of imported wheat, but the 
exports would cease if the Italian duty on wheat were doubled, for 
Swiss, German, or French producers would then underbid the 



WAR LOANS, TAXATION, AND PROPOSED MONOPOLIES. 127 

Italians. Russia exports flax and hemp, but if these products were 
burdened with heavy taxes exportation might become impossible 
owing to the unhampered competition of other countries. 

When the workman sees better opportunities abroad, he emigrates. 
The motto, " Ubi bene ibi patria," may not be a noble one, but peo- 
ple act on it, nevertheless. The low exchange value of German 
money compels the exportation of larger quantities of merchandise 
in order to obtain as much as before, e. g., there must be sent to 
Holland more carloads of coal to obtain quantities of cheese no larger 
than before. The prices of raw materials are higher, and domestic 
prices are and will be higher, while the pressure of foreign goods 
will cease. Germany, for example, formerly imported large quanti- 
ties of bran from Russia, and the price of domestic bran had to 
follow the lower price of Russian bran. After the Avar, however, 
prices will be higher abroad, too, and will not help to keep down 
the prices in the German market. The three factors the possibility 
of emigration, foreign competition in the world market, and the in- 
crease of prices by low exchange exert a powerful influence upon 
the economic life of the country, and Germany, the Prince asserts, 
stands helpless before them. International competition sets a limit 
to domestic taxation, and even State socialism can not alter the fact. 

ESTIMATES OF NEEDED NEW REVENUES. 

Germany will need 9 or 10 billion marks of new revenue per year. 
How is the money to be obtained ? A number of measures have been 
proposed: Monopolies of grain, alcohol, electricity, and petroleum 
have been suggested ; partial confiscation and various new taxes have 
been recommended. Thus, it is contended that import duties should 
be increased; that both import and export duties should be levied 
on coal ; freight rates, it is urged, should be doubled ; and the tax on 
merchandise turnover should be increased tenfold. Everything is to 
be made dearer ; sugar is to bear a tax of 20 marks per 100 kilos ; 
beer, 15 marks per hectoliter ; salt, 20 marks per metric quintal ; the 
tobacco tax is to be trebled; coal is to pay 5 marks per ton; the in- 
heritance tax is to be twenty times higher than at present so as to 
reach even small bequests. 

But what would all these measures bring? They would produce 
hardly one-half of the amount required, would disgust the people 
and cool their zeal for work. But that is not all. The principal 
point is that such taxes could not be collected very long, for the 
proposals are Utopian, as the taxes suggested exceed the limits set 
by international competition. Within a short time prices in Germany 
would be so high that neither foodstuffs nor raw materials could be 
obtained for the economic life of the nation. Emigration, inability 
to compete, and downfall of exchange would be the inevitable result. 
Germany simply can not place such burdens upon its economic sys- 
tem. Financial measures, such as issues of fiat money, confiscation, 
forced loans, increase or decrease of prices, might help for a time, 
but they would end in exhaustion. Hence, concludes the Prince 
zu Lowenstein, Germany must have victory and a war indemnity. 

The arguments of the prince appear to be somewhat inconsistent, 
as the heavy burdens which the industries of other belligerent coun- 
tries will have to bear are not taken into account, while it is ad- 



128 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

mitted that prices will be high abroad, if not as high as in Germany. 
The arguments have found favor, however, with the representatives 
of the so-called heavy industries, and the workers of Germany are 
being advised through books, magazine and newspaper articles that 
it will be impossible for the employers to pay them good wages in 
case Germany concludes a peace " without annexations and without 
indemnities." 

While the bank reports show that prominent men in Germany are 
still talking indemnity, the report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft urges 
that fiscal reform is of greater importance than indemnities. Gov- 
ernnment interference with numerous branches of production, neces- 
sary as war measures, must cease, the report says, and free compe- 
tition must be restored for the spirit of enterprise to revive and 
private energy and initiative to assert themselves. Under such con- 
ditions only, the bank report adds, can the German people cope with 
the unavoidable burdens of heavy taxation. 

GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES. 

It is highly probable that a number of State monopolies will be 
established in Germany after the war for fiscal reasons. As has 
been pointed out, the Government has been paying its war expenses 
with the proceeds of loans, the yield of special war taxes being 
rather small. On the assumption that the enemy would pay the 
cost of the war, the Government discouraged any discussion of the 
ways and means which the Empire might employ to meet the ever- 
growing charges. As the war progressed, however, and the cost 
of the war increased while the chances of victory diminished, a dis- 
cussion of the " burden of billions " could no longer be avoided. A 
huge indemnity is still hoped for by many, but hopes have largely 
replaced expectations; it is now openly or tacitly conceded in many 
quarters that the people of Germany will. have to pay for the war 
out of their own earnings, and Government monopolies are sug- 
gested as one of the best means to obtain the necessary funds without 
oppressive taxation. 

GOVERNMENT OPERATION OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIES ADVOCATED. 

It was declared by a labor organ as early as May 22, 1915, that 
Government monopolies were the only means to defray the enor- 
mous cost of the war. The public debt of the Empire was then 
about 25 billion marks, and the debt charges, including interest, 
amortization, pensions, etc., were estimated at 3 billion marks, at 
the very least, in addition to the ordinary budget of three or four 
billions. The Correspondenzblatt favored Government monopo- 
lies of the tobacco industry, insurance, mining, and the manufacture 
of munitions. The first three were recommended for economic rea- 
sons; the monopoly of munitions for both economic and strategic 
reasons. The manufacture of rifles and cannon, armor plates and 
warships, powder and ammunition, aeroplanes and war automobiles, 
it was contended, ought to have been undertaken by the State long 
ago. The manufacturers, the Krupp firm in particular, had made 
profits by the hundred millions, charging the Empire high prices. 



WAR LOANS, TAXATION, AND PROPOSED MONOPOLIES. 129 

By selling arms and ammunition of the latest pattern to enemies 
of Germany they had stimulated international competition in arma- 
ments and increased the menace of war. Krupp guns, German 
guns, were killing German soldiers. Armaments should be limited 
in the interest of a lasting peace and all munitions factories taken 
over by the State. 

Prof. Jaffe, editor of the Europaische Staats- und Wirtschafts- 
zeitung, estimated the indebtedness of Germany at the end of July, 
1917, after three years of the war, at 120 billion marks. The annual 
charges for interest and amortization were estimated at 7,500 mil- 
lion, ordinary civil expenditure at 3,000 million, making up an 
annual budget of 10,500 million marks. The annual expenditure 
for pensions and various other war charges, estimated by others at 
not less than 3,000 million marks, but left out of consideration by 
Prof. Jaffe, should be added to his total, increasing the budget to 
13,500 million marks. 

Even the smaller charge of 10,500 million, however, is considered by 
Prof. Jaffe a disastrous burden upon the economic life of Germany. 
If the necessary revenue is to be raised by taxation, the burden will 
weigh heavily upon the people in general and the middle classes and 
the liberal professions in particular. The great industries will not 
suffer so much, as they can make great economies by consolidation and 
shift a part of the burden upon consumers. Professional men have 
no such opportunities. Taxpayers would have to surrender at least 
50 per cent of their incomes to the Government. In view of the dis- 
astrous effects of taxation, the author is of the opinion that it would 
be much better to liquidate the obligations of the Empire by a forced 
cession of a considerable part of all property holdings to the State 
that is, by confiscation of property. 

If revenue is to be raised by taxation, the taxes will certainly be 
oppressive. The labor press points out that most of the taxes are 
shifted by the nominal contributors upon the class immediately below 
them in the economic scale, until the burden rests upon the workers 
lowest in the scale, who can not pass it any further. Hence the idea 
of State monopolies is much more popular. In the issue of Prof. 
Jaffe's review for September 17, 1917, Prof. C. Ballod of Berlin dis- 
cusses the subject at great length. The monopolies usually suggested 
include tobacco, alcohol, grain, electricity, petroleum, coal, and ship- 
ping. The author adds a number of others. He argues that a State 
monopoly, well organized, need not increase retail prices and thus 
decrease consumption, while bringing large returns to the State. The 
State achieves a large saving by eliminating small establishments 
both in production and distribution ; the number of workmen can be 
reduced greatly by concentrating production in a few large establish- 
ments. The reduction of the working force is the chief argument of 
the opponents of monopolies; it prevented the organization of a to- 
bacco monopoly under Bismarck, and as a result the Empire accu- 
mulated a debt of five billion marks in time of peace. The argument 
has lost much of its weight through the war, for many workmen will 
have been killed, and the survivors can be employed elsewhere. 

The author presents detailed calculations showing that the monopo- 
lies suggested by him not including shipping or insurance would 
yield nearly five billion marks a year: Alcohol, beer, and tobacco, 
43339 18 9 



130 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAE. 

1,200 million; sugar, tea, coffee, and cocoa, 400 million; nitrogen, 
coal, and electricity, 1,000 million; bread, 600; meat, 500; colonial 
agriculture, 1,000 million. 

MONOPOLY OF SHIPPING UNDER DISCUSSION. 

The monopoly of shipping, suggested by the success of the Gov- 
ernment railways, has been opposed on the ground that it can not be 
a real monopoly like that of the railways, since German merchantmen 
on the high seas have to compete with the shipping of other nations, 
and the foreign customers of German exporters can not be compelled 
to accept delivery in German bottoms. It has been urged against 
this monopoly that the privately owned shipping worked satisfac- 
torily in time of peace, and that a State monopoly of such an inter- 
national nature might lead to diplomatic and political complications. 
In favor of a State monopoly it is pointed out that the ocean freight 
rates will doubtless continue high for several years after the war, 
and that the monopoly would yield considerable profit to the 
Treasury. The cost to the State of taking over the merchant ship- 
ping is not expected to exceed two billion marks, which is not 
looked upon as an insurmountable hindrance. There exists, and, as 
a matter of fact, has for a long time existed, a shipping monopoly, 
and it is now a question of breaking the power of this trust and trans- 
ferring it to the Empire. Prof. Ballod concludes that it would be 
more economical for the Government to own the ships and take 
advantage of the high freights than pay out billions in subsidies or 
indemnities to private shipping. 

A German imperial line has been proposed. It is urged that it 
would be preferable for the State to take over a concern which owned 
steamship lines, shipyards, iron works, and coal mines, so that the 
State should become independent of all groups of private capitalists. 
The company which best answers this demand is the North German 
Lloyd in Bremen, which, besides its large fleet, has its own docks, 
large repair shops, and, partly at least, also coal fields. It has no 
shipyards, but the State could take over a couple of Weser yards. 
The Government line would be worked in close connection with the 
State railways. The capital required in the first instance is calcu- 
lated at 450 to 500 million marks, the State to take over shares 
and debentures in exchange for Government bonds, the interest pay- 
able to stockholders to be the average of the dividends for the last 
10 years. The Government plan of meeting the after-the-war ship- 
ping question, embodied in legislation (see p. 104) does not contem- 
plate such a program, but does make the contact between the Govern- 
ment and the merchant-shipping combine even closer than it has been 
in the past. 

A monopoly of the insurance business is demanded by the labor 
press, and opposed by those who have been the loudest in their 
praise of workingmen's insurance as conducted by the State. 

POSSIBLE REVENUE FROM SUGAR, TOBACCO, AND ALCOHOL. 

The sugar industry has been highly centralized and can easily be 
taken over by the State, but the monopoly will doubtless be strenu- 
ously opposed by the interested parties. In 1913 Germany had 378 



WAR LOANS, TAXATION, AND PROPOSED MONOPOLIES. 131 

sugar factories employing 96,000 workmen who received 64 million 
marks in wages. The excise tax on sugar, 14 marks per 100 kilos 
($1.51 per 100 pounds), yielded 181.7 million marks in the fiscal year 
1912-13. The consumption of refined sugar' in that year was 1,282,- 
309 metric tons, or 42.3 pounds per inhabitant. In the United 
Kingdom and the United States per capita consumption of sugar is 
much higher ; it can be increased in Germany. The monopoly should 
yield 200 to 300 million marks a year. According to the German 
press for January, 1918, the project of a sugar monopoly is being 
seriously considered by the Government. 

The idea of a tobacco monopoly is not new. The monopoly was 
planned by Bismarck in 1882, but was combated by Von Windhorst 
on the ground that it was an industry of small shops, and that 
thousands of men would be thrown out of work if the industry were 
monopolized. The sugar industry, highly centralized, was suggested 
as a more fitting subject for monopolization. There is no doubt 
that the monopoly would force many "thousand people out of work, 
for the manufacture would be concentrated in about a dozen large 
factories instead of being distributed among many thousands of 
small shops. 

In 1907 there were 25,470 establishments in the tobacco industry 
in Germany, employing 203,224 persons. Five-sixths of these estab- 
lishments were small shops employing one to five persons each. In 
1913 the number of factories obligated to insure their workers was 
6,399, the home workers not being included. These factories em- 
ployed 178,840 workers. The wages paid the tobacco workers were 
probably lower than the wages paid in any other industry. The 
total number of industrial workers insured in 1913 was 10,630,437, 
and their wages aggregated 11,517 million marks, giving an average 
of 1,078 marks ($257), whereas the average earnings of a tobacco 
worker were only 691 marks ($165). Some of them may have been 
employed only a part of the time, or may have had other occupa- 
tions. Prof. Ballod is of the opinion that the monopoly, employing 
modern machinery, would not need more than 80,330 workers, and 
would be enabled to pay them double the wages prevailing in 1913. 

The indemnity to be paid to manufacturers and to workmen 
thrown out of work is estimated at 1 billion marks, and the cost of 
new factories at 200 million, involving an annual charge, at 5 per 
cent, of 60 million marks. The annual revenues of the monopoly, 
estimated on the basis of the retail prices prevailing in 1913, would 
total 1,092 million marks, as follows: 8,500 million cigars, 615 mil- 
lion marks ; 13 billion cigarettes, 301 million marks ; 44 million kilos 
of smoking and other tobacco, 176 million marks. The expenditures 
are estimated at 479.2 million marks: Purchases of foreign tobacco, 
135 million marks ; domestic tobacco, 30 million ; wages, 120 ; packing, 
10; interest charges, 60; freight, 5; administration, 10; 10 per cent 
commission to retailers, 109.2 million marks. The net profits would, 
therefore, amount to 612.8 million marks. The writer points out 
that the revenue law of 1916 increased the retail prices, while his 
calculations are based on the prices of 1913. 

The alcohol monopoly might be built up on the model of the Eus- 
sian spirit monopoly, which formerly brought hundreds of millions 
annually into the Government treasury. The author mentions inci- 
dentally that the Russian monopoly sold only rectified spirits which 



132 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

were less injurious to health than some of the spirits sold in Germany. 
The consumption of potable alcohol in Germany in 1913 was 1,871,200 
hectoliters, at 100 per cent (98,867,000 U. S. proof gallons), the tax 
receipts being 226 million marks. The writer estimates the net 
profits of the monopoly at 610 million marks, estimating consump- 
tion at 2,140,000 hectoliters. The latter figure appears too high, as 
the consumption of alcohol has been decreasing in Germany. Some 
saving would be achieved by combining the sale of spirits with that 
of tobacco. 

MANUFACTURE OF BEER. 

The selling of beer at retail can hardly be monopolized, but the 
production of beer might profitably be undertaken by the State. 
The present system of small breweries involves waste in production, 
and the competition of the breweries causes waste in distribution, too 
many unnecessary retail places being maintained. In 1907 Germany 
had 9,383 breweries employing 111,779 persons, and 1,285 malt fac- 
tories employing 8,553 people. The United States in 1909 had only 
1,414 breweries employing 66,725 persons, or about one-half of the 
number employed in Germany, although production was nearly the 
same in the two countries (59,244.000 barrels in Germany, 56,364,000 
barrels in the United States). Most of the German breweries are 
small. 

Prof. Ballod estimates the annual profits of the monopoly at 630 
million marks, or 400 million higher than the proceeds of the beer 
tax in 1913. The revenue is reckoned at 1,430 million marks 65 
million hectoliters of beer at 24 marks per hectoliter, less discount, 
the retail price to remain at 30 pfennigs per liter. The expendi- 
tures are estimated at about 800 million marks 1.6 million tons of 
barley at 200 marks, 320 million ; hops, one-third kilo per hectoliter, 
about 22J thousand tons in all, priced at 4.000 marks, 88 million; 
2 million tons of coal at 20 marks, 40 million ; wages of 60.000 work- 
men at 1,500 marks, 90 million; administration, 20 million; barrels, 
20 million ; total operating expenses, 578 million marks. Indemnity 
to brewery owners is estimated at 2 billion marks, requiring an an- 
nual payment of 100 million marks for interest. Repairs are reck- 
oned at 1 per cent, or 20 million marks ; depreciation is estimated at 
the same amount. In the opinion of the author, the Government 
monopoly would improve the quality of beer and operate much more 
economically than the private breweries. 

COAL OFFERS OPPORTUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY. 

The institution of a coal monopoly will be opposed by the largest 
and most influential group of interested parties the great banks, the 
industrial magnates, and their press. It has been pointed out, how- 
ever, that the mineral wealth of the country is recognized by German 
law as property of the State. Mining had been a prerogative of the 
State before it was made free. In the eyes of the law, coal, ores, 
salts, water power, all belong to the State, and the legislature may at 
any time authorize the exploitation of these natural resources by the 
State. "That time is now at hand," say the Correspondenzblatt 
(May 22, 1915) , the organ of the social-democratic federated unions. 



WAR LOANS, TAXATION, AND PROPOSED MONOPOLIES. 133 

" The operators have made billions in exploiting our underground 
resources and hope to make gains of additional billions. The work- 
ing methods have been perfected so that the intensity of exploitation 
can hardly be increased. Competition has been limited by cartels, 
and the proprietary rights have been concentrated in the hands of a 
few holders." 

Prof. Ballod's argument in support of a coal monopoly is very 
elaborate and thorough. The interests of the private operators, he 
says, are directly opposed to those of the State. The operators seek 
to make as large profits as possible out of the sale of coal ; they may 
encourage a waste of coal, whereas the State's aim should be to con- 
serve the supply. As a matter of fact, enormous quantities of coal 
are wasted annually by improper methods of combustion in stoves 
and furnaces and under boilers, while the opportunities of using 
water power are neglected. German railways and industries employ 
nearly 100,000 steam locomotives and engines, many of them very 
small ; and the smaller the engine, the greater the waste of coal, pro- 
portionately, and also the waste of labor. In the future the em- 
ployment of labor must be more scientific and production more in- 
tensive. Hence railways, as well as the large industrial and agri- 
cultural establishments, must be electrified. 

It is not easy to imagine what a large saving of coal would result 
if electricity were generated in plants of 100,000 kilowatts or larger 
and distributed throughout the land over high-tension transmission 
lines. Even if transformers (converters or substations) were neces- 
sary for the employment of electricity, it may be assumed that at 
least 60 per cent of the original energy, whether steam or gas, would 
be utilized at the driving shaft of the working machines or the loco- 
motive. 

During the last year of peace the railways consumed about 20 
million tons of coal. The work performed gave a service of 815 
million locomotive kilometers, besides 50 million kilometers of trips 
without loads and 40 million hours of shunting service, reckoned at 
10 kilometers per hour. If the average velocity of a train be taken 
at 40 kilometers per hour, the service would represent about 20 mil- 
lion locomotive hours. The average locomotive may be estimated at 
500 horsepoAver. For 1 train kilometer the locomotive consumes 13 
to 15 kilos of coal, the consumption per hour per horsepower being 
estimated at 1.5 kilos. In large electric works, particularly when 
steam turbines are employed, consumption does not exceed 0.6 kilo of 
coal per hour per horsepower ; hence 1 kilo, at the most, for delivery 
of the energy to an electric locomotive. The latter, however, can 
be made much lighter, as it does not have to carry coal or water, 
and may be utilized for carrying passengers or mail. Thus a large 
part of the expenses now incurred in transporting coal and deliver- 
ing it to railways and industrial establishments would be saved. 

The electrification of railways would save at least one-third of the 
total amount of coal used by steam railways that is, six to seven 
million tons annually. The production of coal in 1913 was 190 
million tons, and the net exports 24 million tons ; in addition, 5J mil- 
loin tons of coke, equivalent to TJ million tons of coal, were exported. 
The exports would be a source of profit ; coal will be higher after the 
war, and 30 marks will probably be charged for a ton instead of the 
prewar price of 15 marks. The net profits of the coal monopoly may 



134 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

be estimated at 450 to 500 million marks a year, besides a profit of 
about 100 to 150 million marks to be derived from the electric power 
monopoly after deducting interest, amortization charges, and ex- 
penses. While the domestic consumption of coal might profitably be 
reduced by about one-third, it is the opinion of the writer that prices 
should not be increased to domestic consumers. If the German in- 
dustries are to export their products they must receive power at low 
prices. 

COLONIAL EXPLOITATION. 

A special system of colonial economy is expected by the author to 
yield about one billion marks annually. The expectation is based on 
the experiences of the Netherlands Government in the East Indies, 
In the thirties of the last century Van den Bosch, governor of Java, 
introduced a system of compulsory cultivation of tropical products 
the so-called " cultuurstelsel " which brought the Government con- 
siderable revenue, reaching as hi^h as 60 million a year. The natives 
were required to cultivate one-fifth of their plantation areas for the 
State and deliver the produce to Government warehouses at fixed 
prices. The system was abolished in the sixties at the behest of 
Amsterdam capitalists who, the author says, were eager to reap the 
profit themselves, and a system of private exploitation was substi- 
tuted. Prof. Ballod suggests that the African subjects of Germany, 
both men and women, be required to work three or four years for the 
Government instead of being bound to military service. On the sup- 
position that Germany will receive no more than its old colonies the 
Empire would have a million workers who might be expected to raise 
at least a billion marks' worth of cotton, oilseeds, and other tropical 
products. They would gain in knowledge and practical application 
and might be given a few acres of public lands for life as a reward. 

Prof. Ballod challenges the opponents of State monopolies to point 
out other ways and means of obtaining the enormous sums necessary, 
if they can. The Alldeutsche Blatter sees the only hope in large war 
indemnities payable in kind in foodstuffs and raw materials for the 
industries. Unless such indemnities be obtained, the paper says, 
Germany will be unable either to compete with other nations or feed 
her own population. " What would remain ? A declaration of bank- 
ruptcy by the State." 



XL PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 

DIFFICULTIES TO BE MET. 

Determined efforts will be made by Germany after the conclusion 
of peace to regain the foreign markets lost during the war. Large 
quantities of raw materials to be delivered after the war, are said 
to have been ordered abroad by German manufacturers; ship space 
has been engaged, and orders taken in neutral countries. It is pos- 
sible, however, that those manufacturers who have contracted for 
the delivery of raw materials at satisfactory rates may not be able 
to take advantage of their bargains, as the Government appears to 
incline to the view that all available supplies coming into the country 
should be distributed as equally as possible, according to the capacity 
of the various firms and the extent of their activities before the war. 
The manufacturers expect that raw materials for the industries will 
be given preference over all other imports during the reconstruction 
period; the importers insist that manufactures ready for imme- 
diate consumption should be given first place; others urge the 
importation of foodstuffs. In this clash of interests the needs of 
the industries will certainly be favored over the interests of the 
traders. 

Owing to the uncertainties of war, most of the measures proposed 
are still in the stage of discussion, only a few having received legis- 
lative sanction. Many of the industries have been syndicated or 
consolidated; an Imperial Ministry of Economic Affairs has been 
created; subsidies have been voted to rehabilitate the merchant ma- 
rine; steps have been taken to promote the exportation of German 
goods under the guise of neutral products. 

ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN CREDITS. 

The loss of capital during the war, the lack of ship space, and the 
difficulty in obtaining foreign credits and means of payment for the 
imports of raw materials and foodstuffs are regarded in Germany 
as the principal obstacles to a speedy rebuilding of the foreign trade. 
The low exchange value of the mark will enforce economy in impor- 
tation, and the State will be obliged to interfere " not because it has 
become socialistic but because it will have no other choice" (Dr. 
Kurt Singer, in the Europaische Staats- und Wirtschaftszeitung, 
Oct. 20, 1917). 

Three factors will contribute to the difficulties of exchange: The 
low price of the mark abroad, the revival of foreign claims suspended 
by the war, and the financing of the importation of raw materials 
and foodstuffs which can not be offset by an equivalent exportation. 
Only an increase of exports will improve the mark quotation, but 
a chronic weakness of exchange will probably continue for a con- 

135 



136 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAE. 

siderable time, though increased exports and limited imports may 
keep it within narrow limits. Even if a large part of the imports 
can be obtained on a year's credit, that will only postpone the effects 
of the pressure for a time during which the weakness of exchange 
will continue, and new burdens may arise. Thus it may happen 
that after the conclusion of peace large demands will be made upon 
the Imperial Bank by the banks of the occupied territories whose 
funds are held in Berlin. The exact amount of these deposits is un- 
known, but it exceeds a billion marks. It is likewise unknown 
whether the balance of the international claims suspended by the 
war is favorable to Germany or not, but it seems that the indebted- 
ness of Germany is larger, and that the payment of the balance due 
to citizens of foreign countries must be postponed. But postpone- 
ment is not settlement. 

EFFECT OF GENERAL DEMAND FOR MATERIALS. 

The Imperial Bank will have to continue buying and selling for- 
eign exchange and shipping gold abroad. Here, it has been pointed 
out, another new condition may arise : Foreign countries may not be 
willing to accept gold in their desire and demand for payment in 
certain merchandise. During the war this tendency has been notice- 
able in Scandinavia, in the Netherlands, and in Spain: it may con- 
tinue after the war. The State Bank of Sweden has been released 
from its legal obligation to purchase gold bullion offered, and the 
mark quotation at Stockholm is lower than anywhere else. The de- 
mand for tonnage will be greater than the supply ; the disproportion 
will gradually disappear, though not without a restrictive influence 
on trade. It is the opinion of Dr. Singer that the free play of eco- 
nomic forces and the unconditional freedom of private initiative may 
be restored within this generation, but the probability will grow less, 
the longer the war lasts. 

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. 

The Kingdom of Prussia has a Ministry of Commerce and In- 
dustry, but there never has been a Department of Commerce in the 
imperial administration, commercial matters being in charge of the 
Ministry of the Interior. 1 The sufferings caused by the war have 
demonstrated in a striking manner the importance of foreign trade 
for the country, and a demand was made by representatives of the 
trade for the institution of a special Department of the Export 
Trade. The government did not accede to the request. It was 
admitted, however, that the matters placed under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of the Interior were too many and too varied to be 
properly administered by one man; the department was divided and 
a new establishment created under the title " Reichwirtschaftsamt," 
Imperial Department of Economic Affairs. 

The new department is to take charge of matters of social or com- 
mercial policy, matters affecting the welfare of the working classes, 
commerce, and shipping, as well as economic questions affecting agri- 
culture and industry. According to the Deutscher Reichsanzeiger of 

1 See " vierman Foreign-Trade Organization," Miscellaneous Series No. 57, pp. 56, 57, 
and 115. 



PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 137 

November 5, 1917, the jurisdiction of the department in matters of 
commerce embraces questions of commercial policy, commercial 
treaties, war economic measures (including retaliation), the economic 
aspects of the tariff and taxation, the econofrdc aspects of mobiliza- 
tion and demobilization, insurance, corporations, banks, stock ex- 
changes, exhibitions, and matters concerning conditions of produc- 
tion at home and abroad, general statistics, statistics of the trade with 
foreign countries, weights and measures. The department will also 
be in charge of matters affecting marine and inland shipping, includ- 
ing the mail steamer services and the administration of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Canal; war damages suffered by shipping; marine and 
inland fisheries. 

PLANS FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD. 

The transition of the industries from the war to peace conditions 
in Germany, as in other belligerent countries, will require much time, 
capital, and labor. The various problems of the reconstruction period 
are now being discussed in and out of the halls of legislation by states- 
men, economists, and other men of affairs. The following exposition 
(pp. 138-140) is a condensation of an article by Arthur Dix 
(" Gesichtspunke bur die Ubergangswirtschaft "), published in 
Deutsche Politik for September 14, 1917. It is worth reading as the 
view of one of the best known German students and writers on such 
political and commercial topics. The calm assumption that foreign 
markets will be open to German competition as before, and the ex- 
pressed regret that German foreign trade in textiles was in the past 
conducted under the guise of foreign manufactures, instead of as 
goods made in Germany, and the future need for emphasizing this 
" made in Germany " idea are, at this time, novel to say the least. It 
is also interesting to note that Herr Dix, as late as the fall of 1917, 
was still indulging in the hopes of indemnities. 1 

It is impossible during the war, says the author, to prepare a defi- 
nite working scheme for the period of transition, but certain possi- 
bilities can be considered. The situation of the labor market at the 
end of the war will depend upon two factors, the conditions of peace, 
and the season of the year when peace will be concluded. The condi- 
tions of peace will decide whether the German industries shall ex- 
pand and aspire to higher achievements, or, confined to their old 
limits, shall face less favorable prospects under a heavy burden of 
taxation. The conditions of peace will also decide whether Germany 
shall immediately have a free hand to obtain sufficient quantities of 
raw materials from abroad and freedom of competition to revive the 
export trade, or the economic war shall continue to hamper with diffi- 
culties in both fields. The season of the year will determine whether 
it will be possible to employ all the nation's forces or not. This will 
be of particular importance for the building trades. 

1 Arthur Dix, in spite of the English ring of the name, is a German through and 
through. He has been correspondent, editor, and publisher of some of the leading political 
and economic reviews. As managing editor of Weltpolitik his views have carried consider- 
able conviction in Germany. It can not be overemphasized that the expressed views of 
Herr Dix on annexation, indemnities, and a German world empire are the views of a large 
proportion of the leading thinkers and men of position in Germany. See " Germany's 
Annexationist Aims." by S. Grumbach, translated by J. Ellis Barker, E. P. Dutton & Co., 
New York, 1917. 



138 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAE. 

TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE CONDITIONS. 

The chief tasks of the transition period will be making good the 
damage caused to industrial life by the war and rebuilding the vari- 
ous war establishments for the purpose of peace. The first task 
presents a wide field of labor. The injuries caused by all kinds of 
reckless exploitation made necessary by the war will have to be made 
good, as well as the various sins of omission due to lack of labor 
or materials. Three principal groups will have to receive primary 
consideration : First, agriculture, stock raising, and forestry ; second, 
transportation; third, the building trades. During the war it has 
been impossible for the German farmers to do their work with the 
customary care and intensity, owing to lack of laborers, teams, and 
fertilizers. The rational system of crop rotation was abandoned in 
order to satisfy the needs of the moment. The fields and the farm 
equipment as well as the working methods must be brought to normal 
conditions. The same holds true in regard to mining; the damage 
caused by abnormal exploitation must be made good. The transpor- 
tation services have suffered heavily. Time, labor, and materials 
have been lacking to keep roads and other means or transportation 
in repair. All means of land transportation have been taxed to the 
utmost during the war and the rolling stock has deteriorated. New 
roads and railways will have to be built ; locomotives, cars, and auto- 
mobiles repaired or replaced by new stock. Shipyards will also be 
kept busy. The building trades will have to reconstruct the factories 
now working for army needs ; and as the war has stopped the build- 
ing activities almost completely, large numbers of new buildings 
will have to be erected. The speed of all this work will depend to 
some extent on the situation of State, municipal, and private finances ; 
that is, on the conditions of peace. A peace " without indemnities " 
would impose enormous burdens upon the State and the citizens; 
strict economy would have to be practiced throughout the land ; and 
the scope of the necessary undertakings would be reduced to the dis- 
advantage of the German workingmen. 

The readjustment of war establishments to the purposes of peace 
will depend on the conditions of peace to a greater degree than the 
other necessary tasks. Those conditions will decide to what extent 
the armament and munition industry must be retained or may be 
reconstructed, what raw materials and markets Germany shall 
possess at home, what raw materials may eventually be obtained as 
war indemnity, and under what circumstances and on what terms 
raw materials will be obtainable in the world market. The condi- 
tions of peace will influence estimates of the national wealth of Ger- 
many after the war, the course of exchange, and ability to compete in 
foreign markets. They will determine the ability of the export in- 
dustries to continue exportation and to supply the home market with 
products manufactured from imported materials, the level of prices 
in the home market, and, finally, the rapidity of the transition from 
war to peace economy. 

IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE. 

If the season will permit, the farmers must make strenuous efforts 
to supply the country with foodstuffs. In 1907 nearly 10,000,000 per- 
sons found their principal employment in agriculture, and more than 






PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 139 

ive and a half million people were pursuing agriculture as a sec- 
mdary occupation. About 4,000,000 of the men employed in agricul- 
ure were of military age. Mining and metallurgy, which have, so to 
ay, lived from hand to mouth during the war, will have to work to 
fill the empty warehouses and keep the manufacturing industries 
smployed and the transportation services in operation. These two 
>ranches employed over 860,000 operatives, mostly men of military 
ige. A like task awaits the cement, brick, tile, and stone industries, 
nd the woodworking industries' each employed above 770,000 per- 
ons in 1907. The building trades employed more than one and a 
talf million men. 

CHEMICAL, PAPER, AND LEATHER INDUSTRIES. 1 

The chemical industry is in an exceptional position. It employed 
>nlv 172,000 persons in 1907, but has acquired unusual importance 
[uring the war. The industry expects an easy transition from war 
o peace conditions and is sure of a good market, even in peace times, 
it has brought forth a number of substitute articles of common use 
which will remain in the market, and foreign countries will still be 
Lependent on the German chemical industry, so this German writer 
laims, notwithstanding the various attempts to establish independ- 
nt chemical industries elsewhere. 

The paper and the leather industries have worked but little for 
ivilian needs during the war, owing to lack of raw materials; after 
he war the domestic demand for their products will be correspond- 
ngly great. The canned-goods industry has been well employed 
luring the war, but the other foodstuff industries, as well as the 
obacco industry, have only been able to work for the needs of the 
noment. They will be kept busy when sufficient supplies of raw 
naterials have been obtained, but these materials, whether domestic 
>r foreign (cocoa, tobacco, etc.), will hardly be as plentiful as in 
he times of peace. 

TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRIES. 2 

The textile and the clothing industries will find themselves in 
situation beset with many difficulties. These industries employed 
learly two and a half million workers, a majority of whom were 
tvomen. Their stocks of raw materials are gone, and many of their 
nills have been lying idle. In times of peace Germany imported 
normous quantities of cotton, wool, silk, and yarns, and exported 
nanuf actured textile products of more than a billion marks in value. 
Dwing to lack of ship space and high foreign exchange it will be 
mpossible early in the reconstruction period to import enough raw 
naterials to satisfy the demand at home and bring exportation to 
he average of the antebellum period. The textile industry will have 
o make an uphill fight to win back its old place in the markets of 
he world. Foreign competition has grown up during the war, and 
he reconquest of the markets will take a long time. 

The industry, according to Herr Dix, will also pay a penalty for 
;he mistaken policy of placing its goods on the market under false 
lags. As a result of that policy German textiles are almost unknown 

1 See also pp. 38-39, 48, and 62. 
See also pp. 49-53 and 58. 



140 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAE. 

as such in markets where they have been sold under foreign labels. 
Even in Germany, the author complains, silk fabrics hud to bear a 
Lyon mark, and ^suitings an English label, in order to be popular. 
The textile industry will do well in the future to make the most of 
the advantages offered by the superior quality of German dyes and 
market its fabrics as German wares. Germany can not achieve any 
permanent success in the economic war, the writer says, by getting 
into the markets by stealth through competing countries and under 
their flags; on the contrary, the thing to do is openly to exploit the 
fame achieved by German technical skill during this very war. 
However, the textile industry will be affected more by the course 
of exchange and the general economic situation than by demobiliza- 
tion, as a large proportion of its operatives are women. 

OPTIMISTIC VIEWS OF GERMAN PUBLICISTS. 

German agriculture, mining, and the manufacturing industries 
will doubtless face many difficulties during the period of reconstruc- 
tion. It should be noted, however, that the author whose views have 
been given above uses these difficulties as an argument for war in- 
demnities, pointing out the differences between a " good " and a 
"bad'' peace. President Havenstein, of the Imperial Bank, on the 
other hand, is of the opinion that "when peace has opened a free 
road for German work both at home and overseas, and when the 
German merchant shall again be able to wrestle in free competition 
with other nations in the world market, nothing can permanently 
paralyze German work, which is inimitable." Even England, he 
says, has been greatly weakened, so that the Germans have no need 
to fear her competition. 

These are typical views of publicists and business leaders current 
in Germany; similar discussions fill not only the newspapers and 
periodicals but innumerable books and pamphlets as well. Many 
German business men are facing the future with the view that in 
the past not a mark's worth of German goods was purchased abroad 
for love of Germany, but value was the only consideration. They 
assume that the trade of the future will be based on the same grounds 
and that German commerce in foreign markets can proceed as before. 1 

1 The following is an abstract of an article given considerable publicity in the German 

fress in the latter part of 1917, having been sent out by Wolff's German News Bureau. 
t is a view of the raw material situation and the subject of trade after the war which 
is obviously intended to afford consolation for the German business men. 

"The belief of the Entente in the final military victory seems now to be greatly 
shaken. They desire to exclude Germany from economic cooperation and to put it in 
a difficult situation by stopping the supply of raw materials after the war. This can 
only be effected as long as the Entente and the countries overseas stand together, and 
it seems doubtful that they for long will be willing to exclude themselves from so good 
a market as the German. Italy can not long do without Germany, its best market for 
vegetables, fruits, flowers, silks, etc. The natural market for Russian grain, hemp, 
bran, wood, eggs, and many raw materials is Germany. Many of these countries need 
goods which they can only get from Germany, such as coal, coke, potash, sulphate of 
ammonia, chemicals, dyes, engines, optical and electric apparatus. By compensation 
agreements it would be easy for Germany to prevail upon such countries to make ex- 
changes secretly or openly. If individual States take up business connection with 
Germany, openly or secretly, there will be many ways to get raw materials. 

" As soon as the chain of agreements with regard to an economic war is broken, 
England will be the greatest sufferer An exchange of goods, not carried on according 
to natural, economic laws, will make the costs of production greater, export more difficult, 
and inland consumption more expensive, all to the detriment of English laborers. Before 
the war Germany was England's best customer in raw materials. The use of aluminum 
instead of copper will go on after the war and will considerably decrease the necessity 
of importing copper from overseas. The textile industry, which before the war imported 
a considerable amount of raw materials, has during the war made itself independent of 
foreign countries by supporting the domestic production of binder twine, by growing and 
utilizing nettles and by the use of paper twine." 

See aiso p. 15. 



PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 141 

lit is difficult to reconcile such views with the current home-market 
[ideals and activities that accompany them with regard to the trade in 
the German market. German trade for German manufacturers is 
more than ever a slogan. Deutsche Arbeit is an organization with 
headquarters in Berlin which is conducting the home-market propa- 
ganda with extravagant promises for the future. Under "home 
market " are not infrequently included Austria-Hungary, Turkey, 
the Balkan countries. 



ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA- 

HUNGARY. 

! The discussion of various plans for closer economic relations be- 
tween Germany and Austria-Hungary has given rise to an extensive 
literature. The idea of an economic union in " Mitteleuropa " 1 is not 
(new. It originated in the forties of the last century in Austria and 
jwas championed by the Austrian dynasty which aspired to leader- 
ship in Germany. The war of 1866 put an end to these aspirations 
land also to the plans of an economic union. Eighteen hundred and 
(seventy saw a united Germany, but Austria was not included. In 
JL879 the idea was revived by representatives of the German indus- 
tries, and several futile efforts to bring about closer relations have 
been made since. In 1903 the Mitteleuropaischer Wirtschaftsverein 
pas organized for the purpose of promoting the principles of mutual 
Concessions between Germany and Austria-Hungary. In 1912 the 
blan of a customs union was discussed by representatives of indus- 
trial organizations of both countries, and in the following year the 
jcreation of an Austro-German economic society was suggested by 
{Berlin, but only the German branch was actually organized. 

PROPOSED CUSTOMS UNION. 

The present discussion embraces numerous plans, the predominat- 
ng idea being that of a customs union of Germany and Austria- 
-lungary as against other countries, with home rule for each of the 
wo Empires. The idea is favored by Austrian politicians and other 
epresentatives of the nonindustrial classes with w r hom political con- 
iderations are uppermost, but has been received rather coldly by 
epresentatives of the industries with whom economic considerations 
ire of first importance. Inasmuch as the Austrian and Hungarian 
ndustries are both absolutely and relatively weaker, some guaranties 
would have to be found to protect them against the overwhelming 
competition of Germany. 2 

The attitude of the Austrian manufacturers toward the proposed 
union may be judged by the following declaration of their principal 
(organ, Die Industrie, of March 9, 1915: "To believe that Austria- 
jHungary has any reason to seek closer relations with the ultimate 

1 See also Appendix B, p. 177, and Appendix C, p. 184. 

i 2 Any proposal for a customs union naturally meets with a certain amount of opposition 
irom certain interested parties in various quarters. Thus the opposition to a customs 
fonion between Germany and Austria-Hungary is not confined to the manufacturers of 
(Austria. The German agrarian interests have frequently voiced their opposition to any 
scheme of customs union which would leave the German market open to the agrarian 
competition of Hungary. It is interesting to note that the Hamburg Chamber of Com- 
merce on Jan. 31, 1918, submitted a memorandum to the Reichstag opposing either a 
jcustoms union or a customs preference between Germany and Austria, and emphasizing 
jthe importance of protecting the interests of Germany, as distinct from those of Austria, 
an trade with Poland. 



142 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

object of a customs union would be equivalent to a complete disre- 
gard of the actual conditions. For a large majority of our industries 
a customs union would mean heavy losses ; it would be tantamount to 
a surrender of the economic independence of our fatherland, a giving 
up forever of all hope of the further development of our striving in- 
dustries, which is inseparably connected with the existence, the wel- 
fare, and the financial and political strength of the Monarchy. If 
this second pillar of the State be gradually weakened, the State will 
totter to its fall along with the industry." 

The idea finds more favor with the theoreticians and the intel- 
lectuals. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished German historian, 
speaking in Dresden in the autumn of 1914, lamented that German 
unity had been a mere fiction; that 1870 had been merely a big step 
forward ; that the German Empire embraced only a part of the Ger- 
man nation there should be one great German country of central 
Europe. Prof. Philippovich. the Vienna economist, was one of the 
most outspoken partisans of a closer union with Germany. He would 
like to see central Europe as an economic unit with a common cus- 
toms barrier against other countries and moderate duties in the in- 
terstate commerce on such products as may still be in need of protec- 
tion. The duties on many raw materials might be gradually reduced 
to encourage the manufacturing industries. In his opinion, however, 
Austria can not make new concessions without compensation on the 
part of Germany. The new conditions brought about by the union 
would require important changes in administration and legislation 
in the interest of the economic development of Austria, as, for ex- 
ample, in the laws relating to corporations, stock exchanges, and the 
like. Among the advantages which the union would bring to the two 
countries the author mentions the inducements to Austrian agricul- 
ture to introduce better methods, the increased opportunities for the 
investment of German capital in Austria-Hungary, and the strength- 
ening of the influence of the central powers in the Near East. 

Prof. Karl Diehl, of Freiburg, on the other hand rejects the idea 
of a customs union between Germany and Austria-Hungary abso- 
lutely, if such a union should mean a repeal of all import duties oil 
tra'de between the two countries. According to his views closer eco- 
nomic relations with Austria-Hungary should be secured through a 
revised treaty of commerce. The differences in the social legislation 
of the two countries are considered a serious obstacle to the creation 
of an economic Greater Germany. 

F. von Liszt, professor of international law at Berlin, lays special 
stress on the political aspects of the union. A union of the two 
central powers, formed for mutual protection, would serve as a basis 
for the federation of all central European States. Protection 
against attacks from without should not be the sole aim of the union ; 
an assimilation of the industrial life should be sought, although 
the two States might retain their fiscal duties and even the protec- 
tive duties for certain products of agriculture or the industries. A 
uniform system of weights and measures, transportation, etc., would 
also be of great value. 

FREE TRADE WITH GERMANY OPPOSED IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

The idea of a customs union has but few sponsors in Hungary. 
Some of the Hungarian manufacturers have gone so far as to demand 



PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 143 

a temporary protective tariff against Austria, asserting that there 
is no possibility of development for Hungarian industries while trade 
is free between the two parts of the Monarchy. The plan of a cus- 
toms union with Germany was discussed by the Hungarian Manu- 
facturers' Association in February of 1916, the union being favored 
by the flour millers, meat packers, and a few representatives of the 
machinery industry, and opposed by the representatives of the iron, 
sugar, and woolen industries, while the manufacturers of cotton 
goods declared that they were not afraid of the union but did not 
expect much from the plan. All agreed that the union might en- 
large the market and reduce the costs of production, but that Hun- 
garian industries were still in need of tariff protection. 

On behalf of the Austrian manufacturers an important declaration 
was made in April, 1916, at a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce 
of Brunn, by the president of the chamber, Baron von Haupt, an 
authority on industrial and commercial, questions. President Haupt 
declared that, in view of the insuperable difficulties arising from 
the differences of economic conditions in the two countries, the idea 
of a customs union between Germany and Austria-Hungary, born 
in the early excitement of the war, would have to be abandoned. 

All competent judges of the economic conditions in Germany, 
Austria, and Hungary, he said, had rejected the idea of a customs 
union as wrong in principle. Even mutual preference through a 
reduction of duties was not, according to his opinion, the principal 
thing to be considered in a scheme of closer economic relations; it 
was but one of several parts of the plan. Greater importance was 
to be ascribed to all legislative measures that would facilitate both 
material and spiritual intercourse between the countries interested, 
or that would tend to equalize the conditions of production, so far as 
the latter were not determined by nature itself. Different methods 
of taxation produced differences in the cost of production which 
would have to be equalized by customs duties. The entire body of 
industrial legislation in Austria should, first of all, be brought into 
agreement with the industrial legislation of Germany. The laws 
relating to labor, corporations, direct and indirect taxation, must be 
revised according to the same principles in both Empires, just as 
the law of negotiable instruments had been unified. Thus, for 
Austria, the question of closer economic relations with Germany 
was less a question of tariff rates than of a uniform legislative and 
transportation policy. From a rapprochement in those two domains, 
Austria might rightly expect an invigoration of its economic life. 

In the numerous discussions of these plans it is generally recog- 
nized that no definite measures can be worked out until after the 
war, since no one can foretell what the results of the war will be. 1 
It must be remembered also that the Germans represent less than a 
fourth (23.4 per cent) of the total population of the Monarchy and 
little more than one-third (35.1 per cent) of the population of 
Austria alone. The majority, composed of Slavs and Latins, has not 
shown any desire for a political or economic union with Germany. 
The Bohemian and South Slavic representatives in the Austrian 

1 Proposals for a customs union involve the study of the whole question of most-favored- 
nation relations. Under any agreement of preferential customs treatment the existing 
most-favored-nation relations would be affected and might have to be entirely revised. 



144 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

Parliament have declared expressly that the Slavs expected to form 
independent States after the war. 1 

PROMOTION OF TRADE WITH THE NEAR EAST. 

The countries of the Near East, including the five Balkan coun- = 
tries, Roumania, Asiatic Turkey, and Persia, took only a little more 
than 3 per cent of the German exports in 1913 and furnished less 
than 2 per cent of the imports. The trade is comparatively small, 
but has been increasing of late, the value of the combined imports 
and exports having risen from $76,850,000 in 1909 to $124,855,000 in 
1913, an increase of 62 per cent. It is believed that the trade can 
be increased after the war. Conspicuous among the various or- 
ganizations which have taken the Near East as their province of 
trade propaganda is the Deutscher Levante Verband, established 
March 23, 1916. The object of the society is to promote and safe- 
guard German trade, industry, and finance in the Near East by work- 
ing in constant touch with the official authorities, though inde- 
pendently. The society assists its members to obtain import and 
export permits as promptly as possible, and capital and credits as 
easily as possible, and advises them as to the purchase of land. It 
has established a special export and import bureau, which accepts 
offers of agricultural and industrial products. The market reports 
issued by the society make known various import and export trade 
opportunities. The society also maintains an information bureau 
which has already had opportunities of cooperating in the acquisition 
of concessions and in the intended erection of new factories. Exhibi- 
tions of samples of German agricultural and industrial products have 
been organized at Belgrade, Sofia, and Constantinople. The offi- 
cial organ of the society, the Deutsche Levante Zeitung, is also the 
publicity organ of the Hamburg- America Line, the German Le- 
vante Line, and the German Balkan Society. The latter organiza- 
tion has issued a special commercial guide to the Balkans. 

The Institute for Economic Intercouse with Bulgaria, organized. 
at Berlin, under the patronage of the King of Bulgaria, has for its 
object to stimulate and develop trade and commerce between the cen-j 
tral powers and Bulgaria. 

The statutes of the German-Turkish Society (Deutsche Turkische 
Vereinigung) provide for the sending of German teachers to Turkey, 
the establishment of libraries and other educational institutions, the 
circulation of literature, and assistance to Turkish subjects who wish 
to complete their education in Germany. During the four years of 
its existence the society has contributed largely to the support of 
German schools in Turkey and circulated thousands of popular pam- 
phlets in the Turkish language. The society has also established an 
information bureau for economic and commercial matters relating to 
the two countries. In 1915 a Turkish-German Society was formed 
under the presidency of Enver Pasha at Constantinople. During the 
war many Turks have visited Germany. The German-Persian Eco- 
nomic Association has its headquarters at Hamburg. The main ob-- 
ject of the society is the promotion of economic relations and trade 
between Germany and Persia. 

1 See also Appendix C. p. 186. 



PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 145 

The German plans for peaceful economic penetration in Turkey 
I have not found much favor with the Turk. As early as the summer 

of 1915 all German signs and inscriptions in Constantinople, even in 
1 1 the European settlement of Per a, were replaced by Turkish texts, and 

in 1916 Turkish was made the official language of all public and 
i ; semipublic institutions, including banks, papers, and transportation 

companies. Even the German professors at the Ottoman University 
! of Stamboul were required to wear the Turkish fez and learn Turkish 

within a year. 

TRADE WITH THE LATIN COUNTRIES. 

A number of German- Spanish associations were formed during 
I the war, the first one at Stuttgart. In January, 1918, all these 
n societies were consolidated in a Verband Deutschland-Spanien, the 
head office being located in Hamburg^ for 1918. The association 
now has more than 3,000 members. It proposes to foster "cultural, 
I economic, and scientific " intercourse with Spain. The monthly 
| " Mitteilungen aus Spanien," established in August, 1917, and 
[published by the Ibero-American Institute of Hamburg, has been 
I selected as the official organ of the association. 

Trade wi{h the Latin American nations is promoted both by the 
| German colonies in Brazil, Chile, and elsewhere, and by various 
| organizations in Germany. Hamburg has an Ibero-American Insti- 
tute; Aix-la-Chapelle, a German-South American Institute; there is 
la German Economic Association for Central and South America, 
I with 1,400 members, and a German- Argentine Central Association. 
| The publications issued by these societies are printed in German, 
j Spanish, and Portuguese. At the meeting of one of these societies 
the claim was made that the United States has failed to obtain per- 
Imanent advantages from the opportunities created by the world 

I war in Central and South America, and that Germany would soon 
j regain or even improve her position in Latin America. 

THE COMMERCIAL INVASION OF SWITZERLAND. 

In order to overcome obvious disadvantages, a commercial inva- 
j sion of Switzerland has been planned by German capitalists and 
| is already in progress. Swiss manufacturing and exporting en- 

II terprises are to be purchased wholly or in part by Germans and 
continued in operation under their Swiss names. The movement is 
naturally conducted with a certain attempt at secrecy, but has not 
escaped the attention of the Swiss people themselves. In 1917, in 
Berne, the Deutscher Werkbund of Berlin opened an exhibition of 
samples of German goods, which was the occasion for considerable 
hostile criticism of German methods and motives in the Swiss press. 
Meetings and conferences have been held by interested Swiss parties 
to devise methods for the protection of legitimate Swiss interests 
which it is feared would suffer if German trade should be permitted 
to masquerade extensively under the guise of Swiss manufacturers. 

The official Swiss Journal of Commerce has announced the estab- 
lishment of an enterprise called " Metallum," with a capital of 
$965,000, whose object is to monopolize the metallurgical trade by 
the establishment of branches. The president of this company is 

43339 18 10 



146 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAB. 

Dr. Walther Rathenau, of Berlin, also president of the Allgemeine 
Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft of Berlin. The company has established 
its offices at Bern and will doubtless enter into international com- 
petition as a Swiss company. 

Swiss trade-marks for German goods is another method of Ger- 
man commercial camouflage now finding favor in Germany. The 
German firm of Andreas Schilli & Co., of Oberursel, manufacturers 
of scythes, has registered in Switzerland a trade-mark representing 
the classic scene of the oath of Rutli, and the article bears the in- 
scription. "Rutli scythe." The German firm of Hanssen &' Studt, 
of Hamburg, with a branch at Olton, Switzerland, has registered a 
trade-mark representing the figure of Wilhelm Tell. 

RECENT GERMAN EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT SWITZERLAND. 

Under the name of "Ateliers Mecaniques de Waldgarten," a com- 
pany was organized April 2, 1917, for the manufacture and sale of 
metal goods at Schwamendingen, near Zurich, about 50 miles from 
the German border. The board of directors consists almost entirely 
of Prussian subjects. 

The Swiss Export Review has learned of the organization of a 
Protective Trust of German Creditors, whose object is to safeguard 
German credits in Switzerland. In the opinion of the Review, such 
measures might be reasonable in Turkey or Persia, where the safe- 
guards of the law may be inadequate ; in Switzerland, however, the 
courts are open to foreign litigants, and in every canton there are 
German-speaking lawyers amply qualified to protect German clients. 
The Review sees in this organization a new form of propaganda and a 
further effort at pacific penetration of Germany into Switzerland. 
The trust proposes to become the general trustee of German patent 
rights and of German property in Switzerland. German exporters 
have granted liberal credits, thus inducing non-Germans to under- 
take enterprises beyond their means, especially in the case of depart- 
ment stores and other local establishments. When difficulties in 
payments to German creditors arise the Protective Trust of German 
Creditors demands payment relentlessly, and in case of default takes 
over the enterprises. In this way, it is said, numerous enterprises 
of domestic foundation, before the war, passed into the hands of the 
Germans in Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and in 
South American countries, as well as in Russia and Italy. 

The German commercial invasion of the country has caused great 
irritation in Switzerland, and the commercial interests are attempt- 
ing to arouse a patriotic movement which may lead to protective leg- 
islation. 1 The most favored method of protection appears to be the 
proposed establishment of a special trade-mark for genuine Swiss 
goods goods made in Switzerland by Swiss labor. 

IMPORTATION OF RAW MATERIALS. 

The importance of the raw-material question has already been 
pointed out. 2 How to obtain the necessary stocks immediately after 
the war is recognized as a matter of prime importance for the Ger- 

i The Algemeen Handelsblad, Amsterdam, Dec. 27, 1917, ran an article on this subject 
quoting a leading article in the export supplement of the Neue Ziircher Zeitung warning 
against this German operation " under a Swiss fagade." 

3 See " The vital question of materials," p. 64. 



PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR, 147 

(man industries. The Government has recognized its gravity by ap- 
pointing a special Imperial Commissioner in the new Department of 
Economic Affairs (Reichswirtschaftsamt) to take charge of economic 
problems during the transition period after the war. Numerous 
debates in the Imperial and State Parliaments, chambers of com- 
merce, and industrial organizations have shown that the inherent 
Idifficulties of the problem will be greatly increased by its close con- 
nection with other vital questions, such as those of foreign exchange, 
fehip space, financing, and distribution. It is accepted that the 
ienemy trade lists have caused considerable injury to Germany inter- 
jests abroad and that some sort of economic war will doubtless con- 
tinue in peace times. 

It is taken for granted that the business sagacity of the German 
(merchants will enable them to succeed in obtaining sufficient quan- 
jtities of raw materials for the industries, but that will not solve the 
[problem. " Our first consideration," says Dr. Lothar Dessauer 
[(Europaische Staats- und Wirtschaf ts-Zeitung, Sept. 17, 1917) , " must 
jbe to obtain raw materials and semimanufactured products at prices 
[that will enable us to compete in the world market and to sell the 
(manufactured products at acceptable prices at home." Hence one 
lof the most important tasks of the transition period will be to deter- 
imine the best method for the regulation of imports and exports. 
Three different systems have been suggested : Importation by indus- 
trial syndicates; importation by the Government, the imports to be 
distributed to the various industries; free importation by private 
{parties. 

Either of the first two methods would eliminate the trader the 
importer, the wholesaler, the jobber. These middlemen of inter- 
national trade, seeing their business existence threatened, are now 
carrying on a vigorous propaganda in favor of a return to the status 
(quo ante bellum, demanding the right freely to import as before the 
war. The views of the wholesalers are expounded by Commercial 
{Councillor Lustig, general manager of the Aktien-Gesellschaft 
JDcutscher Eisenhandel, in an essay issued as the first number of a 
(long series by the Zentralverband des Deutschen Grosshandels (Cen- 
tral Union of the German Wholesale Trade). Opponents of plans 
contemplating elimination of the middlemen argue that Germany 
j would lose more by giving up transshipment trade and abandoning 
the idea of making Germany the world's great raw-material entrepot 
that it could conceivably gain by direct purchasing by industrial 
organizations. 

The writer describes the development of the foreign trade of Ger- 
|many, which, he says, held second place at the time the war broke 
I out. He quotes an utterance of the former director of the Imperial 
[ Grain Bureau, Dr. Michaelis, who later became Chancellor, to the 
effect that an imperial grain monopoly must be established after the 
| war. It is possible that the Government will seek to establish 
(monopolies of other staple goods. For the other goods the plan 
I appears to be to regulate the importation of raw materials by means 
I of industrial organizations under close Government supervision. 

GOVERNMENT CONTROL MAT BE EXERCISED. 

This author voices the opinion that a sudden dissolution of the 
[ economic organizations formed during the war might be very harm- 



148 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

ful to the economic life of the country, but that their methods of 
operation should, nevertheless, be modified in such a way as to permit 
cooperation on the part of the wholesale trade. If goods are to be 
imported by the Government, or by the industries, necessity will soon 
arise to pay large sums of money to foreign countries. The whole- 
sale trade, however, can make use of its own connections to obtain 
credit so that payments will be better regulated and more widely 
distributed. At the same time an effort should naturally be made 
to export, as far as possible, goods of a high value, such as potash 
and dyes, whereby credits may be obtained abroad. The problem 
would be greatly simplified also by setting aside a large amount of 
gold for the use of the importers if that can be done without injury 
to the German economic system. 

Purchases abroad would be made through syndicates, consisting of 
representatives of both industry and the wholesale trade. Trade 
might well be left wholly free, except for the provision that imported 
goods should be delivered to the syndicates exclusively. Shipping 
should also be represented in these organizations. 

The Government should exercise a certain control over prices, par- 
ticularly if it should appear that the centralization of imports by 
itself did not suffice to prevent a large increase in prices. For this 
purpose price-control bureaus might be established. Taking due 
account of the prices prevailing in the world markets, these bureaus 
would fix maximum prices for purchases for German account. In 
addition, a central organization should be formed to supervise the 
imports, so that importation may be limited to goods urgently needed, 
that no industry and no State may be favored at the expense of others 
and that all dealings in foreign exchange by the syndicates may be 
passed upon by a central authority. If such measures should be 
taken, it is urged that the distribution of the imported goods may 
safely be left to the trade. 

Some German manufacturers are professing to find a ray of com- 
fort in the idea that overproduction abroad will solve Germany's 
raw-material question. They counsel against hurried buying abroad, 
and further urge that good business and patriotism demand that 
German manufacturers in many lines should simply wait for a big 
slump in the international markets which will make the desired ma- 
terials available in ample quantities at. low prices. 

IMPORT BANKS. 

As a compromise measure, Dr. Edgar Landauer, writing on the 
subject of raw materials (in his booklet, "Unserve Kohstoffversorgung 
nach dem Kriege," Leipzig, 1917), recommends the organization of a 
chain of import banks. Dr. Landauer favors freedom of importa- 
tion by individual traders, provided the interests of the general pub- 
lic can be safeguarded from the competition that might arise under 
conditions of such freedom and mobility of imports. The import 
banks are recommended to provide the safeguard. 

INADEQUACY OF EXISTING FOREIGN BANKS. 

The existing foreign trade banks of Germany are pronounced 
insufficient and unsatisfactory all being branch institutions of the 
great domestic banks, are dominated by their influence, and have 



PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 149 

I other duties to perform. The special import banks would purchase 
raw materials in foreign markets and distribute them at home. They 
would thus in a measure compete with the trade, but the competition 
would not be serious, as the trade buys only^to satisfy the temporary 
demand, whereas the banks would buy for stock, being guided by 
political rather than commercial considerations. The chief object of 
the banks would be, in addition to supplying the domestic market 
during the transition period, to accumulate a stock of raw materials 
which would protect the public against speculation on the exchanges 
in time of peace and keep the mills running in time of war. They 
would advance money on the security of goods afloat or in ware- 
house, but would not furnish credit to individual firms. They would 
simply provide the foundation for a sound and steady development 
of trade, independent of speculation, which has always followed the 
conclusion of peace. 

Dr. Landauer would have a central bank with branches specializing 
for the various imports an imperial wool bank, a cotton bank, jute 
bank, etc. located in those cities which have heretofore been the 
principal markets for the various materials. The activities of the 
banks would not exclude trading by individuals or their personal 
connections. The banks would be working with their own capital, 
and the importing trade would obtain credit with greater ease than 
would be the case if each individual firm were obliged to make large 
demands upon the great banks. The import bank, according to the 
author, could not be considered a purchasing monopoly, and the 
country would be saved the disagreeable experiences which have 
resulted from the workings of the Central Purchasing Bureau during 
the war. On the contrary, it might be expected that Germany would 
obtain larger quantities of goods on satisfactory conditions. The 
stock of raw materials in the bank's warehouses would prevent sudden 
fluctuations of prices, limit speculation, and mitigate the effects of a 
commercial crisis. 

EXPORT BANKS. 

Dr. Landauer is also one of the many German writers who urge 
that export banks should be organized, though on different principles 
and for different purposes. The enemy countries have made a partial 
conquest of some of the foreign markets heretofore held by the Ger- 
mans and German exports to those markets will consequently be 
smaller. Certain factors are cited, however, as tending to increase 
German exportation: The great technical progress of the German 
industries and their new inventions, the closer connection with the 
Balkan countries, the universal need of replacing the values de- 
stroyed by the war, and replenishing depleted stocks. The foreign 
markets must be cultivated; all means should be used to renew the 
connections broken by the war. Other countries are doing it, while 
the Germans are only talking about it. The export banks should 
help to open the markets and assist the export trade. They should 
grant credit to exporting firms, but do no trading on their on 
account. 

American readers familiar with the organization of German over- 
sea banking may wonder at the recommendation of establishing an 
export bank as if it were a new thing, 1 and it appears that the pro- 

1 See " German Foreign Trade Organization,'' Miscellaneous Series No. 57, pp. 34-39. 



150 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

posal appeals chiefly to those who believe that the existing over-sea 
banks are too intimately tied up with the great banks in Germany. 
It is recommended as a means of furnishing disinterested service to 
any German exporters who apply and strictly commercial service 
uninfluenced by policies' depending on complicated speculative and 
industrial alliances. The organization of an export bank to assist 
in the restoration of trade relations with Central and South America 
and to promote export trade generally was advocated at a meeting of 
trade organizations and Latin-American export houses at Hamburg 
early in July, 1917. The bank should establish branches abroad, 
particularly at the important trade centers of Central America, the 
West Indies, the Far East, and Australasia. 

PROPOSED CENTRAL FOREIGN -TRADE BANK. 

A central foreign-trade bank was planned in Germany a generation 
ago, but the project was abandoned owing to the great diversity of 
conditions in the foreign markets. In 1884 the president of the Im- 
perial Bank opened negotiations with the Deutsche Bank and the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft intending to establish a banking institution, 
closely connected with the Imperial Bank, to regulate the financial 
transactions between Germany and over-sea countries. The Im- 
perial Chancellor interested himself in the plan, the Hamburg Cham- 
ber of Commerce was consulted, and the negotiations went on for 
two years, but it was found impracticable to establish an imperial 
over-sea bank, a large institution which would provide banking 
facilities for all the colonies and over- sea trading districts as the 
conditions abroad were too varied to be served properly by one in- 
stitution. Similar plans are now being considered. 

Mr. George Simon, of Hamburg, president of the Verein deutscher 
Exporteure (Association of German Exporters), discusses the ques- 
tion in the Wirtschaf tszeitung der Zentralmachte. The writer points 
out that export banks are being organized in all industrial countries, 
and that Germany should not lag behind any longer. The activities 
of the new German export bank should consist, at first, principally 
in extending acceptance credits to exporting firms so as to enable 
them, after the prohibition of payments to enemy aliens has been 
rescinded, to meet their obligations, inasmuch as the demands upon 
the money lenders will doubtless be many and large after the con- 
clusion of peace; the bank may also advance money on outstanding 
debts owing by reputable firms, and on consignments. It is admitted 
that it may be difficult to obtain the necessary funds by private sub- 
scription, and Government participation is urged by some of the 
sponsors for the foreign-trade banks. ' It is also feared that it may 
be difficult to muster a capable personnel for the banks. 

Some of the arguments for the German need of export banks are 
clearly based on the ground that the existing over-sea banks have 
had their day and outlived their usefulness ; it is plain also that the 
effects of the liquidation of banks in enemy countries and breaking 
of connections on account of the war are causing apprehension. They 
have lost business and prestige, and it is claimed that a real need 
exists for new, export-promoting banks unhampered by tradition and 
independent in policies. It has been stated in some quarters that the 
banks have too often shown a tendency to take a profit wherever pos- 



PREPARATIONS FOR TRADE AFTER THE WAR. 151 

sible and to become oblivious of original German-trade fostering 
aims. Herr Simon's remarks about lagging behind the other indus- 
trial nations in this regard are interesting, though not convincing. 
In view of the known extent of German over-sea banking it is doubt- 
ful if much will result from the recommendations in question. 

FOREIGN-TRADE INSTITUTES. 

The need of a central institute for the promotion of the German 
foreign trade has been recognized by the public for years. Germany 
possesses more than 40 separate associations for the promotion of for- 
eign commerce, working independently and often at cross-purposes. 
The Handelsvertragsverein (Association for Commercial Treaties) 
now proposes the creation of a central foreign-trade institute by 
means of a combination of the various societies (" Handelspolitische 
Flugschriften," No. 14, by Dr. W. Bor~gius, Berlin, 1917). Accord- 
ing to this plan the various special associations for foreign-trade 
services should unite to form a foreign-trade bureau, provide an 
office building with a library and reception rooms, and organize joint 
advisory and executive bodies from among their committees and 
chairmen. 

The associations would remain independent each in its own sphere, 
but large firms might be given the opportunity of collective member- 
ship. The societies would form five divisions, according to the. sub- 
ject matter considered, viz, divisions for the tariff, traffic, judicial 
procedure, information service, and general commercial policy. By a 
close cooperation of these divisions a proper division of labor would 
be achieved and also a concentration of effort; the present wasteful 
dissipation of energy and means would be ended and better results 
obtained. Foreign branches of the associations now existing would 
be utilized as branches of the institute. 

German merchants going abroad after the conclusion of peace will 
be more than ever in need of an organized protection for their eco- 
nomic interests and will gladly join such organizations abroad. The 
so-called foreign chambers of commerce are considered less suitable 
for these purposes by the author. The German commercial experts 
abroad may be instructed to act, extra-officially and without pay, as 
economic advisers or managing directors. The German commercial 
world would thus be enabled to make use of their services directly, 
without the delay, often prejudicial, now caused by the transmission 
of their reports through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of the Interior. With the Handelsvertragsverein behind it, 
this proposal will probably result in closer organization of foreign- 
trade promotion, if not in the actual organization of an institute. 

The Institute for Sea Traffic and World Economy (Das Institut 
fiir Seeverkehr und Weltwirtschaft) of the University of Kiel laid 
the cornerstone of its new building February 9, 1918. The institute, 
established in 1914, is a development of the seminary for political 
and social sciences founded by Prof. Bernhard Harms in 1911. The 
new building is to cost over 3,000,000 marks and its erection has 
been made possible by the efforts of a special society for the promo- 
tion of the institute. The purposes of the institution were explained 
by the president of the society, Heinrich Diederichsen, a merchant of 
Kiel. "We are laying the cornerstone of a building in which the 



152 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

scientific study of sea traffic and world economy is to find a home," 
the speaker said. " We men of affairs see clearly that we shall have 
to face difficult tasks after this war. German economic life must 
be built up anew. The present task is to establish a connection be- 
tween the practical life in all its branches and the economic science. 
In its investigations and its teachings the institute must be inde- 
pendent of the public, of the State, of the society and its directors. 
I make this declaration in the name of all the leading members of 
the society." 

Prof. Harms said the institute was a pioneer in a new field and 
only the future could pass judgment on the value of the work done. 



XII. GERMANY A FORMIDABLE ECONOMIC REALITY. 

GERMAN DREAM OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM. 

In an address before the (Italian) Industrial and Commercial 
AJliance, at Milan, on January 7, 1917, Eucardio Momigliano, after 
discussing the remarkable industrial development, concentration of 
banks, interlocking of the banks and the industries, large scale pro- 
duction to the point of overproduction, dumping, cartels, and indus- 
trial colonization, concluded as follows: 

"And now the question arises spontaneously why, with an organi- 
zation thus formidably prepared, with trade flourishing abroad, with 
competition overcome and even destroyed, why has Germany gone 
to war? 

a The madly imperialistic dream of one person or of a dynasty is 
not sufficient to justify and to explain the breaking out of the belli- 
cose delirium of Germany; the network of interests, of aspirations, 
led the German people and the German economic system inevitably 
into war. 

" Germany, master of the European market first, then of the world 
market, was the realization of the dream of economic imperialism; 
but to complete it, it was necessary to destroy all obstacles ; political 
conquest had to complete the economic conquest follow it wherever 
it had gone before, precede it wherever it had not yet penetrated. 
And the Empire, in order to effect its ' Weltpolitik,' had to make war. 

" This has been a hard, harsh lesson ; the dream was destroyed on 
the battle fields of the Marne. at the first defeat of the armed forces 
of the Kaiser, and the superb castle is being battered down under 
the blows that are being delivered at it by the entire world defending 
i+s liberty and its civilization. 

" Germany will be defeated, but afterwards what new aspirations 
will prepare new perils for the coming generations? 

" It is necessary to look the facts calmly and squarely in the face : 
With Germany and the Prussian military empire defeated, the Ger- 
man people will not be destroyed. Germany's population of seventy 
million souls represents for all time in Europe a formidable economic 
reality. We can not get away from this, and therefore the economic 
problems of the period after the war are more urgent and more 
imposing than ever. 

" The German people, feeling the bitter lesson of their defeat, will 
renounce., let us hope, for a long time, their mad ideas of reconquest 
or of revenge, but it will be necessary in every way for us to make 
haste in defense against their methods of economic invasion. The 
Germans have until now been playing a dishonest game, while their 
competitors were playing the game according to the rules; thus the 
play has been in their favor for a long time. If they desire to take 
their place again at the table of economic competition, they will have 
to do so under the conditions of playing fairly, else they will have to 
stay out of the game." 

153 



154 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WORLD COMMERCE. 

In these half-dozen paragraphs the eminent Italian lawyer has 
started out with a definition of the German aim of political con- 
quest to complete the previous economic conquest, and has wound 
up with a succinct statement of the important truth that even after 
defeat in the war Germany, with its seventy million population, will 
continue to exist as a formidable economic reality in Europe for all 
time, and must be faced as such by other nations. 

This truth is one which we Americans must not ignore. It means 
that when the war is over there is still going to be advantageously 
located in the center of western Europe a great and populous nation, 
through which will continue to pass many of the most important 
routes of trade. It means that Germany is still going to have its 
wonderful natural system of river transportation made more valu- 
able by years of dredging and the building of canals, and still 
further supplemented by railroads and good highways. It means 
that Germany is still going to have her great natural wealth of coal, 
iron, potash, lead, zinc, and other less important minerals. 

It means, further, that Germany is going to continue to have a 
population of hard workers, showing remarkable aptitude and 
capacity for agriculture, industry, trade, shipping, engineering, and 
finance. This will continue to be the same country that in little more 
than a generation, with its comparatively poor soil, one-tenth unpro- 
ductive, one-fourth forested, and only about one-half under cultiva- 
tion, has been able to continue to produce foodstuffs sufficient for the 
maintenance of a surprisingly large proportion of its own popula- 
tion and sufficient with great hardships to withstand for a period 
of % years in time of war the cutting off of foreign sources of supply, 
while rising to the position of the greatest sugar-producing nation in 
the world, the foremost manufacturing nation of continental Europe, 
and at the same time extending her trade, banking, shipping, and 
industrial colonization to all corners of the earth. 

A country that can thus capitalize its territorial resources and its 
resources of men and mind for economic conquest in time of peace 
and for economic defense in time of war is a country that always has 
to be reckoned with. So long, in time of peace, as Germany did only 
these things there was cause for admiration; but at the point where 
Germany, completely intoxicated by its striking successes, began to 
disregard completely the rights of all other countries and developed 
an insane passion for subjecting all the rest of the world to German 
exploitation, that country became truly formidable. 

DANGER OF GERMAN POLITICS ASSOCIATED WITH COMMERCE. 

There is no longer any doubt of the imperialistic tendency of Ger- 
man commerce and industry, so intimately tied up with German poli- 
tics. We now know that Germany is coming out of this war with 
vast losses proportionally greater losses, perhaps, than those of any 
of her adversaries. She has lost in trade prestige good will in all 
parts of the world. She has saddled herself with losses of capital and 
men and depreciation of industrial competitive power, and a weight 
of taxation which will increase her costs of production and make the 
retention of her position in competitive trade more difficult. Her 



GERMANY A FORMIDABLE ECONOMIC REALITY. 155 

stocks of raw materials and finished products are depleted, her re- 
construction needs are great, her merchant marine can not be restored 
for a long time. There is no reason to believe, however, that the 
insensate aspirations for dominating the labor and industry of the 
world are entirely of the past. In fact, there is very good reason to 
believe the contrary. 1 

As Signore Momigliano has pointed out, there is need of preparing 
for defense in 6rder that German business may not continue its old 
methods of quiet penetration in one country after another. People 
everywhere are now awake to the German methods, but the mistake 
must not be made of underestimating the recuperative power of the 
Germans and of overestimating the effects of the "burden of bil- 
lions " resting on Germany as a result of the war. There is danger 
that even in defeat this economic reality of seventy million Germans 
in the middle of Europe is going to continue to dream the dreams of 
middle Europe, followed by the dreams of middle Africa, and also 
the dreams of a German world. 

President Wilson has stated the American policy of " the removal, 
so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of 
an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to 
the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." He has 
further advocated the formation of an association of nations to make 
the world safe, but in doing so he has stated that it may be necessary 
to leave Germany without the benefits of " the free economic inter- 
course which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of 
a real peace." Apart from questions of governmental policy, there 
is a clear duty resting on American business men individually to 
keep their eyes open to German competition in whatever form it 
may come. The American Government, in concert with the Govern- 
ments of the other great nations, will see to it that Germany, as a 
Government, shall henceforth operate in the open. American busi- 
ness men, like business men in the other great countries, must like- 
wise see to it that all operations of German trade enterprises shall 
take place in the open and bear a clear indication of having been 
" made in Germany." 

1 See " Germany's Annexationist Aims," by S. Grumbach, as translated, abbreviated, and 
introduced by J. Ellis Barker, published by E..P. Button & Co., New York, 1917. In this 
book are reproduced in full, for the first time in English, petitions addressed to the Im- 
perial Chancellor of Germany by six great economic associations (the League of Agricul- 
turists, the German Peasant League, the Westphalian Peasant Society, the Central Asso- 
ciation of German Industrialists, the League of Industrialists, and the German Middle 
Class Association), and by 1,341 intellectual leaders of Germany, in which the war aims 
are set forth. In addition to the demands for cash indemnities these petitions set forth 
almost incredible demands for annexations east and .west, and an extensive colonial empire 
outside Europe. 



APPENDIXES. 



Appendix A. GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 

TABLE I. TOTAL IMPORT TRADE OF GERMANY, BY COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, 

1909 TO 1913. 

[Statistics of German export trade may be found in " German Foreign-Trade Organizations," Miscellaneous 

Series, No. 57, pp. 117-147.] 



Countries. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


United States... 


$300, 490, 000 
324, 613, 000 
172,133,000 
179,607,000 
115,456,000 
75,435,000 
104,172,000 
68,918,000 
60, 312, 000 
68,509,000 
55,477,000 
55,761,000 
44,006,000 
33,758,000 
38,710,000 
34,157,000 
29,443,000 
32,202,000 
20,797,000 
15,515,000 
22,783,000 
8,770,000 
15,361,000 
13, 635, 000 
14,651,000 
1,997,000 
6,956,000 
5,657,000 
8,097,000 
4,585,000 
5, 107, 000 ' 
5,935,000 
4,840,000 
4,322,000 
3,084,000 
5,119,000 
6,451,000 
3,585,000 
2, 944, 000 
3,003,000 
2, 634, 000 
2, 433, 000 
1,853,000 
3,059,000 
2,932,000 
2, 467, 000 
2, 644, 000 
885,000 
889,000 
3,662,000 
1,697,000 
504, 000 
1,847,000 
1. 536, 000 
1,999,000 
635,000 
1, 162, 000 
788, 000 
895, 000 
865,000 
880,000 
914,000 
15, 876, 000 


$282, 652, 000 
330,013,000 
182,444,000 
180,686,-000 
121,099,000 
96,162,000 
85,022,000 
77,489,000 
61,515,000 
65,340,000 
63,750,000 
66,385,000 
44, 628, 000 
38,986,000 
41,386,000 
36, 793, 000 
33,363,000 
37,629,000 
25,786,000 
22,531,000 
22,282,000 
11,820,000 
16,394,000 
16,054,000 
14,133,000 
2,531,000 
8,760,000 
6,226,000 
6,798,000 
8,421,000 
7,047,000 
4,516,000 
4,889,000 
5,060,000 
5,176,000 
5,641,000 
10,864,000 
3,771,000 
3, 396, 000 
3,645,000 
2,543,000 
3,092,000 
2,571,000 
3,456,000 
2,730,000 
2,039,000 
5,586,000 
920,000 
868,000 
4, 267, 000 
2,003,000 
1,224,000 
2,168,000 
2,815,000 
1,502,000 
657,000 
1,636,000 
967,000 
761, 000 
1,250,000 
896,000 
824,000 
20, 464, 000 


$319,726,000 
388,951,000 
192,497,000 
175,903,000 
124,811,000 
104,790,000 
88,040,000 
80,942,000 
70,862,000 
67,779,000 
59,082,000 
76,161,000 
43,881,000 
43,554,000 
42,753,000 
37,688,000 
39,050,000 
42,899,000 
25,424,000 
24,596,000 
23, 689, 000 
12,876,000 
25,643,000 
16,682,000 
13,304,000 
5,702,000 
8,942,000 
8,243,000 
8,427,000 
8,803,000 
8,704,000 
6,474,000 
6,153,000 
5,634,000 
6,064,000 
7,384,000 
6,531,000 
3,974,000 
3,410,000 
4,678,000 
2,871,000 
3,473,000 
2,914,000 
4,908,000 
1,984,000 
2,311,000 
4,016,000 
1,181,000 
1,199,000 
5,893,000 
1,987,000 
1,691,000 
2,970,000 
2,565,000 
2,520,000 
2,257,000 
1,447,000 
760,000 
807,000 
1,042,000 
1,181,000 
1,075,000 
18, 189, 000 


$377,464,000 
363,628,000 
200,543,000 
197,531,000 
13'1,432,000 
126,911,000 
105,880,000 
92,021,000 
82,195,000 
72,498,000 
65,858,000 
74,537,000 
51,149,000 
50,929,000 
48,963,000 
49,897,000 
45,176,000 
48, 120, 000 
28,221,000 
27, 498, 000 
26,577,000 
15,215,000 
32,886,000 
18,480,000 
15,995,000 
13, 835, 000 
10,266,000 
8, 775, 000 
11,972,000 
9,450,000 
9,121,000 
7,527,000 
7,506,000 
5,963,000 
5,879,000 
8,459,000 
5,652,000 
4,736,000 
3,765,000 
4,568,000 
3,763,000 
3,122,000 
3,485,000 
3,212,000 
1,666,000 
2,737,000 
4,275,000 
2,245,000 
2,179,000 
4,695,000 
2,018,000 
2,112,000 
4,538,000 
2,033,000 
4,274,000 
3,720,000 
1, 737, 000 
1,338,000 
1, 479, 000 
1,371,000 
1,213,000 
888,000 
19, 458, 000 


$407,246,000 
339,055,000 
208,454,000 
196,935,000 
138,808,000 
128,936,000 
117, 710, 000 
81,975,000 
79,260,000 
75,599,000 
70,468,000 
59,008,000 
54,175,000 
53,350,000 
50,767,000 
47,561,000 
47,293,000 
45,657,000 
32,010,000 
31,052,000 
28,176,000 
19,510,000 
18,971,000 
17,604,000 
16,570,000 
15, 293, 000 
11,098,000 
10,763,000 
10, 294, 000 
9,979,000 
9,692,000 
8,298,000 
8, 238, 000 
6,184,000 
6,010,000 
5,958,000 
5,792,000 
4,913,000 
4,604,000 
4,304,000 
4,059,000 
3,796,000 
3,466,000 
3,373,000 
3,347,000 
3,151,000 
3,110,000 
2,605,000 
2,511,000 
2,508,000 
2,417,000 
2,397,000 
2,315.000 
2,097,000 
2,088,000 
,829,000 
,804,000 
,802,000 
,739,000 
,711,000 
1,668,000 
1,304,000 
20,687,000 


Russia... 


United Kingdom . . 


Austria-Hungary 


France. 


British India 


Argentina 


Belgium 


Netherlands.. 


Italy. . 


Australia... 


Brazil 


Dutch East Indies 
Sweden... 


Switzerland 


Chile 


Spain . 


Denmark. . 


British West Africa 


China 


Egypt . . 


Norway 


Roumania 


Turkey 


British South Africa 


Canada 


Japan 


Finland 


Uruguay 


Ceylon 


Bolivia.... 


Guatemala 


Algeria 


Greece. . . 


Portugal 


Mexico 


Straits Settlements 


Venezuela 


French West Africa 


Portuguese West Africa. 


Ecuador 


Colombia 


German East Africa 


Peru .. 


Siam 


Cuba... 


Kameroon . 


Philippine Islands 


Tunis 


Serbia.. . 


Dominican Republic 


New Zealand... 


Morocco . . . 


Madagascar 


Bulgaria. . 


Persia 


British East Africa 
German Southwest Africa . 
Togo 


Paraguay. 


Costa Rica 


Salvador 


All other countries 


Total 


2 029 399 000 


2,126,322,000 


2. 309, 947, 000 


2,544,636,000 


2,563,354,000 










157 



158 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE II. PRINCIPAL ARTICLES IN GERMAN IMPORT TRADE, IN ORDER OF THEIR 
IMPORTANCE, 1909 TO 1913. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Cotton, raw 


$126,669,000 


$133,495,000 


$143, 780, 000 


$137, 990, 000 


5144, 496, 000 


Wheat 


108, 637. 000 


89, 791, 000 


94, 932. 000 


94, 211, 000 


99,319 000 


Wool raw 


84 917 000 


'92,763 000 


88 464 000 


96 613 000 


98 216 000 


Barley 


72, 118, 000 


73, 782, 000 


109, 981, 000 


105, 723, 000 


92,911 000 


Copper crude 


45, 183, 000 


51,449.000 


54,989 000 


74,496 000 


79,794 000 


Cattle and buffalo hides 


40 031 000 


49 173 008 


49 311 000 


59 696 000 


76 564 000 


Iron ores 


30, 142, 000 


38, 390, 000 


48,500 000 


47, 854, 000 


54,048 000 


Coffee raw 


44 683 000 


42 002,000 


59 873 000 


60,119 000 


52 259 000 


Coal... 


39, 568, 000 


37, 545, 000 


42, 678, 000 


45, 455, 000 


48,685 000 


Eggs; yolks of eggs . 


38,086 000 


39, 768, 000 


41,840 000 


45,964 000 


46,189 000 


Fur skins 


51,761,000 


50,057,000 


38, 492, 000 


46,361,000 


44,701,000 


Nitrate of soda (Chile saltpeter) . . . 
Silk raw not dyed 


28,508,000 
37, 546, 000 


31,771,000 
35,110 000 


32,183,000 
32,452 000 


42,563,000 
34,965 000 


40,912,000 
37 603 000 


Bran; rice refuse 


33,280,000 


27,353,000 


39, 286, 000 


49,748,000 


35,566 000 


India rubber, gutta-percha, and 
balata gum 


36,599 000 


64,345 000 


46,324 000 


43,971 000 


34 929 000 


Wood of conifers, sawn 


25, 306, 000 


29, 318, 000 


32,225 000 


35,987 000 


32, 199' GOO 


Tobacco leaf 


31,437 000 


24,770 000 


27,734 000 


32,277 000 


31,956 000 


Linseed 


25, 150. 000 


23,983,000 


22,460 000 


24,946,000 


30,867 000 


Copra ..... 


11,069 000 


19,636 000 


17,652 000 


22,853 000 


29,019 000 


Lard 


26,516 000 


16,525 000 


20 874 000 


26,458 000 


28, 300 000 


Butter .. . 


23,352.000 


21,888,000 


30,749 000 


30, 070, 000 


28, 252* 000 


Oil cakes 


23,403 000 


22,076 000 


24,835 000 


27,717 000 


28,217 000 


Horses 


20, 992, 000 


26, 041, 000 


25,329 000 


23,831,000 


27,683 000 


Cotton yarn and twist . 


21,310 000 


24,292 000 


23,535 000 


24,749 000 


27,657 000 


Woolen yarn 


28,478 000 


28,532 000 


27,082 000 


25,618 000 


25, 706 000 


Palm nuts. . 


16, 446. 000 


21,041 000 


21, 460' 000 


23, 640. 000 


24,75l'oOO 


Rice 


14,087 000 


19,104 000 


20,983 000 


24,424 000 


24,728 000 


Corn 


20,929,000 


14, 669, 000 


20,639 000 


34,086,000 


24, 257, 000 


Fruits southern 


15,560 000 


18,963 000 


22,468 000 


22,425 000 


24,076 000 


Wood of conifers rough 


19,395 000 


20,084 000 


22 084 000 


23,016 000 


23, 077 000 


Calfskins 


19,963 000 


17,444 000 


17, 952' 000 


20, 029, 000 


22, 52?' 000 


Jute raw and tow ... . 


12,284 000 


10,070 000 


14,834 000 


17,785 000 


22,371 000 


Meats 


11,994,000 


11,696,000 


11,131 000 


22,774,000 


22, 310, 000 


Cattle 


17,321 000 


20,234 000 


14,271 000 


17,477 000 


20,775 000 


Machinery 


15,108 000 


15,305 000 


16 901 000 


18,341 000 


19, 141 000 


Fruits, common, fresh 


13,401 000 


8,294*000 


11,816'000 


14,005 000 


17,38l'oOO 


Sheep, lamb, goat, and kid skins. . 
Cotton fabrics 


14,354,000 
12,730 000 


12,292^000 
13,482 000 


11,555^000 
12,249 000 


14,759,000 
13, 827, 000 


17,276,000 
17,158,000 


Kerosene . . 


14,982 000 


13,095 000 


11,131 000 


14,981 000 


16,632 000 


Brown coal 


18, 465, 000 


16,726,000 


16,824 000 


16, 429, 000 


16,463,000 


Cocoa, raw 


10,009 000 


10,805 000 


13,210 000 


15, 134, 000 


16,070 000 


Wool, carded or combed 


20, 395, 000 


18,949,000 


17, 722, 000 


20,481,000 


14,605,000 


Oats 


15, 632, 000 


11,225 000 


17,816 000 


21,823,000 


14, 382, 000 


Fish fresh 


10,374 000 


11,372 000 


12,391 000 


14,083 000 


14,252 000 


Intestines and stomachs of cattle; 
bladders 


12,337 000 


12,831 000 


13,158 000 


13,227 000 


14,107 000 


Tin crude 


8,733 000 


10,418 000 


13 157 000 


15,435 000 


13,840 000 


Flax, raw, cleaned, steeped, broken 
Poultry live 


8,511,000 
10,646 000 


9,606^000 
12,111 000 


10,' 744^ 000 
10 913 000 


16,032,000 
13,079 000 


13,630'000 
13,319 000 


Wine in casks 


8, /61, 000 


14, 164, 000 


14, 227* 000 


13, 548. 000 


12,735 000 


Herring, salted . . 


7,731 000 


9,451 000 


9,404 000 


10,501 000 


12,316 000 


Phosphate of lime, natural 


9,473,000 


8, 607, 000 


9,916,000 


10, 744, 000 


11,062,000 


Clover seed . 


12,495 000 


12,149 000 


14,871 000 


13, 110, 000 


10, 941, 000 


Lubricating oils mineral 


7,042 000 


6,904 000 


8 326 000 


9,827 000 


10,903 000 


Sesame 


5,242,000 


9,798 000 


8, 052* 000 


8, 454, 000 


10, 403, 000 


Woolen fabrics 


8,317 000 


8,896 000 


9,860 000 


11,025 000 


10,336 000 


Rye 


9,175,000 


10,113,000 


18,09l'oOO 


10, 447, 000 


10,036,000 


Tin ores . . . 


4,919,000 


6, 357, 000 


8,549 000 


9,852 000 


10,029 000 


Wood for the manufacture of pulp 
or cellulose 


5,578,000 


5, 767, 000 


4,776 000 


7, 680, 000 


9, 480, 000 


Cotton seed . . 


3,512 000 


4,100 000 


5,949 000 


8,381 000 


8,874 000 


Fruits, dried 


5,915,000 


6,334,000 


7,233,000 


7,373,000 


8,843,000 


Zinc ores .. 


5, 266, 000 


6, 434, 000 


8,042 000 


9,655,000 


8, 743, 000 


Lead ores 


4,765 000 


4,676 000 


6,412 000 


7,170 000 


8,609 000 


Benzine raw 


4,082 000 


4,020 000 


5 293 000 


9 668 000 


8 535 000 


Linen yarn . .... 


5.509,000 


6,495 000 


7, 198* 000 


7,343 000 


8,368'000 


Sheep, lamb, goat, and kid skins, 
dressed 


6,344,000 


7, 567, 000 


7,692 000 


7, 381, 000 


7,997,000 


All other articles............... 


526,876 000 


570,819 000 


631 087 000 


694 950 000 


691,968 000 














Total 


2,029,399,000 


2,126,322 000 


2 309 947 000 


2,544 636 000 


2,563,354 000 















GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



159 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 

1909 TO 1913. 

ABYSSINIA. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 . 


Total imports 


$256, 000 


$416 000 


$458 000 


$759 000 


$1 505 000 














Cattle hides 


40 000 


69 000 


105 000 


396 000 


1 057 000 


Beeswax 


166 000 


224' 000 


191 000 


241 000 


'339 ooo 


Vegetable ivory 




100 000 


70 000 


43 000 


54*000 















ALGERIA. 



Total imports 


$4 840 000 


$4 889 000 


$6 153 000 


$7 506 000 


$8 238 000 














Iron ores 


957 000 


1 016 000 


1 464 000 


2 029 000 


2 405 000 


Phosphate of lime 


1 833 000 


1 746 000 


1 960 000 


2 270 000 


2 278 000 


Cork 


206.000 


578 000 


746 000 


720 000 


' 748J 000 


Vegetable hair 


322 000 


366 000 


389 000 


431 000 


526 000 


Goatskins 


164.000 


59,000 


271,000 


413 000 


402*000 


Sheep and lamb skins . ... 


102 000 


91 000 


95 000 


202 000 


398 000 


Cork waste and scrap 


100 000 


134 000 


96 000 


113 000 


21l' 000 


Tartar crude 


54.000 


79 000 


55 000 


90'000 


158*000 


Wine in casks 


138 000 


136 000 


174 000 


158 000 


143 000 


WineVea^t (lees) 


49,000 


42 000 


127 000 


96 000 


92*000 


Tobacco 


6 000 


37 000 


45 000 


59 000 


88 000 


Dates dried 


40,000 


50,000 


68 000 


80 000 


87*000 















ARGENTINA. 



Total imports 


$104 172 000 


$85 022 000 


$88 040 000 


$105 880 000 


$117 710 000 














Linseed ... . 


21 183 000 


16 226 000 


11 319 000 


12 991 000 


23 520 000 


Wool raw 


21 583 000 


23 471 000 


21 469 000 


20* 853* 000 


21* 456* 000 


Whea't 


25 769*000 


12* 527* 000 


20 476 000 


22* 099* 000 


17* 857* 000 


Cattle hides 


9 725 000 


11 734 000 


13 828 000 


13* 552* 000 


16* 933* 000 


Corn 


8 148*000 


5* 437* 000 


3* 467* 000 


13 925 000 


14 722 000 


Bran 


4 946 000 


4 294 000 


4 600 000 


5 941 000 


5* 293* 000 


Oats 


2,138 000 


' 637* 000 


2* 349* 000 


5* 042* 000 


4*551*000 


Quebracho logs ... 


1 824 000 


3 105 000 


3 141 000 


2 151 000 


2 298*000 


Premier jus 


502 000 


658 000 


' 479* 000 


1*115*000 


1* 820* 000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


706 000 


1 119 000 


1 029 000 


1 420 000 


1 343 000 


Tallow 


734 000 


' 878* 000 


1*013*000 


1*145*000 


1*043*000 


Quebracho extract 


437,000 


288,000 


373,000 


556,000 


852*000 


Fur skins, raw 


2. 223, 000 


995 000 


353 000 


429 000 


703 000 


Barley 


150 000 


66 000 


15 000 


268 000 


421 000 


Rye 


23,000 


9 000 


29,000 


105*000 


401*000 


Calfskins 


273 000 


282 000 


481 000 


483 000 


354 000 


Oil cake 


222 000 


361 000 


343 000 


254 000 


328 000 


Blood of slaughtered animals ... 


154 000 


120*000 


136 000 


197 000 


243 000 


Tungsten ores 


111 000 


174 000 


259 000 


242 000 


231*000 















AUSTRALIA 



Total imports 


$55 477 000 


$63 750 000 


$59 082 000 


$65 858 000 


$70 468 000 














Wool, raw 


31 294 000 


37 126 000 


33 433 000 


37 333 000 


38 174 000 


Lead ores... 


3 900 000 


4 005 000 


5 644*000 


5 963*000 


7* 709* 000 


Copper 


1 477*000 


2* 393* 000 


2* 291* 000 


3 750 000 


4 731 000 


Zinc ores 


2* 076* 000 


3 684 000 


4*446*000 


5* 304* 000 


4* 730* 000 


Wheat 


5 643 000 


5 209 000 


4*445*000 


2* 539* 000 


3 669 000 


Tin 


1*175*000 


' 781 ' 000 


l' 010* 000 


1 511 000 


' 620* 000 


Tallow 


545 000 


695*000 


J 744'000 


1*075*000 


'390*000 


Wool washed 


3, 007* 000 


3 432*000 


2 155' 000 


1* 563* 000 


'281*000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 

animals 


567 000 


816 000 


787 000 


812 000 


229 000 


Cattlehides 


215*000 


124*000 


298 000 


656 000 


' 175* 000 


Tin ores 


14 000 


3 000 


2 000 


286*000 


539 000 


Precious stones, raw 


230 000 


203*000 


168*000 


165*000 


431*000 


Tungsten ores 


232 000 


286 000 


428 000 


511 000 


394 000 


Apples fresh 


196 000 


179*000 


162*000 


353 000 


356*000 


Calfskins 


82*000 


49 000 


96*000 


386*000 


353*000 


Lead 


747 000 


548 000 


446 000 


349 000 


248 000 















160 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$179, 607, 000 


$180,686,000 


$175,903,000 


$197, 531, 000 


$196,935,000 


Eees 


14,759,000 
18,464,000 
7, 616. 000 
5,735,000 
5, 608, 000 
6,401,000 
3,254,000 
3, 890, 000 
137,000 
2,087,000 
3,185,000 
2, 675, 000 
1, 381, 000 
2,811,000 
1,441,000 
2,050,000 

1,258,000 
1, 039, 000 
1, 556, 000 
1, 532, 000 
2, 860, 000 
1, 482, 000 
1, 210, 000 
1,158,000 
967,000 
2, 049, 000 
564, 000 
1,398,000 
576,000 
829,000 
1,535,000 
715,000 
1,394,000 
824,000 
532, 000 
894,000 
1,060,000 
1, 721, 000 
1,155,000 
745, 000 
655,000 
631,000 
738,000 
294, 000 
987, 000 
1,903,000 
368,000 
615,000 
744,000 


15,249,000 
16, 726, 000 
8,330,000 
4, 805, 000 
5,511,000 
6, 863, 000 
2, 756, 000 
4,549,000 
358,000 
2, 406, 000 
3, 172, 000 
2, 700, 000 
1,187,000 
2, 445, 000 
1,535,000 
1,839,000 

1, 472, 000 
765,000 
1,722,000 
1, 209, 000 
1, 846, 000 
1,427,000 
1,467,000 
1, 278, 000 
1,147,000 
2,363,000 
681,000 
1,690,000 
568, 000 
905,000 
1,323,000 
596,000 
1,212,000 
810,000 
452, 000 
931,000 
1,076,000 
518,000 
1,204,000 
823,000 
744,000 
677,000 
709,000 
472,000 
979,000 
2,350,000 
512,000 
639,000 
800,000 


17, 462, 000 
16,824,000 
9,382,000 
4, 073, 000 
3,626,000 
2, 266, 000 
2,317,000 
4,535,000 
414,000 
2, 654, 000 
2,931,000 
2,950,000 
1,362,000 
2, 243, 000 
1,738,000 
1,935,000 

1,136,000 
1,798,000 
1,878,000 
1,339,000 
2,291,000 
1,970,000 
1,321,000 
1,343,000 
1,143,000 
1, 642, 000 
836, 000 
162,000 
588,000 
697, 000 
1,392,000 
524, 000 
723,000 
837,000 
615,000 
872,000 
915,000 
883, 000 
1,437,000 
793, 000 
956,000 
691,000 
662,000 
675,000 
806,000 
1,863,000 
806,000 
645,000 
957, 000 


19, 866, 000 
16,428,000 
9, 236, 000 
5,265,000 
7, 183, 000 
5,320,000 
4,361,000 
3, 466, 000 
546, 000 
2,742.000 
3, 020, 000 
2,761,000 
2, 174, 000 
2, 260, 000 
1, 843, 000 
1,860,000 

1,769,000 
1, 793, 000 
1,781,000 
890,000 
3,288,000 
1,866,000 
1,306,000 
1,426,000 
1, 169, 000 
1,293,000 
1,019,000 
760, 000 
679,000 
1,027,000 
1,528,000 
981,000 
864,000 
897, 000 
700, 000 
966,000 
923,000 
1,216,000 
920, 000 
1,011,000 
789,000 
848,000 
832, 000 
682,000 
842,000 
1,069,000 
560, 000 
769, 000 
837,000 


18,200,000 
16,463,000 
9, 255, 000 
5,486,000 
5,250,000 
4,477,000 
4,187,000 
3,639,000 
3, 555, 000 
3, 229, 000 
3, 163, 000 
3,034,000 
2,848,000 
2,404,000 
2,140,000 
1,946,000 

,920,000 
,805,000 
,798,000 
,788,000 
,774,000 
,695,000 
, 550, 000 
,467,000 
, 436, 000 
, 373, 000 
,334,000 
, 193, 000 
, 099, 000 
,073,000 
,028,000 
,022,000 
,008,000 
998,000 
952,000 
950,000 
926,000 
914,000 
913,000 
901,000 
838,000 
800,000 
794,000 
793,000 
790,000 
775,000 
755,000 
753,000 
714,000 


Brown coal 


Wood of conifers, rough 


Calfskins 


Barley 


Oxen 


Cattle hides 


Wood of conifers sawn 


Cotton yarn 


Linen yarn 


Malt 


Feathers for beds raw 


Kerosene 


Coal 


Beer in casks 


Paintings 


Wood for the manufacture of pulp or 
cellulose 


Fur skins, dressed 


Books . . 


Apples fresh 


Hops 


Oil cake 


Cotton waste 


China clay 


Sulphate of ammonia 


Horses 


Lubricating oils, mineral 


Cows . . 


Men's hats of felt 


Fur skins, raw 


Red clover seed 


Mine timber 


Cigarettes 


Flax tow 


Zinc 


Gee^e 


Chickens 


Pears and quinces fresh 


Beans for food, dry 


Flax 


Feathers for beds, prepared 


Human hair 


Goat and kid skins 


Hemp tow 


Poultry, killed 


Bran 


Plums, dried 


Wood alcohol 


Paraffin 





BELGIUM. 



Total imports 


$68 918,000 


$77, 489, 000 


$80, 942, 000 


$92, 021, 000 


$81 975 000 














Wool washed . 


6, 220, 000 


6,411,000 


7,516,000 


8,413,000 


7,589 000 


Horses 


6, 579, 000 


7, 862, 000 


6, 988, 000 


6, 610, 000 


7 413 000 


Wool, carded or combed 


4,476,000 


5,392,000 


3, 142, 000 


5,403,000 


4, 829, 000 


Silk artificial 


2, 948, 000 


3,411,000 


3, 453, 000 


4, 596, 000 


3,181,000 


Zinc 


3, 280, 000 


3, 088, 000 


3, 880, 000 


4,070,000 


3 178 000 


Linen yarn 


1 733 000 


2 089,000 


2 483,000 


2 529 000 


2 976 000 


Coke 


2,231,000 


2,373,000 


2,594,000 


2,551,000 


2,715,000 


Thomas phosphate 


1, 668, 000 


2, 179, 000 


2, 445, 000 


2, 429, 000 


2,674 000 


Ore slag 


769 000 


1,353 000 


1, 153, 000 


2,628 000 


2 534 000 


Carbonate of lime, slaked lime 


1, 116, 000 


2,230,000 


1,882,000 


1,905,000 


2,311,000 


Copper 


111,000 


322, 000 


937, 000 


1, 647, 000 


1, 959, 000 


Sulphuric acid 


776, 000 


887, 000 


1, 062, 000 


1, 000, 000 


1 354 000 


Iron old and scrap 


731 000 


1 276 000 


1 452 000 


2 266 000 


1 274 000 


Lead 


1, 250, 000 


1, 833, 000 


2, 276, 000 


2,841,000 


1, 222, 000 


Coal 


1,431,000 


1, 365, 000 


1,343,000 


1, 279, 000 


1, 126, 000 


Zinc ores 


298 000 


440 000 


455 000 


407 000 


1,103 000 


Fur skins 


1, 577, 000 


1,333,000 


621,000 


1, 055, 000 


1,078,000 


Woolen waste 


951, 000 


937, 000 


785, 000 


1,077,000 


762,000 


Oil cake 


370, 000 


491, 000 


751, 000 


899, 000 


756, 000 


Oleicacid... 


751,000 


822. 000 


836,000 


725, 000 


755,000 



GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



161 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

B ELGIU M-Continued. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Cattle hides 


$364 000 


$852 000 


$1 042 000 


$958 000 


$727 000 


Woolen yarns, carded 


850, 000 


872, 000 


596, 000 


790, 000 


688,000 


Phosphate of lime natural 


1,142 000 


1,230,000 


1, 086, 000 


750, 000 


636, 000 


Potatoes 


701, 000 


489, 000 


1,617,000 


2, 316, 000 


616,000 


Apples fresh 


321, 000 


274, 000 


501,000 


1, 039, 000 


583, 000 


Chickory roots dried 


374 000 


1. 019, 000 


1,554,000 


1,903,000 


572,000 


Paper stock 


500,000 


448, 000 


546, 000 


632, 000 


569, 000 


Flax tow ... . 


303, 000 


198, 000 


374, 000 


589, 000 


568, 000 


Passenger automobiles 


414 000 


472 000 


477, 000 


695, 000 


525 000 















BOLIVIA. 



Total imports 


$5 107 000 


$7 047 000 


$8 704 000 


$9 121 000 


$9 692 000 














Tin ore 


4 178 000 


5 837 000 


7 248 000 


7 911 000 


8 478 000 


India rubber 


621, 000 


755,000 


598, 000 


254, 000 


313,000 


Copper ores 


6 000 


3,000 


9 000 


225, 000 


240 000 


Bismuth 


117,000 


267, 000 


310, 000 


274, 000 


230,000 


Cattle hides 


30 000 


13 000 


39,000 


38,000 


184,000 















BRAZIL. 



Totil 


$55, 761, 000 


$66, 385, 000 


$76, 161, 000 


$74, 537, 000 


$59, 008, 000 














Coffee - 


29, 770, 000 


31, 268, 000 


45, 093, 000 


43, 628, 000 


33, 667, 000 




12 550 000 


20 977 000 


16 258,000 


14, 672, 000 


9, 256, 000 


Cattle hides 


5, 644, 000 


7, 085, 000 


5,311,000 


6,399,000 


6, 368, 000 


Tobacco leaf 


2 585 000 


2 079 000 


2, 700, 000 


2, 809, 000 


2, 886, 000 


Cocoa 


1,651,000 


1, 563, 000 


1,977,000 


2, 238, 000 


1,922,000 


Bran 


443 000 


530, 000 


722, 000 


715, 000 


689,000 


Vegetable wax 


417 000 


549 000 


565 000 


729 000 


662 000 


Semiprecious stones 


87 000 


145, 000 


385, 000 


337,000 


497, 000 


Cotton 


7 000 


16 000 


103 000 


93 000 


357, 000 


Monazite sand 


271 000 


115. 000 


832,000 


607, 000 


330, 000 


Manganese ores 


724 000 


474 000 


385 000 


253, 000 


266,000 


Egrets 


37 000 


69, 000 


43, 000 


77,000 


210, 000 


Precious stones . . 


62 000 


93 000 


79,000 


198, 000 


178,000 


Oil cake 


67 000 


93 000 


251 000 


117 000 


150,000 


Tobacco rolls, plugs, and carrots, for 


137 000 


113 000 


138 000 


144 000 


144,000 


Goat skins 


267 000 


151,000 


149,000 


252, 000 


141,000 


Copper scrap 


45 000 


72 000 


84 000 


83 000 


124,000 


Brass and tombac 


37, 000 


66,000 


71,000 


43,000 


117,000 


Para nuts 


118 000 


107 000 


87, 000 


223, 000 


102,000 















BRITISH INDIA. 



Total imports 


$75, 435, 000 


$96,162 000 


$104, 790, 000 


$126,911,000 


$128, 936, 000 














Jute jute tow. . 


12, 222, 000 


10, 025, 000 


14, 718, 000 


17, 662, 000 


21, 873, 000 


Rice 


7,743 000 


12 532 000 


15 047 000 


19 108 000 


18 373.000 


Cotton 


11, 161, 000 


20, 107, 000 


16, 395, 000 


9,318,000 


13,964,000 


Cattle hides 


5, 356, 000 


6 018 000 


5,494 000 


7,842 000 


11,451,000 


Copra 


3, 237, 000 


3,502,000 


2, 572, 000 


4, 849, 000 


8,006,000 


India rubber . 


850, 000 


1,316 000 


1,781 000 


3, 544, 000 


7,110,000 


Rape and colza seed 


6 627 000 


7 809 000 


7 458 000 


6 326 000 


7 088 000 


Linseed 


918, 000 


3,276 000 


6, 429, 000 


5, 815, 000 


3,958,000 


Sesame 


1,676 000 


3 587 000 


2 607 000 


1,637 000 


2, 820, 000 


Wheat 


1 761 000 


444 000 


2 510 000 


2 887 000 


2 428 000 


Rice bran and refuse 


1,156,000 


924 000 


1,113 000 


2, 246, 000 


2,350,000 


Manganese ores 


1 145 000 


1 327 000 


1 629 000 


462 000 


2 114 000 


Shellac 


2, 331, 000 


2,638 000 


1, 549, 000 


,865,000 


, 559, 000 


Goat and kid skins dressed . 


2 165 000 


2 156 000 


2 704 000 


650 000 


549, 000 


Peanuts 


626 000 


1 488 000 


2 088 000 


721 000 


431 000 


Goat and kid skins, raw 


797' 000 


1, 218' 000 


954 000 


370, 000 


,295,000 


Coir yarn 


943 000 


1 009 000 


1 176 000 


Oil 000 


,278 000 


Mica 


745,000 


982 000 


1, 075, 000 


,393,000 


,241,000 


Oil cake 


1 368 000 


907 000 


804 000 


1, 189, 000 


,196,000 


Coffee 


957,000 


777,000 


822,000 


864,000 


,062,000 


Mowra seed; elipe nuts, shea nuts 
Peas dry 


827,000 
188 000 


531,000 
71 000 


1,573,000 
718 000 


1,709,000 
7, 098, 000 


,022,000 
1,011,003 


Tin.!...... 


677.000 


789.000 


1.157.000 


1.387.000 


920.000 



43339 



162 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

BRITISH INDIA-Continued 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Poppy seed... 


$1.160,000 


$1,006,000 


$1 059 000 


$649 000 


$814 000 


.Lmters . 


706 000 


981 000 


917 000 


676*000 


721 000 


India hemp, kapok, pineapple fiber. .. 
Sheep and lamb skins, dressed 


249,000 
511,000 


506.000 
524 000 


494,000 
733 000 


696,000 
712 000 


663* 000 
627 000 


Tamarinds 


228 000 


305 000 


422 000 


518'000 


61o'oOO 


Cotton waste 


137,000 


120,000 


lie' ooo 


357 000 


519*000 


Tungsten ores 


6 000 


42 000 


62 000 


222 000 


517 000 


Pepper 


314 000 


328 000 


366 000 


392 000 


458 000 


Jute sacking 


186,000 


148 000 


259' 000 


399 000 


451*000 


Gutta-percha 


197 000 


1 160 000 


452 000 


609 000 


446 000 


Ivory 


288 000 


352 000 


401 000 


439 000 


446 000 


Ebony wood, sawn 


114,000 


242 000 


236 000 


426*000 


446*000 


Myrobalans 


400 000 


470 000 


399 000 


321 000 


411 000 


Ground bone 


237,000 


202,000 


295 000 


391 ' 000 


339*000 


ICauri, dammar, and other resins 


210 000 


150 000 


94 000 


209 000 


227 000 


Tea 


327 000 


227 000 


277 000 


276 000 


309 000 















BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA. 



Total imports 


$14,651,000 


$14, 133, 000 


$13 304 000 


$15 995 000 


$16 570 000 














Wool, raw... 


8, 704, 000 


8, 678, 000 


8, 588, 000 


10 432 000 


10 810 000 


Ostrich feathers 


2,191,000 


1 980 000 


1 797 000 


1 949 000 


2 090*000 


Wool, washed 


1 193 000 


1 266 000 


933 000 


1 010 000 


1 183 000 


Wattle bark 


569,000 


694,000 


767 000 


825 000 


1 124 000 


Cattle hides 


39 000 


55 000 


128 000 


242 000 


327 000 


India rubber 


592 000 


51 000 


32 000 


30 000 


207 000 


Whalebone 




11*000 




2 000 


76*000 


Aloe juice 


16 000 


15 000 


19 000 


20 000 


74*000 


Lead ores 


1,000 




5 000 


18*000 


69 000 


Sheepskins, raw 


34 000 


22 000 


20 000 


76 000 


67 000 


Corn 


816 000 


904 000 


492 000 


830* 000 


64 000 















BRITISH WEST AFRICA. 



Total imports 


$20 797 000 


$25 786 000 


$25 424 000 


$28 221 000 


$32 010 000 














Palm nuts . . . 


15 534 000 


19 792 000 


19 762 000 


20 934 000 


21 588 000 


Cocoa 


2 210 000 


2 306 000 


2 875 000 


3 929 000 


4 660 000 


Palm oil 


1*341*000 


1*815*000 


1 442 000 


1 520 000 


2* 004* 000 


Peanuts 


165 000 


180 000 


91 000 


308*000 


1 761 000 


Cattle hides 


87 000 


119*000 


222*000 


278 000 


' 832* 000 


India rubber 


959 000 


1 111 000 


605 000 


491 000 


260 000 


Mahoganv and palisander wood 


218,000 


220 000 


197 000 


323 000 


245 000 


Sesame . .". 


24 000 


7 000 


23 000 


25 000 


149 000 


Corn . 


83 000 


26 000 


6 000 


39*000 


122 000 















BULGARIA. 



Total imports . 


$1 999 000 


$1 502 000 


$2 520 000 


$4 274 000 


$2 088 000 














Eggs 


1 165 000 


870 000 


1 127 000 


1 748 000 


918 000 


Rose oil 


172 000 


200 000 


283 000 


* 533* 000 


500 000 


Bran 


74 000 


82 000 


235*000 


378 000 


112 000 


Tobacco 


9*000 


20*000 


25 000 


81 000 


105 000 


Corn... 


68 000 


5 000 


239 000 


438*000 


79 000 


Lamb skins 


14 000 


26*000 


70* 000 


143 000 


57*000 


Wheat 


134 000 


21 000 


91 000 


460*000 


53 000 


Vetches, dry 


2 000 


8 000 


119*000 


74 000 


41 000 















CANADA. 



Total imports 


$1 997 000 


$2 531 000 


$5 702 000 


$'3 835 000 


$15 293 000 














Wheat 




685 000 


3 394 OOC 


11 013 000 


12 324 000 


Reaping machines 


484 000 


352 000 


' 411* 000 


' 555* 000 


'923' ooo 


Asbestos 


416 000 


482* 000 


41 1 ' 000 


566 000 


677* 000 


Lobsters, canned 


32*000 


109* 000 


155* 000 


139 000 


166* 000 


Barley 








e'coo 


155* 000 


Apples, fresh 


20 COO 


13 000 


553 000 


276 000 


151 000 


Hay tedders, presses 


6l'oOO 


69 000 


87*000 


70*000 


77*000 















GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



163 



I TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 

1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

CEYLON. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports ' 


$4 585 000 


$8 421 000 


$8 803 000 


$9 450 000 


|9 979 OQO 














Copra 


1 136 000 


4 051 000 


4 516 000 


4 246 000 


4 208 000 


India rubber 


353. 000 


1. 189, 000 


1. 210, 000 


1,527' roo 


1 874* 000 


Graphite . 


1.081 000 


1.019 000 


1.136 000 


1 151 000 


1 238 000 


Coconuts 


262 000 


253 000 


504 000 


555 000 


' 926* 000 


'Oilcake 


204 000 


189 000 


164 000 


190'000 


251 000 


Tea 


206 000 


154 000 


182 000 


197 000 


233 000 


Cinnamon 


182. 000 


160.000 


179, 000 


202' ooo 


191 'OOO 


Precious stones 


136 000 


64 000 


86 000 


224 000 


173 000 


Cocoa 


171 000 


223 000 


208 000 


178 000 


160'000 


Coconut fiber. 


67 COO 


74' ooo 


87 000 


lie' ooo 


111 000 















CHILE. 



Total imports 


$34,157 GOO 


$36 793 000 


$37 688 000 


$49 897 000 


$47 561 000 














Nitrate of soda 


28 488,000 


31.728,000 


32 146 COO 


42 451 000 


40 699 000 


Wool, raw 


93^ 000 


1 211 000 


883 000 


1 203 000 


1, 976' 000 


Iodine 


1 223 000 


1 157 000 


1 009 000 


1 023 000 


1 151 000 


Borate of calcium .. . 


368 000 


' 4oe' ooo 


' 546' 000 


' 467' 000 


' 6C7' 000 


Cattle hides 


85 000 


92 000 


160 000 


249 000 


606 000 


Bran 


426 000 


382 000 


470'000 


827' 000 


527 000 


Tin ores 


312 000 


335 000 


892 000 


1 269 000 


465 000 


Sole leather 


535 000 


512 000 


554 000 


' 632' 000 


386' 000 


Silver ores 


30 000 


61 000 


81 000 


238 000 


223' ooo 


Honey 


99 000 


90 000 


109 000 


lie' ooo 


106 000 


Plants, berries, leaves, etc., for indus- 
trial purposes 


138, 000 


185, 000 


131,000 


95 000 


103 000 


Sheepskins, raw 


50 000 


15 000 


65 000 


65 000 


96 000 


Beeswax 


18 000 


49 000 


50 000 


56 000 


79' ooo 















CHINA. 



Total imports 


$15,515,000 


$22,531,000 


$24, 596, OOC 


$27,498,000 


$31,052,000 


Sesame 


3, 268, 000 


5,778,000 
1,336,000 
1,958,000 
1, 358, 000 
797. 000 
399, 000 
950,000 
1,049,000 
715,000 
710, 000 
1,036,000 
649,000 
322,000 
582,000 
421,000 
526,000 
202, 000 
386,000 
217,000 


5, 193, 000 
2, 238, 000 
2,167,000 
1,452,000 
938, 000 
1, 552, 000 
986, 000 
882, 000 
568,000 
1,151,000 
377,000 
656,000 
509,000 
600,000 
569,000 
373, 000 
41, 000 
296, 000 
276,000 


6, 506, 000 
3, 895, 000 
1,929,000 
1,325,000 
1, 243, 000 
475, 000 
1,058,000 
749,000 
500, 000 
991,000 
446,000 
1,038,000 
870, COO 
288,000 
612,000 
559,000 
131,000 
316,000 
312, 000 


7,150,000 
4,342,000 
4. 071, COO 
1,457,000 
1,281,000 
976,000 
942,000 
806,000 
800,000 
687,000 
599, 000 
544,000 
521,000 
519, 000 
517, 000 
512, 000 
510, 000 
502, 000 
372,000 


Sova beans 


Cattle hides 


1,304,000 
1,068,000 
674,000 
167,000 
1,124,000 
870, 000 
124,000 
317,000 
699,000 
664,000 
314,000 
515,000 
333,000 
573, 000 
97,000 
273,000 
161,000 


Feathers for beds 


Yolk of egg^ 


Cotton 


Tea 


Bristles 


Peanuts 


Wood oil 


Fur skins 


Plaits of straw . . 


Ramie 


Gallnuts 


Albumen 


Silk, raw, not dyed 


Shea butter and other vegetable tallow. 
Goat and kid skins, raw 


Menthol 





COLOMBIA. 



Total imports 


$2, 433, 000 


$3, 092, 000 


$3,473,000 


$3, 122, 000 


$3, 796, 000 


Coffee 


703,000 
1,000 
372, 000 
259,000 
520, 000 
62,000 


613,000 


746,000 


696,000 
141,000 
877, 000 
367, 000 
547, 000 
81,000 


957,000 
875,000 
717,000 
484, 000 
416,000 
99,000 


Bananas 


Taguanuts 


660,000 
650, 000 
611,000 
42,000 


676, 000 
785,000 
562, 000 
144, 000 


Cattle hides 


Tobacco 


Panama hats 





164 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

COSTA RICA. 



Articles 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$880, 000 


$896, 000 


$1, 181, 000 


$1,213,000 


$1, 668, 000 














Coffee 


738 000 


737 000 


1 017 000 


928 000 


1 164 000 


Bananas 








65,000 


239.000 


Cedar wood 


96 000 


106, 000 


78, 000 


110 000 


135 000 


Cattle hides 


14, 000 


32, 000 


67,000 


91, 000 


118, 000 















CUBA. 



Total imports 


$2, 467, 000 


$2, 039, 000 


$2,311,000 


$2, 737, 000 


$3,151,000 














Cattle hides 


249, 000 


363, 000 


515, 000 


695, 000 


1, 071, 000 


Tobacco 


452, 000 


539, 000 


468, 000 


617, 000 


806 000 


Cigars 


968, 000 


452, 000 


499, 000 


552,000 


496,000 


Cedar wood 


316, 000 


256,000 


314, 000 


317,000 


180,000 


Honey 


171 000 


162, 000 


150, 000 


181, 000 


150 000 


Beeswax 


63, 000 


86,000 


70,000 


90,000 


133, 000 


Cocoa 


36,000 


30,000 


62, 000 


42, 000 


80 000 















DENMARK. 



Total imports 


$32, 202, 000 


$37, 629, 000 


$42, 899, 000 


$48, 120, 000 


$45, 657, 000 














Cattle 


7 800 000 


8 548 000 


9 457 000 


7 675 000 


10 595 000 


Cream, fresh 


3,362,000 


5,599,000 


5, 206, 000 


6, 658, 000 


6,679 000 


Horses 


4 589,000 


5, 400, 000 


6 062,000 


6, 683, 000 


6 077 000 


Beef and veal, fresh 


1, 259, 000 


2, 092, 000 


2, 183, 000 


5,535;000 


3, 233, 000 


Salt-water fish and shellfish fresh 


1 433,000 


1,537,000 


1, 853, 000 


2, 700, 000 


2,824 000 


Calfskins, raw 


1,036,000 


1,331,000 


1,377,000 


1, 683, 000 


1, 793, 000 


Pork, fresh or simply prepared 


711,000 


753, 000 


740, 000 


1,587,000 


1, 307, 000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


1, 128, 000 


1, 036, 000 


1, 198, 000 


1, 737, 000 


1, 284, 000 


Butter 


3 212,000 


2 847,000 


4, 373, 000 


3, 219, 000 


1 210 000 


Barley... 


569, 000 


800,000 


1, 187, 000 


1,564,000 


983, 000 


Lard ... 


499, 000 


510,000 


599, 000 


848, 000 


906, 000 


Cattle hides 


778, 000 


597, 000 


612, 000 


927, 000 


863, 000 


Fresh- water fish, fresh 


430,000 


516, 000 


535, 000 


559, 000 


652, 000 


Oil cake 


291 000 


229. 000 


375, 000 


549, 000 


508 000 


Sheepskins, raw 


109, 000 


253,000 


229, 000 


186,000 


439,000 


Eggs 


61,000 


118, 000 


216, 000 


305, 000 


362 000 


Canary seed 


72, 000 


118,000 


162, 000 


204, 000 


295, 000 


Sulphate of ammonia 


173, 000 


195, 000 


151, 000 


152, 000 


218,000 


Cryolite 


138 000 


177 000 


137 000 


167 000 


189 000 


Cement 


185,000 


181,000 


181,000 


144,000 


159,000 


Horsehides 


86 000 


98,000 


99,000 


124 000 


157 000 


Lobsters 


215, 000 


274, 000 


274, 000 


304, 000 


150, 000 


Carbonate of lime 


221 000 


243, 000 


248, 000 


146, 000 


143, 000 


Glycerin 


3,000 


6,000 


30, 000 


58, 000 


128, 000 















DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. 



Total imports 


$1 697,000 


$2, 003, 000 


$1,987,000 


$2, 018, 000 


$2,417,000 














Tobacco 


672, 000 


1, 000, 000 


1, 150, 000 


1, 186, 000 


1, 087, 000 


Cocoa 


756, 000 


734, 000 


558, 000 


509,000 


917,000 


Cattle hides . 


126, 000 


121, 000 


113, 000 


144, 000 


225,000 


Beeswax 


18 000 


19,000 


6,000 


12, 000 


55, 000 















DUTCH EAST INDIES. 



Total imports 


$44, 006, 000 


$44, 628, 000 


$43,881,000 


$51,149,000 


$54,175,000 














Tobacco 


20, 622, 000 


14, 337, 000 


15,737,000 


18,813,000 


18, 515, 000 




4,834,000 


8,176,000 


6,561,000 


9, 487, 000 


11,761,000 


Tin 


4,935,000 


5,963,000 


7,464,000 


7,217,000 


6, 199, 000 


Coffee . 


2,272,000 


1:353,000 


1,524,000 


1,954,000 


1,978,000 


Benzine heavy 


310,000 


361,000 


727,000 


1,344,000 


1,618,000 


Gutta-percha .. 


534,000 


3,154,000 


1,148,000 


1,452,000 


1,504,000 


Rice... 


751,000 


777,000 


1,109,000 


1,245,000 


1,137,000 



GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



165 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

DUTCH EAST INDIES Continued. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


India rubber 


$1 366 000 


$2,518,000 


$1,429,000 


$1,487,000 


$1,111,000 


Cattle hides 


716,000 


862,000 


931,000 


925, 000 


1,070,000 


Kauri dammar and other resins.... 


760,000 


815,000 


342 000 


606, 000 


1,036,000 




2 191 000 


1 365 000 


1, 080, 000 


737, 000 


899,000 


Kapok; India hemp. 


519,000 


785, 000 


670,000 


698, 000 


771,000 


Rattan 


246 000 


477,000 


638,000 


631,000 


769,000 


Peru\ 7 ian bark. . . 


665,000 


549,000 


577, 000 


613,000 


662,000 


Sandalwood 


152,000 


217, 000 


406,000 


407, 000 


660,000 


Cotton... . 


424,000 


401,000 


177, 000 


84,000 


568,000 


Pepper . . 


435, 000 


433,000 


547, 000 


495,000 


551,000 


Goat and kid skins, raw 
Tea 


131,000 
314,000 


167,000 
211,000 


131,000 
283,000 


236,000 
235,000 


444,000 
326,000 


Camphor oil, juniper oil, and other 
volatile oils 


67,000 


87,000 


98,000 


165,000 


294,000 


Boxwood, ebony, teak wood 


105, 000 


,73,000 


160,000 


218,000 


250,000 


Nutmegs 


212 000 


220 000 


258,000 


241,000 


228,000 


Jute, jute tow. . . 


3,000 


2,000 


39,000 


50,000 


216,000 


Cocoa 


109 000 


142,000 


280,000 


216,000 


207,000 


Paraffin . . . 


33,000 


36,000 


91,000 


130, 000 


134,000 


Corn 4 dari 


83 000 


11,000 


21,000 


26,000 


92,000 















ECUADOR. 



Total imports . . 


$2,634,000 


$2, 543, 000 


$2,871,000 


$3,763,000 


$4,059,000 














Cocoa 


1,443,000 


1,392,000 


1,632,000 


2,337,000 


2,309,000 


Tagua nuts 


579,000 


543,000 


450, 000 


668,000 


1,165,000 


Panama hats . . 


139,000 


253, 000 


355,000 


364,000 


306, 000 


Cattle hides 


36 000 


56 000 


94 000 


67 000 


143 000 


India rubber .... 


332,000 


255,000 


259,000 


238,000 


66,000 















EGYPT. 



Total imports 


$22, 783, 000 


$22,282,000 


$23 689,000 


$26, 577, 000 


$28,176,000 














Cotton 


17,463,000 


16,836,000 


15, 985, 000 


16,551,000 


17.374,000 


Cottonseed 


2 867 000 


3 306 000 


5 266 000 


7 542 000 


8 409 000 


Acacia gum. . . 


363,000 


504,000 


664,000 


643,000 


639,000 


Cigarettes 


800 000 


510 000 


598 000 


621 000 


600 000 


Onions fresh 


707 000 


535 000 


588 000 


704 000 


418 000 


Linters . 


129, 000 


160 000 


165 000 


116 000 


228 000 


Cattle hides 


98 000 


51 000 


13 000 


30 000 


117 000 


Eels, frozen.. 


10,000 


16 000 


18 000 


20,000 


56 000 















FINLAND. 



Total imports 


$5, 657, 000 


$6, 226, 000 


$8,243,000 


$8,775,000 


$10,763,000 


Wood of conifers sawn 


2 991 000 


2 988 000 


4 372 000 


4 143 000 


6 423 000 


Butter 


'762 000 


'sis' ooo 


l' 526' 000 


2' 027' ooo 


1 185 000 


Calfskins, raw 


193,000 


651,000 


254,000 


342,000 


694,000 


Wood of conifers, hewn 


515 000 


514 000 


605 000 


615 000 


648 000 


Cranberries huckleberries 


66 000 


81 000 


239 000 


315 000 


302 000 


Cellulose. . . 


107,000 


160 000 


241 000 


292 000 


291 '000 


Spools, wooden 


18,000 


60, 000 


44,000 


114,000 


240,000 


Pasteboard 


226 000 


188 000 


157 000 


188 000 


218 000 


Game dead . . 


43' ooo 


56' 000 


36' 000 


38*000 


80 000 


Cattle hides, raw 


20,000 


12,000 


71,000 


93 000 


76 000 


Medicinal plants.. 


1 000 


2 000 


4 000 


33 000 


60 000 















FRANCE. 



Total imports 


$115 456 000 


$121 099 000 


$124 811 000 


$131 432 000 


$138 808 000 














Fur skins, dressed 


3,110 000 


2 993 000 


4 002 000 


2 776 000 


6 180 000 


Iron ores 


1 954 000 


3 166 000 


3 789 000 


4 165 000 


5 895 000 


Calfskins, raw 


3,446 000 


l' 891 '000 


3 892'000 


2 776 000 


5 565 000 


Silk, raw, not dyed 


3 317 000 


5 666 000 


4 991 000 


4 896 000 


5 303 000 


Wine in casks... 


3.691.000 


5.409^000 


4.627^000 


5. 617. 000 


5.023.000 



166 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

FRANCE Continued. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Wool, carded or combed 


$12 081 000 


$9 248 000 


$10 543 000 


$11 031 000 


$4 889 000 


Apples, fresh 


564 000 


164 000 


1 898 000 


620 000 


4' 588' 000 


Cattle hides 


1,533 000 


3,121 000 


2 724*000 


4 207' 000 


3 871 000 


Chrome, tungsten, ferrochrome, cad- 
mium 


1 000 


4 000 


10 000 


875 000 


3 493 000 


Wool, washed . 


2, 670, 000 


3,087 000 


2, 625' 000 


2 837' 000 


3' 052' ooo 


Sheep and lamb's leather dressed 


1 422 000 


1 603 000 


1 701 000 


2 345 000 


2 715 '000 


Clover seed '. 


3,326,000 


2, 756, 000 


3,170,000 


I'gis'ooo 


2' 630' 000 


Kitchen vegetables, fresh 


1 586 000 


381 000 


1 457 000 


1 531 000 


2 209 000 


Oilcake . 


1 933 000 


818 000 


1 997 000 


2 081 000 


2' 034' ooo 


Sheep and lamb skins, dressed 
Worsted yarn 


1,' 067', 000 
2 254 000 


,360,000 
614 000 


1, 283, 000 
1 480 000 


l' 696', 000 
1 754 000 


, 872, 000 
849 000 


Yarn of floss silk 


1, 434, 000 


, 613, 000 


2, 056, 000 


1 790'000 


' 747' ooo 


Horses 


1 157,000 


726 000 


1 858 000 


1 818 000 


747 000 


Films of celluloid 


109 000 


354 006 


1 340 000 


1 012 000 


61 1 000 


Close- woven tissues of silk (except rib- 
bons) 


1 562 000 


1 479 006 


1 358 000 


1 513 000 


586 000 


Aluminum 


935 000 


958 000 


850 000 


l'048 000 


' 586' 000 


Wine, sparkling 


1 973 000 


2 276' 000 


1 488 000 


l' 507' 000 


542 000 


Oils of camphor, anise, juniper, rose- 
mary, and other volatile oils 


674, 000 


771,000 


935, 000 


972 000 


417 000 


Thomas phosphate 


697 000 


791 000 


1 115 000 


917 000 


345 000 


Oak, pine, and chestnut extracts 


926 000 


988 000 


1 063 000 


1 194 000 


i iss'ooo 


Beef and veal, fresh. . . . 


74,000 


108, 000 


95, 000 


'354' ooo 


l' 090' 000 


Carnations, orchids, roses, violets fresh. 
Gauze, crape, and veiling, of silk 
Turpentine resins. . 


640, 000 
1,342,000 
803 000 


630, 000 
1. 743, 000 
1 080 000 


675, 000 
1,383,000 
1 617,000 


791, 000 
1, 065, 000 
1 568 000 


1, 068, 000 
1, 028, 000 
1 005 000 


Passenger automobiles 


1,051,000 


1,034,000 


1,077,000 


1 039 000 


977 000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


822 000 


778, 000 


766 000 


873 000 


943 000 


Wares of gold 


798 000 


961 000 


863 000 


845 000 


906 000 


Carbonate of lime. . . . 


785 000 


908 000 


820 000 


750' 000 


89l'oOO 


Platinum and platinum metals 


403, 000 


787, 000 


1, 094, 000 


856, 000 


880,000 


Oleomargarin 


963,000 


935,000 


214, 000 


400 000 


854 000 


Walnuts, hazel nuts . 


662 000 


224 000 


870 000 


739 000 


819 000 


Precious stones, wrought 


680 000 


616 000 


510 000 


500 000 


795' ooo 


Paper stock 


298, 000 


391 000 


537, 000 


669' 000 


780'000 


Sheep and lamb skins, raw 


865,000 


537, 000 


643, 000 


718,000 


772, 000 


Women's hats, ornamented 


560,000 


773, 000 


673, 000 


520 000 


721 000 


Goat and kid skins, raw 


1 396 000 


815 000 


843 000 


338 000 


714 000 


Tulle of silk 


774 000 


873 000 


516 000 


387 000 


663 000 


Cotton laces 


291 000 


360 000 


383 000 


480' 000 


633' 000 


Paintings 


578 000 


629 000 


560 000 


660 000 


598 000 


Books 


567 000 


562 000 


531 000 


54g' 000 


538'000 















FRENCH INDO-CHINA. 



Total imports 


$823 000 


$1,312,000 


$481, 000 


$735 000 


$818 000 














Rice refuse 


232 000 


379 000 


285 000 


485 000 


554 000 


Gum lac 


1 000 


55 000 


23 000 


52' ooo 


us' ooo 


Oil of star-anise 


2 000 


27 000 


23 000 


33 000 


66 000 


Rice 


507 000 


814 000 


55 000 




3' ooo 















FRENCH WEST AFRICA 



Total imports 


$2, 944, 000 


$3,396,000 


$3, 410, 000 


$3, 765, 000 


$4, 604, 000 














Peanuts 


1 198 000 


1 026 000 


1 033 000 


1 191 000 


1 879 000 


Wood of deciduous trees, soft 




338, 000 


535, 000 


574,000 


945, 000 


Palm nuts 


360 000 


473, 000 


623 000 


704 000 


863 000 


India rubber 


902 000 


1 303 000 


980 000 


726 000 


335 000 


Cattle hides 


52, 000 


16,000 


17, 000 


47,000 


146, 000 


Corn 


33 000 


16 000 


2 000 


36 000 


124 000 


Copper ores 








296 000 


45 000 















GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



167 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

GERMAN EAST AFRICA. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$1 853 000 


$2 571 000 


$2 914 000 


$3 485 000 


$3 466 000 














India rubber 


767 000 


1 330 000 


1 289 000 


1 732 000 


1 303 000 


Cotton 


99,000 


231, 000 


304,000 


294,000 


487' 000 


Sisal hemp 


245, 000 


258, 000 


269 000 


284 000 


447 000 


Peanuts 


28, 000 


.43, 000 


114,000 


159, 000 


265*000 


Beeswax 


111,000 


111,000 


93, 000 


189 000 


188 000 


Coffee 


125 000 


126 000 


204 000 


135 000 


148 000 


Mica 


94,000 


85,000 


87,000 


200,000 


127' 000 


Ivory 


9 000 


18 000 


21 000 


14 000 


90 000 















GERMAN KAMEROON. 



Total imports 


$2 644 000 


$5^586 000 


$4 016 000 


$4 246 000 


$3 110 000 














India rubber 


2 043 000 


4 837 000 


3 242 000 


3 404 000 


1 753 000 


Cocoa 


260, 000 


238, 000 


311,000 


241,000 


'455'000 


Palm nuts 


195, 000 


346 000 


289 000 


372 000 


382 000 


Palm oil 


16, 000 


45, 000 


29, 000 


13, 000 


204' ooo 


Ivory 


88 000 


53, 000 


39 000 


49 000 


87 000 















GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA. 



Total imports 


$788 000 


$967 000 


$760 000 


$1 338 000 


$1 802 000 














Diamonds'and other precious stones . . . 
Vanadium ores 


362, 000 


724, 000 


595,000 
28 000 


1, 030, 000 
24 000 


1,283,000 
111 000 


Tin ores 




2 000 


1 000 


7 000 


87' 000 















GREECE. 



Total imports 


$4, 322, 000 


$5,060 000 


$5 634 000 


$5 963 000 


$6 184 000 














Currants 


1, 250, 000 


1, 572, 000 


2 010 000 


1 653 000 


1 457 000 


Wine in casks 


544 000 


786 000 


793 000 


712 000 


' 902' ooo 


Sheep and lamb skins 


223,000 


188, 000 


130 000 


398' 000 


603 000 


Iron ores ... 


473 000 


302 000 


453 000 


503 000 


595*000 


Tobacco 


143 000 


95 000 


167 000 


252' ooo 


447' ooo 


Magnesite 


139 000 


168* 000 


246' 000 


360' 000 


322*000 


Zinc ores 


89 000 


63 000 


127 000 


195' ooo 


295 ooo 


Sponges 


269, 000 


187 000 


177' 000 


202' ooo 


igo'ooo 


Figs dried . . 


166 000 


173 000 


238 000 


165* 000 


174* 000 


Turpentine oil, pine-needle oil 


117, 000 


246 000 


294' ooo 


127' 000 


iso'ooo 


Emery 


87 000 


149 000 


185 000 


126 000 


128*000 


Goat and kid skins 


14 000 


14 000 


12' ooo 


127' ooo 


112' ooo 


Cedrat fruits, fresh 


75' ooo 


23' ooo 


92* 000 


49 000 


98*000 


Wine for the manufacture of cognac. . . 
Alabaster and marble 


18,000 
73,000 


12' ooo 

86 000 


16, 000 
52 000 


41*000 
75 000 


67.' 000 
59 000 















GUATEMALA. 



Total imports 


$5 935 000 


$4 516 000 


$6 474 000 


$7 527 000 


$8 298 000 














Coffee 


5 487 000 


4 029 000 


5 995 000 


6 992 000 


7 791 000 


Cattle hides 


310 000 


336* 000 


' 384* 000 


' 447* 000 


' 443* 000 


India rubber 


95* 000 


104* 000 


59 000 


65* 000 


33*000 















HAITI. 



Total imports 


$213, 000 


$291,000 


$310, 000 


$314,000 


$416, 000 


Cotton 


60, 000 
28, 000 
62. 000 
1,000 
33, 000 


122, 000 
44, 000 
57,000 
5,000 
32,000 


71, 000 
30, 000 
123, 000 
20, 000 
37, 000 


32, 000 
41,000 
150, 000 
34, 000 
24,000 


108, 000 
87,000 
73,000 
58, 000 
37,000 


Cocoa 


Coffee . . 


Honey 


Logwood 





168 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

ITALY. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports ...... 


$68, 509, 000 


$65, 340, 000 


$67,779.000 


$72,498,000 


$75,599 000 
















30. 353, 000 


25,512,000 


23,756.000 


25, 328. 000 


26, 699, 000 




3, 394, 000 


2,789,000 


3,420,000 


3,387,000 


3,324.000 




2,207,000 


2,979,000 


3, 369, 000 


3,618,000 


2,795 000 


Marble 


1,498,000 


1 616,000 


1,993,000 


2,454,000 


2 318 000 


Lemons, figs, cedrats, fresh 
Apples fresh 


1,320,000 
1,959,000 


1,455,000 
380,000 


1,680.000 
1,149.000 


2,033,000 
248.000 


, 849, 000 
,800,000 


Eees 


1,421,000 


1,260,000 


1,471,000 


1,706,000 


696 000 


Grapes fresh 


1,448,000 


1,038.000 


1,269.000 


1,143,000 


, 578, 000 


Potatoes 


724,000 


801.000 


768,000 


1,358,000 


,563,000 


Cattle hides 


312,000 


409,000 


456,000 


639,000 


,430 000 


Yarn of floss silk not dyed 


658,000 


1,187,000 


1,181.000 


1, 049, 000 


170 000 




967,000 


1,133.000 


1,089,000 


974,000 


, 019, 000 


Flowers fresh 


281,000 


244,000 


272,000 


357,000 


927 000 


Asphalt . - 


736,000 


705,000 


938,000 


1,019,000 


911 000 


Clover seed . . 


561,000 


795, 000 


' 1,889.000 


1, 968, 000 


882! 000 


Hazelnuts 


877, 000 


783,000 


712.000 


535.000 


881, 000 


Oranges and mandarins fresh 


970,000 


1, 035, 000 


874,000 


803.000 


816 000 


Calfskins, raw 


853,000 


608.000 


436,000 


558,000 


784,000 


Pumice stone tripoli 


403,000 


439,000 


625,000 


657,000 


731,000 




252,000 


1,118,000 


214.000 


90,000 


621,000 


Rice refuse 


379,000 


346,000 


859,000 


1,151,000 


548 000 


Cauliflower . . 


498,000 


521,000 


407,000 


953,000 


544,000 


Cherries fresh 


604,000 


356,000 


295,000 


332,000 


537,000 


Hemp tow 


581,000 


624,000 


772.000 


575, 000 


517 000 


Floss silk combed 


393,000 


374,000 


273,000 


440, 000 


509 000 


Buttons o'f vegetable ivory 


106,000 


174,000 


184,000 


272.000 


505,000 


Zinc ores 


178,000 


33,000 


326,000 


628, 000 


484 000 


Oils of oranges, lemons, bergamots 
Oak pine and chestnut extract 


259, 000 
261 000 


245,000 
257,000 


366,000 
373 000 


423,000 
400 000 


454,000 
408 000 


Hats of vegetable plaiting material 
other than straw untrimmed 


66,000 


60.000 


164,000 


370 000 


405 000 


Mercury . 


257,000 


261,000 


477, 000 


389.000 


402 000 


Tartar 


119,000 


204 000 


225,000 


200,000 


402 000 


Peaches fresh 


354, 000 


186,000 


203,000 


195 000 


392 000 


Tomatoes, artichokes, melons 


168,000 


210,000 


179,000 


318.000 


347,000 


Rhubarb 'cucumbers^ carrots . . . 


334,000 


382.000 


426,000 


330,000 


339,000 


Wine in casks 


317,000 


1,279,000 


905,000 


342,000 


338 000 


Olive oil 


239,000 


553,000 


295,000 


487,000 


337,000 















JAPAN. 



Total imports 


$6, 956, 000 


$8, 760, 000 


$8,942,000 


$10,266,000 


$11,098,000 














Silk raw not dyed 


770.000 


1,073 000 


932 000 


1 550 000 


2 017 000 


Pongees (habutae), raw 


1,169,000 


1,305,000 


1,299,000 


1, 130, 000 


1* 271,' 000 


Oil of camphor* menthol.... 


220,000 


379,000 


447,000 


603,000 


1, 243, 000 


Camphor 


1,114.000 


966,000 


1,241.000 


1, 123 000 


574 000 


Copper 


80 000 


892 000 


572 000 


721 000 


565*000 


Train oil 


266,000 


452,000 


319, 000 


269.000 


525 000 


Fur skins 


265,000 


387,000 


237, 000 


312 000 


408 000 


Oak wood 


51,000 


72 000 


208 000 


350 000 


405*000 


Trimmings and button-makers' ware. . . 






78,000 


267,000 


290 000 


Cattle hides 


6,000 


1,000 


17,000 


61,000 


232 000 


Floss silk combed 


175, 000 


212,000 


134 000 


155 000 


213*000 


Tin ores 






77,000 


150*000 


210*000 


Plaits of straw . . . . 


366,000 


372,000 


368,000 


325,000 


9Qg 000 


Agar-agar . 


77,000 


87,000 


144 000 


182 000 


159 000 


Zinc ores 


10.000 


1,000 


86,000 


275,000 


120*000 


Vegetable wax .. .. 


104.000 


122 000 


99, 000 


100 000 


118 000 


Plaited wood shavings 


380,000 


475, 000 


160,000 


158 000 


117*000 















MADAGASCAR. 



Total imports 


SI, 536, 000 


$2, 815, 000 


$2, 565, 000 


$2,033 000 


$2,097,000 














Cattle hides 


467,000 


724 000 


761 000 


601 000 


874 000 


Raffia and piassava fibers 


113,000 


142. 000 


172,000 


194, 000 


209, 000 


Mangrove bark . . . 


129,000 


246 000 


293, 000 


312 000 


186 000 


Vanilla 


126,000 


106 000 


270 000 


125 000 


182 000 


Semiprecious stones 


1,000 


7 000 


103 000 


119 000 


154*000 


Beeswax 


134 000 


139 000 


135 000 


146 000 


125* 000 


India rubber 


454,000 


1,318,000 


607,' 000 


360, 000 


1 134000 















GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



169 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

MEXICO. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$5,119,000 


$5,641,000 


$7,384,000 


$8, 459, 000 


$5, 958, 000 














Coffee 


1,153,000 


724,000 


1,120,000 


1, 103, 000 


1,518,000 


Agave fibers 


439, 000 


498,000 


616,000 


852,000 


1, 363, 000 


Cattle hides 


247, 000 


342, 000 


369,000 


337, 000 


551 000 


India rubber 


1,493,000 


2, 437, 000 


2,901,000 


2,334,000 


546, 000 


Piassava and other fibers 


409,000 


450, 000 


422, 000 


437, 000 


534, 000 


Oil cake 


63,000 


172, 000 


267,000 


364,000 


310,000 


Tobacco 


401,000 


186,000 


229, 000 


260,000 


197, 000 


Logwood 


131,000 


130, 000 


131,000 


182, 000 


133,000 


Linaloa oil 


32,000 


40,000 


45,000 


52,000 


108,000 















MOROCCO. 



Total imports 


$1, 847, 000 


$2,168,000 


$2,970,000 


$4,538,000 


$2,315 000 














Almonds . . . 


370, 000 


610, 000 


669,000 


693,000 


868, 000 


Wool raw 


115,000 


412, 000 


410,000 


249, 000 


590 000 


Goat and kid skins 


166,000 


186,000 


207,000 


209, 000 


288, 000 


Sheep and lamb skins 


83,000 


85,000 


67, 000 


66,000 


160 000 


Medicinal plants 


80, 000 


69, 000 


91,000 


115,000 


94,000 


Barley 


431,000 


164,000 


737, 000 


2,207,000 




Wheat 


67, 000 


69, 000 


163, 000 


403,000 

















NETHERLANDS. 



Total imports 


$60,312,000 


$61, 515, 000 


$70, 862, 000 


$82,195,000 


$79 260 000 














Butter 


9 074 000 


8 696 000 


7 720 000 


10 587 000 


10 102 000 


Cheese 


3, 839, 000 


4, 020, 000 


4, 274, 000 


4, 093, 000 


5' 155' ooo 




2,786 000 


3,295 000 


3,171 000 


3 332 000 


4 124 000 


Horses 


1,837,000 


2, 319, 000 


2,213,000 


2, 325, 000 


2 949*000 


Cucumbers carrots lettuce 


1, 780, 000 


2, 350, 000 


3,534,000 


3,473 000 


2 752 000 


Beef and veal, fresh 


1,064,000 


1,088,000 


978, 000 


2,259,000 


2,661 000 


Pork fresh 


1, 609, 000 


516,000 


27,000 


1,895,000 


2 392 000 


Coal 


1,537 000 


1 509 000 


2. 047, 000 


2 309 000 


2 369* 000 


Potatoes 


2, 177, 000 


1,748,000 


6,456,000 


5, 450, 000 


2' 323' ooo 


Eg^s 


1. 422, 000 


2, 009, 000 


1,742,000 


1,991 000 


2 268 000 


Cattle hides 


910, 000 


1,379,000 


1,836,000 


1,747,000 


2 034' 000 


Fruits fresh 


1, 010, 000 


847, 000 


1,221,000 


2, 030, 000 


1 873 000 


Rice, polished 


1, 903, 000 


1,994,000 


2, 109, 000 


2,084,000 


1,783' 000 


Salt-water fish fresh 


818, 000 


1,072,000 


1,054,000 


1, 395, 000 


1 437 000 


Bulbs and tubers of flowers 


753, 000 


613, 000 


833,000 


1,791 000 


1 190 000 


Chickens 


762, 000 


1, 256, 000 


933,000 


1, 140, 000 


1 176' 000 


Cauliflower 


500,000 


522. 000 


593,000 


701, 000 


1 163'000 


Bran 


1,042,000 


780,000 


1, 247, 000 


1,377,000 


1,112' ooo 


Oilcake . . 


628, 000 


771,000 


779, 000 


894, 000 


1 087 000 


Cotton waste 


714,000 


762, 000 


702,000 


714,000 


900' 000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


540, 000 


608, 000 


593, 000 


633, 000 


739 000 


Beans and pease, fresh. . . 


705, 000 


716,000 


1, 223, 000 


683, 000 


68s' 000 


Precious stones, wrought, not set 
Fresh- water fish 


675,000 
732,000 


481, 000 
769,000 


605,000 
769,000 


790, 000 
669,000 


681,000 
666 000 


Cattle ... 


3,000 


3,000 


2,000 


935, 000 


657 000 


Books 


541 000 


600, 000 


759,000 


669, 000 


633 000 


Iron, old and scrap . . 


397,000 


509, 000 


473,000 


523, 000 


61?' 000 


Wood of conifers, sawn . . . 


265, 000 


325,000 


420,000 


546, 000 


558, 000 


Tin 


226 000 


445 000 


716 000 


1 028 000 


553 000 


Hay and green fodder. . 


735 000 


389 000 


691 000 


590'000 


550' 000 


Paper stock 


353 000 


402 000 


407 000 


424 000 


519 000 


Zinc 


557, 000 


415,000 


573, 000 


924, 000 


509' 000 















NEW ZEALAND. 



Total imports 


$504 000 


$1 224 000 


$1 691 000 


$2 112 000 


$2 397 000 














Wool, raw 


218 000 


755 000 


1 349 000 


1 711 000 


1 023 000 


Kauri and other gums 


113,000 


130, 000 


51,000 


172, 000 


2oO 000 


New Zealand flax 


74 000 


70 000 


65,000 


79, 000 


212 000 


Tungsten ores 


18 000 


45 000 


41 000 


17 000 


95 000 















170 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

NICARAGUA. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$384, 000 


$246.000 


$309 000 


$297 000 


$297 000 














Coffee 


293.000 


168,000 


248.000 


228 000 


250 000 


Cedar wood 


71 000 


30 000 


38 000 


32 000 


25*000 


Cattle hides 


10,000 


36,000 


6,000 


16,000 


g 000 















NORWAY. 



Total imports 


$8,770,000 


$11,820,000 


$12, 876, 000 


$15,215,000 


$19 510 000 














Train oil 


1 064.000 


1 627 000 


1 689 000 


2 058 000 


3 624 000 


Norway saltpeter; ferrosil icon 


289,000 


982,000 


605,000 


1. 733, 000 


1 788 000 


Iron ores . 


5,000 


14,000 


91,000 


649 000 


1 770 000 


Salt-water fish fresh 


1 212 000 


1,784 000 


1 462 000 


1 381 000 


1 743*000 


Herring, salted . . 


620,000 


825,000 


908, 000 


1, 033. 000 


1*304' ooo 


Nitrite 


229,000 


337,000 


328 000 


716 000 


806 000 


Calcium carbide 


337 000 


421 000 


627 000 


729 000 


726*000 


Zinc 


4,000 


113,000 


412,000 


644 000 


701*000 


Blood of animals, refuse of fish, stable 
refuse 


146 000 


267 000 


362 000 


558 000 


693 000 


Cattle hides 


137,000 


159,000 


297,000 


393 000 


588 000 


Nitrate of ammonia 




25,000 


71 000 


60 000 


494 000 


Bran 


693 000 


333 000 


987 000 


616 000 


357 000 


Calfskins .. . 


259,000 


332,000 


283.000 


258*000 


324 000 


Lobsters 


249 000 


317,000 


271 000 


300 000 


30^ 000 


Wood of conifers, sawn 


438,000 


411,000 


491, 000 


350,000 


291*000 


Aluminum 


25,000 


51,000 


153,000 


92 000 


271 000 


Pyrites 




2 000 


60 000 


208 000 


269*000 


Sprats in oil 


20,000 


75,000 


61,000 


125 000 


257 000 


Felspar 


171 000 


211,000 


204,000 


210 000 


222 000 


Stonecutters' work, plain 


243,000 


255,000 


242,000 


266,000 


218'000 


Copper . . . 


69,000 


32,000 


67,000 


109 000 


205 000 


Whalebone 


150 000 


297,000 


187, 000 


338 000 


140 000 


Codfish, dried 


148,000 


179,000 


185,000 


119,000 


121*000 


Cellulose 


89,000 


124.000 


97,000 


125 000 


102 000 


Granite blocks 


38 000 


68 000 


64 000 


71 000 


102 000 















PANAMA. 



Total imports 


$133, 000 


$117,000 


$165 000 


$262 000 


$133 000 














Shells of mollusks 


25,000 


43,000 


52,000 


44 000 


40 000 


Nuts and shells for carving 


71,000 


13 000 


38 000 


82 000 


23 000 


Panama hats 


17 000 


10 000 


25 000 


42 000 


17*000 


Tortoise shells 


9,000 


8,000 


10,000 


20*000 


15 000 















PARAGUAY. 



Total imports 


$865 000 


$1 250 000 


$1 042 000 


$1 371 000 


$1 711 000 














Cattle hides 


739,000 


1,106 000 


893 000 


1 110 000 


1 510 000 


Tobacco 


26 000 


42 000 


57 000 


67 000 


70 000 


Egrets 




3,000 


30,000 


128,000 


60*000 


Oil of petit grain 


5,000 




5 000 


9 000 


14 000 















PERSIA. 



Total imports 


$635,000 


$657, 000 


$2, 257, 000 


$3, 720, 000 


$1, 829, 000 














Woolen rugs 


66 000 


115 000 


336 000 


403 000 


397 000 


Opium 


108,000 


19,000 


174,000 


138,000 


350,000 


Gum tragacanth 


94,000 


155 000 


238 000 


264 000 


259 000 


Barley 


28 000 


31 000 


452 000 


2 097 000 


236 000 


Rice 






67 000 


53 000 


171 000 


Almonds 


50,000 


46,000 


33 000 


8,000 


70,000 


Dates dried 


50 000 


55 000 


35 000 


83 000 


55 000 















GERMAN IMPOET TRADE. 



171 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

PERU. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$$3,059,000 


$$3, 456, 000 


$$4,908,000 


$$3,212,000 


$$3,373,000 


Guano 


874,000 


817,000 


843,000 


798,000 


1,005,000 


Cattle hides 


190,000 


223,000 


329,000 


371,000 


601,000 


India rubber 


952,000 


861,000 


942, 000 


667,000 


599,000 




160,000 


196,000 


218,000 


136,000 


210,000 




124,000 


238,000 


989,000 


320,000 


175,000 


Lead ores . ... 


109,000 


67,000 


100,000 


171,000 


151,000 


Wool 


42,000 


75,000 


49,000 


84,000 


119,000 


Panama hats 


120,000 


192,000 


222,000 


192,000 


109,000 




296,000 


294,000 


232,000 


131,000 


104,000 















PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



Total imports 


$885,000 


$920,000 


$1,181,000 


$2, 245, 000 


$2,605,000 
















189,000 


189,000 


500,000 


1, 430, 000 


1,843,000 




531,000 


627,000 


598,000 


679,000 


569,000 


Oil cake 


16,000 








84,000 


Resins 


72,000 


57,666 


19,000 


49,000 


50,000 


Cigars 


30,000 


11,000 


15,000 


19,000 


23,000 















PORTUGAL. 



Total imports 


$3,084,000 


$5,176,000 


$6,064,000 


$5,879,000 


$6, 010. 000 














Cork 


958,000 


1,265,000 


1,382,000 


1,730,000 


1,515,000 


Wine in casks 


392,000 


950,000 


1, 626, 000 


864,000 


840,000 


Pineapples fresh 


250, 000 


505,000 


600,000 


629,000 


687,000 




81,000 


113,000 


200.000 


287,000 


310,000 


Pyrites 


164,000 


268,000 


139,000 


226,000 


293,000 




160,000 


225,000 


182,000 


152,000 


232,000 




98,000 


46,000 


109,000 


103,000 


198,000 




113,000 


126,000 


246,000 


257,000 


188,000 




23 000 


59.000 


79,000 


94,000 


178,000 


Lamb and sheep skins 


134,000 


97,000 


97,000 


138,000 


149,000 




134,000 


86,000 


87,000 


158,000 


148,000 


Iron ores 


5,000 




23,000 




148,000 




106,000 


86,666 


153,000 


176,000 


145,000 






24 000 


44,000 


37,000 


118,000 


Copper, crude and scrap; copper coins. 
Oil cake 


60,000 
129 000 


114,000 
83,000 


99,000 
159,000 


122,000 
172,000 


115,000 
110,000 


Grapes fresh 


35,000 


157,000 


144,000 


177,000 


106,000 















PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA. 



Total imports 


$1,041,000 


$946, 000 


$795,000 


$777, 000 


$616,000 














Copper 










177,000 




462,000 


534,000 


306.000 


315, 000 


123,000 


Beeswax 


30,000 


25,000 


35,000 


123,000 


81,000 


Sesame 


70,000 


49,000 


37,000 


74,000 


67,000 




334 000 


251 000 


292 000 


147 000 


57,000 


Chrome ore 


1,000 


12,000 


24, 000 


32,000 


48,000 















PORTUGUESE WEST AFRICA. 



Total imports . . 


{3 003 000 


$3 645 000 


$4 678 000 


$4 568 000 


$4 304 000 














Cocoa ..... 


2. 157, 000 


2,796 000 


3 753 000 


3 746,000 


3,381,000 




84 000 


62 000 


158 000 


146 000 


275 000 


Palm nuts 


61,000 


62,000 


127.000 


140,000 


192,000 


Beeswax 


% 000 


115 000 


61 000 


79 000 


142,000 


India rubber 


447 000 


475 000 


350 000 


232 000 


118 000 


Cattle hides 


31,000 


10 000 


11,000 


19,000 


68,000 


Coffee 


95 000 


88 000 


173 000 


108 000 


45 000 















172 



GERMAH TRADE AKD THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

ROUMANIA. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$15,361,000 


$16,394,000 


$25 643 000 


$32 886 000 


$18 971 000 














Wheat 


5 480 000 


6 378 000 


8 652 000 


11 332 000 


3 825 000 


Benzine, raw 


428,000 


736 000 


1. 08o' 000 


2' 695* 000 


2 686* 000 


Barley 


999 000 


1 129 000 


4 241 000 


4 282 000 


2 340 000 


Corn 


3 017 000 


1 756 000 


4 053 000 


6 019 000 


l' 83o' 000 


Eggs 


789,000 


585 000 


696 000 


1 03(> 000 


l' 373' 000 


Rape and colza seed 


245 000 


1 192 000 


586 000 


679 000 


i' 300' ooo 


Benzine, heavy 


6,000 


29,000 


121,000 


766 000 


' 937' ooo 


Kerosene 


427,000 


499,000 


473 000 


396 000 


73o'oOO 


Beans dry 


127 000 


209 000 


480 000 


346 000 


454 000 


Wood of conifers, sawn 


1, 149, 000 


1,378,000 


1,851 000 


626'000 


432' 000 


Rye . . 


505,000 


674 000 


1 426 000 


994 000 


410 000 


Lubricating oils mineral 


8 000 


8 000 


43 000 


359 000 


366 000 


Walnuts 


254,000 


489,000 


247 000 


IGo'oOO 


283* 000 


Bran . . ... 


141,000 


183 000 


316 000 


317 000 


265 000 


Oats 


1 065 000 


470 000 


618 000 


1 170 000 


263 000 


Pease, dry 


122,000 


117,000 


222 000 


' 236* 000 


238'000 


Linseed 


1 000 


16 000 


23 000 


88 000 


167 000 















RUSSIA. 



Total imports 


$324,613,000 


$330,013,000 


$388,951,000 


$363,628,000 


$339,055,000 


Barley 


63,744,000 
19,854,000 
54,051,000 
16,794,000 
8,918,000 
13,981,000 
7,543,000 
6,320,000 
16,856,000 
8,381,000 
12,046,000 

4,220,000 
5,407,000 
3,784,000 
5,117,000 
5,039,000 
3,307,000 
3,159,000 
2,727,000 
2,160,000 
3,791,000 
5,851,000 
343,000 
2,957,000 

3,432,000 
1,244,000 
1,866,000 
3,930,000 
2,216,000 
361,000 
2,294,000 
1,636,000 
1,982,000 
940,000 
952,000 
328,000 
389,000 
2,193,000 
1,176,000 
1,091,000 
1,050,000 
850,000 
414,000 
788,000 
878,000 


65,512,000 
20,589,000 
56,721,000 
17,889,000 
8,416,000 
10,760,000 
8,632,000 
6,376,000 
19,131,000 
9,291,000 
10,039,000 

4,213,006 
6,177,000 
5,055,000 
4,209,000 
5,293,000 
3,921,000 
2,969,000 
2,528,000 
2,787,000 
3,139,000 
4,050,000 
401,000 
4,534,000 

3,372,000 
1,368,000 
1,954,000 
2,107,000 
2,032,000 
460,000 
3,875,000 
1,754,000 
1,022,000 
1,438,000 
971,000 
481,000 
345,000 
2,139,000 
1,104,000 
1,201,000 
1,048,000 
510,000 
413,000 
786,000 
608,000 
1,000 
96,000 
131,000 
627,000 
252,000 


98,322,000 
21,302,000 
42,625,000 
17,018,000 
15,973,000 
16,775,000 
9,972,000 
7,166,000 
13,746,000 
16,452,000 
14,726,000 

3,599,000 
5,482,000 
4,970,000 
3,664,000 
6,530,000 
4,157,000 
3,789,000 
4,025,000 
1,602,000 
7,048,000 
4,213,000 
339,000 
4,958,000 

2,993,000 
1,207,000 
2,697,000 
6,424,000 
2,154,000 
614,000 
4,165,000 
1,900,000 
1,508,000 
1,517,000 
964,000 
1,140,000 
228,000 
2,994,000 
843,000 
1,202,000 
893,000 
514,000 
1,010,000 
894,000 
1,157,000 


75, 535, 000 
24,014,000 
22,595,000 
16,301,000 
12,877,000 
20,696,000 
14,659,000 
7,966,000 
13,629,000 
8,831,000 
12,558,000 

5,910,000 
7,254,000 
4,671,000 
5,519,000 
5,745,000 
4,819,000 
3,937,000 
3,665,000 
3,046,000 
6,559,000 
5,257,000 
1,647,000 
4,050,000 

2, 746, 000 
2,730,000 
3,302,000 
7,454,000 
2,221,000 
2,098,000 
5,160,000 
2,626,000 
1,636,000 
1,741,000 
1,155,000 
2,960,000 
820,000 
1,898,000 
1,165,000 
1,209,000 
1,127,000 
774,000 
907,000 
866,000 
1,090,000 
302,000 
601,000 
736,000 
610,000 
362,000 


77,707,000 
22,024,000 
19, 466, 000 
19,118,000 
14,955,000 
14,242,000 
12,715,000 
9,906,000 
8, 725, 000 
8, 549, 000 
7,768,000 

7,539,000 
7,384,000 
5, 969, 000 
5,903,000 
,722,000 
,499,000 
,311,000 
,219,000 
, 149, 000 
,033,000 
3,972,000 
3,773,000 
3,028,000 

2,936,000 
2,919,000 
2,693,000 
2,382,000 
2,317,000 
2,297,000 
2, 173, 000 
2,092,000 
1,750,000 
1,657,000 
1,534,000 
1,490,000 
1,401,000 
1,353,000 
1,228,000 
1,214,000 
1,210,000 
923,000 
872,000 
872,000 
812,000 
789,000 
704,000 
694,000 
580,000 
572,000 


Wood of conifers. . . . 


Wheat . . 


Eggs 


Butter . 


Bran 


Flax 


Oil cake .... 


Fur skins 


Rye 


Oats 


Wood for the manufacture of pulp or 
cellulose 


Geese live 


Horses 


Hogs 


Clover seed 


Bristles . 


Lubricating oils mineral 


Hemp 


Manganese ores 


Pease 


Calfskins 


Cattle hides 


Iron ores 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


Platinum ores 


Wood of deciduous trees soft 


Corn 


Caviare 


Benzine raw . . 


Linseed 


Oak wood 


Railway ties of wood 


Poultry, killed 


Flax, tow . 


Sugar-beet seeds 


Pork, fresh... 


Lentils 


Goat and kid skins 


Chickens 


Sheep and lamb skins 


Staves and headings of oak 


Buckwheat 


Feathers for beds 


Horsehair 


Beef and veal fresh 


Ore slag and waste from smelting works 
Rape and colza seed 


86,000 
218,000 
507,000 
395,000 


130, 000 
204,000 
722,000 
229,000 


Fresh- water fish 


Platinum 





GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



173 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

SALVADOR. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$914, 000 


$824,000 


$1 075 000 


$888 000 


$1 304 000 














Coffee 


750 000 


584 000 


874 000 


763 000 


1 060 000 


Cattle hides 


45 000 


84'000 


74 000 


85 000 


164 000 


Peru and tolu balsams 


102 000 


104 000 


69 009 


3*000 


52 000 


Indigo 


10 000 


35 000 


34 000 


13 000 


12*000 















SERBIA. 



Total imports 


$3 662 000 


$4 267 000 


$5 893 000 


54 695 000 


$2 508 000 














Plums, dried 


772,000 


784 000 


1 705 000 


560 000 


584 000 


Copper 






228 000 


518 000 


457 000 


Eggs 


273,000 


397,000 


564*000 


695 000 


327*000 


Wheat . 


349 000 


442 000 


696 000 


1 403 000 


259 000 


Lamb and sheep skins. . . 


190,000 


52,000 


69 000 


154 000 


233 000 


Lard 


305,000 


440 000 


168 000 


197 000 


224 000 


Plums, pulped 


217 000 


299 000 


124 000 


47 000 


79 000 


Poultry, killed 


26,000 


11,000 


33*000 


57 000 


50 000 















SIAM. 



Total imports 


$2 932 000 


$2 730 000 


$1 9S4 000 


$1 666 000 


$3 347 000 














Rice. 


2 728 000 


2 399 000 


1 774 000 


1 498 000 


3 009 000 


Rice refuse 


61 000 


122 000 


17*000 




' loVoon 


Cattle hides 


9,000 


7*000 


29 000 


7 000 


69 000 


Teak wood 


99 000 


95 000 


65 000 


89 000 


40 Ann 


Gum lac 


11,000 


63,000 


23 000 


18 000 


47 000 















SPAIN. 



Total imports 


$29,443,000 


$33,363,000 


$39,050,000 


$45,176,000 


$47,293,000 


Iron ores 


9,370,000 
5,404,000 
3,159,000 
558,000 
1,742,000 
679,000 
329.000 
970,000 
751,000 
665,000 
259,000 
415,000 
268,000 
269,000 
201,000 
64,000 
74,000 
73,000 
195,000 


12,598,000 
3,251,000 
3,852,000 
878.000 
3,202,000 
1,023,000 
852,000 
558,000 
457,000 
640,000 
528,000 
540,000 
182,000 
333,000 
273,000 
150,000 
94,000 
129,000 
86,000 


14,265,000 
3,790,000 
3,967,000 
794,000 
4,169,000 
1,462,000 
1,226,000 
805,000 
569,000 
894,000 
570,000 
559,000 
230,000 
355,000 
153,000 
136,000 
183,000 
214,000 
246,000 


17,293,000 
4,933,000 
4,361,000 
2,088,000 
3,956,000 
1,237,000 
1,185,000 
1,087,000 
238,000 
855,000 
694,000 
648,000 
544,000 
259,000 
167,000 
223,000 
224,000 
185,000 
274,000 


17,289,000 
5,045,000 
4,813,000 
3,743,000 
3,677,000 
1,612,000 
1,191,000 
926,000 
917,000 
783,000 
760,000 
667,000 
433,000 
363,000 
344,000 
318,000 
307,000 
276,000 
184,000 


Pyrites 


Oranges and mandarins 


Lead 


Wine in casks 


Bananas 


Grape must 


Sheep and lamb skins 


Almonds dried 


Cork stoppers 


Grapes, fresh 


Canned foods 


Goat and kid skins 


Copper .... 


Red wine for blending ... 


Jewelry of silver . 


Tartar 


Kitchen vegetables, fresh . 


Hazel nuts. ... 





STRAITS SETTLEMENTS. 



Total imports 


$6,451,000 


$10,864,000 


$6,531,000 


$5,652,000 


$5,792,000 


Rattan 


1,004,000 
1,071,000 
430,000 
685,000 
462,000 
2,157,000 
19,000 
129,000 
89,000 


896,000 
2,427,000 
336,000 
1,144,000 
353,000 
4,845,000 
51,000 
131,000 
301,000 


986,000 
1,248,000 
228,000 
899,000 
537,000 
1,831,000 
85,000 
180,000 
226,000 


1,103,000 
1,434,000 
493,000 
432,000 
476,000 
588,000 
94,000 
195,000 
255,000 


1,291,000 
1,147,000 
918,000 
550,000 
472,000 
466,000 
247,000 
119,000 
118,000 


India rubber 


Tin 


Copra 


Pepper . . 


Gutta-percha 


Tungsten ores 


Sago, tapioca 


Catechu 





174 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

SWEDEN. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911m 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$33, 758, 000 


$38,986,000 


$43, 554, 000 


$50, 927, 000 


$53 350 000 














Iron, ores 


11 997 000 


13 919 000 


15 003 000 


17 062 000 


20 637 000 


Wood of conifers 


6, 369, 000 


7,726 000 


8, 317, 000 


9 431 000 


8 240 000 


Paving stones . . 


1 715 000 


1 739 000 


1 840 000 


1 961 000 


2 128 000 


Cattle... 








1, 185, 000 


1 402,000 


Calfskins 


492,000 


1 285 000 


1 278 000 


1 055 000 


1 344 000 


Salt-water fish, fresh 


1 314 000 


1 051 000 


1 586 000 


1 793 000 


1 320 000 


Cream, fresh 


211,000 


609,000 


487.000 


690. 000 


1 166,000 


Pigiron 


783 000 


969 000 


1 063 000 


1 103 000 


1 152 000 


Granite and syenite blocks 


1 290 000 


1 110 000 


1 186 000 


884 000 


1 117 000 


Cellulose 


605 000 


603 000 


1 043 000 


1 117 000 


l'o53 000 


Sash, doors, frames of wood, rough 
Slag and waste from smelting works. .. 
Bran 


64l',000 
26,000 
285 000 


849, 000 
167,000 
111 000 


l) 068, 000 

234,000 
449 000 


'993' ooo 

506, 000 
643 000 


'704' 000 
682,000 
575 000 


Norway saltpeter; acids and salts not 
elsewhere specified 


49,000 


93 000 


53 000 


280 000 


544,000 


Malleable iron in bars.. 


461 000 


630 000 


498 000 


343 000 


531 000 


Carbonate of lime 


393 000 


547 000 


656 000 


428 000 


501 000 


Chrome, manganese, silicon 








136 000 


469,000 


Iron wire 


170 000 


531 000 


645 000 


640 000 


468 000 


Stonecutters' work, plain... 


823,000 


653 000 


607 000 


522,000 


456,000 


Cattle hides 


214 000 


312 000 


334 000 


494 000 


455 000 


Beef and veal, fresh 


1 000 


182 000 


769 000 


1 165 000 


444 000 


Cream separators 


390 000 


336*000 


485*000 


' 408' 000 


431,000 


Cranberries, huckleberries . 


782 000 


357 000 


223 000 


464 000 


377 000 


Copper . . . 


79 000 


227 000 


142 000 


385 000 


370 000 


Iron tubes, rolled or drawn . 


206' 000 


378' 000 


294' 000 


232' ooo 


366,000 


Blooms, billets, puddled bars, ingots... 
Brass and tombac 


203,000 
142 000 


241.000 
160 000 


282,000 
187 000 


408, 000 
400 000 


337,000 
317.000 


Pork, fresh or simply prepared 


16 000 


30 000 


47 000 


241 000 


281 000 


Packing paper 


113,000 


147 000 


174' ooo 


207 000 


245,000 


Feldspar 


132 000 


126 000 


185 000 


222 000 


233,000 















SWITZERLAND. 



Total imports 


?38 710 000 


$41 386 000 


$42 753 000 


$48 963 000 


$5Q 767 000 














Watches 


4 714 000 


5 325 000 


5 674 000 


6 089 000 


5 971 000 


Cotton fabrics 


2' 631 '000 


2 927* 000 


2 942 000 


3' 275' ooo 


4' 175' ooo 


Yarn of floss silk not dyed 


3 625 000 


3 674 000 


3* 739* 000 


3 123 000 


3 393 COO 


Silk raw 


2' 624* 000 


2 133' 000 


1 901 '000 


1,966,000 


2 885 000 


Cheese 


2 017' 000 


2 097 000 


2 096 000 


2 103 000 


2 698' 000 


Aluminum 


546 000 


| 126' 000 


l' 005* 000 


2' 481 000 


2 309 000 


Cattle hides 


1 248'000 


1 360 000 


1 338 000 


l' 563' 000 


l' 840' GOO 


Machinery 


1 105 000 


1 251 000 


1 482 000 


1 849 COO 


1 563 000 


Chocolate 


' 745' ooo 


' 936* 000 


l' 031 '000 


l' 166* 000 


1 150 COO 


Cotton yarn 


714*000 


911 000 


' 821 ' 000 


921 000 


l' 139* 000 


Metalloids, acids, salt, not specially 
mentioned 


154 OOC 


343 000 


492 000 


831 000 


1,138,000 


Calcium carbide . . . 


571 000 


692 000 


785 000 


1 048 OOC 


1 120 000 


Worsted yarn 


1 268 000 


1 088 000 


1 168 000 


1 318 000 


1 077 000 


Alkaloids, alkaloid salts and com- 
pounds 


251 000 


346 000 


675 000 


843 COO 


1 072 000 


Coal-tar dyes 


892 000 


944 000 


90 1' 000 


981 000 


944 000 


Calfskins 


830 000 


724 000 


716 000 


831 000 


813 000 


Close-woven tissues of silk 


1 111' 000 


958 000 


711 (TO 


787 OCO 


688' 000 


Books 


644 000 


694 000 


61 7' 000 


599 OCO 


616 000 


Milk, fresh 


390*000 


459' ooo 


553' coo 


543' ooo 


579 000 


Cotton waste . 


419 XX) 


480 000 


418 OCO 


392 000 


513 000 


Woolen suitings 


342 000 


367 000 


380 000 


439 000 


472 000 


Shoes of leather 


212 000 


237*000 


261 '000 


342' coo 


427 000 


Commercial automobiles 


42 000 


139 000 


319 000 


465 000 


346 000 


Dynamos, electric motors, transformers 
Sodium 


121,000 
207 000 


230,000 
229 000 


282,000 
148 000 


274,000 
243 000 


341,000 
298,000 


Foods, chemically prepared 


1 000 


203 000 


777 000 


175 000 


288 000 















TOGO. 



Total imports 


$895, 000 


$761 COO 


$807 000 


$1 479 000 


$1,739,000 














Palm nuts 


179 000 


174 000 


389 000 


1 052 000 


1 457 000 


India rubber 


190, 000 


338 000 


242 000 


222, COO 


95,000 


Cotton 


70 COO 


115 000 


108 000 


135 000 


76,000 















GERMAN IMPORT TRADE. 



175 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 

1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

TUNIS. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$889 000 


$868 000 


$1 199 000 


$2 179 000 


$2 511 000 














Phosphate of lime, natural 


396. 000 


229 000 


741 000 


1 371 000 


1 285 000 


Iron ores 


297,000 


547,000 


315, 000 


637, 000 


682,000 


Lead ores 


69, 000 


12, 000 


1,000 


14,000 


208,000 


Goat and sheep skins 


33 000 


24 000 


40, 000 


65 000 


114 000 


Zinc ores 


55, 000 


7,000 


54,000 


6,000 


108, 000 















TURKEY (INCLUDING CRETE PRIOR TO 1912). 



Total imports 


813,635,000 


$16, 054, 000 


$16, 682, 000 


$18, 482, 000 


$17,604,000 














Tobacco. 


3,521,000 


3,610,000 


4,258,000 


4, 819, 000 


4,671,000 


Raisins 


1,574,000 


2,068,000 


2,391.000 


2, 147, 000 


2,250,000 


Woolen rugs. . .. . 


1,733,000 


1,792,000 


1,966,000 


2,176,000 


2,244,000 


Valonia 


613, 000 


973,000 


464, 000 


332, 000 


688,000 


Hazel nuts 


412 000 


875 000 


776 000 


559 000 


604 000 


Opium . . 


534, 000 


665, 000 


683,000 


588, 000 


601,000 


Figs dried 


317 000 


441 000 


430 000 


484 000 


514 000 


Cotton... 


204, 000 


248, 000 


134, 000 


232, 000 


498, 000 


Fur skins raw 


626 000 


437 000 


453 000 


739 000 


456 000 


Wine in casks 


276, 000 


413,000 


395, 000 


367, 000 


404,000 


Goat and kid skins 


159 000 


240 000 


154 000 


452 000 


380 000 


Emerv 


220, 000 


152, 000 


213, 000 


280, 000 


347, 000 


Lamb and sheep skins 


331 000 


232 000 


253, 000 


337 000 


324 000 


Eggs 


323, 000 


255, 000 


240,000 


682, 000 


285,000 


Silk. raw. 


110 000 


249 000 


201.000 


249 000 


228, 000 


Pyrites 


46 000 


113 900 


97 000 


204 000 


227 000 


Poppy seed 


55, 000 


253 000 


318, 000 


203 000 


225 000 















UNITED KINGDOM. 



Total imports 


$172 133 000 


$182 444 000 


$192 497 000 


$200 543 000 


$208 454 000 














Coal 


33, 731, 000 


32 164 000 


37 003 000 


39 576 000 


42 741 000 


i Cotton yarn 


19 393 000 


21 937 000 


21 248 000 


22 123 000 


21 718 000 


Worsted yarn . . . 


12 627,000 


13 528 000 


13' 143' ooo 


12* 108* 000 


12* 103' 000 


Herring salted 


4 046 000 


5 236 000 


5 236 000 


5 950 000 


6 664 000 


Genappes, mohair, and alpaca yarn 
Woolen suitings 


8,335,000 
4,141,000 


8, 228, 000 
4,631,000 


7*628,000 
5, 149, 000 


6*. 462*. 000 
5, 702, 000 


6* 644' 000 
5,213,000 


1 Seagoing ships of iron or steel 


1,314,000 


739 000 


2 154 000 


1 048 000 


5 144 000 


Machinery 


4 623 000 


4 626 000 


4 807 000 


5 397 000 


5 004 OOCT 


Wool, carded or combed. 


3, 793, 000 


4, 287, 000 


3,853 000 


3 999 000 


4 869*000 


Sheep, lamb, and goat skins, dressed. . 
Close-woven tissues of cotton, un- 
bleached 


2,290,000 
2 274 000 


3,223,000 
2 547 000 


2,794,000 
2 293 000 


3,073,000 
2 179 000 


3,697,000 
3 229 000 


Tin plate 


2 564 000 


3 241 000 


3 395 000 


3 431 000 


3 142 000 


Salt-water fish, fresh . . 


2 093 000 


2 175 000 


2 678* 000 


3* 137* 000 


3*115*000 


Fur skins, raw 


739, 000 


546, 000 


557, 000 


607, 000 


2,318,000 


Films of celluloid 


163, 000 


243 000 


2 713 000 


2 734 000 


2 305 000 


Fur skins, dressed 


1 409 000 


1 284 000 


2 151 000 


2 099 000 


2 229 000 


(Bran. ... 


2, 528, 000 


1,793 000 


2 630*000 


4 103 000 


2' 176* 000 


I Wool, raw and washed 


2 707 000 


1 802 000 


1 989 000 


2 236 000 


2 151 000 


Houses 


879, 000 


1, 173, 000 


1 306 000 


1 134 000 


1 784 000 


Cotton tissues, dyed, printed, woven 
in colors 


1, 229, 000 


1, 516, 000 


1 375 000 


1 442 000 


1 717 000 


Cotton waste... 


1 294 000 


1 143 000 


1 195 000 


1 224 000 


1 699 000 


Tin 


880 000 


946 000 


1 375 000 


1 624 000 


1 636 000 


Linen yarn . . 


1 225 000 


1 598*000 


1, 629' 000 


l' 464* 000 


1, 534* 000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


1 151 000 


1 183 000 


1 248 000 


1 159 000 


1 367 000 


Pig iron 


1. 230' 000 


1* 139' 000 


l' 075' 000 


1 487*000 


1*347*000 


Cotton tissues, dressed, bleached 
Cotton velvet and plush. 


832,000 
737 000 


904, 000 
843 000 


'845,000 
1 147 000 


904,000 
1 492 000 


1,340,000 
1 339 000 


Oilcake . 


1 145 000 


1 513 000 


1 487 000 


1 763 000 


1 262 000 


Noils.. . 


1,324,000 


1 155 000 


'962' 000 


1 153 000 


1* 225* 000 


1 Blood of animals, refuse of fish, stable 
1 manure 


333, 000 


622 000 


918 000 


973 000 


1 183,000 


(Alkaloids, alkaloid salts and com- 
1 pounds. 


596 000 


545 000 


1 152 000 


1 136,000 


1 134 000 


Soft India Rubber paste 


452, 000 


1 449*000 


l' 239* 000 


1*444 000 


1,086 000 


Malt sprouts. . . 


1 118 000 


857 000 


973 000 


1 330 000 


1 048 000 


Grass seed 


1, 058, 000 


1 115' 000 


1 126*000 


1*224 000 


1*042 000 


Chin a clay... 


937 000 


928 000 


944 000 


1 231 000 


1 013 000 


Close-woven tissues, wholly or partly- 
of silk 


674 000 


873 000 


981 000 


961 000 


950 000 


Books.,. 


465' 000 


743' 000 


911 000 


917 000 


906*000 



























176 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



TABLE III. GERMANY'S IMPORT TRADE, BY COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL ARTICLES, 
1909 TO 1913 Continued. 

UNITED STATES. 



Articles. 


1909 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 


Total imports 


$300 490 000 


$282 652 000 


$319 726 000 


$377 464 000 


$407 246 000 














Cotton 


96,715.000 


94,578,000 


108 001 000 


110 561 000 


109 896 000 


Copper ... 


42 072 000 


45 206 000 


49 383 000 


65 945 000 


69 981 000 


Wheat... 


13,888,000 


6,701,000 


11 523 000 


18 597 000 


39 243 000 


Lard 


25 230,000 


15 161 000 


19 927 000 


25 074 000 


26 71l'oOO 


Fur skins, raw 


16,535,000 


14,950,000 


10,495,000 


14,657 000 


15* 827* 000 


Kerosene . . 


12, 569, 000 


11,013,000 


9 110 000 


11 882 000 


12 612' 000 


Oil cake . . 


8 510,000 


6 930 000 


7 442 000 


8 589 000 


7' 684 'oOO 


Wood of conifers sawn 


4 830 000 


5 894 000 


6 745 000 


9*519 000 


6 535 000 


Barley... 


12,000 


' 13,000 


' 3l'oOO 


346 000 


5 480 000 


Phosphate of lime natural 


4 791 000 


3 550 000 


4 507 000 


4 077 000 


5 013 000 


Oleomargarine. . . 


4,772,000 


4,606,000 


5 346 000 


6 139* 000 


5 000 OX) 


Lubricating oils mineral .... 


3 236 000 


3 178 000 


3 582 000 


4 390 000 


4 755 000 


Turpentine resins 


3,232,000 


4, 822, 000 


7,476,000 


6,472 000 


4 676 000 


Corn... 


2,975,000 


2,836 000 


3 968 000 


3 914 000 


4 595 ooo 


Reaping machines 


2,760,000 


2,375,000 


2,307,000 


2,742,000 


4' 247' ooo 




3 753 000 


4 182 000 


3 426 000 


3 657 000 


3 919 000 


Prunes 


1 152 000 


' 938' 000 


'768'000 


2 221 000 


3 896 000 


Linters . 


1 648 000 


814 000 


2 050 000 


2 891 000 


3' 889* 000 


Bran 


2,103,000 


sss'ooo 


3 550 'OOO 


5 027 000 


3 664 000 


Benzine, raw . . 


865 000 


249 000 


2 182 000 


3 604 000 


2 239 000 


Apples and pears, dried 


1,808,000 


677, 000 


2,160 000 


2' 241 '000 


2 206 000 


Premier jus . 


648 000 


209 000 


1 488 000 


2 755 000 


2 170 000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


2,716,000 


2,376 000 


2 814 000 


2 292 000 


2 049 000 


Malt sprouts 


1 462 000 


1 452 000 


1 710 000 


1 707 000 


2 023 000 


Salmon. . . 


1,341,000 


1,541,000 


1,634,000 


1 687 000 


'984' 000 


Nickel. 


1 005 000 


1 314 000 


1 338 000 


969 000 


745 000 


Tobacco . 


1 951 000 


1 794 000 


1 723 000 


1 910 000 


705 000 


Oats 


34,000 


' 10,000 


' 27' ooo 


2' 561 'OOO 


'en' ooo 


Cottonseed oil 


3 183 000 


1 231 000 


1 496 000 


2 931 000 


595 000 


Cattle hides.... 


501,000 


973.000 


1,124,000 


1 036 000 


'575 ooo 


Lead 


1 656 000 


1 268 000 


2 389 000 


1 948 000 


423 000 


Metal-working machinery 


871 000 


1 093 000 


1 231 000 


1 696 000 


381 000 


Paraffin 


488 000 


612 000 


874 000 


1/394 'ooo 


' 243' ooo 


Acetate of calcium 


761 ' 000 


777 000 


841 000 


1 055 000 


'l63' 000 


Apples fresh 


536 000 


585 000 


922 000 


1 05 9 000 


068 000 


Cash registers, speedometers, automatic 
scales . 


954 000 


1 016 000 


1 095 000 


964 000 


1 015 000 


Oils of camphor, juniper, rosemary, and 
other volatile oils . . 


251 000 


549 000 


561 000 


1 154 000 


1 014 000 


Cotton waste . . . 


300 000 


449 000 


371 000 


623 000 


991 000 


Typewriters and calculating machines. . 
Goat and kid leather, dressed 


743,000 
1 102 000 


977,000 
1 253 000 


1,178,000 
1 502 000 


1,178,000 
1 002 000 


972,000 
958 000 


Tin 


33 000 


60 000 


134 000 


'681 000 


906 000 


Peaches and apricots, dried . 


519' ooo 


601 '000 


638 000 


1 102 000 


889 000- 


Cedar wood 


1 056 000 


923 000 


988 000 


927 000 


885 000 


Oak wood 


594 000 


615 000 


779 000 


1,171 000 


876,000 















URUGUAY. 



Total imports 


$8, 097, 000 


$6,798,000 


$8,427,000 


$11,972,000 


$10,294,000 














Wool, raw. 


2 366 000 


1 637 000 


3 979 000 


5 413 000 


4 497 000 


Meat extract 


1,734,000 


1,381,000 


1,330,000 


2,123,000 


2, 573, 000 


Cattle hides. . . 


2 793 000 


2 970 000 


2 483,000 


3 295,000 


2 184 000 


Linseed 


276 000 


1 000 


27 000 


294 000 


376 000 


Intestines, stomachs, and bladders of 
animals 


117,000 


201,000 


208,000 


263,000 


237,000 


Lamb and sheep skins 


160,000 


96,000 


63,000 


39,000 


94,000 















VENEZUELA. 



Total imports 


$3,585,000 


$3,771 000 


$3 974,000 


$4,736,000 


$4,913,000 














Coffee 


1,472,000 


955,000 


1,171,000 


1,773,000 


1,897,000 


Balata gum 


576,000 


898,000 


941 000 


832,000 


1 184,000 


Cocoa 


551,000 


668,000 


716,000 


823,000 


700,000 


Cattle hides. ... 


293,000 


393,000 


302,000 


225, 000 


282,000 


Divi-divi 


144,000 


184 000 


153,000 


241,000 


243,000 


Medicinal plants 


46,000 


62,000 


74,000 


154,000 


159,000 


India rubber 


279,000 


432,000 


382,000 


324,000 


131,000 


Egrets. 


56,000 


36 000 


44,000 


95,000 


108,000 















Appendix B. EXTRACTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S 
ADDRESSES. 

In his public addresses President Wilson has discussed at some 
length the aims and activities of " the Prussian military and commer- 
cial autocracy," and has laid down a number of principles affecting 
Germany's future position and course of action in international com- 
mercial relations. 

In the opening chapter of the present monograph the pertinent 
sections of the President's speech at Buffalo on November 12, 1917, 
are reproduced. In his Flag Day address, delivered June 14, 1917, 
in Washington, he discussed German penetration in the East, middle 
Europe, and Germany's desire to " close its bargain before it is too 
late, and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will de- 
mand." The pertinent paragraphs are here quoted, together with 
some annotations of the address as published by the Committee on 
Public Information i 1 

GERMAN PENETRATION IN THE EAST. 

" But the rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what 
concrete plans, what well-advanced intrigues lay back of what the 
professors and the writers were saying, and were glad to go forward 
unmolested, filling the thrones of Balkan States with German 
princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her 
armies 2 and make interest with her Government, developing plans of 
sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in 
Persia. 

" The demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single 
step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to 

1 Conquest and Kultur," by Messrs. Notestein and Stoll, issued by the Committee on 
Public Information on Nov. 15, 1917, gives further "Aims of the Germans in Their Own 
Words " ; in this compilation free use was made of Grumbach, already referred to. 

2 Not long ago, after the treaty of Berlin (1878), German officers, one of whom was Gen. 
von der Goltz, set about reorganizing the Turkish Army. In 1888 German financiers, de- 
pending upon the Deutsche Bank, asked for a railway concession. In the next year tne 
Kaiser, William II, visited Abdul Hamid. By 1891 German influence at Constantinople 
became evident. Germans in Turkey were directing the building of railways and Germans 
at home were urging the necessity of German railways to the Persian Gulf. In 1898 the 
Kaiser went to Constantinople and on to Palestine, where he declared himself the friend 
of 300,000,000 Moslems. In 1899 Dr. Siemens, a Berlin capitalist, signed the Bagdad 
Railway convention with Turkey. By 1900 the route was sketched, and in 1903 the 
Turkish decree was issued constituting the company. Although capitalists of other 
nations were allowed to share in financing the road, German interests maintained control 
over it. Since that time German officers have been going to Turkey in numbers, drilling 
the Turkish troops, teaching them modern warfare, equipping the army with the best new 
artillery, and thoroughly fortifying strategic points. Meanwhile German diplomats were 
studiously indifferent to Armenian atrocities perpetrated by the Turks. When the Young 
Turk movement culminated in the revolution of 1908 the Kaiser's Government was quick 
to show favor to the new Government. German officers assisted the Turks in their two 
Balkan wars, 1912-13. These different moves have all been part of a general plan. For 
two decades German policy has been to create in Turkey a strong but subordinated mili- 
tary ally and to bring her within the German economic system. Rich territories in Asia 
Minor and the Mesopotamian Valley might thus be developed, an all-German route to the 
East assured, and Britain's routes to India and her position in Egypt brought within 
striking distance. 

43339 18 12 177 



178 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

Bagdad. They hoped those demands might not arouse Europe, but 
they meant to press them whether they did or not, for they thought 
themselves ready for the final issue of arms. 

" Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power 
and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond 
the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia ; and Austria-Hungary was 
to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey 
or the ponderous States of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was 
to become part of the Central German Empire, absorbed and domi- 
nated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented 
the German States themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. 
It could have had a heart nowhere else. 

"It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely.' The choice 
of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding to- 
gether racial and political units which could be kept together only 
by force Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Ar- 
menians the proud States of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little 
Commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtile 
peoples of the East. 

" These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired 
to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed 
independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the 
constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common 
power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. 

" But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that 
and were ready to deal with it in their own way. 

"And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing 
plan into execution ! Look how things stand. Austria is at their 
mercy. It has acted, not upon its own initiative or upon the choice 
of its own people but at Berlin's dictation, ever since the war began. 
Its people now desire peace, but can not have it until leave is granted 
from Berlin. The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a single 
Power. Serbia is at its mercy, should its hands be but for a moment 
freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and Roumania is overrun. 
The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving Germany, 
certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships lying in 
the harbor at Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day 
that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin 
From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread. 

" Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that has been 
manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set and sprung? 
Peace, peace, peace, has been the talk of her Foreign Office for now 
a year and more; not peace upon her own initiative, but upon the 
initiative of the nations over which she now deems herself to hold the 
advantage. A little of the talk has been public, but most of it has 
been private. Through all sorts of channels it has come to me, and 
in all sorts of guises, but never with the terms disclosed which the 
German Government would be willing to accept. 

" That Government has other valuable pawns in its hands besides 
those I have mentioned. It still holds a valuable part of France, 
though with slowly relaxing grasp, and practically the whole of Bel- 
gium. Its armies press close upon Russia and overrun Poland at 
their will. It can not go further ; it dare not go back. It wishes to 



EXTRACTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESSES. 179 

close its bargain before it is too late and it has little left to offer for 
the pound of flesh it will demand. 1 

" The military masters under whom Germany is bleeding see very 
clearly to what point fate has brought them. If they fall back or are 
forced back an inch, their power both abroad and at home will fall to 
pieces like a house of cards. It is their power at home they are 
thinking about now more than their power abroad. It is that power 
which is trembling under their very feet, and deep fear has entered 
their hearts. They have but one chance to perpetuate their military 
power or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure 
peace now with the immense advantages still in their hands which 
they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified 
themselves before the German people ; they will have gained by force 
what they promised to gain by it an immense expansion of German 
power, an immense enlargement of German industrial and commer- 
cial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with their 
prestige their political power. If they fail, their people will thrust 
them aside; a government accountable to the people themselves will 
be set up in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, 
in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time except 
Germany. If they succeed, they are safe and Germany and the world 
are undone ; if they fail, Germany is saved and the world will be at 
peace. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace. We and 
all the rest of the world must remain armed, as they will remain, and 
must make ready for the next step in their aggression ; if they fail, 
the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union." 

BASIS FOR ENDURING PEACE. 

In his annual address before the joint session of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, on December 4, 1917, the President 
interpreted the voice of humanity in the formula " No annexations, 
no contributions, no punitive indemnities." He gave a further 
answer to German pretensions, as follows: 

" Germany's success by skill, by industry, by knowledge, by enter- 
prise we did not grudge or oppose, but admired, rather. She had 
built up for herself a real empire of trade and influence, secured by 
the peace of the world. We were content to abide the rivalries of 
manufacture, science, and commerce that were involved for us in her 
success and stand or fall as we had or did not have the brains and the 



1 The rapid industrial development of Germany after the war of 1870, though due to 
economic causes, greatly enhanced the prestige of the military classes, who assumed the 
credit for it. Their present position on the war map is highly advantageous to them from 
an economic point of view, for they now control the chief centers of European industry 
outside Great Britain. They hold the greater part of Belgium, one of the most highly 
developed industrial centers of the world. They are exploiting the chief mining and 
manufacturing part of France, the oil and wheat fields of Routnania, and one of the 
few important manufacturing districts of Russia. They have secured the Balkan cor- 
ridor to the Near East, with its boundless possibilities of cemmercial exploitation and 
of further political aggression in the direction of Egypt and India. If they can retain 
these conquests they will be permanently enriched at the expense of their impoverished 
neighbors. If they can capitalize their present advantageous positions on the war map, 
whether by annexations or otherwise, this war also, like that of 1870, will appear in the 
light of a profitable business adventure. War itself will indeed have become one of the 
greatest of national industries, with the military caste necessarily in supreme political 
control. In such an atmosphere democracy can not develop. Nor can the triumph of 
democracy be expected In Germany till the prestige of the military caste has been de- 
stroyed. The celebrated Prof. Hans Debrucke, of the University of Berlin, wrote early in 
1914 : " Anyone who has any familiarity at all with our officers and generals knows that 
it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce 
in the control of the army by the German Parliament." 



180 GERMAN TEADE AND THE WAR. 

initiative to surpass her. But at the moment when she had conspicu- 
ously won her triumphs of peace she threw them away to establish 
in their stead what the world will no longer permit to be established, 
military and political domination by arms by which to oust where she 
could not excel the rivals she most' feared and hated. The peace we 
make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands 
and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prus- 
sion conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the 
peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the 
peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent 
and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial auto- 



cracy." 



Discussing the partnership of nations after the war is over, Presi- 
dent Wilson said: 

" That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere 
partnership of governments. It might be impossible, also, in such 
untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic 
intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partner- 
ships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; 
and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very 
nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would 
assuredly set in." 

Before a joint session of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate on January 8, 1918, the President set forth the following 14 
principles in " the program of the world's peace " : 

1. " Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there 
shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but 
diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 

2. "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside terri- 
torial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be 
closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement 
of international covenants. 

3. "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and 
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the 
nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its 
maintenance. 

4. "Adequate guaranties given and taken that national arma- 
ments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic 
safety. 

5. " A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of 
all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle 
that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests 
of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined. 

6. " The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement 
of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest 
cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her 
an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent 
determination of her own political development and national policy 
and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations 
under institutions of her own choosing and, more than a welcome, 
assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself 
desire. The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in 



EXTRACTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESSES. 181 

tho months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their 
comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own inter- 
ests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 

7. " Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and 
restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she 
enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single^ act 
will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations 
in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the 
government of their relations with one another. Without this heal- 
ing act the whole structure and validity of international law is for- 
ever impaired. 

8. "All French territory should be free and the invaded portions 
restored, and the wrong done to France in 1871, in the matter of 
Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for 
nearly 50 years, should be righted, in order that peace may once 
more be made secure in the interest of all. 

9. "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected 
along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 

10. " The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the 
nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded 
the freest opportunity of autonomous development. 

11. "Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; 
occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access 
to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one 
another determined by friendly counsel along historically established 
lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guaranties of 
the political and economic independence and territorial integrity 
of the several Balkan States should be entered into. 

12. " The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should 
be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are 
now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security 
of life, and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as 
a free passage to the ships of commerce of all nations under inter- 
national guaranties. 

13. "An independent Polish State should be erected which should 
include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, 
which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose 
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should 
be guaranteed by international covenant. 

14. "A general association of nations must be formed under specific 
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political 
independence and territorial integrity to great and small States 
alike." 

The third principle the removal, so far as possible, of all eco- 
nomic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade condi- 
tions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating 
themselves for its maintenance is of particular significance as a 
statement of international commercial policy. In the same speech 
the President elaborated this point somewhat, as follows: 

" We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing 
in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or 
distinction of learning or of specific enterprise, such as have made her 



182 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her 
or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not 
wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of 
trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace- 
loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fail- 
dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the 
peoples of the world the New World in which we now live instead 
of a place of mastery." 

PEACE TERMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE. 

On February 11 the President, speaking to Congress, made reply 
to public addresses on peace terms by Chancellor von Hertling, of 
Germany, and Count Czernin, of Austria. The following extracts 
discuss the position of commercial and industrial life in a stable 
world peace : 

" The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs 
or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would dis- 
dain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to im- 
pose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be 
shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the 
most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of prin- 
ciples and of the way in which they should be applied. But she 
entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would 
or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military 
masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind ; and 
the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any 
other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance 
of civilization. She can not see her way to peace until the causes 
of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be 
impossible. 

" This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small na- 
tions and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to 
make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their 
own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into 
which will render such things impossible for the future; and those 
covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that 
love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial 
settlements and the political relations of great populations which have 
not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts 
of the powerful governments which consider themselves most directly 
affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic ques- 
tions also ? 

" It has come about in the altered world in which we now find our- 
selves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field 
of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair 
and equal conditions of trade. Count von Hertling wants the essen- 
tial bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by com- 
mon agreement and guaranty, but he can not expect that to be con- 
ceded him if the other matters to be determined by the articles of 
peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final account- 
ing. He can not ask the benefit of common agreement in the one 
field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he 
sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the 






EXTRACTS FROM THE PRESIDENT^ ADDRESSES. 183 

essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for 
peace; neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish com- 
pacts with regard to provinces and peoples. 

" Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace 
with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that 
an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish 
peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European 
concern and must, of course, be conceded; that Belgium must be 
evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions 
that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, 
even within his own Empire, in the common interest of Europe and 
mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interest 
and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of 
Austria only, it must of course be because he feels constrained. I 
suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. 

Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved 
and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that 
Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the 
United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He 
would probably have gone much further had it not been for the em- 
barrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Gert 
many." 



Appendix C. PAN-GERMANISM AND MITTELEUROPA. 

PAN-GERMANISM. 

[From an article by Prof. Thomas G. Masaryk, of Prague, in The New Europe, London, 

Oct. 19, 1916.] 

Very often we read discussions about the importance of this or the other 
front; whether this is a war of the west or a war of the east or the south, 
and on which front the final decision is likely to be reached. The question is 
not quite clear; it may have a strategical meaning, and in that case it must 
be borne in mind that the importance of the respective fronts is liable to change 
in the course of the war. So far, however, as the political meaning is con- 
cerned, more is to be learned from the Germans who started the war than 
from the allies, who have hitherto been on the defensive. Now the Germans 
have stated clearly enough, both before and during hostilities, why they were 
looking forward to this war, and what they wish its result to be. The meaning 
of the present war is reflected in the voluminous political literature which 
propagates the pan-German program and the discussions which still center 
around it. * * * 

Pan-Germanism reached its highest point during the reign of the Emperor 
William II, growing into the political doctrine of German imperialism, which 
proclaimed, in the first place, the need of economic and political union between 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and of adding the Balkans and Turkey to 
this union. This plan is expressed in the watchword " Central Europe," which 
involves a further program for the annexation of the Baltic and some purely 
Russian Provinces of Russia, and would thus provide an opportunity for re- 
constructing Poland under German leadership. Further, this plan enlarges 
Central Europe by taking in Holland and Belgium, Switzerland, and Scandi- 
navia. The relations to be maintained between these countries and Germany 
are formulated in various ways by various pan-German politicians. A kind 
of customs union is demanded, but it is evident that, as a matter of fact, many 
pan-Germans have in their mind also a political and military union, if not 
annexation pure and simple; and this applies especially to the lands in the 
immediate neighborhood of Germany. * * * 

The earlier pan-Germans proclaimed the consolidation of the German nation; 
their successors of to-day advocate the program of world power. Especially 
since the renovation of the German Empire the pan-Germans adduce so-called 
historical rights. The German Empire, they say, can claim the territories of 
the old Germano-Roman Empire, i. e., not only the Bohemian lands and Austria 
in general, but also Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and parts of Italy and 
France. 

But the pan-Germans also demand the annexation of non-German territories. 
Germany, they argue, needs colonies, needs a hinterland. They point to the 
growth of population. Anxiety concerning their daily bread forces them to 
extend their frontiers; Germany requires more land to cultivate, and must 
therefore simply take it. * * * 

The votaries of pan-Germanism appeal to German inclination for war; war 
is positively adored, and with that goes the worship of militarism. They tell 
us that Germans and Teutons are naturally gifted with the necessary con- 
structive statesmanlike ability ; in the Slavs this ability, according to them, 
is lacking; therefore the Slav States were founded and subsequently annexed 
by the Germans. But not only the Slavs, the French and other nations also 
were according to these theorists formed by the Germans, just as even Christ 
Himself was of German origin. Pan-Germans do not disguise the lust of power 
and the greed of imperialism; they proclaim German aristocratism, social, 

184 



PAH-GERMANISM AND MITTELETJROPA. 185 

political, cultural, racial, and linguistic, and carry it mercilessly to its extreme 
logical results imperare, regnare, over all the nations and lands. 

This pan-German relapse into the law of brute force was facilitated by va- 
rious scientific theories. Darwinism, for instance, was utilized to argue the 
rights of big and powerful nations; while Nietzsche's Darwinistic " Ueber- 
mensch " (superman) and " Herrenvolk " (ruling race) were especially ac- 
cepted in a pan-German sense. The will to power was proclaimed as the will to 
' world power." Marxist historical materialism also strengthened pan-Ger- 
manism by its demand for large economic territories and by its materialistic 
and purely economic conception of politics. In this war the German social- 
ists have accepted the pan-German ideal. 

The pan-Germans became intoxicated by the successes of Germany in science, 
industry and finances, art and literature (take, for instance, the importance of 
Wagnerism), philosophy, and culture in general. The superiority of German 
culture became an excuse and even a justification for dominating less educated 
nations in short, for ruling the whole world. * * * 

In France and England the folly of regarding the pan-German movement as 
Utopian is only now becoming clear. The Utopia of yesterday often happens to 
be the reality of to-day. In every political" plan which considers the distant 
future there is a Utopian element ; but pan-German political literature has been 
evolved in close connection with German history, science, and philosophy. 

That German policy, in following the pan-German scheme, was not in the 
least Utopian has been amply demonstrated in the Balkans and in Turkey. A 
Hohenzollern was enthroned in Koumania, an Austrian vassal in Bulgaria, and 
German princesses went to Greece and Montenegro. List, the well-known econo- 
mist, was one of the first to speak of a central European customs union the 
earlier Zollvereins showing the political effectiveness of such an economic policy. 
List, who directed Germany to the Far East, and Moltke, are proclaimed by the 
Germans as the first and weightiest authorities for Berlin to Bagdad. One of 
the earlier propagandists of a customs union under the leadership of Germany, 
Paul Dehn, directed Germany to the east and southeast and preached the eco- 
nomic union not only of Germany and Austria, of the Balkans and Turkey, but 
also of Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland. Dehu speaks of " Weltwirtschafts- 
politik" and " Weltpolitik,' these ideas becoming the stock ideas of pan-Ger- 
man policy. 

William II officially inaugurated the pan-German imperialistic world policy. 
Very early one of his ministers, Bronsart von Schellenhof (Minister of War, 
1883-1889), voiced the pan-German scheme of central Europe; the Kaiser him- 
self rejoiced over Germany as a " world empire " ; William II was a pupil not 
only of Lagarde, but of the later pan-German philosophers and historians, 
notably of Houston Chamberlain; he himself went to Constantinople and Asia 
Minor in order to strengthen the German financial and economic penetration of 
the Orient. Pan-German Central Europe was practically extended to Mesopo- 
tamia and the Persian Gulf. " Berlin to Bagdad " became under William II the 
general watchword. The Germans soon acquired concessions for building rail- 
roads (the line Haidar Pasha to Angora is German). Within a year of William 
II's visit to tha Sultan in. 1898 the line to Bagdad was approved and the aid of 
the Deutsche Bank and other financial institutions secured. 

Even long before the war pan-German imperialism dominated not only intel- 
lectual circles, but also wider classes of the population of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, and supplied them with their political education. It is simply not 
true that only a few people participated and cooperated in pan-German propa- 
ganda. The number of such writers is very great ; pan-German books and pam- 
phlets had and still have to-day a very large circulation and run through many 
editions. The pan-German plan of " Berlin to Bagdad " has been upheld by men 
like Moltke, List, Rodbertus, W. Roscher, Lassalle, Lagarde, C. Frantz, Wind- 
horst, and others. Pan-German ideas w r ere propagated by energetic societies 
and clubs, notably the Allgemeiner deutscher Verband (Pan-German League, 
1890), Mitteleuropiiischer Wirtschaftsverein (Central European Economic 
Union, 1904), and Vorderasien-Komitee (Asia Minor Committee, 1911) ; the 
latter was founded by Hugo Grothe, and among its trustees are to be found such 
names as Ballin, von der Goltz Pasha, Karl Lamprecht, Hans Meyer, Cornelius 
Gurlitt, Dr. von Jacobs (president of the German Levant Line), and R. Willing. 
The pan-Germans expressed explicitly and in plain language what the others 
expressed implicitly ; they have dared a political plan of international bearing. 



186 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR, 

But they spoke in the name of all Germany, and I can not understand how any- 
body can speak of men like Lagarde, not to mention Treitschke, Bernhardi, and 
many others, as political dreamers. And why should a Utopia be only theoreti- 
cal? Can not a war, or practical work, sometimes be Utopian? And is only a 
victorious war non-Utopian? * * * 

There can be no doubt that German policy is primarily concerned with 
continental aims the absorption of Austria-Hungary and the conquest of the 
Balkans and Turkey. With this end in view, Germany must prevent Russia 
from reaching Constantinople, and must weaken her to the utmost of her 
power. Once Germany has achieved " Central Europe," the time for a blow at 
Britain would soon come. Germany, with Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and 
Turkey at her disposal, has a free path to Egypt and India, and nothing could 
then stop her march into Holland and Belgium and the maritime north of 
France, if occasion should arise. Once Berlin-Bagdad and Berlin-Cairo be- 
came a reality, the power and riches yielded by this Central Europe would 
perhaps even render the fight against Britain in Europe superfluous ; moreover, 
the progress of aeronautics and the development of the navy would facilitate 
the invasion of England, if that were still required. The possession of Trieste, 
Saloniki, and Constantinople would assure to " Central Europe " dominion 
over the Adriatic, ^Egean, and Mediterranean ; Turkey would secure to Ger- 
many access to Africa and India, and Britain would collapse in pitiful iso- 
lation. States are often undone by what has made them great, and in that 
case, the amphibious German would swallow up the British fish. * * * 

If Berlin succeeds in creating " Central Europe," the aim of the war is 
attained, even if, at the worst, some time should elapse before the completion 
of the Constantinople-Bagdad and Constantinople-Cairo routes. 

If successful, Prussia-Germany would become an Asiatic and African power 
like Russia, Britain, and France; nay, more, she would become the greatest 
world power. Pan-Germanism is a program for the final solution of the Eastern 
question. The great war is a daring attempt to organize Europe, Asia, and 
Africa the Old World under the leadership of Germany. 

AUSTRIAN SLAVS OPPOSED TO MITTELEUROPA. 

[Dr. Alois Rasin in the Narodni Listy, Prague, Oct. 21, 1917.] 

The declaration of May 30, 1917, by which the Bohemian representatives in 
the Austrian Parliament demanded a reestablishment of Bohemia as an inde- 
pendent State, will be a permanent landmark in the history of Bohemian 
politics. The ideas and aspirations .expressed therein have, indeed, for gener- 
ations, consciously or unconsciously, been the common property of the Bohemian 
people. The declaration derives its significance from the fact that the ultimate 
object of our national aspirations has been clearly defined. 

The war aims of the central Empires have placed our problem not only 
before our own eyes, but before the whole world. Nothing could have thrown 
a better light on our situation than the agitation for " Mitteleuropa." Austria- 
Hungary and Bulgaria were to become a highway for the march of German 
imperialism through Constantinople and Bagdad toward the Persian Gulf. 
[Seven lines erased by the censor.] 

That was the ideal set up by the German nation as the object of this w r ar 
and as the object of the State in which we live. The Germans could not receive 
any other answer than the one they have received from us and the Yugoslavs : 
A determination that these two Slav peoples shall form two independent States, 
capable of defending themselves successfully against the aggression of the 
Germans of both Empires, closely allied with the Magyars. 

There is no other way for us, and the people feel in the depths of their souls 
that it would be useless to seek other ways in the belief that the execution of 
those plans would be postponed. Herr Naumann may for a time quit roaming 
over central Europe, public agitation for Mitteleuropa may stop, but in reality 
no new idea, no program has been offered which would make amends for the 
centuries of oppression. 

The dissensions in the German ranks are not an expression of personal con- 
troversies, neither are they a result of serious differences in political programs ; 
they are simply due to disagreement among the German parties as to the 



PAN-GERMANISM AND MITTELEUROPA. 187 

tactics to be pursued, whether the ultimate ends of German imperialism should 
be carefully disguised or openly supported. 

All the pronouncements of the Austrian and the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ments have been designed to conceal the real intentions. We hear only words 
of which we have a large collection from the past, but otherwise everything 
remains as of old ; not one of the bulwarks of German-Magyar hegemony has 
been given up, and the only change that is being given half-hearted consider- 
ation concerns Poland, and that within the limits of the .pan-German program. 

After a war in which the peoples of Europe have shed rivers of blood we 
can not return to the conditions prevailing before the war, under which all 
the fundamental laws of Austria and the Hungarian law of nationalities, 
which have never been observed in practice, would only be furbished up anew 
and provided with a theoretical introduction about the self-determination of 
nations, which in practice would again be determined by German bureaucracy 
and Magyar nobility. The war can not preserve and strengthen these amazing 
fictions which have shaken the foundations of the monarchy while concealing 
the true state of things from the outside world. 

In the intoxication of victory, however, the persecution of the Slavs, the 
proposed changes of the fundamental laws$ and the plan of Mitteleuropa have 
uncovered the true intentions of the central powers. The mask has been cast 
off, and it is now useless to put it on again. Everybody knows what is hidden 
behind it. 

The Bohemians and the Yugoslavs have seen through the disguise. They can 
not believe that Austria's repentance is sincere. The only way for the Bo- 
hemian representatives is firmly to stand by the declaration of independence, 
lay bare all insincerities, destroy fictions, and reject beautiful words which 
have no meaning, compromises of which it is known that they will not be kept, 
and treacherous peace agreements which would be followed by renewed strife 
as soon as our opponents had recovered. 

A great war can only result in great changes. And a small nation, too, has 
a right thoroughly and permanently to arrange the conditions of its life in the 
most perfect forms, to defend itself and to attack, to submit its plea to honest 
judges and to all those who have taken up arms for the ideals of a new polit- 
ical arrangement of the world. 

The Bohemian representatives have no other way before them but the one 
leading directly to a full independence of the whole Czecho-Slovak race, and our 
political labors both at home and elsewhere must tend to convince everybody 
that this is the only way to make peace secure for the future in this part of 
Europe. 

HUNGARY AND MITTELEUROPA. 

The Hungarian position on the subject of Mitteleuropa and on the 
relations of Hungary and Austria is well shown in excerpts from the 
leading newspapers of Budapest, quoted in the Literary Digest for 
March 9, 1918. It is pointed out that these statements, which are 
reproduced below, are significant since they appear in a governmeiit- 
controlled press, passed by the censor. The following is from Az Est : 

We want nothing whatever from Austria, who has nothing but ill-will for us 
and whose decomposing internal State life and senile useless traditions act on 
our vigorous young State life as a source of infection. We do not want any- 
thing from Austria or the present monarchy. All we want is complete economic 
freedom so that we can control our own imports and exports, and, if we sell 
anything, can see that we get real value in exchange and not worthless paper. 
We want freedom for our industry, our railroad system, and all our possi- 
bilities of progress. * * * What we wan" is to be a free and independent 
country, with only those points of contajt with Austria which are inseparable 
from the circumstance of having a common ruler. 

And we do ^ot merely wish for this; we are perfectly certain that we are 
going to get it. The war has shaken to its verj foundations the world in which 
the unhappy nations of mankind have been living, and wlien the axis of the 
whole world has been displaced things can never go on again as they did 
before. 



188 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

The following is from Pesti Naplo: 

To-day, when the question of a customs union with Germany is being ad- 
vocated, comes the great object lesson of Count Hadik's downfall, to teach us 
our need of economic independence. We can learn from it that the more gen- 
erously we surrender our independence the more unpleasant are the surprises 
in store for us. To-day it is the Austrians who decide who is to be our food 
controller. To-morrow perhaps the Germans will come and tell us whom we 
must have as Hungarian minister of commerce. And who knows? Perhaps in 
a little while it will be the Great Council of Mitteleuropa that will say who 
shall be prime minister in Hungary. Truly a fine prospect for us. But, after 
all, perhaps \\e ought to thank the Austrians, for their unjustifiable inter- 
ference in our own private affairs is a more effective propaganda for Hun- 
garian independence than a thousand orators. 



Appendix D. THE LEIPZIG FAIR IN WAR TIME, 

The subject matter in the following report has been partly covered 
in the text of the present publication, but it has been deemed of 
sufficient interest in this connection to justify reproduction in full. 
Appendix E should also be read in this same connection. 

[Frankfurter Zeitung, Aug. 30, 1917 ; the present translation was published in Commerce 

Reports for Oct. 20, 1917.] 

The seventh war fair (Kriegsmesse) is "best characterized by the one word 
'* warenhunger," hunger for merchandise. Bread is not the only thing the 
desire for which has been quickened by the war; the whole world is suffering 
from a real hunger for wares to such an extent that the condition might be 
termed almost an epidemic. The causes are well known the increasing scarcity 
of raw materials, lack of workers, and, finally, a scarcity of fuel. The influence 
of these factors can be seen very plainly at the fair, for many important, even 
leading, firms are not represented at the fair at all, because they wish to spare 
themselves and their customers the disagreeable admission that they are unable 
to fill orders. It can not be said, however, that there are many vacant spaces 
at the fair owing to the absence of those firms, for the management of the fair 
has induced a large number of new firms to send in their exhibits, and, more- 
over, the industries have had such a great success in the manufacture of sub- 
stitute articles during the war that an untrained eye will hardly notice any 
change in the fair. 

In many branches it is really difficult to find any difference in the war ex- 
hibits as compared with exhibits shown in peace times. On the other hand, the 
absence of aluminum and rubber wares, of many leather wares, and many tex- 
tile fabrics naturally is noticeable at once. For these the inventive German 
industry has naturally found substitutes immediately, and we find a really 
wonderful inventiveness in the manufacture of substitute articles also in the 
metal industries, which lack not only aluminum but also copper and brass and 
have to be very economical in the use of iron and steel. 

It needs hardly to be mentioned that, owing to a scarcity of leather soles, 
the wooden and -the paper soles are very much in demand, but the prices of 
these substitute articles are even now quite high and will doubtless go still 
higher. With the progress of the war, however, price has become a matter 
of secondary consideration only. The most important thing for the pur- 
chaser is that he obtains any goods at all, and it should be noted in this con- 
nection that the exhibitors have taken pains to offer to the purchasers as much 
as they have been able to offer at all. 

The largest stocks were exhibited by the china and earthenware and the 
glass industries, by the manufacturers of articles of luxury, and the wooden- 
ware industries. The toy industry also had considerable stock, although the 
lack of clothing on dolls was readily noticed. Prices were much higher in all 
branches, the increases varying between 30 per cent (wooden wares) and 100 
or more per cent (china and special articles). 

In all branches of the industries represented at the fair trade was good, 
in part even unusually good, and many exhibitors received in the first two days 
of the fair as many orders as they could handle at all satisfactorily. By 
the end of the second day the fair bureau had issued about 40,000 cards to 
visitors from outside the city, a record number for the period of the war. 
A number of neutral press correspondents at Leipzig attend the fair on the 
second day, and the astonishingly large number of visitors convinced them that 
the reports circulated so industriously by the enemy press about the alleged 
failure, partial or total, of the Liepzig Fair were only "hot air." Neutral 

180 



190 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

countries were represented very wen at tne tair, tne Netherlands and Switz- 
erland particularly so. Many buyers had come frfom the Scandinavian coun- 
tries and also from Poland, for the hunger for wares is quite strong in the 
occupied territory. It is hardly necessary to add that the countries of our 
allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, too, were well represented. 

Among the various industries represented, those that seek to produce substi- 
tute articles had exhibits of special interest. The paper industry exhibited a 
large number of imitation textiles designed to take the place of linen, cotton, 
jute, and other fabrics. It must be admitted that in many cases the imitations 
are surprisingly successful, so that it is somewhat difficult to distinguish these 
table covers, napkins, aprons, hatbands, or even articles of underwear, in the 
manufacture of which paper is the chief material employed, from similar articles 
of the genuine materials. Good imitations of leather were also shown in large 
quantities. 

The prices of these new articles are not low, but still not excessive; fears 
have been expressed, however, that the prices will soon be increased considerably. 
Sales were satisfactory both in the paper trade and in the woodenware indus- 
try, wooden soles being particularly in demand as a substitute for leather. The 
demand for household articles w r as not as large as formerly, owing to the de- 
crease in the number of marriages, but it was still good and could hardly be 
satisfied in many cases. The lighting industry has to work largely with substi- 
tute articles ; it has produced some very beautiful models, nevertheless. Trading 
was not as brisk as formerly, owing to the limitation placed on the consump- 
tion of lighting materials. The demand for metal wares and small hardware 
was very good, and the buyers paid the higher prices willingly. The toy indus- 
tries suffer greatly from scarcity of both materials and workers; many large 
firms were not represented at the fair at all, but those that still had goods to 
sell made very good sales. The ceramic industries again found a very good 
market for articles of common use and particularly good for articles of luxury. 

The absence of French, Belgian, and British manufacturers of glassware, and 
of Galle and other specialists in the production of articles of luxury, was hardly 
to be noticed ; on the other hand, the German and the Austrian industries fur- 
nished proofs that they were fully able to compete with foreign manufacturers 
of china, fine glassware, and even fine articles of jewelry. The importance of 
this fact for the transition period and the period after the war is not to be 
underestimated, and a similar observation may be made concerning the manu- 
facturers of foods, now represented at the fair for the third time, who have shown 
great inventiveness and zeal in the preparation of substitute articles. In this 
branch of industry trading was unusually lively, and large sales were made. 

The industry of foodstuffs at the fair, better known as a surrogate industry, 
is still in its infancy, but has furnished such strong proofs of its right to exist 
that it deserves to be fostered by the authorities as much as possible. The value 
of the substitutes for tea, coffee, and oil, and the value of German tobacco, Ger- 
man soup, roots, meat extracts, vegetable soups, etc., can be properly estimated 
only after the war when the numerous decrees and ordinances have been re- 
pealed, when good raw materials will be abundant, and the manufacturer will 
be in a position to offer goods of quality. 

The attempt to introduce a few marketable products of the textile industry 
seems to be very promising. The laces, trimmings, etc., shown have found uni- 
versal approval and permit us to hope for the future. The little exhibit of the 
association of Saxon artisans and craftsmen also attracted many amateurs 
and purchasers. 

All in all. the seventh war fair has had a very good success and has proved to 
be an excellent selling organization and also an excellent means to educate 
popular taste and stimulate production. 



Appendix E. CHRISTMAS IN BERLIN, 1917. 

Following is an exact translation of the Berlin correspondence of 
the Algemeen Handelsblad, Amsterdam, January 1, 1918. It is a 
sympathetic view which throws much light on actual conditions in 
Germany, especially when read in conjunction with the foregoing 
report on the Leipzig Fair, written four months earlier : 

BEELIN, December 27, 1917. 

The Berlin newspapers of Monday morning relying on the authority of the 
official weather bureau, which, too, is working under difficulties during the 
war made the unanimous announcement that we should have brisk Christmas 
weather ; a moderate frost with sunshine and without snow. The Berliners 
of 14 to 60 years of age did not have to fear that they would be compelled to 
perform involuntary exercises on the snow'-covered asphalt pavements of the 
streets. 

People hajl scarcely finished reading the good news when the first snowflakes 
fell, small, hard crystals which remained on the ground. And it has been snow- 
ing ever since that Monday morning. 

I suppose that such is the traditional Christmas weather, snow, with a 
light frost, so the snow will not melt. Everything is white; the streets, the 
roofs, the trees, and the people. If we only had the currant cake and the 
gingerbread, nuts, apples, and punch, not to mention the more important eat- 
ables, that prompt decoration by the powers above would have been received 
with jubilation. 

Three years ago we still had all those delicacies during the first winter of 
the war we were living in a fairyland flowing with milk and honey but it 
rained then. A year later the currant cake and the gingerbread were baked 
without currants or raisins and from a brown flour, with saccharin, an attempt 
to keep up appearances which deceived nobody, but we still had apples and nuts 
and even the festive roast; the snow melted into a chocolate porridge. Again, 
a year later, the punch, the nuts, the apples, and the goose, the latter now as 
dear as a fat pig had been in former times, awakened sad memories of the 
happiness gone by ; the weather w r as stormy, there was a heavy rain, and the 
gutters overflowed. 

Now, on the fourth " war Christmas," the municipal authorities here and 
there would graciously provide chocolate and cakes for the children. The 
adults had to be satisfied with punch innocent of alcohol, for there were no 
sweets, no apples, no nuts. And the Christmas tree bore no candles. But the 
snow remained on the ground. 

The powers above had done their duty. They showed still more plainly how 
man had failed completely in his duty through inhumanity. The snow which 
formerly would have been awaited with eagerness now became a burden. 

I stayed indoors all through the holy Christmas eve. I watched the world 
through the window and saw that most houses across the street, houses with 
children, were dark. Only a gigantic tree with electric lights upheld the repu- 
tation of the street. The owner of the tree is a dealer in foodstuffs. 

Was everybody downhearted? Not at all. A light shines at Brest-Litovsk 
and throws its rays over all Germany. The voices heard there permit us 
to believe that peace will really come to the world. 

Were there no Christmas trees? Were the railways unwilling or unable to 
carry them? Not at all. Fourteen days ago when the first trees were brought 
to the city it looked as if the people would have to buy early if they wished to 
get a tree. The merchants charged war prices, 4 or 5 marks for a tiny speci- 
men, 8 to 10 marks for a larger tree. When the War Bureau declared the 
Christmas trees to be articles of necessity and fixed maximum prices for them 
people who wanted the trees would make haste to purchase what could be 

191 



192 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

had, knowing well from experience that whenever a maximum price had been 
established the article in question immediately disappeared from the market. * 
It was not so with Christmas trees, however. It would not pay to keep them 
for the next year. And the trees came in enormous numbers. The quantities 
shipped were unusually large, considering the lack of laborers and the diffi- 
culties of transportation. There were so many trees in the market that the 
merchants could not dispose of them. As the days passed, the finest and largest 
trees could be had for a mark and a half ; trees which would have commanded 
double the price in times of peace. On the very last day the price had fallen 
to 75 pfennigs. In the Netherlands anyone would have paid that price with- 
out a moment's hesitation, just to get the tree for fuel. 

The poor man on the corner of my street lost his small capital. For two 
weeks he had been exposed to rain and wind, standing on the corner or walking 
around his little forest of trees to keep warm. For the night he always piled 
up his trees in a corner of the portico. He could not leave his treasure un- 
guarded as in former years. The streets are now dark, the policemen are few, 
and the people have acquired a more accommodating conscience. 

The poor man had speculated. He had hoped to make war profits, and 
suffered a war loss instead. The Berliner's love for the Christmas tree does 
not go so far as to make him willing to set before his children a tree without 
candles, and without ornaments of bright-colored paper, without waxen angels, 
silver garlands, nuts, dolls, and gewgaws, and without a table under the tree 
with candies and toys. 

The owners of department stores and other large stores say that they have 
done very good business this year. If they had had more goods, the Christ- 
mas trade would have been a brilliant success. But the lack of goods, not only 
of foods and beverages, but also of articles obtainable on permits only, such 
as clothing and footwear, of toys, glass, china, of useful and useless trifles, 
set a limit to profits. Dealers in gold, precious stones, crystal, objects of art, 
and articles of luxury in general, are the best satisfied. Dealers in furs have 
had a singular experience. A short time ago they might have asked any price 
for genuine skins, even if the genuine wares were but imitations prepared 
from rabbit skins properly dyed. But now they noticed that the customers 
were no longer willing to pay high prices, and the prices naturally declined. 
The cause of the sudden change must be sought in the peace negotiations with 
Russia. It is a question, however, whether the importation of fur skins will 
increase all of a sudden when peace has been concluded. Germany has a more 
urgent need of other things. It is easier to explain why the prices of tea on 
the clandestine market have been declining during the last week. The pro- 
fessional speculator is afraid that his stocks may be left on his hands and is 
now offering larger quantities for sale. Some remarkable developments may 
be expected in the food market when the general peace treaty has been signed. 

The Railway Administration had announced that no extra trains would be 
run during the Christmas holidays. The public were urgently requested to 
give up all unnecessary traveling, but the appeal was made in vain. This 
year the railway traffic was even larger than in peace time. The receipts of the 
Stettin railway station at Berlin for December 21, 1917, were 30 per cent 
higher than in the preceding year, the yield of the increase in rates not being 
included ; the receipts for December 22 were 40 per cent higher, and those for 
Dceniber 23, 25 per cent higher. The number of passengers leaving Berlin 
by rail during the four days, December 21 to 24, was 221,872 in 1913; it de- 
clined to 194,315 in 1914, rose to 199,425 in 1915, and 300,854 in 1916. In 1917 
the number was estimated at not less than 400,000, although the number of' 
trains dispatched was smaller than ever. The scenes at some of the stations 
can easily be imagined. The administration had introduced a new regulation 
for the most popular trains, requiring a special card of admission besides the 
regular ticket. Without a card no one would be admitted to the perron (sta- 
tion platform), and the card could be obtained only by the early coiners. The 
result was that people desiring to leave early on Saturday were on hand 
Friday evening; the crowds became unmanageable, barriers were overthrown 
and windows broken. Many people waited 15 to 20 hours in front of a sta- 
tion hoping to board a cheap accommodation train where the fare had not 
been doubled. They had no business to attend to anywhere but were de- 
termined to take a " pleasure " trip and see their relatives or friends. A 
Berliner would rather eat pebbles than give up traveling. 

Meanwhile, the snow continues falling. The male inhabitants between the 
ages of 14 and 60 years have to sweep a path through the center of the street. 



CHRISTMAS IN BERLIN, 1917. 193 

It is no longer the janitor who handles the broom or shovel ; the householders 
attend to the work themselves, selecting one of their number as manager of 
the little cooperative society for the removal of snow. 

It is remarkable how many things have had to be done. There have been 
protests by the city fathers, a deluge of letters to the newspapers, a great deal 
of joking, grumbling, and cussing. But when it comes to a showdown, the 
Berliner understands that it is in the interest of both city and country that 
he should toil and sweep and shovel, and he does it as if he had never been 
accustomed to do otherwise. They do so in my neighborhood, at least. Such 
public spirit certainly is rare. 

The Berliner removes the snow from the street, although the sno\v continues 
to fall as if all Berlin were to be covered up. The machine is running. And 
it will not stop until the authorities give the order, " Stop." 

43339 18 13 



Appendix F. INTERLOCKING OF GERMAN BANKS AND 
OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

The brief reference to the interlocking 1 of directors among the 
German banks and between the banks and the big industrial enter- 
prises on pages 36 and 37 of " German Foreign-Trade Organization," 
Miscellaneous Series No. 57, has been received with such signs of 
interest that there are republished here, without change, the detailed 
tables showing the interrelationship of German banks and industrials, 
originally published by the Federal Trade Commission in its report 
on " Cooperation in American Export Trade," Part II, pages 519- 
536. It should be borne in mind that numerous changes have taken 
place since the publication of the sources on which these tables are 
based. 

INTERRELATIONSHIP OF GERMAN BANKS AND INDUSTRIALS. 

DIRECT CONNECTIONS OF THE LARGER GERMAN BANKS. 

DIRECT CONNECTIONS OF THE LARGER GERMAN BANKS WITH THE " DIRECTION " 
(MANAGEMENT) OF OTHER GERMAN CORPORATIONS. 

[Prepared from Saling's Borsen-Jahrbuch for 1914-15 by William J. Clark, of The General Electric Co., 
30 Church Street, New York, N. Y.] 

REICHSBANK. 
CONNECTIONS OF ITS "DIRECTION" WITH THE "DIRECTION" OF OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Approximate capital, $63,600,000.] 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approxi- 
mate capi- 
talization. 


Bank f iir Handel und Industrie 


Dr Johs. Kaempf Paul 


$48 000 000- 


A G Korting's Elektricitatswerke 


Bernhard,Dr. Hugo Op- 
penheim. 
Paul Bernhard 


1 800 000 


Deutsche Hypothekenbank A G 


Dr Emil Hecker Carl 


8 300*000 


Bank des Berliner Kassen-Vereins 


Furstenberg, Edmund 
Helfft, Max Richter. 
Dr Emil Hecker E J 


2 590 000 


Disconto-Gesellschaft 


Meyer, Fritz Andreae, 
Carl Joerger, Edmund 
Hellfft, Dr. R. von Men- 
delssohn, Dr. Hugo Op- 
penheim, Ed. Arnhold, 
Karl Mommsen. 
Dr Emil Hecker, Dr 


75 000 000 


Concordia Spinnerei und Weberei 


Louis Ravene, Dr. A. S. 
Salomonsohn, E. Hardt. 
Dr Emil Hecker 


850 000 - 


Tempelhofer Feld A G fur Grundstucksverwertung 


Dr Emil Hecker Dr Karl 


5 000 000 


Bergmann-Elektricitatswerke A. G 


Helfferich. 
Dr Emil Hecker 


22 500 000 


Hafengesellschaf t Haidar Pascha 


Dr. Emil Hecker 


5, 642, 000 


Gesellschaf t f iir elektrische Hoch- und Untergrundbahnen 


Dr. Emil Hecker . 


37 650 000 


Deutsch-Ostafrikaniache Gesellschaft 


Dr Emil Hecker Edw 


2 500 000 


Allgemeine Berliner Omnibus A. G 


Woermann, Dr. Hugo 
Oppenheim. 
Dr Emil Hecker, Dr P 


4 600 000 


Ostafrikanische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


von Schwabach. 
Dr Emil Hecker Carl Joer- 


26 000 000 


AnatolischeEisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


ger, Dr. O. Braunfels. 
Dr Emil Hecker 


28 280 000 


Bank f iir Orientalische Eisenbahnen in Zurich. .. 


Dr. Emil Hecker... 


18,200,000 



194 



INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



195 



Direct connections of the larcicr German ftanfcs Continued. 
REICHSBANK Continued. 



Other corporations. 



Connection through- 



Approxi- 
mate capi- 
talization. 



Betriebs-Gesellschaft der Orientalischen Eisenbahnen Dr. Emil Hecker $11, 000, 000 

Saloniki-Monastir Eisenbahn Dr. Emil Hecker 16, 000, 000 

Deutsche Bank Dr. Emil Hecker, F. von 62,500,000 

F. Fuld. 

Sachsische Bank zu Dresden Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 9, 500, 000 

E. von Oppenheim. 

Preussische Central Bodenkredit A. G Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 16, 000, 000 

A. Salomonsohn. 

"Landbank" A. G. in Berlin Dr. P. von Schwabach, 12,500,000 

Engelbert Hardt. 

Banca Commerciale Italiana (Italy) Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 31, 250, 000 

John Kaempf. 

Banca Generala Romana in Bukarest Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 3, 000, 000 

A. Salomonsohn. 

Braunkohlen u. Briket-Industrie A. G ^ Dr. P. von Schwabach 4, 856, 000 

Hedwigshutte (Coal Co. ) British connections do 1, 500, 000 

Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia Dr. P. von Schwabach, 26,000,000 

Carl Fiirstenber?. 

Otavi Minen u. Eisenbahn Gesellschaft (virtually a foreign Dr. P. von Schwabach 4,000,000 

holding company.) 

Rybniker Steinkohlen Gewerkschaft j Dr. P. von Schwabach, 4,600,000 

Fritz von F. Fuld. 

Vereinigte Koenigs- u. Laurahiitte A. G. fiir Bergbau u. Dr. P. von Schwabach 14,500,000 

Huttenbetrieb. 

Deutsche Erdol A. G Dr. P. von Schwabach ... 7,675,000 

Anglo-Continentale Guanowerke Dr. P. von Schwabach ... 4, 250, 000 

Vulcan-Werke I Dr. P. von Schwabach, 7,000,000 

Carl Furstenberg. 

Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft j Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 12, 500, 000 

E. von Oppenheim. 

Felten u. Guilleaume Carlswerk A. G | Dr. P. von Schwabach, 22, 000, 000 

Carl Furstenberg. 

Deutsche Waffen u. Munitions Fabriken Dr. P. von Schwabach, 5, 000, 000 

Ed. Arnhold. 

Dommitzscher Thonwerke A. G Dr. P. von Schwabach 250, 000 

Norddeutscher Lloyd in Bremen ! Dr P von Schwabach ... 56, 000, 000 

A. G. f ur Verkehrswesen Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 4,000,000 

A. Salomonsohn, Dr. 

Hugo Oppenheim. 

Neu Guinea Compagnie Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 2,750,000 

Louis Ravene, Arnold 

von Siemens, Dr. A. 

Salomonsohn, Dr. Hugo 

Tabak-Regie-Gesellschaft des Tiirkischen Reiches (Turkey) ! Dr. P. von Schwabach 10,000,000 

" Nordstern ' ' Lebens-Versicherungs A. G | Dr. P. von Schwabach, F. 5, 000, 000 

W. von Krause, Dr. A. 

Salomonsohn. 

"Nordstern" Unfall-, Haftpflicht u. Feuer-Versicherungs A. G. J Dr. P. von Schwabach, Dr. 1, 650, 000 

A. Salomonsohn. 

Kamerun Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin Dr. P. von Schwabach, 4,000,000 

Carl Furstenburg. 

Luxemburger Bank (Internationale Bank in Luxemburg) Dr. Emil von Oppenheim . 6, 700, 000 

Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerks- u. Hiitten A. G. in Dr! Emil von Oppenheim, 56,000,000 

Bochum. Dr. Louis Ravene. 

Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A. G Dr. Emil von Oppenheim, 80,000,000 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn. 

Westfalische Eisen- und Drahtwerke A. G ! Dr. Emil von Oppenheim . 4, 000, 000 

Rheinisch-Westfalische Sprengstoff A. G Er. Emil von Oppenheim. 2, 125, 000 

Deutsch-Niederlandische Telegraphengesellschaft Dr. Emil von Oppenheim. 4, 750, 000 

A. E. G. fiir Verzinkerei u. Eisen- Konstruktion Dr Emil von Oppenheim 1,000,000 

Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, Shanghai Dr. Hugo Oppenheim, Dr. 5, 000, 000 

, . TT ^ Otto Braunfels. 

Vereinsbank in Hamburg Dr. Hugo Oppenheim 9, 000, 000 

Oberrheinische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft A. G do 5,000,000 

Ostdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft "b"r. Hugo Oppenheim, Dr. 1, 125, 000 

A. Salomonsohn. 

Keneh- Assouan Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft Dr. Hugo Oppenheim 13, 500, 000 

Neue Boden A. G Dr. Otto Braunfels 11, 000, 000 

Mannesmannrohrenwerke Dr. Otto Braunfels, Arnold 21, 325, 000 

Berliner Hagel-Assicuranz-Gesellschaft Dr. R. von Mendelssohn, 900, 000 

E. J. Meyer. 

Berliner Hypothekenbank A. G Dr. Jolis. Kaempf 5, 675, 000 

Siiddeutsche Boden-Creditbank in Miinchen Dr. Johs. Kaempf 6, 750, 000 

Wiirttembergische Bankanstalt (vormals Pflaum u. Cie.) Dr. Johs. Kaempf 2, 500, 000 

Amsterdamsche Bank (Holland) Dr. Johs. Kaempf 9, 000, 000 

Siiddeutsche Immobilien-Gesellschaft in Mainz Dr Johs. Kaempf 5, 000 000 

Hugo Schneider A. Q ! Dr. Johs. Kaempf 5,000,000 



196 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



Direct connections of the larger German Panics Continued. 
REICHSBANK Continued. 



Other corporations. 



Connection through 



Bankfiir Deutsche Eisenoahnwerthe 

Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft 

Bismarckhiitte 

Harpener Bergbau A G 

Oberschlesische Eisen-Industrie 

Rheinische Stahlwerke zu Duisburg-Meiderich. 



Rombacher Hiittenwerke 

Schlesische Kohlen u. Kokes Werke. . . . 

Gewerkschaft Victoria in Liinen 

Handelsgesellschaft fur Grundbesitz. . . . 
Elektrochemischewerke Ges. m. b. H . . 
Berlin-Anhaltische Maschinenbau A G . 

Accumulatoren Fabrik 

Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft. . . 



Bank fiir elektrische Unternehmungen . 

Berliner Elektricitatswerke 

Elektro-Treuhand A. G 



Kraftiibertragungswerke Rheinfelden . 

Gasanstalt-Betriebs-Gesellschaft 

Aluminium Industrie A. G 

Deutscher Eisenhandel A. G 



Eisenhiitte Silesia. . 



Julius Pintsch A. G 

Rhenania Vereinigte Emaillierwerke A. G. 
Vereinigte Deutsche Nickelwerke A. G .... 

Westfalische Drahtindustrie 

A. E. G. Schnellbahn A. G 



Grosse Berliner Strassenbahn 

Zucker Raffinerie Tangermiinde-F. R. Meyers Sohn A. G.. 

" Phoenix, " A. G. fiir Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb 

Deutscher Lloyd Transport- Versicherungs A. G 



Allgemeine Deutsche Credit-Anstalt 

Brasilianische Bankfiir Deutschland 

Deutsche Ansiedlungsbank 

Werschen-Weissenfelser Braunkohlen A. G 

Kaliwerke Eschersleben 

Naptha-Productions-Gesellschaft Gebriider Nobel (Russia) . 

Freiherrlich von Tucher 'sche Brauerei 

Vereinigte Kom-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken 

Deutsch-Ueoerseeische Elektricitats-Gesellschaft 

Ludwig Loewe & Co., A. G 



Preussische Pfandbrief Bank zu Berlin 

Kattowitzer A. G. fiir Bergbau u. Eisenhiitten Betrieb. 



A. G. Mix u. Genest, Telephon u. Telegraphen- Werke. 

Bergisch-Markische. Industrie Gesellschaft 

Preussische -Lebens- Versicherungs A. G 

Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 



The Southwest Africa Co. (Ltd.) (British company). 
Siemens-Halske A. G 



Siemens-Schuckertwerke 

Stahlwerke Rich. Lindenberg A. G 

Gewerkschaft Ludwig II Stassfurt 

Berliner Weissbier Brauerei A. G 

Vereinigte Chemische Fabriken zu Leopoldshall A. G. 

"Archimedes" A. G. fiir Stahl- u. Eisen-Industrie 

Ammendorfer Papierfabrik 

Schlesische Elektricitats- u. Gas A. G 

Deutsche Wasserwerke A. G 

Crollwitzer Aktien- Papierfabrik 

Berlinische Lebensversicherungs Ges 

Braunkohlen u. Brikettwerke Roddergrube A. G 

Russiche Eiseaiadustrie A. G. in Gleiwitz 



C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg, Dr. A. 

Salomonsohn. 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg,Ed.Arnhold. 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg, F. von F. 

Fuld, Ed. Arnhold, Dr.A. 

Salomonsohn. 
C. Fiirstenberg, CarlJoerger. 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg, Carl Momm- 

sen. 
C. Fiirstenberg, Carl Joerger. 

C. Furstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Furstenberg. Dr. Louis 

Ravene", Dr. A. Salomon- 
sohn. 
C. Fiirstenberg, Dr. Louis 

Ravene'. 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Furstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg 

C. Fiirstenberg, Ed. Arn- 

hold,Dr. A. Salomonsohn. 

C.Fiirstenberg.Ed. Arnhold. 

C. Fiirstenberg 

Engelbert Hardt 

Engelbert Hardt, F. von F. 

Fuld. 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn, Dr. 

E. F. von Oppenheim. 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn 

Dr. A. Salomonsohn, Ed. 

Arnhold. 

A. K. G. von Donhoff 

A. K. G. von Donhoff, G. F. 

H. von T. Winckler, Dr. 

Louis Ravene". 

A. K. G. von Donhoff 

A. K. G. von Donhoff 

A. K. G. von Donhoff 

A. K. G. von Donhoff, Ed. 

Arnhold, Dr. Otto Braun- 

fels. 

Edw. Woermann 

A. von Siemens, Carl Momm- 



A. von Siemens 

Carl Joerger 

Carl Joerger 

Carl Joerger 

Carl Joerger 

Carl Joerger 

Carl Joerger 

CarlJoerger, Fritz Andrae... 

Carl Joerger 

Carl Joerger 

Carl Joerger 

F. von F. Fuld 

F. von F. Fuld, K. Fursten- 
berg. 



INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



197 



Direct connections of the larger German ~banks Continued. 
REICHSBANK Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through- 


Approxi- 
mate capi- 
talizStion. 


Bank fur Brau-Industrie 


Fritz Andreae 


$2 750 000 


Nationalbank fur Deutschland . 


Fritz Andreae 


26 400' 000 


Diisseldorfer Eisenhiitten-Gesellschaft 


Fritz Andreae 


'500' ooo 


Bauland Seestrasse-Nordpark A. G 


Fritz Andreae 


450*000 


A. G fur Beton u. Moneirbau 


Fritz Andreae 


1 400'oOO 


Deutsche Bierbrauerei A. G 


Fritz Andreae 


1 500 000 


Deutsche Linoleum u. Wachstuch Compagnie . 


Fritz Andreae 


2' 200' ooo 


Poppe u Wirth A G 


Fritz Andreae 


i 'soo' ooo 


Kolfinar u. Jourdan A. G. (Uhrkettenfabrik in Pforzheim) 


Fritz Andreae 


l',600'oOO 


Mechanische Weberei 


Fritz Andreae 


950 QQQ 


Elektricitats-Lieferungs-Geseilschaft 


Fritz Andreae 


15 000* 000 


Leonhard Tietz A. G. (department stores, trading concern) 


Fritz Andreae. . 


9 OOO' 000 


Heinrich August Schulte. Eisenhandlung A. G 


Dr Louis Ravene 


900 000 


Action- Verein des Zoologischen Gartens zu Berlin > 


Dr L Ravene 


1 500 000 


Norddeutsche Grund-Credit Bank 


E. J. Meyer 


2 100 000 


Preussische Hypotheken-Actien-Bank 


E J Meyer 


20 000 000 


Mitteldeutsche Creditbank 


E. J. Meyer, Carl Mommsen 


17 250 000 


Internationale Baugeaellschaft 


E J Meyer 


2 500 000 


Pfalzische Hypothekenbank 


E. J. Meyer.. 


10' ooo' ooo 


Chemische Fabrik Griinau Landshon* & Meyer A. G 


E J Meyer 


900 000 


Oesterreichische Sudbahn 


E. J. Meyer... 


440 000' 000 


Dresdner Bank 


Ed. Arnhold 


65 000 000 


A. G. fur Anilin Fabrikation 


Ed Arnhold 


8 OOD'OOO 


Westliche Berliner Vorortbahn 


Ed. Arnhold 


l' 900' 000 


Harkort'sche Bergwerke u. chemische Fabriken zu Schwelm. 


Max Richter.. . 


2,300 000 


Allgemeine Hauserbau-A. G. in Berlin 


Max Richter 


500 000 


Terraingesellschaft am Neuen Botanischen Garten A. G 


Max Richter 


900,000 


Berliner Bierbrauerei A. G. vorm. F. W. Hilsebein 


Max Richter . 


800 000 


Boehmisches Brauhaus A. G 


Max Richter 


1 600 000 


Chemische Fabrik Auf Action (vorm. E. Schering) 


Max Richter . 


2 500'oOO 


Verein chemischer Fabriken A. G. in Zeitz 


Max Richter 


1 500 000 


Norddeutsche Gummi- u. Guttapercha-Waren-Fabrik 


Max Richter . . 


450*000 


Berliner Waschefabrik A. G. vormals Gebr. Ritter. . 


Max Richter 


528 000 


Admiralsgarten-Bad in Berlin . 


Max Richter 


1 688'000 


Berlin-Neuroder Kunstanstalten 


Max Richter 


'soo' ooo 


Allgemeine Deutsche Kleinbahn-Ges. A. G . 


Max Richter 


7 320*000 


Braunkohlenwerke Leonhard A. G 


Carl Mommsen 


3' ooo' ooo 


Orenstein & Koppel Arthur Koppel A. G . 


Carl Mommsen 


18 000 000 


Elektrische Licht-u. Kraftanlagen A. G 


Carl Mommsen 


14' 200' ooo 


"Siemens" elektrische Betriebe A. G 


Carl Mommsen 


10 500 000 


Deutsche Eisenbahn-Betriebs-Gesellschaft in Berlin 


Carl Mommsen 


I'soo'ooo 


Teutoburger Wald Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft zu Giitersloh 


Carl Mommsen 


2 000 000 


Deutsche National bank, Kommanditgesellschaft auf Akti6n 


J. L. Schrade . . . 


9 000' 000 


Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt A. G 


J. L. Schrade 


69 000 000 








Total 




2 573 388 000 


Reichsbank ; 




63 600 000 








Grand total 




2.636.988.000 



DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT. 

CONNECTION OF ITS "DIRECTION" WITH THE "DIRECTION" OP OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Approximate capital, $75,000,000.] 



Other corporations. 



Connection through- 



Approximate 
capitalization. 



Also 

shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 



Not 

shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 



Deutsche Hypothekenbank A. G . . 
Bank des Berliner Kassen-Vereins. 
Neu Guinea Compagnie 



Dr. E.Hecker, Dr. G.Strupp 
Dr. E. Hecker, H. Waller... 
Dr. W. Schlauch, A. S. von 
Oppanheim, A. Lent, Dr. 
O. von Hentig, Dr. L. Ra- 
ven e". 

Brolthaler Eisenbahn Dr. W. Schlauch, A. S. von 

Oppenheim. 



$9.500.000 
2,590,000 
2, 750, 000 



$1,565,000 



198 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 
DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Hiistener Gewerkschaft A G 


Dr. R. Fuss. T. Hinsberg, 
H. Mathies. 
Dr. R. Fuss, J. Holier 




$1,900,000 
1,335,000 
8,000,000 


Maschinenfabrik und Miihlenbaunstalt G. Lu- 
ther, A. G. 
Deutscher Eisenhandel A. G 




Dr. R. Fuss, L. Ravene" 
Dr. L. Raven, H. Mathies. . 
R F Ullner 




Heinrich August Schulte Eisenhandlung A. G . . 
Deutsche Erdol A G 


$1,000,000 
11,980,000 




Deutsche Dampschifffahrts-Gesellschaft" Hansa" 
A. G. fur Maschinenpapier-Fabrikation 


Dr. F. Boner 


12,500,000 
5, 800, 000 
420,000 

688,000 


G. Wiss . . 




Farbwerke Franz Rasquin A. G. zu Muhlheim a. 
Neuwalzwerk A. G 


P. Brandi 




P. Brandi 




Otavi Minen u. Eisenbahn Gesellschaft 


Dr. P. D. Fischer... 


4 000 000 


The Southwest Africa Co. (Ltd ) 


Dr. P. D. Fischer, J. B. 
Schroder. 
Dr. P. D. Fischer, J. Holter, 
A. S. von Oppenheim, Dr. 
O. von Hentig. 
E. Hardt.. . 


8,750,000 
17,000,000 

5,000,000 
50, 000, 000 

1,500,000 








Landbank 




Phoenix, A. G. fur Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb. 

Deutscher Lloyd Transport- Versicherungs A. G . 
A. Schaaffhausenscher Bank-Verein A G 


E. Hardt, L. Hagen, W. 
Beukenberg, A. S. von 
Oppenheim, R. Esser, H. 
Hartung, G. von Langen. 
E. Hardt 






E. Kirdorf, O.Ulricht, A. S. 
von Oppenheim, H. Har- 
tung, A. Ballen. L. Hagen, 
Dr. M. J. Schroder, R. Es- 
ser, W. Benkenberg, W. 
Hoesch, P. Klockner, G. 
von Langen. 
E. Kirdorf, R. Esser, A. 
Salomonsohn, H. Mathies. 
E. Kirdorf, L. Hagen, J. 
Holter. 
E. Kirdorf, G. von Langen, 
L. Hagen, R. Esser. 
E. Kirdorf . 


42,500,000 


Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A. G 


80,000,000 
2, 625, 000 
6,500,000 


Rheinisch-Westfalische Sprengstoff A. G 




Vereinigte Koln-Rottweiler Pulver-Fabriken . . . 

Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektricitatswerke A. G. 
A. G. fur Gas u. Elektricitat 




20, 000, 000 
4,100,000 
8, 680, 000 


E. Kirdorf... 




Wasserwerk fiir das Nordliche Westfalische 
Kohlenrevier. 
Deutsche Waflfen- u. Munitions Fabriken 


E. Kirdorf 




E. Kirdorf, L. Hagen.. 


5,000,000 


Stahlwerk Oeking A. G 


E. Kirdorf... 


850,000 


"Nordstern" Lebens Versicherungs A. G 
Oberrheinische Eisenbahn Gesellschaft A. G 
Concordia Spinnerei u. Weberei . 


E. Kirdorf... 


5,000,000 
4,000,000 
850,000 

7,000,000 
95, 000, 000 

13,200,000 


E. Kirdorf 




Dr. E. Hecker, Frederick 
Jay. 
A. Ballin. . 




Vulcanwerke Hamburg u. Stettin 




AllgemeineElektricitats-Gesellschaft 


A. Ballin, L. Hagen, A. S. 
von Oppenheim. 
A. Ballin 
A. Ballin, H. F. von Oppen- 
heim,. F. von Schroeder. 
A. Ballin . 




Elektro Treuhand A. G 
Hamburg- Amerikanische Packetfahrt A. G 

Norddeutsche Versicherungs-Geselischaft 


" "69," 666," 666 

5,000,000 




Allgemeine Deutsche Credit- Anstalt 


J. Favreau, Dr. G. Strupp, 
F.Jay. 
J. Favreau . 


39,666,666 


Fritz Schulz jun. A. G 


1,850,000 
10,000,000 
2,500,000 


A. G. Brown Boveri & Cie. in Baden, Schweiz. . 
Porzellanfabrik Kahla 


J Favreau 




J Favreau Dr G Strupp 




Deutscher Eisenhandel A. G 


J Favreau 


8,000,000 


Aussig Teplitzer Eisenbahn. .. . 


j Favreau 


18,750,000 
9,500,000 
6,000,000 
2, 500, 000 
8,850,000 


Sachsische Bank zu Dresden 


F Jay 




Deutsche Grundcredit Bank 


F.Jay. 


Landkraftwerke Leipzig A. G. in Kulkwitz 


F.Jay... 


Grosse Leipziger Strassenbahn 


F.Jay 


Preussische Central-Bodenkredit A. G 


A. S. von Oppenheim. H. 
Klitzing. 
A S von Oppfynheim 


15,000,000 
5 000 000 


Deutsch-Asiatische Bank . . . 




Eschweiler Bergwerks- verein . . . 


A. S. von Oppenheim 




13,000,000 
2,300,000 


Gussstahl-WerkWitten 


A. S. von Oppenheim, R. 
Esser, T. Hinsberg. 









INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



199 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 
DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 




A S von Oppenheim .... 


$31,000,000 




Rheinische A. G. fur Braunkoliienbergbau u. 
Brikettfabrikation Coin. 
Werschen Weissenfelser Braunkohlen A. G 
A G fur Elektricitats-Anlagen 


A S von Oppenheim 


$13,000,000 


A. S. von Oppenheim 


4,800,000 


A. S. von Oppenheim 


4,260,000 


Elektrische Licht u Kraftanlagen A G 


A S von Oppenheim 


14,200,000 
22,000,000 


Felten u Guilleaume Carlswerk A G . 


A. S. von Oppenheim, L 
Hagen,, 
A. S. von Oppenheim, L. 
Hagen. 
A S von Oppenheim 




Basalt-Actien-Gesellschaft 


2,680,000 
785,000 


Deutsche Eisenbahn-Speisewagen-Gesellschaft . . 
Deutsch-Ostafrikaniscne Gesellschaft 




A. S. von Oppenheim, A. 
von Langen. 
A. S. von Oppenheim, G. 
von Langen. 
A S von Oppenheim 


2,500,000 


Kolnische Feuer-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft-Co- 
lonia. 
Concordia, Colnische Lebens-Versicherungs- 
Gesellschaft. 
Kolnische Hagel-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft 

Kolnische Riickversicherungs-Gesellschaft 


3,250,000 
8,250,000 
2,250,000 
2,500,000 




A. S. von Oppenheim, G. 
von Langen. 
A. S. von Oppenheim, R. 
Esser. 
H. Mathies, W. Marx, J. 
Holter, Dr. L. Ravene, 
R. Esser. 
T. Hinsberg, R. von Vill- 
nagel. 
T. Hinsberg, F. A. von der 
Heydt, W. Marx 
T Hinsberg 






Deutsch-Luxemburgische Berwerks-u. Hiitten 
A. G. 

Westdeutsche Bodenkreditanstalt ............ 


56,000,000 


2.830,000 
28,600,000 
460,000 


Barraer Bank-Verein Hinsberg, Fischer & Co . 
Schenck u Liebe-Harkort A G 






Vereinigte Deutsche Nickel-Werke A G 


T Hinsberg 


2,500,000 
9,000,000 


Leonhard Tietz A G 


T Hinsberg 




Rheinisch-Westfalische Boden-Kreditbank 


E. Ladenberg, W. Hoesche, 
L. Hagen, R. Esser, G. von 
Langen. 
E Ladenberg 


5,800,000 

15,000,000 

800,000 
2,100,000 


Suddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft A. G. in 
Mannheim. 
J D Riedel A. G Berlin-Britz 




Dr. O. von Hentig 




A. G. Mix. & Genest Telephon-u. Telegraphen- 
werk. 
Kattowitzer A. G. fur Bergbau-u. Eisenhiitten- 
betrieb. 
Eisenhiitte Selisia 


Dr O von Hentig 




Dr L Ravens' 


15,775,000 

4,000,000 
1,500,000 


Dr L Raven6 




Aktien Verein des Zoologischen Garten 


Dr. L. Raven6 




Norddeutsche Grundcredit-Bank 


Dr. G. Strupp 


2,100,000 




Bank fur Thiiringen (vorm. B. M. Strupp A. G. 
in Meiningen). 
Mltteldeutsche Creditbank 


Dr G Strupp 


3,000,000 


Dr G. Strupp 


17,250,000 


A G fur Montan-Industrie 


Dr. G. Strupp, Dr. F. Barn- 
burger. 
Dr G Strupp .. . 




1,200,000 
3,400,000 

720,000 
745,000 
663,000 
715,000 
408,000 
2,073,000 
1,360,000 

643,000 
745,000 
1,936,000 

313,000 
2,680,000 
8,300,000 
5,000,000 
1,396,000 


"Eintracht," Braunkohlenwerke u. Briketfabri- 
ken. 
A G Johannes Jeserich 




Dr G Strupp 




Saline u Soolbad Salzungen 


Dr G Strlpp 




Vereinigte Thiiringische Salinen 


Dr G. Strupp 




Porzellanfabrik Konigszelt 
Porzellanfabrik Schonwald 


Dr. G. Strupp 
Dr. G. Strupp 





Triptis A G. 


Dr G Strupp 




H. Berthold Messinglinienfabrik u. Schriftgies- 
serei. 
Kammgarnspinnerei Wernshausen 

Westdeutsche Jute Spinnerei u Weberei 


Dr G Strupp 




Dr. G. Strupp 

Dr G Strupp 





Vereinigte Eisenbahnbau- u. Betriebs-Gesell- 
schaft. 
E Wunderlich & Co A G 


Dr. G. Strupp 




Dr G Strupp 




Wiirttenibergische Notenbank 


R vonVellnagel 




Deutsche Effecten- u Wechsel-Bank 


R von Vellnagel 




Madgeburger Bank-Verein 


H Folsche 




Maschinenfabrik Buckau A. G. zu Madgeburg. . 
Kaliwerke Aschersleben 


H Folsche 




J. Hoeter, A. Salomonsohn. . 
J. Hoeter, G. von Langen, 
L. Hagen. 


4,000,000 
12,500,000 


Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraph en- Geeellschaft. . 








200 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 

DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Rteichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Deutsch-Niederlandische Telegraphen-Gesell- 
schaft. 
Deutsch-SudamerikanischeTelegraphen-Gesell- 
schaft. 
Gesellschaft fur elektrische Unternehniungen . . 


J Hoeter L Hagen 


$4,750,000 
9,000,000 




J Hoeter, L Hagen 




J Hoeter 


$28,000,000 
5,160,000 


Gebr Bi hler & Co A G 


J Hoeter W Marx 




Ludwig Loewe & Co. A. G 
Grosse Berliner Strassenbahn 


J. Hoeter 
J Hoeter 


7,000,000 
54,000,000 


Badische Lokal-Eisenbahn A. G 


J. Hoeter 


4,213,000 


Ostafrikanische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 
Westdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


J. Hoeter 
J Hoeter 


26,000,000 


5,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,225,000 
1, 430, 000 

6,800,000 
1,500,000 
4,135,000 

390,000 
656,000 
900,000 
7,500,000 
800,000 


Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs A. G 
Th Goldschmidt A G Essen 


O Ulrich 




W Marx 




Dusseldorfer Eisenbahn-Bedarf (vorm. Carl We- 
yer & Co.). 


W Marx 




W Marx .. 




Hoffmanns Starkefabriken A G 


W Wolde 




rlasper Bison u Stahlwerke .... 


F. A. von der Heydt, P. 
Klockner. 
F A von der Heydt . 




Erste Deutsche Fein-Jute-Garn-Spinnerei A. G . 
Kammgarn Spinnerei Diisseldorf 




F A von der Heydt 




Hermann Schott A G 


F A von der Heydt 




Ostbank f iir Handel u Gewerbe 


H von Klitzing 




Deutsche Labens-Versicherungsbank 


H von Klitzing 




Anglo Continentale Guanowerke 


H. von Ohlendorff 


4,250,000 


Hamburg-SudamerikanischeDampfschiffahrts- 
Gesellschaft. 
Rheinische Stahlwerke zu Duisburg Meiderich.. 
Rutgerswerke A G 


H. von Ohlendorf 


10,140,000 


Dr J Hasslacher 


16,000,000 


Dr J Hasslacher 


7,100,000 
1,070,000 
23,500,000 
8,160,000 

2,945,000 
370,000 

550,000 
1,150,000 
9,000,000 

2,895,000 

460,000 
2, 300, 000 

23,400,000 


Mfisohinfinfabrik Ban 


Dr j Hasslacher 




Farbwerke(vorm. Meister, Lucius & Briining).. 
Luxemburger Bank (Internationale Bank in 
Luxemberg). 
Rheinisch-Nassauische Bergwerks u. Hiitten 
A. G. 
A. G.fiir Rheinisch-Westfalische Cement Indus- 
trie Beckum. 
Maschinenfabrik Grevenbroich 


K. von Weinberg 




R Esser 




R Esser 




R Esser 




R Esser P. Klockner 




Waggonfabrik A. G. (vorm. P. Herbrand & Cie.). 
Masohinenbau- A Tistalt " TTmnboldt " 


R Esser 




R. Esser, P. Klockner, W. 
Hoersch. 
R. Esser, P. Klockner, L. 
Hagen. 
R Esser 




Faconeisen Walzwerk 1, Mannstaedt & Co. A. G. 
A G f iir Rheinisch-Westfalische Industrie 






Lothringer Hiitten-Verein Aumetz Friede 


L. Hagen, P. Klockner, W. 
Hoesch. 
L. Hagen 

L Hagen 




Vereinigte Koenigs- u. Laurahiitte A. G. fiir 
Bergbau. 
The Nobel Dynamite Trust Co. (Ltd ) .... 


14,500,000 


Berlin- Anhaltische Maschinenbau A G 


L Hagen H Hartung 


4,000,000 


Deutsche Maschinenfabrik A. G. zu Duisburg 




4,590,000 
980,000 

18,000,000 
525,000 
1,200,000 
1,375,000 
886,000 

1,325,000 
550,000 
8,600,000 
3,060,000 
5,150,000 
1,300,000 
2, 200, 000 
6,150,000 

8,157,000 
600,000 


Kalker Werkzeug Maschinen Fabrik Brevier 
Schumacher & Co. A. G. 
Orenstein & Koppel Arthur Koppel A. G 


L Hagen 




L Hagen 




Annaburger Stemgutfabrik A G 


L Hagen H Hartung . . 




Glas u Spiegel Manufactur 


L Hagen 




Diirener Metallwerke A G 


L Ha^en 




Vereinigte Metallwaarenfabriken A. G. (vorm. 
Haller&Co.). 
Mecklenburgische Bank . . . . 


L Hagen 




H Hartung 




Carl Ernst & Co A G 


H Hartung 




Eisen u. Stahlwerk Hoesch A. G. in Dortmund. . 
Gerb- u Farbstoffwerke H. Renner & Co 


W Hoesch 




W Hoesch 




Mittelrheinische Bank in Coblenz 


P. Klockner 




Krefelder Stahlwerk A. G. in Fischeln bei Krefeld 
Hochofenwerk Liibeck A. G.. 


P Klockner 




P Klockner 




Vereinigte Stahlwerke van der Zypen u. Wis- 
sener Eisenhiitten A. G. 
Gasmotoren Fabrik-Deutz 


P Klockner 




P. Klockner, G. von Langen . 
P. Klockner.... 




Schwelmer Eisenwerke Miiller & Co. A. G 
Bergmann Elektricitatswerke A. G... 




P. Klockner.... 


22,500,000 



INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



201 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 

DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT-Continued. 



Other corporations. 



Connection through- 



Approximate 
capitalization. 



Also 

shown in 

connections 

of Reichs- 

bank. 



Not 

shown in 

connections 

of Reichs- 

bank. 



Diisseldorfer Eisen- u. Draht-Industrie 

Koln-Neuessener Bergwerks-Verein 

Continentale Gesellschaft fur elektrische Unter- 
nehmungen. 

Elektricitats A. G. (vorm. Schueket & Co.) 

Mannesmannrohren Werke 

Privatbank zu Gotha 



P. Klockner... 
G. von Langen. 
G. von Langen. 

G. von Langen. 
G. von Langen. 
P. Schoeller... 



$21,325,000 



$1,827,000 
3,360.000 
10,045,000 

31,490,000 



3,000,000 



Total. 
Reichsbank. 



Dr. E. Hecker. Dr. L. Ra- 
vene, Dr. A. Salomon- 
sohn, E. Hardt. 



781,595,000 



694,259,000 
63,600,000 



Grand total. 



781,595,000 



757,859,000 



BANK FUR HANDEL UND INDUSTRIE. 

CONNECTION OF ITS "DIRECTION" WITH THE "DIRECTION" OF OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Approximate capital, $48,000.000.) 





M Klitzing Dr H Oppen- 


$2 590 000 




Boden-Aktien Gesellschaft am Amtsgerioht Pan- 


heim. 
H Marks A Rosen 




$1 250 000 


kow. 
NeneBodenA G in Berlin 


H Marks 


11,000 000 




Deutsch-Sudamerikaiiische Telegraphen-Gesell- 


H. Marks 


9,000,000 




schaft. 
Mixu Genest Telephon- u Telegraphenwerke... 


H. Marks... 


2,000,000 




Gebriider Stollwerk A G 


H Marks 




5 000 000 


Berliner Hypothekenbank A. G 


G. von Simson 


6,800,000 




Ostbank fiir Handel u Gewerbe 


G. von Simson, M. Herz. ... 




7,500,000 


Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerks u. Hutten 
A. G. 
Bank fur elektrische Unternehmungen 


G. von Simson 

G von Simson 


56,000,000 
34 000 000 




Continentale Wasserwerks-Gesellschaft 


G. von Simson 




2,800,000 


Liibeck-BiichenerEisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


G von Simson 




15 000 000 


Filter- u brautechnische Maschinenfabrik A. G. 


J. Andreae, jr 




1,300,000 


(vorm, L. A. Enzinger). 
Deutsehe Lebens-Versicherungs-Bank 


J Andreae jr S Boden- 




800 000 


Harpener Bergbau A G 


heimer. 
S Bodenheimer 


31 000 000 




Eisenhiittenwerk Thale A G 


S Bodenheimer 




2,390,000 


Borsigwalder Terrain A G in Berlin 


S Bodenheimer 




1,100,000 


Brauerei Ernst Engelhardt, nachf A. G. Berlin. 


S Bodenheimer 




1,000,000 


Ostelbische Spritwerke A G 


S Bodenheimer 




1, 250, 000 


Berlin-GubenerHutfabrickA.G.(vorm.A. Cohn) 


S. Bodenheimer 




900,000 


Berliner Spediteur-Verein A G 


S Bodenheimer 




500,000 


Edward Lingel Schuhfabrik A. G 


S. Bodenheimer 




1,900,000 


A G Korting's Elektricitatswerke A. G 


P Bernhard 


1,800,000 




Baverische Celluloid-Waarenfabrik (vorm Alb 


R Gutmann 




500,000 


Wacker) A. G. 
Reiss & Martin A G 


R Gutmann 




325,000 


Terrain-Aktiengesellschaft Miillerstrasse in Ber- 


A. Rosen 




1,300,000 


Suddeutsche Immobilien Gesellschaft 


A Rosen J Andreae C 


4 000 000 




Gustav Genschow & Co. A. G 

Malzbierbrauerei Groterjahn & Co. A. G. in 


Parkis, Dr. J. Kaempf. 
A. Rosen 
A. Rehfeld 




900,000 
300,000 


Berlin. 
Berliner Hypothekenbank A G 


J Kaempf 


6 800 000 




Siiddeutsche Boden-Creditbank 


Dr J Kaempf J Andreae 


9 250 000 




Wurttembergische Bankanstalt (vorm Pflaum 


Dr. C. S. Polex. 
Dr J Kaempf C Parkis 


3 500 000 




&Cie. 
Amsterdamsche Bank ......... 


Dr J Kaempf J Andreae 


9,000,000 




Banca Commerciale Italiana 


C. Parkis. 
Dr J Kaempf 


31, 250, 000 




Hugo Schneider A. G.. in Leipzig... 


Dr. J. Kaempf... 


1,800,000 





202 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



Direct connections of the larger German &anfcs Continued. 

BANK FUR HANDEL UND INDUSTRIE-Continued. 



Other corporations. 



Connection through 



Approximate 
capitalization. 



Also 

shown in 

connections 

of Reichs- 

bank. 



Not 

shown in 

connections 

of Reitjhs- 

bank. 



Chemische Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron Dr. C. S. Polex, J. Andreae 

Felten u. Guilleaume Carlswerk A. G Dr. C. S. Polex, T. Guil- ! $22,000,000 

leaume. C. Parkis. 

Elektricitacs A. G. (vorm. W. Lahmeyer & Co.) Dr. C. S. Polex, T. Guil- 
leaume, C. Parkis. 

Adlerwerke (vorm. Heinr. Kleyer) A. G j Dr. C. S. Polex 

"Concordia " Bergbau A. G Ed. Carp 

Rheinisch-Westf alische Sprengstoff A. G Ed . Carp, T. Guilleaume .... 2, 625, 000 

Niederrheinische Giiter-Assequrenz A. G Ed. Carp. . 1 

Vereinigte Berlin-Frankfurter Gummiwaaren H. Rinkel 

Fabriken. 

Norddeutsche Jute-Spinnerei u. Weberei H. Rinkel 

Vereinigte Koto-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken T. Guilleaume 6, 500, 000 

AllgemeineElektrieitats-Gesellschaft T. Guilleaume, Dr. F. G. 95,000,000 

Brockdorf. 

Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft . . T. Guilleaume 12, 500, 000 

Chemische Fabrik Gronaulandshoff u. Meyer Prof. J. Riesser 900,000 

A. G. 

Westliche Berliner Vorortbahn Prof. J. Riesser 3,250,000 

"Union," Allgemeine Versicherungs A. G. zu Prof. J. Riesser 

Berlin. 

Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft Prof. J. Riesser 17, 000, 000 

Bank des Berliner Kassen-Vereins Dr. H. Oppenheim 2, 590, 000 

Deutsch-Asiatische Bank Dr. H. Oppenheim 5,000,000 

Vereinsbank in Hamburg Dr. H. Oppenheim 11,OOU,000 

Aktiengesellschaft f iir Verkehrswesen Dr. H. Oppenheim 4, 150, 000 

Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft Dr. H. Oppenheim 2, 500, 000 

Neu Guinea Compagnie j Dr. H. Oppenheim 2,750,000 

Ostafrikanische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft Dr. H. Oppenheim 26, 000, 000 

Keneh Assouan Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft Dr. H. Oppenheim 13, 500, 000 

Siiddeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft H. Bachstein 

Deutsche Hypothekenbank A. G C. Parks 9,500,000 

Brauerei Gebr. Dietrich A. G C. Parks 

Henn. Lohnert A. G M. Herz 

Posener Strassenbahn M. Herz 

Frankfurter Hypothekenbank A. E. Schonberg 

Preussische Pfandbrief-Bank zu Berlin J. Andreae 9, 000, 000 

Farbwerke (vorm. Meister Lucius & Broning) Dr. L. Gans 

in Hochst. 

"Silesia " Neu-Oppelner Portland-Cementfabrik Dr. L. Nasse 

zu Oppeln. 

Deutsche Grundcredit Bank Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 

Bismarckhiitte Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 7,500,000 | 

Actiengesellschaft Eisenwerke Kraft Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 

Schlesische Actiengesellschaft fur Bergbau und Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 

Zinkhiittenbetrieb. 

Vereinigte Koenigs- und Laurahutte A. G. fur Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 14, 500, 000 

Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb. 

Oppelner Actien-Brauerei u. Presshefefabrik i Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 

Vereinigte chemische Fabriken zu Leopoldshall ! Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 3, 000, 000 

A. G. 

"Union" Fabrik chemischer Producte zu Stet- Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 

tin. 

"Archimedes" A. G. fur Stahl u. Eisen-Indus- Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 1,200,000 

trie. 

Schlesische Dampfer Compagnie A. G Dr. F. G. Brockdorff 

Brieger Stadtbrauerei A. G Dr. L. Grunfeld 

Total 558,455,000 

Reichsbank Dr. J. Kaempf, P. Bernhard 

Dr. H. Oppenheim. 

Grand total 558,455,000 



INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



203 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 
NATIONAL BANK FUR DBUTSCHLAND. 

CONNECTION OF ITS " DIRECTION " WITH THE " DIRECTION " OF OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Approximate capital, $26,400,000.] 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Bank des Berliner Kassen-Vereins 


M. Winterfeldt, F. Andreae. 
M. Schiff 


$2, 590. 000 
2,100 000 




Norddeutsche Grund-Credit-Bank 




Berliner Makler-Verein 


M Schiff Carl Hagen 


$1,250.00 


Deutsche- L,uxemburgische Bergwerks- u- Hilt- 
ten A. G. 
Huttenwerke C. Wilh. Kayser u. Co. A. G. zu 
Berlin. 
Consolidate Alkaliwerke 


M. Schiff-. 


56. 000 000 


M. Schiff, Prof. H. Paasche . 


1,200.00 

6.000 000 
2,000 000 


M Schiff 




Gebriider Goedhart A. G. in Diisseldorf 


M. Schiff. . 




Neue Boden A. G 


M. Schiff 


11. (XX 


Stahnsdorfer Terrain A. G. am Teltowkanal 
Tiefbau u. Kalteindustrie A. G. (vorm. Geb- 
hard & Koenig). 
Deutsch - Ueberseeische Elektricitats - Gesell- 
schaft. 
Gesellschaft fiir elektrische Unternehmungen . 


M. Schiff, L. Born 
M. Schiff 


1,700,000 
1,400,000 


M. Schiff, F. Andreae 


67, 000, 000 


M Schiff 


28,000,000 


Kraftiibertragungswerke Rheinfelden 


M. Schiff... 


6, 400, 000 


H. Schonberg & Sohne A. G.. 


M. Schiff 


430,000 
400,000 


Leipziger Gummi-Waaren-Fabrik A. G. (vorm. 
J. Marx Heine & Co.). 
Deutsche Waffen- u . Munitionsfabriken 
Ludwig Loewe & Co 


M. Schiff 




M. Schiff . . . 
M. Schiff, Dr. P. von Gont- 
ard. 
M Schiff 


5,000,000 
7,000,000 

7 300 000 




Allgemeine Deutsche Kleinbahn-Gesellschaft 
A. G. 
Grube Leopold bei Edderitz, A. G. in Edderitz.. 
Deutsch-Niederlandische Telegraphengesell- 
schaft A. G. Conn. 
Deutsch-Sudamerikanische Telegraphen-Gesell- 
schaft. 
Continentale Wasserwerk-Gesellschaft . 




E Wittenberg 




r mooo 


E.Wittenberg 


4, 750, 000 
9,000,000 


E Wittenberg 




E Wittenberg 


2, 800, 000 
700,000 


Eisengiesserei A. G. (vorm. Keyling & Thomas). 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank 


E. Wittenberg, L. Born. . . 




H. Winterfeldt . 


5.000 000 
10. 000 000 

17.000,000 


Oberschlesische Eisen-Industrie A. G. fur Berg- 
bau & Hiittenbetrieb. 
Schantung-Eisenbahn Gesellschaft 


H Winterfeldt 




T. Marba L Born . 




Alkali Ronnenberg A. G 


T Marba 


5,000,000 
800,000 
1,200,000 

1,700,000 
1,100,000 
300,000 
800.000 
2, 100, 000 


"Handelsstadte" Bellealliance A. G. zu Berlin. 
Terrain- Aktiengesellschaft Mullerstrasse zu Ber- 
lin. 
" Union. " Baugesellschaft auf Actien 


T. Marba 




T Marba . .. 




T. Marba... 


Aktien Brauerei Friedrichshain... . 


T Marba 


A. G. vorm. H. Gladenbeck & Sohn Bildgiesserei. 
Habermann & Guckes A. G. in Kiel 


T. Marba 


P. Koch 


Carl Lindstrom A. G. in Berlin. . 


P Koch 


Deutsahe Bierbrauerei A. G 


F Andreae P Koch 


1,500 000 
9,000 000 


Preussische Pfandbrief Bank in Berlin 


P Koch ' 




Norddeutsche Credit- Anstalt . . . 


R Witting 


6,800,000 
18, 100, 000 
2,950,000 


Oberschlesische Eisenbahn-Bedarfs A. G 


R. Witting, Dr. O. Nie'dt . . 




Zechau-Kriebitzscher Kohlenwerke Gluckauf 
A. G. 
Terraingesellschaft am Neuen Botanischen Gar- 
ten A. G. 
Berliner Bockbrauerei A. G 


R Witting 




R. Witting 


00,000 


R Witting A Philipsthal 


1,900,000 
7,100,000 


Linke-Hofmann-Werke Breslauer A. G. fur 
Eisenbahnwagen-Lokomotiv- u. Maschinen- 
bau in Breslau. 
Schlesische Elektricitats- und Gas A. G. . 


L. Born. 
R Witting 




R. Witting, F. Andreae... 
R. Witting.. 


6, 750, 000 


Breslauer Elektrische Strassenbahn 


1,700,000 
2,000,000 
6,000,000 


Rositzer Zucker-Raffinerie 


R. Witting, Prof. H.Paasch 
R Witting e 




Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs- Gesell- 
schaft A. G. 
Kamerun-Eisenbahn 




R. Witting . 


4,000.000 


Vereinigte Stahlwerke van der Zypen und Wis- 
sener Eisenhiitten A. G. 
Donnersmarckhutte, Oberschlesische Eisen- u. 
Kohlenwerk* A. G. 


C Scheibler 


6.150,000 
5,000,000 


Dr. E. Holz 









204 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 

NATIONAL BANK FUR DEUTSCHLAND-Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Westfalische Stahlwerke 


Dr. E. Holz... 




14,700,000 
2,700,000 

1,300,000 

22,000,000 
80,000,000 
2,300,000 


Chemische Fabrik Honningen u. vorm. Mes- 
singwerk Reineckendorf R. Seidel A. G. Hon- 
ningen a. Rh. 
Eisenhiittenwerk Marienhiitte bei Kotzenau 
A. G. 


Dr. E. Holz. .. . 




Dr. E. Holz 




H. S. von Hahn 




Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A. G 


C. Hagen 




Gussstahlwerk Witten 


C. Hagen 




Gewerkschaf t Gliickauf zu Sondershausen 
G. Sauerbrey Maschinenfabrik A. G 


C. Hagen 

C. Hagen . . 


" $s66 '666* 

1,100,000 


2,200,000 


Vereinigte Berlin-Frankfurter Gummiwaren 
Fabriken. 
C. Lorenz A. G 


C. Hagen 




C. Hagen 


500,000 
900,000 


Hermann Schott, A. G. zu Rheydt 


C Hagen 




Bank fur Brau-Industrie 


F Andreae 


2,750,000 
500,000 
450,000 
1,400,000 
34 000 000 


Dusseldorfer Eisenhiitten-Gesellschaft 


F Andreae 




Bauland Seestrasse-Nordpark A G 


F Andreae 




A. G. fur Beton u. Monierbau 


F. Andreae . 




Bank fiir elektrische Unternehmungen . 


F. Andreae 




Elektricitats-Lieferungs-Gesellschaft 


F Andreae 


15,000,000 
2,200,000 
1,300,000 
1,600,000 

850,000 
9,000,000 
50,000,000 




Deutsche Linoleum u. WachstuchCompagnie. . 
Poppe u. Wirth A. G . . . . 


F. Andreae . 




F. Andreae 




Kollmar u. Jourdan A. G. (Uhrketten Fabrik 
in Pforzheim). 
Mechanische Weberei . 


F Andreae 




F Andreae 




Leonhard Tietz A. G. (trading concern) 


F. Andreae. .. 




"Phoenix" A. G. fiir Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb. 
A. G. Deutsche Kaliwerke Bernterode 


H. Kost . 


"io "666 '666 

270,000 

360,000 
1,200,000 


H Kost 


"Finkenberg" A. G. fur Portland-Cement-u. 
Wasserkalk-Fabrikation. 
R W. Dinnendahl A G 


H. Kost i 


H Kost 




Glas- u Spiegel-Manufactur 


Dr P Mallinckrodt 




Bismarckhutte 


L. Born. Dr. P. von Gontard, 
A. Philipsthal. 
L. Born, A. Philipsthal 


7,500,000 


A. G. H. F. Eckert 


1,860,000 


Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft 


L Born 


95,000,000 
12,500,000 


Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft. . 
Gebr. Bohler & Co. A. G 


L Born 




L. Born, Dr. P. von Gontard 


5,160,000 
4,250,000 
7,700,000 
1,250,000 
525,000 
3,000,000 
895,000 
3, 983, 000 

1,744,000 
4,000,000 
1,600,000 
711,000 


Berlin-Charlottenburger Strassenbahn 


L Born 




Hamburger Strassen-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 
Posener Strassenbahn 


L Born 




L. Born 




Erfuter elektrische Strassenbahn 


A Philipsthal 




Magdeburger Strassen-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft . . 
Bank fiir Bergbau u. Industrie 


A Philipsthal 




Prof. H . -Paasche . . 




Gesellschaft fiir Brauerei Spiritus- u. Presshefe 
Fabrikation (vorm. G. Sinner), Karlsruhe- 
Griinwinkel. 
Howaldtswerke, Kiel. 


Prof. H Paasche 




Prof. H Paasche 




Rheinische Metallwaren- u. Maschinenfabrik 
Telephon-Fabrik A G vorm J Berliner 


Prof H Paasche 




Prof H Paa^che 




Norddeutsche Lederpappen-Fabrik . . . 


Prof. H. Paasche 




"Archimedes." A. G. fiir Stahl- u. Eisen-Indus- 
trie. 
Deutscher Eisenhandel A. G 


Dr O Niedt 


1 200 000 


Dr. O. Niedt.. . . 




8,000,000 
9,250,000 


Schlesische A. G. fiir Bergbau u. Zinkhutten- 
betrieb. 
Vereinigte Koln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken 
Daimler Motoren- Gesellschaft 


Dr P. von Gontard 




Dr P von Gontard 


6,500,000 


Dr P. von Gontard 


3,856,000 
1,375,000 
9,250,000 


Diirener Metallu erke A G 


Dr P von Gontard 




Preussische Boden-Credit-Actien-Bank 


Dr E von Eichhorn 




Total 






479,590,000 


307,919,000 
63,600,000 


Reiohsbank 


F Andreae 


Grand total 






479,590,000 


371,519,000 







INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



205 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 

BANK DES BERLINER KASSEN-VEREINS. 

CONNECTIONS OF ITS "DIRECTION" WITH THE "DIRECTION" OF OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Approximate capital, $2,590,000.1 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Bank fur Handel und Industrie 


Dr. Hugo Oppenheim 


548.000,000 
9,500,000 

75,000,000 

850.000 
5,000,000 

11,000,000 
4,150,000 
' 2,500,000 




Deutsche Hypothekenbank 


Dr. Emil Hecker. Edmund 
Helfft. 
Dr. Ernil Hecker, Herman 
Waller r 
Dr. E mil Hecker.. . 




Disconto-Gesellschaft 




Concordia Spinnereiund Weberei... 




Deutsch-Asfatische Bank 


Dr. Hugo Oppenheim. Paul 
von M. Bartholdi, Albert 
von Blaschke. 
Dr Hugo Oppenheim 




Vereinsbank in Hamburg 




A. G. fur Verkehrswesen . ... 


Dr. Hugo Oppenheim 




Deutsch-Ostafrikanische-Gesellschaft 


Dr. Hugo Oppenheim 




Neu Guinea Compagnie 


Dr. Hugo Oppenheim 


2,750,000 
26,000,000 

1,600,000 
13,500,000 

62,500,000 




Ostrafrikanische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


Dr. Hugo Oppenheim, Carl 
Joerger. 
Dr. Hugo Oppenheim 




Ostdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 




Keneh Assouan Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft .. 


Dr. Hugo Oppenheim, Max 
Winterfeldt. 
H. Wallich, P. Mankiewitz. . 
H Wallich 




Deutsche Bank 




Deutsche Uberseeische Bank 


$16,000,000 


Banca Commerciale Italians 


H. Wallich, Max Winter- 
feldt. 
H Wallich 


31,250,000 

6,700,000 
900,000 

36,500,000 
26,400,000 


A G fur Anilin Fabrikation 




Berliner Hagel-Assecuranz Gesellschaft vom 
1832. 

Berliner Handels- Gesellschaft 


H. Wallich. Ernest Joaquin 
Meyer, Rot. von Mendell- 
sohn. 
Max Winterfeldt. 






Nationalbank fur Deutschland 


Max Winterfeldt, Fritz An- 
dreae. 
Max Winterfeldt 




Bergwerks-A G Consolidation 


7,500,000 
2,000,000 

"i,"25o,"666 


Gewerkschaft Fiirst Leopold zu Hervest- 
Dorsten. 
Bergwerks Gesellschaft Hibernia 


Max Winterfeldt 




Max Winterfeldt 


26,000,000 


A. G Thiederhall . 


Max Winterfeldt 


Handelsgesellschaft fiir Grundbesitz 


Max Winterfeldt 


6,000,000 


Leipziger Bierbrauerei zu Reudnitz Riebeck 
& Co. A. G. 
Berliner MaschinenbauA.G. (vorm.L.Schwartz- 
kopfif). 
Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft 


Max Winterfeldt 


4,000,000 
5,200,000 

15,000,000 
5,000,000 

3,750,000 
15,000,000 


Max Winterfeldt 




Max Winterfeldt 




A. G. fur Glassindustrie (vorm. Friedr. Sie- 
mens). 
Westfalische Drahtindustrie 


Max Winterfeldt, Max von 
Klitzing. 
Max Winterfeldt 






Allgemeine Lokal- und Strassenbahn-Gesell- 
schaft. 
Pfalzische Hypothekenbank 


Max Winterfeldt 




Ernest Joaquin Meyer 
Ernest Joaquin Meyer 


8,000,000 
20,000,000 
17,250,000 

2,500,000 


Preussische Hypotheken Aktien Bank 


Mitteldeutsche Creditbank 


Ernest Joaquin Meyer, Carl 
Mommsen. 
Ernest Joaquin Meyer. . . ... 




Internationale Baugesellschaft 




Chemische Fabrik Cronau Landshoff und 
Meyer A. G. 
Oesterreichische Siidbahn 


Ernest Joaquin Meyer 


900,000 
440,000,000 




Ernest Joaquin Meyer 




Dresdner Bank 


Ed Arnhold 


65,000,000 
4,000,000 
95,000,000 

5.000,000 
7,000,000 

10,625,000 
54,000,000 

1,500,000 
1,500,000 




Berlin-Anhaltische Maschinenbau A G 


Ed. Arnhold,P. Mankiewitz. 
E d. Arnhold , Max von Klitz- 
ing, Albert von Biaschke. 
Ed Arnhold 




Allegemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft 
Deutsche Waflen- und Munitionsfabriken 






Ludwig Loewe & Co. A. G 


Ed. Arnhold, Max vonKlitz- 
ing. Albert von Blaschke. 
Ed. Arnhold 




AEG. Schnellbahn-A. G 




Grosse Berliner Strassenbahn .... 


Ed. Arnhold, Max vonKlitz- 
ing. 
Carl Mommsen, Carl Joerger. 
Carl Mommsen 








Deutsche Eisenbahn-Betriebs-Gesellschaft in 
Berlin. 






206 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 

BANK DES BERLINER KASSEN-VEREINS Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through- 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connect! on 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Teutoburger Wald-Eisenbahn-Cesellschaft zu 
Gutersloh. 


Carl Mommsen 


$2,000,000 




Max von Klitzing 


$7,500,000 


Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bcrgwerks- und Hiit- 
ten A. G. 
"Phoenix" A. G. fur Bergbau und Hiitten- 
betrieb. 
Rheinisohe A. G. fiir Braunkohlenbergbau und 
Briket tfa orikation-Coln . 
A. G. Firma Saar- und Mosel Bergswerks- 
Gesellschaft zu Karlingen 
Boden A G Berlin-Nord 


Max von Klitzing 


56,000,000 
50,000,000 


Max von Klitzing 
Max von Klitzing 


13,000,000 
9,500,000 
4,000,000 

20,000,000 


Max von Klitzing 




Max von Klitzing 




Tempelhofer Feld A. G. fiir Grundstiicksver- 
wertung. 
Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektricitats- Werk . . . . 
Bauland Seestrasse-Nordpark A G 


Max von Klitzing 


5,000,000 


Max von Klitzing 


Fritz Andreae 


450,000 
1,400 000 




Fritz Andreae 






Ed Arnhold 

Albert von Blaschke, Ed. 
Arnhold 
Albert von Blaschke 


3, 250, 000 
17,000,000 

15,000,000 
14,500,000 

07,000,000 





Schantung-Eisenbahn Gesellschaft 


Preussische Central-Bodenkredit A. G 




Vereinigte Koenigs und Laurahiitte A. G. fur 
Bergbau ..und Hiittenbetrieb. 
Deutsche Uberseeische Elektricitats Gesell- 
schaft. 
G esllschaft fiir elektrische Unternahmungen . . . 

Barlin-Charlottenburger Strassenbahn 


A Ibert von Blaschke 




Albert von Blaschke, Max 
von Klitzing. 
Albert von Blaschke, Max 
von Klitzing. 
Albert von Blaschke . 




28,000,000 
4,250,000 




Deutscher Lloyds Transport- Versicherungs A . G . 
Liegnitz-Rawitscher Eisenbahn 


Albert von Blaschke 


1,500,000 


Albert von Blaschke 


2,500,000 






4,666,066 
18,000,000 
14,200,000 
13,200,000 
11,000,000 
31,000,000 


Orenstein & Koppel (Arthur Koppel) A. G 
Elektrische Licht- und Kraftanlagen A. G 


Carl Mommsen 




Carl Mommsen 




Elektro-Treuhand A G 


Carl Mommsen 




Siemens elektrische Betriebe A G 


Carl Mommsen 
Carl Mommsen 







" Allianz " Versicherungs A G 


Max von Klitzing 


6,000,000 

""5," 666, "066 

1,250,000 

3,000,000 
31,000,000 

^ 


Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaf t 


Max von Klitzing 


4,000,000 


Westdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


Max von Klitzing 




P. Mankiewitz, Herman 
Waller. 
P Mankiewitz 








Hohenlohewerke A. G. zu Hohenlohehiitte 
Kreis Kattowitz. 
The Southwest Africa Co. (Ltd.) (British 
company). 
Accumulatoren-Fabrik A G 


P Mankiewitz 




P Mankiewitz 


8,750,000 

6,000,000 
6,400,000 
5,000,000 
56,000,000 


P. Mankiewitz 

P. Mankiewitz, Carl Joerger. 
P. Mankiewitz 
P Mankiewitz 




Kraftiibertragungswerke Rheinfelden 




Aluminium Industrie A. G 




Norddeutscher Lloyd 


""3," 666,' 666 

5,000,000 
15,000,000 


Bank fiir Thiiringen, vorm. B. M. Strupp A. G. 
in Meiningen. 
Magdebujger Bank-Verein 


Herman Waller 


Herman Waller 




Siiddeutscher Discontogesellschaft A. G. in 
Mannheim. 
Stahlwerke Rich Lindenberg A. G 


Herman Waller 




Carl Joerger 


1,400,000 
1,000,000 
425,000 
3,000,000 

1,200,000 

34,000,000 
6,750,000 
1,100,000 
850,000 
900,000 
2,750,000 
500,000 
1,500,000 
15,000,000 


Gewerkschaft Ludwig II Stassfurt 


Carl Joerger 










Vereinigte Chemische Fabriken zu Leopaldshall 

"Archimedes" A. G. fiir Stahl- u. Eisen-Indus- 
trie. 
Bank fiir elektrische Unternehmungen 


Carl Joerger . 








Carl Joerger, Fritz Andreae.. 
Carl Joerger, Fritz Andreae.. 
Carl Joerger 
Carl Joerger 




Schlesische Elektricitats- u Gas A G 




Crollwitzer Aktien-Papierfabrik 




Berlinische Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft. . 


Carl Joerger 














Fritz Andreae 

Fritz An draee... 





Elfiktrioitats Lieferunes-Gesellschaft. . . 



INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



207 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 

BANK DP:S BERLINER KASSEN-VEREINS-Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through- 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 

shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Deutsche Linoleum- und Wachstuch Compagnie 
Poppe und Wirth A G 


Fritz Andreae ... 


$2,200,000 
1,300,000 
1,600,000 

850,000 
9,000,000 




Fritz Andreae 




KoTlmar and Jourdan A. G. (Uhrketten Fabrik 
in Pforzheim). 






Fritz Andreae 




Leonhard Tietz A G (trading concern) 


Fritz Andreae 




Total 






1,708,500,000 


$222,700,000 
63,600,000 


Reich sbank 


H Waflich, P Manidewitz 


Grand total 






1,708,500,000 


$286,300,000 







DEUTSCHE HYPOTHEKENBANK A. G. 

CONNECTIONS OF ITS "DIRECTION" WITH THE "DIRECTION" OF OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Approximate capital, $9,500,000.) 



Bank fiir Handel u. Industrie 
Handelsstadte "Bellealliance" A. G. zu Berlin. . 
Fabrikisolirter Drahte zu elektrischen Zwecken 


C. Parkis ! 
Dr.G.Hirte 

Dr G Hirte C Sobernheim 


$48,000,000 


"$8o6,"666 

1 000 000 


(vorm. A. J. Vogel) A. G. 
Bank fur Deutsche Eisenbahnwerthe 


Dr. C Fiirstenberg 


2, 700, 000 




Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft 


Dr C Fiirstenberg 


36,500 000 




Bismarckhutte . 


Dr. C. Fiirstenberg 


7,500,000 




Harpener Bergbau A G 


Dr C Fiirstenberg 


31,000 000 


" 


Bergwerks-Gesellschaft (Hibernia) 


Dr. C. Fiirstenberg 


26, 000, 000 




Oberschlesische Eisen-Industrie A G fiir Berg- 


Dr C Fiirstenberg . . 


10, 000, 000 




bau & Hiittenbetrieb. 
Rheinische Stahlwerke zu Duisburg Meiderich 


Dr C Furstenberg 


16, 000. 000 




Rombacher Hiittenwerke 


Dr. C. Fiirstenberg 


24,000,000 




Schlesische Kohlen- u Kokeswerke 


Dr. C. Fiirstenberg 


3,000,000 




Gewerkschaft Victoria in Ltinen 


Dr. C. Fiirstenberg 


3,000,000 




Handels-Gesellschaft fiir Grundbesitz 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


6,000,000 




Elektro chemische Werke Gesellschaft mit 


Dr C Furstenberg .... 


2, 500, 000 




beschrankter Haftung. 
Berlin- Anhaltische Maschinenbau A G 


Dr C Furstenberg 


4,000,000 




Vulcanwerke 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


7,000,000 




Accumulatoren Fabrik A G . .... 


Dr C Furstenberg 


6,000,000 




Allgemeine Elektricitas-Gesellschaft 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


95,000,000 




Bank fiir elektrische Unternehmungen 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


34,000,000 




Berliner Elektricitatswerke 


Dr C Furstenberg . . . 


42, 000, 000 




Felten & Guilleaume Cartswerk A. G 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


22,000,000 




Kraftiibertragungswerke Rheinfelden . . 


Dr C. Furstenberg 


6,400.000 




GasanstaJt-Betriebs-Gesellschaft 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


3,000,000 




Aluminium Industrie A. G 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


5,000,000 




Deutscher Eisenhandel A G 


Dr C Fiirstenberg 


8,000,000 




Eisenbiitte Silesia 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


4,000,000 




Rhenania Vereinigte Emaillierwerke A G 


Dr C Furstenberg . ... 


1,000,000 




Vereinigte Deutsche Nickelwerke A G 


Dr C Furstenberg 


2 500 000 




Westalische Drahtindustrie 


Dr C Furstenberg 


3, 750, 000 




A. E. G. Schnellbahn A G 


Dr C Fiirstenberg 


10,625 000 




A. G. fiir Verkehrswesen 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


4,150,000 




Grosse Berliner Strassenbahn 


Dr C Furstenberg . . . 


54,000,000 




Zucker-Rafflnerie Tangermiinde F R Meyers 


Dr C Furstenberg 


3 500 000 




Sohn A. G. 
Kamcrun-Eisenbahn 


Dr C Furstenberg 


4,000,000 




Ostdeutsche-Eisenbahn Gesellschaft 


Dr. C. Furstenberg 


1, 600, 000 




Neu-Westend A. G. fur Grundstucksverwertung 


Dr L Darmstaedter . . 




3 400 000 


Reichelt Metallschrauben A G 


Dr L Darmstaedter 




750 000 


Liegnitz-Rowitscher Eisenbahn 


A Goldschmidt 




2 500 000 


Ostbank fiir Handel u Gewerbe 


N Hamburger 




7 SOO'OOO 


Bierbrauerei A G (vorm Gebr Hugger) 


H Hamburger C Sobern- 




400 000 


Herm, Lohnart A. G 


heim. 
N Hamburger 




400 000 


Hermannmuhlen A G zu Posen 






350 000 


Bank des Berliner Kassen-Vereins 


Dr E Hecker E HeLfft ... 


2,590,000 




Disconto-Gesellschaft. . . 


Dr. E. Hecker. Dr. G. Strupo 


75,000,000 





208 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 



Direct connections of the larger German banks Continued. 

DEUTSCHE HYPOTHEKENBANK A. G. Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 




Dr E Hecker 


$850,000 
2,300,000 




Harkort'sche Bergwerke u. chemische Fabriken 
zu Schwelm. 
Allgemeine Hauserbau A G in Berlin 


M. Richter 




M Richter 


500,000 
900,000 

800,000 

1,600.000 
2,500,000 




Terraingesellschaft am Neuen Botanischen Gar- 
ten A. G. 
Berliner Bierbrauerei A. G. (vorm. F. N. Hilse- 
bein). 
B6hmisch.es Brauhaus A G 


M. Richter 




M. Richter 




Max Richter . . 




Chemische Fabrik auf Actien (vorm. E. Scher- 
ing). 
Union Fabrik chemischer Producte in Stettin. . 
Norddeutsche Gummi-und Guttapercha-War- 
en-Fabrik. 
Berliner Waschefabrik A. G. (vorm. Gebr. 
Ritter). 


Max Richter . . 




Max Richter . . 


13,250,000 


Max Richter . 


450,000 
528,000 

1,688,000 
500,000 
7, 300, 000 


Max Richter . . 




Max Richter . . 




Berlin-Neuroder Kunstanstalten 


Max Richter 




Allgemeine Deutsche Kleinbahn-Gesellschaft, 
A.G. 
"Fortuna/' Allgemeine Versicherungs A. G 
Bank fur Brau-Industrie . 


Max Richter 
Max Salinger 


650,000 

"25" 666,' 665 

1,200,000 
700,000 
1,280,000 
5,000,000 
550,000 
1,800,000 


Curt Sobernheim 
C. Sobernheim 


2,750,000 


Commerz-u Disconto-Bank 


A G fiir Montan-Industrie 


C Sobernheim . . 




Baroper Walzwerk A G Barop i West 


C Sobernheim . . 












C Sobernheim.. 




Held & Francke A G 


C Sobernheim - - 




"Adler," Deutsche Portland-Cement Fabrik 
A.G. 
Deutsche Bierbrauerei A G . 


C Sobernheim . 




C Sobernheim 


1,500,000 


Waggon-Fabrik A. G. (vorm. P. Herbrand & 
Cie.). 
Maschinenbau-Anstalt "Humboldt" 


C Sobernheim . . 


1,150,000 

9,000,000 
800,000 
1,400,000 

1,250,000 
500.000 
1,600,000 
9,000,000 
2,200,000 
1,250,000 
650,000 
2,000,000 

1,250,000 
750,000 

1,800,000 


C Sobernheim . . . 




G. Sauerbrey Maschinen-Fabrik A. G 
Tiefbau- u. Kalteindustrie A. G. (vorm. Geb- 
hardt & Koenig). 
Hackethal-Draht u Kabel-Werke A G 


C Sobernheim - . 




C Sobernheim 




C Sobernheim . . 






C Sobernheim.. . 




Telephon-Fabrik A. G. (vorm. J. Berliner) 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs A.G... 
Niederlausitzer Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


C Sobernheim . 








C Sobernheim . . 




Spritbank A. G 


A . Zulinzinger 




Berliner Kindl-Brauerei A G 


Dr H Arnhold 




Hofbierbrauerei Schofferhof u. Frankfurter Bur- 
ger brauerei. 
Deutsche Gussstahlkugel- u. Maschinenfabrik.. 
A. G. fiir Fabrikation von Eisenbahnmaterial 
zu Gorlitz. 
A. G. Gorlitzer Maschinenbau-Anstalt u. Eisen- 
giesserei. 

Total 


Dr H Arnhold. 




Dr. H. Arnhold . 




C Peters 




C. Peters 








553,731,000 


88,139,000 
63,600,000 


Reichsbank 


Dr. E. Hecker, C. Fiirsten- 
burg, Ed. Helfft. Max 
Richter. 


Grand total 




553,731,000 


151,739,000 







INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



209 



DIRECT CONNECTIONS OF THE SIEMENS-SCHUCKERTWERKE AND SIEMENS- 

HALSKE A. G. 

DIBECT CONNECTIONS OF THE "DIRECTION" (MANAGEMENT) OF SIEMENS-SCHUCK- 
ERTWERKE AND SIEMENS-HALSKE A. G. (ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS) WITH 
THE " DIRECTION " OF OTHER GERMAN CORPORATIONS. 

[Prepared from Saling's Borsen-Jahrbuch for 1914-15 by William J. Clark, of the General Electric Co. 

30 Church Street, New York.] 



CONNECTIONS OF ITS 



SIEMENS-SCHUCKERTWERKE. 

'DIRECTION" WITH THE "DIRECTION" OF OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Approximate capital, $60,000,000.] 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 

w 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Deutsche Bank 


C. K16nne,C. von Siemens. . 


$62, 500, 000 




Siemens-Halske A. G 


Dr. F. A. Spiecker, C. F. 
von Siemens, A. von Sie- 
mens, Dr. W. von Sie- 
mens, C. Klonne. 
A. von Siemens, G. Gill- 
hausen. 
A. von Siemens 


31,000,000 

21,325,000 

2,750,000 
11,000,000 




Mannesmannrohren Werke 




Neu Guinea Compagnie 




" Siemens " Elektrische Betriebe A. G 


W. von Siemens, E. Budde, 
R. Werner. 
C. Klonne G Gillhausen 




Essener Credit-Anstalt 


$28,600,000 
15,150,000 


Bochumer Verein fur Bergbau u. Gussstahl- 
fabrikation. 
Braunkohlen u. Brikettwerke Roddergrube 
A. G. 
Gewerkschaft Ver. Constantin der Grosse. . . 


C. Klonne, G. Gillhausen.... 




C Klonne 


7,000,000 


C Klonne 


9,600,000 
6,000,000 
2,250,000 

5,460,000 
5,225,000 


Gewerkschaft Dorstfeld 


C. Klonne 




Gewerkschaft des Steinkohlenbergwerks Ein- 
tracht Tiefbau zu Freisenbruch. 
Essener Bergwerks- Verein " Konig Wilhelm" . . . 
Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke A. G 


C. Klonne 




C. Klonne 





C. Klonne... 




Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A. G 


C. Klonne 

C Klonne 


80,000,000- 
31,000,000 
3,230,000 
1,400,000 


Harpener Bergbau A. G 


Konigsborn A. G. fur Bergbau 


C. Kltfnne 




Stahlwerke Rich. Lindenberg A. G. zu Rhem- 
scheid. 
Oberschlesische Kokswerke & Chemische Fa- 
briken A. G. 
Rombacher Hiittenwerke zu Rombach 


C Klonne 




C. Klonne. 


5,770,000 


C. Klonne... 


24,000,000 
3,000,000 


Gewerkschaft Victoria in Liinen 


C Klonne 




Gewerkschaft Gliickauf zu Sondershausen 
Gewerkschaft "Gliickauf Berka" zu Sonders- 
hausen und Gewerkschaft "Gliickauf Ost," 
Sondershausen. 
Wilmersdorfer Terrain Rheingau A. G 


C. Klonne 


2,200,000 
600,000 

1,260,000 
7,100,000 
16,000,000 

4,590,000 
1,325,000 

"26," 666," 666 

8,680,000 
1,100,000 


C. Klonne 




C. Klonne 




Riitgerswerke A. G 


C. Klonne .. 




Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A. G 


C. Klonne, O. von Petri, 
A. von Rieppel. 
C. Klonne, G. Gillhausen . . . 




Deutsche Maschinenfabrik A. G. zu Duisburg . . . 
Ernst Schiess Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik A. G. . . 
Elektro-Treuhand A. G 




C. Klonne 




C. Klonne 
C. Klonne 


13,200,000 


Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektricitatswerk A. G. 
Wasserwerk fur das Nordliche Westfalische 
Kohlenrevier. 
Vereinigte Berlin-Frankfurter Gummiwaaren 
Fabriken. 
Julius Pintsch A. G 


C. Klonne 




C. Klonne 




C. Klonne 


6,800,000 


Reichelt-Metallschrauben A. G 


C. Klonne . 


750,000 
1,350,000 
6,000,000 
1,700,000 


F. Kiippersbusch & Sohne A. G 


C. Klonne 




" Alltanz " Versicherungs A. G 


C. Klonne, H. R. von Maffei. 
C. Klonne 




"Union," Allgemeine Versicherungs A. G. zu 
Berlin. 
Gesellschaft fur elektrische Hoch- u. Unter- 
grundbahnen in Berlin. 
Stettiner Elektricitatswerke 




C. von Siemens 


37, 650, 000 


C. Dihlmann R. Werner 


1,665,000 
2,700,000 

10,045,000 


Chemische Fabrik Ho'nningen und vorm. Mess- 
ingwerk Reinickendorf R. Seidel A. G 
Continentale Gesellschaft fur elektrische Unter- 
nehmungen. 


H. Natalis 




H Natalis, O. von Petri, A. 
Wacker, H. R. von Maffei, 
A. Pohlmann, A. von 
Rieppel. 







43339 18 14 



210 



GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR, 



Direct connections of the Siemens-Schuckertwerke and Siemens-Halske A, G. 

Continued. 

SIEMENS-SCHUCKERTWERKE Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Deutsch Ueberseeische Elektricitats-Gesell- 
schaft. 

Rheinische Shuckert-Gesellschaft fiir elecktri- 
sche Industrie A. G. 
Elektricitats A. G. (vorm. Schuckert & Co.) in 
Niirnberg. 

Baverische Notenbank 


H. Natalis, R. Werner 


$67,000,000 




H. Natalis 


$3, 528, 000 
31,490,000 

2,800,000 
31,000,000 
23, 400, 000 
1,050,000 
1,850,000 
8,000,000 
2,533,000 
3.300,000 
4,800,000 

2,486,000 


H. Natalis, A. Wacker, A. 
von Rieppel, H. R. von 
Maffei, O. von Petri, A. 
Pohlmann. 
H. R. von Maffei 






Bayerische Hypotheken- u Wechsel-Bank 


H R von Maflfei 




The Nobel Dynamite Trust Co. (Ltd.) 


G. von Chauvin 




Griin & Bilfinger in Mannheim . . . 


O. von Rieppel 




ElektraA G 


A von Petri 




Hamburgische Elektricitatswerke 


O. von Petri 




Bergische Klein bahnen 


O von Petri 




Gewerkschaft Eimscher Lippe zu Essen 


G. Gillhausen 




Sachsische Maschinenfabrfic (vorm. Rich. 
Hartmann). 
Blechwalzwerk Schulz Knaudt A G 


G. Gillhausen 




G Gilhausen 




Westfalische Drahtindustrie 


G. Gilhausen 


3, 750, 000 


Stiddeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 


G Gillhausen 


12,600,000 


Total 






384,725,000 


317,347,000 
63,600,000 


Reichsbank 


A von Siemens 


Grand total 






384,725,000 


380,947,000 







SIEMENS-HALKSE A. G. 

CONNECTIONS OF ITS "DIRECTION" WITH THE "DIRECTION" OF OTHER CORPORATIONS. 

[Affiliated with Siemens-Schuckertwerke. Approximate capital, $31,000,000.] 



Bank des Berliner Kassen-Vereins 


C Mommsen 


$2 590 000 




Deutsche Bank 


E Heinemann C von Sie- 


62 500 000 




Vereinigte Lausitzer Glaswerke A G . . 


mens, E. Berve,C. Klonne. 
Dr O Feuerlein Dr A Ber- 




$1 762 000 


Maschinenfabrik Bruchsal A. G 


liner. 
R. Pfeil 




1 900 000 


Eisenbahnsignal Bauanstalt Max Judel & Co 


R. Pfeil 




2 330 000 


Siemens-Schuckertwerke 


Dr F A Spiecker C Klon- 


60 000 000 




Vereinigte Chemische Werke A G 


ne, Dr. W. von Siemens, 
A. von Siemens, C. F. von 
Siemens. 
Dr. A Frank 




844 000 


Mannesrnannrohren Werke ... 


A von Siemens E Heine- 


21 325 000 






mann 






Neu Guinea Compagnie 


A. von Siemens 


2 750 000 




" Siemens ' ' elektnsche Betriebe A G 


Dr W von Siemens Dr A 


11 000 000 




Schlesischer Bankverein Commandit Gesell- 


Berliner, C. Mommsen. 
E. Berve 




17 560 000 


schaft auf Action. 
Steffens & Nolle 


E Berve Dr A Berliner 




3 000 000 


Donnersrnarckhutte, Oberschlesische Eisen- 


E. Berve 




5 000 000 


und Kohlenwerke'A. G. 
Oberschlesische Eisenbahn-Bedarfs A. G 
Oberschlesische Eisen-Industrie A. G. fur 


E. Berve 
E. Berve 


io 666 666 


18,100,000 


Bergbau- u. Hiittenbetrieb. 
Oberschlesische Kokswerke & Chemische Fabri- 


E. Berve, C. Klonne 




5, 770, 000 


ken A. G. 
Portland-Cement-Fabrik (vorm. A. Giesel) 


E Berve 




495,000 


Riitgerswerke A G 


E Berve C Klonne 




7 150 000 


Linke-Hofmann-Werke Breslauer A. G. fur 


E. Berve 




7, 100, 000 


Eisenbahnwagen-Lokomotiv- u. Maschinen- 
bau. 
Elektnsche Licht- u Kraftanlagen A G. 


E Berve C Mommsen E 


14 200 000 




Eisenhtitte Silesia 


Heinemann, Dr. A. Ber- 
liner, A. Koechlin. 
E Berve 


4 000 000 




"Nordstern" Lebens-Versicherunes A. G. zu 


E. Berve... 


5.000.000 





INTERLOCKING BANKS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS. 



211 



Direct connections of the Siemens-Sctiuckertwerke and Siemens-Halske A. G. 

Continued. 

STEMENS-HALSKE A. G. Continued. 



Other corporations. 


Connection through 


Approximate 
capitalization. 


Also 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


Not 
shown in 
connections 
of Reichs- 
bank. 


"Nordstern" Unfall-, Haftpflicht- u. Feuer-Ver- 
sicherungs- A. G. 
Schlesische Feuer- Versicherungs Gesellschaft . . . 


E Berve 


$1,650,000 




E. Berve 


$2,475,000 


Deutsch-Asiat ^che Bank " 


E Heinemann 


5,000,000 


Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank 


E. Heinemann 


10,000,000 
16,000,000 
4,260,000 


Steaua Romana A. G. fur Petroleum Industrie. . 
A G filr Elektricitats-Anlagen 


E Heinemann 




E Heine'mann 




Deutsch-Ueberseeische Elektrieitats Gesell- 
schaft. 
Gesellschaft fiir elektrische Beleuchtung vom 
Jahre 1886. 
Schantung-Eisenbahn Gesellschaft 


E. Heinemann 


67,000,000 


E. Heinemann 


20,850,000 


E Heinemann 


17,000,000 


Ungarische Lokaleisenbahnen A. G.. 


E Heinemann 


22,000.000 
28,600,000 
15,150,000 


Essener Credit-Anstalt 


C Klonne 




Bochumer Verein fiir Bergbau u. Gussstahl- 
fabrikation. 
Braunkohlen u. Brikettwerke Roddergrube A. G 
Gewerkschaftverein Constantin der Grosse 
Gewerkschaft Dorstfeld 


C Klonne 




C. Klonne 


7,000,000 


C Klonne 


7,000,000 
6,000,000 
2,250,000 

5,460,000 
5,225,000 


C. Klonne 




Gewerkschaft des Steinkohlen Bergwerks 
Eintracht Tiefbau zu Freisenbruch. 
Essener Bergwerks- Verein "Konig Wilhelm"... 
Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke A. G 


C Klonne 




C Klonne 




C. Klonne 




Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A. G 


C Klonne A. Kirdorf 


80,000,000 
31,000,000 


Harpener Bergbau A" G 


C Klonne 




Konigsborn A. G. fiir Bergbau 


C Klonne . . 


3,230,000 


Stahlwerke Rich. Lindenberg A. G. zu Rem- 
scheid. 
Rombacher Hiittenwerke 


C Klonne 


1,400,000 

24,000,000 
3,000,000 


C Klonne 




Gewerkschaft Victoria in Liinen 


C. Klonne 

C Klonne 


"'"2" 266, 666 

600,000 

1,260,000 
16,000,000 
4,590,000 
1,325,000 


Gewerkschaft Gliickauf zu Sondershausen 


Gewerkschaft "Gliickauf Berka" zu Sonders- 
hausen u. Gewerkschaft "Gliickauf Ost" zu 
Sondershausen. 
Wilmersdorfer Terrain Rheingau A. G 


C. Klonne 




C Klonne 




Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Niirnberg A. G 
Deutsche Maschinenfabrik A. G. zu Duisburg. . 
Ernst Schiess Werkzeug Maschinenfabrik A. G . 
Elektro-Treuhand A. G 


C Klonne 




C. Klonne 




C Klonne 




C. Klonne, Dr. A. Berliner, 
C. Mommsen. 
C. Klonne 


13,200,000 


Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektricitatswerke A. G. 
Wasserwerk fiir das Nordliche Westfalische 
Kohlenrevier. 
Vereinigte Berlin-Frankfurter Gummiwaaren 
Fabriken. 
Julius Pintsch A G 


20,000,000 
8,680,000 

1,100,000 


C Klonne 




C Klonne 




C Klonne 


6,800,000 


Reichelt Metallschrauben A. G 


C Klonne 


750,000 
1,350,000 
6,000,000 
1,700,000 

28,345,000 


F. Kiippersbusch & Sohne A. G 


C. Klonne 




" Allianz" Versicherungs A. G 


C Klonne 




Union, Allgemeine Versicherungs A. G. zu Ber- 
lin. 
Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto Gesellschaft 
A. G. 
Mitteldeutsche Credit bank 


C. Klonne 




A Kirdorf 




C Mommsen 


17,250,000 
4,000,000 
18,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,500,000 


Braunkohlenwerke Leonhard A G 


C Mommsen 




Orenstein & Koppel (Arthur Koppel) A. G 
Deutsche Wasserwerke A. G 


C Mommsen 




C Mommsen 




Deutsche Eisenbahn-Betriebs-Gesellschaft in 
Berlin A. G. 
Teutoburger Wald Eisenbahn Gesellschaft zu 
Giitersloh. 
Gesellschaft fiir elektrische Hoch- u. Unter- 
grundbahnen. 
Accumulatoren-Fabrik A. G 
Bank fiir Orientalische Eisenbahnen in Zurich. . 

Total 


C. Mommspn 




C Mommsen 


2,000,000 


C F von Siemens 


37,650,000 

6,000,000 
18,200,000 


Dr. A. Berliner... 
A. Koechlin 









521,365,000 


406,011,000 
1)3,600,000 


Reichsbank .... 


A. von Siemens,C. Mommsen 


Grand total 




521,365,000 


469,611,000 







Appendix G. GERMAN METHODS IN TRADE AND INDUS- 
TRY DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

The following reports on German methods in trade and industry 
supplement the reports contained in Appendix C of " German For- 
eign Trade Organization," Miscellaneous Series No. 57. The reports 
here republished, with the single exception of the report by Dennis K. 
Moss on the liquidation of German houses in Hongkong, which calls 
in question some of the long-respected claims of German efficiency in 
over-sea trade, are all from American foreign-trade investigators. 
They considerably amplify the material given in the former publi- 
cation. 

INCOMPETENT GERMAN METHODS IN CHINA. 

The following excerpts are from a little book entitled " Britons v. 
Germans in China," by Dennis K. Moss, of Hongkong. It was pub- 
lished in January, 1917, by the Hongkong Daily Press (Ltd.). Mr. 
Moss was officially connected with the liquidation of the German con- 
cerns in Hongkong, and received official permission " to make use in a 
general way of knowledge obtained during the process of liquida- 
tion." One of this writer's conclusions is that the features of German 
trade which have been actually accepted as successes have really been 
quite the contrary. Mr. Moss concludes the preface to his little mono- 
graph as follows : " I venture the opinion that the present time pre- 
sents the opportunity of a lifetime for merchants at home and abroad 
to cooperate and prevent any reversion to pre-war conditions existing 
in British colonies. Fair competition will be welcome at all times, but 
it would be nothing less than a crime to give Germans, or for that 
matter the subjects of any other nations, a chance to repeat the dog- 
in-the-manger tactics that enemy firms have employed in the past in 
regard to trade." 

However, let us admit the supposition that they (the Germans) captured 
more trade per head than the British. There is nothing surprising about it, and 
nothing else could have been expected, when, as the liquidations have proved, 
they gave long and dangerous credits, worked many lines at a loss, obtained 
their capital by dishonest means, and in fact seemed to vie with one another in 
a mad headlong scramble to obtain business, no matter whether a profit was 
made or not. This idea that it was necessary to do a huge turnover at all costs 
seems to have permeated and actuated all the German houses in Hongkong. 
There is also no reason to doubt that the same selfish methods have been, and 
are still being, employed by Germans in Shanghai and other places in China. 
There is nothing to admire in these methods, they can not be called push or en- 
terprise, as they were not conducted with the methodical and meticulous appli- 
cation we have come to associate with other German undertakings, and military 
preparations in particular. Their whole system of trading is only pathetic, 
considering the vast amount of work put in by their representatives out here 
and their coworkers in the Fatherland. * * * 

When the liquidations were commenced it was generally thought that new 
and successful methods of doing trade would be brought to light, but greatly 
to the surprise of those merchants and accountants who were appointed liqui- 

212 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 213 

dators the average result of their investigations was a more complete knowl- 
edge of how not to do business * * * 

The most curious fact which has been brought to notice was that even 
in their own German and Austrian manufactures they carried on among them- 
selves an astounding cutthroat competition with each other, which leaves one 
in speechless wonder as to where the necessity arose for doing such business. 
Why did they not stop at home, rather than face the discomforts of a tropical 
climate, without any visible recompense for the same beyond a bare living, 
and with little or no prospect of putting anything aside for the proverbial 
rainy day? * * * 

The above are typical instances showing the general spirit which actuated 
the Germans in their trading. They could be multiplied and continued at 
length, but nothing would be gained thereby, as the books of nearly all 
of the German firms have the same curious tale to tell. Some kept their books 
with meticulous care, others were a disgrace, but with the exception of a few 
small and almost retail establishments all pointed to the fact that business had 
been secured regardless of any other object than to sell cheaper than the 
other man. Some offices were economically run, but the majority were con- 
ducted in an extravagant manner. This, however, would have but small bear- 
ing on the profits if they had not been so imbued with the mania for selling, 
selling, selling, regardless of loss. * * * 

THE DYESTUFF INDUSTRY. 

I From " Dyestuffs for American Textile and Other Industries," Special Agents Series 
No. 96, by Dr. Thomas Norton, 1915.] 

CAUSES OF GERMANY'S SUPREMACY. 

The actual supremacy of Germany in the production of coal-tar dyes has been 
outlined and its dominating position in international commerce clearly shown. 
It remains to describe how this supremacy has been won and how it is main- 
tained. 

The base of the present structure was laid half a century ago, when the 
industry of artificial dyestuffs was still in swaddling clothes. A remarkable 
number of German chemists of the first rank and of the second rank were 
attracted to the new industry. The admirably equipped laboratories of the 
German universities and schools of science were devoted largely to research in 
the new field. Simultaneously, in Germany, the molecular constitution of the 
aromatic hydrocarbons was revealed by Kekul, and a vast amount of scientific 
knowledge, keen mental effort, high inventive capacity, and patient labor was 
devoted to applying the new theories to the discovery of tinctorial compounds 
among the derivatives of the aromatic series. A small army of plodding but 
still clever young chemists carried out thousands and thousands of separate 
researches under the leadership of brilliant men, such as Hoffmann, Bayer, 
Liebermann, Graebe, Witt, and many others. Far more was done in Germany 
to develop the possibilities in the province of synthetic dyes than in all the rest 
of the world. At the same time the young industry was fortunate in securing 
the generous cooperation of financiers with farsighted courage and technical 
managers of exceptional sagacity. What is said of Germany is also essentially 
true of Switzerland, but naturally on a more modest scale. 

The seventies saw the industry well defined and established upon a solid 
basis, while the progress of discovery continued at an increased rate. The 
notable triumph of this period was the introduction of synthetic alizarin. 
During the eighties there was an increased appearance of new classes of 
important dyes. It was the golden decade. The industry was recognized as one 
of the great national assets of Germany. In the nineties there was a decided 
lull in invention. Great attention was devoted to the standardizing of manu- 
facture, and especially to the organization of the foreign trade. Germany 
became practically independent of the world in regard to its supply of coal- 
tar crudes. The relations between the great manufacturing houses became 
cordial, and there was a general spirit of cooperation. The manufacture of 
a large number of valuable medicinals and photographic chemicals from coal- 
tar intermediates was added to the production of dyestuffs. Great quantities 
of these intermediates were also employed in the preparation of high explo- 
sives. All this contributed to making the industry better balanced and more 
symmetric, while, of course, adding to its complexity. 



214 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

The present century has seen a steady development. Synthetic indigo won 
its great victory. The discovery of new types of colors has become rare. 
Close trade agreements have come into existence, with Government approval, 
and have been maintained without difficulty. At present the industry is the 
most remunerative in the Empire, and the most conspicuous in international 
trade as distinctly and predominantly German. It has been created in 
Germany and is regarded by Germans as their most brilliant triumph in 
applying science to industry. The rest of the world generously recognizes the 
full right of Germany to be justly proud of its accomplishment. 

RESEARCH THE CHIEF CAUSE. 

Unquestionably the chief factor in favoring the early start of the industry 
and its remarkably rapid and harmonious development was the spirit of 
research in Germany and the marvelous equipment for facilitating, largely at 
public expense, the exercise of this spirit. While other countries sought to 
encourage the introduction of new branches of industry by the aid of tariff 
protection in Germany manufacturers, capitalists, and Government officials 
early recognized the creative power and earning capacity of highly organized 
industrial research. Any marked advance in developing coal-tar chemical 
industry in the United States must depend upon the full recognition of this 
fact, for no other industry is so intimately associated with research of the 
highest scientific character. 

A most competent authority, Dr. B. C. Hesse, says in this connection : 
" What we do need is a semimanufacturing laboratory in which to ascertain 
the most favorable conditions for carrying out those operations which the 
work of the Germans, both in their patents and in their commercial exploitations 
of them, has shown to be needful or worthy of prosecution. That, however, 
is no child's-play task; it calls for engineering skill of the highest order, 
chemical knowledge of great refinement, and experimental ability of high 
rank. Much will have to be learned and determined as to the proper mate- 
rials of construction, the proper size and shape of the apparatus, and the 
most favorable working unit, which is by no means constant from one dye- 
stuff or one intermediate to another. Many dyestuffs can not be made com- 
mercially in lots much greater than 100 pounds; others can be made in lots 
of 1 ton, but the manufacturing unit, as a rule, is small." 

GROWTH OF INDUSTRY, CAPITAL, DIVIDENDS, ETC. 

In analyzing the organization of the German dyestuff industry, it will be 
found that not only a vast amount of brain effort has been expended in its 
creation, but that also the cash investment has been extremely large. 

There are now 22 German establishments devoted to the manufacture of coal- 
tar colors. Of these, 21 are owned by joint-stock companies. The combined cap- 
italization of the 21 companies in 1913 was $36,700,000. In that year they paid 
dividends amounting to $11,600,000, or 21.74 per cent of the nominal capitali- 
zation. 

The explanation of this high percentage lies in the fact that for many years 
the industry regularly devoted a large share of its profits to writing off the 
real estate and plant accounts and to new construction. One of the oldest and 
strongest companies has a capital of $13,100,000. Its stock sells at 600. In 
1913 its net profits were $6,000,000, nearly one-half of the capital. One-third of 
this sum was devoted to a sinking fund for the erection of new plants, etc., and 
to welfare funds for operatives. From the remainder a dividend of 28 per cent 
was paid. This course has been pursued for so many years that it is now es- 
timated that at least $400,000,000 have been invested in the industry. 

It is worthy of note that the next most remunerative chemical industries in 
Germany are those devoted to explosives, glass, heavy chemicals, metallurgy, 
soap, and candles. The factories number 252. Dividends range from 11.2 to 
11.8 per cent. Most of the remaining chemical industries in the Empire pay 
dividends of 5 to 10 per cent. 

It is easily seen that financially the German coal-tar dye industry is ex- 
ceptionally well fortified and in a position to resist powerfully any attempt to 
destroy its supremacy. 

. A marked feature of the industry is its concentration. The plants are all 
located within an area forming a square, with sides of 300 miles. The 
actual concentration is even more pronounced, for, with the exception of the 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 215 

big works at Berlin, all the leading establishments, as well as the coke fields 
supplying the tar and the benzol, are situated on the Rhine and its tributaries, 
in a narrow strip of territory less than 200 miles in length. This means cheap 
haulage for the bulkier raw materials and facilities for the economical distri- 
bution of finished products by water to all parts of the world. 

If an industry of this size in the United States, doing an extensive trans- 
Atlantic business, were located chiefly along the banks of the Hudson, between 
Albany and New York, and obtained most of its raw material and fuel supply 
within short distances from the river, the concentration would be practically 
the same. 

RELATIONS BETWEEN COMPANIES. 

The advantages of this close concentration, permitting each communication 
and transfer of products between different factories, are intensified by the close 
relations between the several companies. Three of the largest organizations are 
closely allied; three other powerful companies form another combine. The re- 
lations between the two big units are, however, friendly, and this is the case 
also with the relations between the larger and the smaller firms. There is 
keen competition to maintain high standards of excellence in products and to 
diminish the cost of production, as well as to bring out new dyestuffs ; but there 
is a well-organized combination to maintain prices and to render mutual as- 
sistance in utilizing intermediates and by-products. For practical purposes the 
industry is a unit, especially in all that concerns its dealings with foreign 
markets and with foreign attempts at competition. These trade agreements and 
cooperative arrangements seem to have prevented the appearance of rivals on 
German soil during recent years. They have made themselves frequently felt on 
this side of the ocean, as efforts have been exerted from time to time to secure 
emancipation from dependence upon German intermediants or finished products. 

EQUIPMENT OF PLANTS. 

As the general industry has developed, the individual companies have, in 
several cases, widely extended their operations, so as to manufacture all or 
nearly all of the intermediates required in their processes and a large share 
of the heavy chemicals needed. They have gone outside the limits of color 
chemistry and manufactured a variety of synthetic medicinal preparations, 
several synthetic perfumes, and some important photographic chemicals, as 
well as materials for modern high explosives. This has meant a great diversity 
of equipment and a delicate adjustment of manufacture, so as to permit the 
complete utilization of all by-products. In this respect the coal-tar chemical 
industry shows a marked resemblance to the great American packing industries. 
Starting with 10 crude coal-tar compounds, it produces a host of valuable 
articles, but finds methods of utilizing and deriving profit from all its by- 
products. If any such compounds occur in the evolution of a new product and 
threaten waste and loss, they are transformed into other new preparations 
for which uses can be created. All of this involves extended application of 
cLjmical engineering and means the employment of a wide range of technical 
devices. 

A couple of examples may be cited as showing the extensive plant and staff 
and output of German works and the rate of expansion. 

The famous " Farbwerke " at Hoechst started in 1863 with five workmen, 
making the few aniline dyes then known. By 1888 it employed 1,860 work- 
men and 57 chemists, and utilized 1,840 horsepower in its steam engines. It 
then produced 1,750 different colors. In 1912, 30.000 horsepower were required. 
The staff included 7,680 workmen, 374 foremen, 307 chemists, and 74 engineers. 
Wages amounted to $2,050,000 and salaries and bonuses to $1,240,000. The 
number of colors reached 11,000. Synthetic alizarin and indigo were leading 
products, and such materials as autipyrine, tuberculin, and diphtheria serum 
were made on a large scale. 

A still larger establishment is the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik, near 
Mannheim-on-the-Rhine. It covers about 500 acres, with a water front of a 
mile and a half on the Rhine. The buildings cover 100 acres. Transportation 
between the several hundred buildings is effected by 42 miles of railway. Power 
is generated and transmitted by 158 boilers, 386 steam engines, and 472 elec- 
tric moters. Steam fire engines number 25, and there are 400 telephones. 
Each day there is a consumption of 1,000 tons of coal, 40 tons of ice, 40,000,000 



216 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

gallons of water, and 2,500,000 cubic feet of gas. In '1908 workmen numbered 
8,000; chemists, 217; engineers, 142; and the commercial staff, 918. 

WAGES IN THE GERMAN FACTORIES. 

The participation of labor in the cost of finished dyes is not high. It ranges 
from 10 to 15 per cent, and is usually nearer the lower figure. There has been, 
however, a steady increase in the average wage rate of late years. The 
average daily wage in Germany for all labor boys and common skilled labor 
was $0.65 in 1886. In 1908 it had reached $1.14, an increase of 77 per cent. 
In 1906 the average daily wage in the Badische works for a 10-hour day was 
$1.04. To the normal wage should be added the contribution by employers to 
the State old-age, accident, and sick funds, bonuses gained by many workmen, 
and the gifts for general welfare. In the case of the Badische this gift was 
$750,000 in 1908. Including these various items, it may be assumed that the 
prevalent adult daily wage in the dyestuff works is now about $1.80 as far as 
the actual outlay by the employers is concerned. 

A large item in the cost of production is due to the salaries of well-trained, 
competent chemists and engineers, who supervise every step of the multitudinous 
processes. Thus, the " Badische " employs 30 well-equipped chemists univer- 
sity graduates in the research laboratory alone, quite apart from the manufac- 
ing staff. 

PAPER AND PRINTING MACHINERY. 

[From " Paper, Paper Products, and Printing Machinery in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador," 
Special Agents Series No. 143, by Robert S. Barrett, 1917.] 

METHODS TJSE1J BY EUROPEAN MANUFACTURERS. 

The methods used by European manufacturers, especially those of Germany 
and England, to build up their export business are too well known to need much 
comment, and it is only necessary to say that the same policies used in other 
lines have been applied to the paper trade with satisfactory results. The lower 
manufacturing costs, the European system of credits, the facilities afforded 
by European banking establishments and their branches, and the better shipping 
facilities have made it far easier for the Peruvian buyer to shop in the European 
than in the American market. It many cases it has been a matter of custom 
and tradition. European houses, especially British, had thoroughly canvassed 
the west coast long before the advent of the American exporter. Some of the 
Peruvian establishments have been buying certain goods from European manu- 
facturers for more than two generations. Commercial ties and connections of 
this sort are not easily severed. 

The principal factors responsible for the preponderance of European paper 
and paper products in Peru may be briefly stated as follows : (1) Lower prices ; 
(2) longer credits; (3) better shipping facilities; (4) more active selling cam- 
paigns; (5) willingness to produce the goods desired by the Peruvian consumer; 
(6) better packing; (7) greater attention to detail; (8) influence of European 
colonies and Europeans engaged in the paper and printing trades. 

PRICES CREDITS SHIPPING FACILITIES. 

The first of these factors is the most important, and was really responsible for 
the greater part of the purchases from Germany. As will later be shown in 
detail, German paper and paper products cost the Peruvian consumer one-third 
less than similar goods from the United States. In news print the average 
was somewhat less, but in some lines prices were one-half those charged by 
American manufacturers. 

Credits have heretofore been an essential factor in the transacting of business 
with Peru, but the importance of this element has been somewhat reduced by 
the forced liquidation that followed the outbreak of the European war and the 
placing of the country more or less upon a cash basis. Just how important the 
question of credits will be after the war remains to be seen, but it is evident 
that if the European nations revert to their policy of long credits they will have 
a tremendous advantage over any competitor insisting on spot cash. 

The better shipping facilities from Europe to west-coast ports of South 
America have been frequently discussed and apply to the paper trade in as 
great a degree as to general merchandise. Since the war American manufac- 
turers have had an advantage over their competitors by reason of better freight 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 217 

service and equal, if not lower, rates ; but it is not to be doubted that with the 
Restoration of peace there will be a resumption of service by the German and 
English steamship lines that formerly played such an important part in the up- 
building of trade with the South American countries, and the same conditions 
that preceded the war will again be in effect. 

Up to the time this report was written the American manufacturer exporting 
to the west coast of South America had received little or no benefit through 
the opening of the Panama Canal, as no regular steamship lines had been 
established between North American Atlantic ports and South American Pacific 
ports via the canal. The new Grace service between New York and Valparaiso 
will undoubtedly improve the situation, as it will not only increase the number 
of sailings but will enable the goods to come through without transshipment. 
The lower freight rates from Europe" have had considerable effect upon the 
situation, especially in the cheaper grades of paper, where the freight rate is 
an important factor in the cost to the consumer. Quotations by European 
manufacturers and dealers of prices c. i. f. the Peruvian port, as opposed to the 
American practice of quoting prices f. o. b. the American port, have helped to 
gain business for the former. 

SELLING CAMPAIGNS. 

The selling campaigns of the European manufacturer must be more closely 
followed by his American competitor, if the latter expects to obtain and hold 
any considerable part of the Peruvian trade, and it is doubtful whether any 
great improvement can be made upon the European methods. The essential 
points of the system include (1) the employment of competent traveling sales- 
men, (2) the establishment of connections with local commission houses or 
representatives, and (3) the systematic solicitation of the trade through sam- 
ples, catalogues, and advertising matter. Salesmen representing German and 
English paper manufacturers and export commission houses dealing in paper 
found Peru a profitable field before the war and covered the territory at regu- 
lar intervals, while American salesmen were rarely seen. As a rule, the former 
were men well trained in the paper trade, with a fluent knowledge of Spanish 
and an understanding of the business and transportation problems peculiar to 
the country. Generally these salesmen arranged for a local commission house 
to represent their firms and look after future orders. In some instances it was 
agreed that these firms were to handle only the orders taken by the salesmen, 
while in other cases the goods were bought outright by the local houses and re- 
billed to the consumer. In the latter instances the customers were in reality 
the customers of the commission house and not of the manufacturer. 

Too much emphasis can not be placed upon the care with which a manufac- 
turer should select a salesman, as he must depend upon him not only to sell the 
goods but also to pass upon the important matter of credits as well as to fur- 
nish information concerning general business conditions, new markets, etc. A 
fluent knowledge of Spanish is, of course, essential. A salesman should not be 
sent to Peru as representative of one paper mill or group of paper mills, but 
should represent a number of concerns in the paper and allied industries. A 
combination might be made up, for instance, of manufacturers of news print, 
book and printing paper, writing paper and envelopes, printing machinery, 
printing ink, linotype and stereotype metals, engravers' supplies, roller paste, 
etc., all represented by the same salesman. Another combination might be 
made up of manufacturers of news print, book and writing paper, envelopes, 
wrapping paper, blank books, papeteries, loose-leaf books, pencils, inks, mu- 
cilages, rubber-stamp supplies, etc. In such cases each manufacturer would 
contribute a part of the traveling expenses of the salesman, allowing him a com- 
mission upon his sales. This plan, in fact, has been developed and extended by 
certain American concerns. 

The systematic canvassing of the Peruvian trade by means of samples of 
paper, catalogues, and correspondence has been productive of excellent results 
for European manufacturers. Full-size sheets of paper are generally sent as 
samples, with the weights and measures given in the metric system and the 
prices (usually quoted c. i. f. Callao or Mollendo) written or printed on each 
sample. Often cable blanks, with the code address of the manufacture and a 
coded message, leaving space for the number of reams or pounds, are included, 
all ready for the signature of the buyer and the insertion of the quantity. The 
value of catalogues, especially of type and printing machinery, is so well known 
as to require little comment. The catalogue issued by one American company is 



218 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

especially valuable and is superior to any catalogue issued by a European 
house. It should be borne in mind that catalogues should not be translated, but 
should be rewritten in Spanish, and that weights and measures should be shown 
in the metric system. Net and gross weight of machines should always be given. 

NECESSITY OF CONFORMING TO LOCAL REQUIREMENTS. 

Unwillingness or inability of American manufacturers to produce the class of 
goods desired by the Peruvian consumer has caused the loss of considerable 
business in the past. Instances are cited of the inability of Peruvian printers 
and stationers to obtain in the United States a cheap combined writing and 
printing paper or the large-size baronial .envelopes in the cheap grades. 

The importance of better packing and the need of greater attention to detail 
are subjects that have been brought to the attention of American nianufac- 
urers on many occasions. There has recently been a noticeable improvement in 
both of these important elements in export trade, but the packing of American 
goods, on the whole, is still much less satisfactory than European packing. 
For shipping news print, wrapping paper, cheap book paper, paper sacks, etc., 
the European bale, tightly compressed, bound with iron straps, and with a bur- 
lap covering, is far superior to the pine box used by the American shipper. For 
shipping cardboard a New York company has adopted a packing that seems to 
be excellent. For the tops and bottoms of the bale a three-ply waterproof, 
pasted board is used and is bent over the edges. Strips of the same material 
are used to protect each corner, and the bale is held together by five iron straps, 
each seven-eights inch wide. For bales weighing 500 pounds the tare is only 
17 pounds. 

JOREIGN RESIDENTS IN PERU AND THEIR EFFECT ON PAPER SALES. 

The large number of Europeans in Peru as compared with the American resi- 
dents and the ownership of printing and lithographing establishments by mem- 
bers of the European colonies have an important effect upon the sale of paper. 
The Italian colony is estimated at more than 7,000, the German at 3,000, the 
French at 1,500, the English at 1,200, and the American at not more than 500. 
Practically all of the important importing houses and financial institutions, as 
well as many of the large retail stores, are owned by Europeans, and when they 
order printing from a local printer they usually specify the use of paper manu- 
factured in the country from which the proprietors came. 

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS. 

[From " Markets for Agricultural Implements and Machinery in Brazil," Special Agents 
No. 140, by Frank H. von Motz, 1917.] 

BRAZILIAN MARKETS. 

The Brazilian market in the farm-equipment trade is not nearly so highly 
organized as that of Argentina. The reasons for this are many and varied, and 
an attempt will be made to outline a few of them. 

Brazil is not a country of large farms, producing mainly one of four or five 
leading crops, as in Argentina. Neither does any one city have a monopoly of 
the import business, nor is there any city that receives the great bulk of the 
country's exportable surplus. There is one such place in each great agricultural 
center, but, as the centers are widely separated geographically, what goes on 
in one place is of slight importance to any of the others and has very little in- 
fluence on their commerce, either import or export. 

It is true that some of the large firms have branch houses in many different 
cities and districts, but aside from the financial end of the business they have 
nothing in common; each manager of a branch house is responsible for the 
work of his house only and engages in different commercial lines as opportuni- 
ties present themselves and without consulting any of the other branches or 
the parent house, except, of course, regarding the strictly financial side of the 
transaction. 

In other words, there is seldom any concerted effort to take up and handle 
certain classes of business. In the several branch houses anything savoring of 
a good business proposition is taken up; competent men, if they can be found, 
are put in charge ; and in this way the various branches of a given firm might 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 219 

be engaged, one in building a railroad, another in different branches of engineer- 
ing, and still another in shipping, banking, or, in fact, anything, large or small, 
that can be done along safe lines, consistent with honorable business practice. 

Most of these houses, especially the German firms, operate with a very large 
capital. They do not hesitate to undertake engineering or other propositions 
involving the expenditure of large sums of money ; they have a high sense of 
business honor, are cautious, courteous, and industrious. The executives and 
department heads are intelligent, well-educated men. All of them have had 
legal, engineering, or advanced commercial training, and are easily reached by 
anyone who possesses similar qualities and who has a bona fide business propo- 
sition to place before them for their consideration. 

Few of these men, however, have had much experience with farm equipment. 
Those who came out from Europe had, for the most part, been engaged in one 
of the many branches of engineering, in legal work, or in important commercial 
organizations, and therefore had little opportunity to learn much of the art of 
scientific farming or the use of modern methods and equipment. 

In Brazil these men took up the sale of farm equipment because it presented 
a business opportunity. Too often they had to rely on statements made to them 
by salesmen, with little experience in the country, concerning the different types 
of implements in which a good volume of business might be done. Just as often 
they relied on the statements made to them by local farmers who had had no 
experience outside the comparatively small district with which they were 
familiar. The statements of both salesmen and farmers, combined with the 
dealers' eagerness to do business, resulted in the bringing out of so many types 
of implements of different kinds (many of which were used with only indifferent 
results) that much dissatisfaction was caused and a skepticism created that 
must now be overcome. 

STATE OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL. 

Four hours up the Lagoa dos Patos from Rio Grande do Sul is the thriving 
city of Pelotas, the center of an agricultural district. Between these two 
cities, and above Pelotas to Porto Alegre (about 16 hours' steamer journey 
from Rio Grande do Sul) is the center of the Brazilian jerked-beef industry. 
The State of Rio Grande do Sul supplies and prepares about 40 per cent of 
the total output o*f jerked or salted beef in South America. 

Porto Alegre, although at present feeling the effects of world-wide condi- 
tions, is a thriving commercial city, the seat of the State Government. It is 
a very important distributing point for the agricultural regions about it, and, 
in fact, for all that part of the State not directly served by Pelotas or Rio 
Grande do Sul. Here nearly all the important business houses are German, 
and many Germans have settled in all parts of the State. The Germans speak 
Gferman and Portuguese and many of them speak English. The Brazilians 
have learned German, and only the sons of Portuguese parents possess only 
one language. 

[Prom " Markets for American Hardware in Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandi- 
navia," Miscellaneous Series No. 48, prepared under the supervision of Erwin W. 
Thompson, Commercial Attache", 1917.] 

GERMAN EXPORT METHODS. 

Export methods include all forms and variations of direct and indirect 
trading, not only in concluding the sale but also in the settlement of bills. 
These variations include direct trading between foreign buyers and the German 
manufacturers and also the employment of special exporting concerns in Ger- 
many having branches, export agents, and commission agents in foreign 
countries. 

Export trade with each foreign territory has attained a certain uniformity, 
notwithstanding the manifold proceedings and usages, which vary by reason 
of continual change in selling possibilities and credit conditions. It can be 
said, therefore, that the export methods for any particular foreign territory 
are in effect well established and standardized for that territory. 

There has been a tendency in the export trade to eliminate the middle 
man. It is difficult, however, to generalize in this matter. In those cases where 
trade moves in well-regulated channels, where business conditions, selling 
possibilities, and credits approach European standards, and where a certain 
density of trade has developed, the middle man may be unnecessary. This, 



220 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

however, is not the rule, as cases are known where the elimination of the 
middle man resulted in heavy losses and serious interruption of business con- 
nections. 

THE EXPORT HOUSE. 

In most cases the so-called export house, or exporter, located in Germany, 
is the principal factor in the export business. The exporter (not the manu- 
facturer) is either a commission agent, or, as in most cases, a purchaser and 
seller on his own account. He maintains continued relations with a certain 
export territory, where he is represented by branch offices, agents, or com- 
mission agents, and fills orders as they come in from these representatives. 
For this purpose he is in connection with a number of reliable and efficient 
manufacturers, who furnish him with samples and catalogues. 

He computes his selling price, based upon the manufacturer's price and the 
foreign conditions of payment as a rule c. i. f. port of import and instructs 
his representative in the foreign territory how to tender his bid. When an 
order is received it is forwarded to the corresponding manufacturer, who col- 
lects his bill from the exporter, who in turn must collect from the foreign 
purchaser. 

The Hamburg Association of Exporters has stipulated the relationship be- 
tween exporter and manufacturer in the following terms : 

" 1. The date of delivery, once agreed upon by the manufacturer, does not 
permit of an extension, and in case date of delivery is not adhered to or only 
partial delivery takes place, the exporter is entitled to compensation from the 
manufacturer for actually suffered losses and for expenses incurred. 

" 2. On orders calling for f. o. b. delivery or ' alongside ship,' the manufac- 
turer must deliver goods at his expense on board of ship or at side of ship. 

"3. Hamburg to be the court of jurisdiction for both parties and according 
to German law. The foreign port is considered to be the place of delivery. 
Goods need not be inspected until four weeks after arrival in the city of the 
foreign customer or until the lapse of four weeks after passing the customs. 
The exporter is responsible for losses or claims resulting from incomplete or 
defective shipments. 

" 4. For claims in regard to quality of goods, assortment, or similar differ- 
ences experts in the town of destination may be called upon, and their opinion 
will be decisive for both parties concerned. 

" 5. Bill of sale must give exact gross weight and dimensions of each case 
or box, the markings of same, contents, net weight of each item, inclusive of 
container, and also absolute net weight of each item. 

" 6. Statute of limitation for collection is one year longer than that set down 
by the German law. 

" 7. Packing and make-up of goods must be strictly neutral, without names 
or trade-marks, unless other directions have been given. 

" 8. Samples should be sent at the time of rendering the bill for the goods. 
Other samples and catalogues should not be packed with the goods, but must be 
sent separately." 

THE EXPORT AGENT. 

In important export centers a further link between exporter and manufac- 
turer has become necessary the so-called export agent. His work is to find 
suitable manufacturers for the exporter and also to find for the manufacturer 
a suitable exporter. The export agent frequently maintains a sample show- 
room where he exhibits the products of the manufacturer whom he represents, 
the manufacturer bearing part of the cost of rent. The export agent derives 
his income from a commission on the turnover of all sales to a certain terri- 
tory, no matter whether sales have been closed directly or through his influence. 
The manufacturer refunds all expenses, such as postage, cables, and freight 
charges. These showrooms are of special value to over-sea buyers who are 
regular visitors ; they are not only a great convenience, making the selection 
and Durchase easier, but they form a source of information for all local ex- 
porters who desire to keep posted on the prevailing demands in certain terri- 
tories. 

The entire business correspondence, such as copies of orders and statements, 
must go through the hands of the export agent. Generally speaking, business 
proceeds as follows : When inquiries and orders come by mail from abroad, the 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 221 

exporter communicates with the export agent representing the article in ques- 
tion and discusses everything with him, first orally, concerning the wishes of 
his clients in regard to new samples, quality, etc. Then the agent enters into 
communication with his manufacturers concerning the special requirements of 
the order, the price, and various other matters. Finally follows the placing 
of the order and the delivery. 

As a rule, the exporter has to procure his goods from hundreds of manu- 
facturers, so that direct communication with them is out of the question. But 
by the intervention of the export agent all parties are served and their interests 
promoted, and the method results in equalizing all intermediate expenses. The 
exporter relieves the manufacturer of all financial risk, as he pays the manu- 
facturer cash within 30 days, while the exporter must give long credit to his 
foreign customers. In this manner the manufacturer is able to turn over his 
money 12 times a year, whereas, if negotiating direct with the foreign customer, 
he would be compelled to employ larger capital. Thus only very large firms 
with great resources can carry on direct exportation and make profits. In 
the hardware trade especially manufacturing and exporting are two distinctly 
separate enterprises. Many attempts on the part of manufacturers to send 
traveling salesmen into foreign territory have been abandoned as useless. It 
is of advantage to the foreign customer, if only for the sake of credit, to be 
able to order from the exporter. Very frequently, however, over-sea purchasers, 
wholesalers, department stores, or manufacturers, send orders direct to the manu- 
facturers as well as to the exporter. Large foreign importers very often have 
their own purchasing agent in Germany, and when they order direct from 
the exporter or the manufacturer, a clause is inserted to the effect that orders 
are subject to confirmation by their purchasing agent. Thus the purchasing 
agent exercises a control over orders and final shipment, constituting the so- 
called "confirmed order." His work proceeds as follows : The purchasing agent 
gets in touch with the manufacturer or exporter, attends to shipment, gives 
shipping directions, and very often settles the bill or arranges for the financial 
transaction. He also attends to all complaints and damage claims. 

COMMISSION AGENTS, BROKERS, AND COMPRADORS. 

Very often there is in the foreign territory some other connecting link for 
the sale of German products the branch office, the agent, or the commission 
agent. The branch office permits a careful and intensive nursing of a foreign 
territory and is considered the best way in which export interests may be 
represented. For bringing in orders, the branch office makes frequent use of 
a middle man, as, for instance, in India the "commission agent," in East Africa 
the native "broker," and in China the "comprador." 

The foreign commission agent is not much in favor, because confidence and 
trust between exporter and importer play an important role, and because, by 
reason of the great distances, any change in the original arrangements that 
may be necessary at times of an uncertain or unfavorable market becomes very 
difficult. 

Representation by agent is the most usual procedure. The agent should 
be provided with a power of attorney, because circumstances often require 
granting of rebates or other concessions. 

To a number of foreign territories for instance, Canada, South and Central 
America, the Far East, etc. traveling salesmen are sent regularly. They are 
provided with sufficient samples and, of course, with more extensive authority 
than the ordinary domestic traveling salesman. In order to save expenses in 
covering foreign territory a number of noncompeting exporters often combine 
and send only one well-ver:',o(l and experienced man abroad and divide the 
costs. 

What has been said about catalogues for the domestic trade applies also to 
the export trade, with the exception that catalogues are sent more liberally. 
Catalogues for the export trade are not always printed in German, but gener- 
ally in the language of the country where they are to be used. This enables 
the native customer to ascertain exactly what the German firm has to sell. If 
a catalogue were printed in German only, the foreign customer would generally 
not attempt to read it or even open it. Even if the catalogue is intended to 
be used in one specific country, it is sometimes printed in several languages. 
This is a good plan, as it frequently happens that in the same plant there are 
men of different nationalities to be consulted about the purchase of material, 



222 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR, 

or asked to suggest, advise, authorize, or order for branch houses in other 
countries. Then, too, the same catalogue may be used for different countries, 
whereby their utility is greatly enhanced. Catalogues are sent very liberally 
in the export trade and are at times distributed broadcast. They are printed 
attractively and are of convenient size to fit the pocket for ready reference. 
They contain, moreover, an appendix of formulas, rules, and general sugges- 
tions of permanent value to the respective trades. The importance of this 
point can not be overestimated, for it makes the catalogue an indispensable 
handbook, and everyone is glad to have a copy and keep it. 

The German manufacturer does not force upon his foreign customer any 
standardized goods, or his regular domestic product, or the metric system, 
but stands ready to make goods in every sense " to order." He even takes 
pains to mention in his catalogue that he is willing to fill special orders for 
goods outside of the line of his regular production, and this at no higher cost 
than for his regular lines. He will work from a model, or even a photograph, 
submitted to him. 

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS. 

Mutual interests of manufacturers, exporters, and wholesalers are well taken 
care of by trade and protective associations. Their aims are manifold, and 
embrace one or more of the following: (a) Fostering manufacturing inter- 
ests, (6) furthering of the domestic market, (c) developing the export trade, 
(d) promoting uniform selling prices, (e) organization of mutual selling, (/) 
distribution of orders according to capacity of production, and (g) counteract- 
ing aggression on the part of labor organizations. 

The number of such organizations is constantly growing, and covers now 
almost all specialties. Manufacturers are not only members of these organiza- 
tions but of other more general bodies, which either promote the interests 
of the domestic trade or of the exporter. They are also members of commer- 
cial bodies which represent the interests of a certain industrial district or of 
the Empire. 

The following are the descriptive names of some of the many specializing 
associations: Association of pocketknife manufacturers, association of scis- 
sors manufacturers, association of flatiron manufacturers, association of blade 
manufacturers, association of plowshare manufacturers, association of scythes 
manufacturers, association of car and carriage trimmings makers, association of 
trimmings makers, and association of ice-box makers. 

One of the most influential commercial bodies is represented in the collective 
name " Deutscher Handelstag," which body, in 1914, comprised 154 chambers 
of commerce located in the important commercial centers of the Empire. These 
chambers are controlled by the General Government and form a part of the 
Imperial Department of Commerce and Labor. 

GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE FOREIGN TRADE. 

The reasons for Germany's extensive export trade have often been pointed 
out both by German and by foreign economists, but often some of the impor- 
tant reasons have been overlooked. 

It can not be doubted that the matter of price plays a most imjjortant part, 
for it is certainly necessary to adjust the final selling price to the market con- 
ditions of the foreign export territory. But this must not be done too much 
at the expense of quality. 

German export prices differ only occasionally from the price asked on the 
domestic market. The reasons for the comparatively low German export price 
may be summarized thus: 

The German manufacturer is extremely economical in the use of raw mate- 
rial ; he does not waste any of it. This endeavor is carried so far that the 
scrap heap is practically unknown in Germany. A manufacturer of small 
articles of wood, or one needing small pieces of wood for any purpose, would 
not buy whole boards, but would get his raw material from a manufacturer of 
furniture, for instance, who could thus sell his short ends and scrap to advan- 
tage and at a price lower than for whole boards. This is practical economy, 
and economy that is practiced to a great extent in Germany. 

The cost of labor, of course, is of vital importance. Although it is acknowl- 
edged that wages paid German workmen are about 30 per cent lower than 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 223 

those paid American workmen, the American manufacturer has the advantage 
of labor-saving devices and machinery, which to a certain extent offset the 
higher cost of labor. If the American manufacturer would exercise the same 
economy and wise policy in obtaining his raw material, the difference between 
the German and American scale of wages would hardly be noticed in the final 
cost of the goods. Prices of raw materials are frequently lower in the United 
States than in Germany. 

The matter of price, once successfully settled, must be followed by proper 
methods in opening up foreign territories and, what is of equal importance, 
keeping the customers. To follow the German lead, American exporters must 
consider the following methods: 

(1) A careful study of foreign conditions by representatives on the spot. 

(2) The filling of orders to meet those conditions, whether they coincide 
with American practice or not. (A German will make anything for anybody 
anywhere. ) 

(3) The development of American banking facilities in the various foreign 
countries. 

(4) The accepting of any reasonable European terms of payment from 
firms of sound financial standing. 

(5) The issuing of catalogues in the different languages of European coun- 
tries, together with such particulars as to freight, duty, etc., as will enable 
the foreign customer to know the cost of goods delivered in his district. 

(6) The establishing in the United States of trade organizations that would 
assist in forming combinations of individual firms for the purpose of pushing 
foreign trade. 

(7) The increasing and strengthening of the American Consular Service to 
render every possible assistance to American traders in foreign countries. 

(8) The building up of an American merchant marine. 

The German manufacturer and exporter makes a systematic and careful 
study of what his competitor is doing. He is assisted by his banks to such an 
extent that he is able to give long credits even in countries like Russia, where 
it is almost impossible to do any business at all except on credit. 

The American rule of making prices f. o. b. New York is absolutely fatal to 
the creation of a large foreign business. American exporters can not in this 
manner expect to get a fair share of the business in other countries against 
competitors who are willing to give reasonable credits to sound concerns and 
are willing to quote prices for goods delivered at their customers' doors. It is 
just as easy to find firms of sound financial standing in Europe as it is in the 
United States, and by methods well known to every business man. Commercial 
risks are no greater (perhaps actually smaller) in European countries than 
in America. 

German manufacturers did not build up their vast foreign trade by staying 
at home and quoting prices f. o. b. Hamburg. American manufacturers may be 
certain that they will not capture trade by staying at home and quoting prices 
f. o. b. New York. 

HARDWARE. 

[From ".Turkish Markets for American Hardware," Special Consular Reports No. 77, by 

G. B. Ravndal, 1917.] 

TURKISH MARKETS. 

Hardware is admittedly one of the lines in which American goods have 
acquired a distinctive character of excellence. That the Turkish market should 
have felt the influence of this superiority is not surprising, but what may sur- 
prise even American hardware manufacturers is the important position their 
product has gained in Turkey, solely on its own merits. Many of them are 
probably unaware that their goods are sold there, and few of them realize 
that, in ordinary times, the Turkish market imperatively demands their articles, 
that of all shelf hardware sold in Turkey fully 60 per cent is sold as American, 
that about 20 per cent actually is American, and that an utterly insignificant 
part of it is sold direct to Turkey. The holding of 20 per cent of a country's 
business in a given line, without the least effort to obtain it, is a fact that 
commends itself to the careful consideration of all those whose wares are 
involved. 



224 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

GEEMAN HOUSES AS INTERMEDIARIES. 

With so favorable a basis, the absence of a strong, healthy growth of busi- 
ness will puzzle all those who are not familiar with the numerous adverse 
factors with which American trade has to contend in this particular line. The 
removal of these obstacles lies entirely in the hands of the American manu- 
facturers themselves. As in the case of various other important lines, Ameri- 
can hardware is not sold by the American producer to the Turkish distributer. 

Turkey's imports of American hardware have been practically monopolized 
by a few firms in Hamburg and Bremen. They are German jobbers, 1 working 
according to German methods and for German interests. Thus American arti- 
cles are shipped to Turkey only if they can not be replaced on the same terms 
by German articles. This tutelage over the American hardware business with 
Turkey, if not checked, must inevitably result in diminishing our trade, as the 
German middlemen command a number of essential advantages. They handle 
all kinds of hardware, and by means of large contracts with the various manu- 
facturers they manage to secure for themselves exceptionally low prices. For the 
shipment of these large quantities to their free port zone they obtain from the 
German steamship companies reduced rates, so that the combined freight from 
New York to Hamburg and thence to Constantinople is lower than the direct 
freight charge from New York to Constantinople. In this business the Ham- 
burg-American Line and the Deutsche Levante Line, both under the same con- 
trol, work in complete harmony. Were an American factory to ship direct only 
its own goods, they would, in most cases, amount to so little that the minimum 
freight rate would have to be paid, where larger quantities might have been 
shipped for the same price. Further, the shipment of an order involves certain 
handling charges at the port of shipment and at the port of transshipment. A 
small order can not as well afford these charges as a transaction on a more 
extended scale. 

SPECIAL CATALOGUES IN FRENCH FOB LEVANTINE TRADE. 

Most American manufacturers usually distribute catalogues in English, 
whereas the German houses furnish catalogues in French, which is the current 
business language in Turkey. The selection of the goods is thus facilitated. 
These catalogues are often specially printed for the Levant, with prices in 
francs, and often bear the Turkish distributor's name on the cover. They con- 
tain a complete list of hardware goods. In some cases the American articles 
are shown on one page and the German imitation on the opposite page, with 
the advantages of price, quick delivery, etc.,*of the German goods conspicuously 
indicated. 

GERMAN IMITATIONS OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS. 

The Germans, who have acquired the reputation of being master imitators, 
are thus offering for sale devices and tools that are very close imitations of 
patented American products, the imitation proceeding even to the brand and 
name of the article. For instance, there is offered in Turkey the " Blosta " 
drill, which is an exact duplication of an American tool. This duplicate is sold 
by the firm of Carl Blombach, of Ronsdorf, Germany, one of the principal Ger- 
man tool firms operating in the Turkish market. 

In each case the German product is in appearance a true reproduction of the 
American article, with a considerable reduction in price. That the Germans 
keep the American article in the catalogue at all must be ascribed to the fact 
that there are people who appreciate the excellence of the American prod- 
uct, in spite of all manipulations and deceptions, and insist on having what 
they want. That the articles are not completely imitated is probably due to the 
fact that they are patented in Germany. However, American manufacturers 
should be warned of the existing danger of seeing complete imitations of their 
products turned out by the Germans and sold in Turkey, where their rights 
in the majority of cases have not been protected by patents. That the Germans 
are alert on the question of patents in Turkey may be inferred from the follow- 
ing list of patents awarded from January 6, 1915, to February 4, 1916: To 
Germans, 11 ; to Ottomans, 3 ; to Austrians, 3 ; to Americans, 2 ; total, 19. 

1 AB a rule. It is known that certain important American trading companies haye 
bandied their European business from Hamburg, however. 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 225 

EFFECT OF GERMAN PRICE CUTTING. 

Another factor militating against American imports is the German method 
of " dumping," not so much for the purpose of disposing of surplus stock as 
of destroying competition. The factory representatives in such emergencies 
make no offers, but merely carry the orders away by allowing 5 to 10 per cent 
discount on the lowest competitive price. A specific instance is related by local 
dealers in steel rivets. These goods were formerly imported from France 
and England. Then there appeared on the market the representative of a Ger- 
man newcomer, the Kronprinz Aktiengesellschaft fur Metallindustrie, with 
works at Ohligs and Immingrath. The prices ruling at the time were as low as 
30s. per 100 kilos (220 pounds) c. i. f. Nevertheless the German cut the price 
until both the English and French withdrew, and he carried off the order at 16s. 
Contrary to what one might believe, this practice not infrequently meets with 
disapproved and mistrust on the part of the trade. The price of rivets has 
rapidly risen since the French and English withdrew, and considering the qual- 
ity they are more expensive now than before. This is but one case out of many. 
The control of the pick trade was acquired in a similar way, all producers in 
Germany forming a syndicate to drive out competition, 

LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES AND ORGANIZATIONS, 

The German houses, with their thorough understanding of the prerequisites to 
the successful introduction of their various articles, select first-class agents,, 
intimately familiar with the market's requirements, and the customs and 
character of the people. These agents are by no means always Germans, but 
they are invariably German in spirit and predilection and have been carefully- 
taught German methods. They are thus linked to a perfectly organized suc- 
cession of elements, all working to the same end. 

The steady increase of German commerce with Turkey is due in very large 
measure to this model organization, which starts with the furnishing of capital 
by the home bank to the small manufacturer against his Turkish customer's 
notes, proceeds to facilitate the shipment of the goods exported, by land as well 
as by sea, by granting reduced combined railroad and steamship rates, and 
finally, through its exterritorial banks, supplies to the Turkish importer the 
funds necessary for releasing the merchandise and selling it, thus enabling 
the latter to honor the initial notes. In this connection prominent mention must 
be made of the Deutsche Levant Line, the stock of which is held by all important 
German banks and whose steamers call at many ports along the Dutch, Belgian, 
and Mediterranean coasts, generally obtaining a full cargo and thus making 
possible low freight rates for German goods. In addition to the above advan- 
tages a system of through bills of lading has been devised by which manufac- 
turers in interior towns of Germany pay the same freight rates on their goods 
destined to the Levant via Hamburg as are paid by manufacturers situated on 
the seaboard. This is a valuable incentive for the manufacturers in all parts of 
Germany to seek export trade with the Levant, as it places them on an equal 
footing with their colleagues in the port towns. Another important feature of 
the system is that the Deutsche Levante Line has an agent in every manufac- 
turing town, who is also an insurance and forwarding broker, and in these 
several capacities he takes the goods from the factory and attends to the for- 
malities required by all the carriers, whose authorized representative he is 
himself. Thus it is seen that in every possible way German goods enjoy a 
preferential position, and American shipments via Hamburg to the Levant 
have been known to wait for weeks in Hamburg warehouses, while German 
goods have been hurried forward. 

The agents of the German houses, as already mentioned, work methodically. 
If they are general commission agents (which is the rule), they have a bright 
young man, a native, looking after the hardware branch only. He visits the 
clients daily, reports the arrival of competing salesmen, and is always ready 
to take new orders, be they ever so small, because the aggregate quantity or- 
dered by all dealers invariably reaches a respectable figure. In this work great 
assistance is rendered by the traveling salesman from Germany, who conies 
twice a year, examines local market conditions closely, makes price reductions 
where necessary, and in general encourage the dealers. A competitor is never 
allowed to gain headway. Not a single instance is known in which a German 

43339 18 15 



226 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

traveling representative failed to obtain an order from every dealer he visited, 
though he may have had to call four or five times on the same man. 

The English and French salesmen admit that they are unable to obtain the 
same results. It is believed in Turkey that only American alertness, perse- 
verance, and organization will be able to cope with German adroitness on this 
score. Especially during the past six years a collosal effort has been made by 
Germany to capture the Turkish hardware trade, or, better perhaps, to drive 
out the English and French competitors. The result has been cheaper prices, 
but also lower quality, which in the end renders the goods more expensive. On 
Cue whole, the dealers do not favor the German system, but they are obliged to 
accept it or go out of business. 

Another factor is the protection given to the German agents by the German 
embassy. Any claim or difficulty with the Turkish authorities is promptly 
settled by the intervention of the German diplomatic representatives. 

ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION OF GERMAN JOBBERS. 

It has been proved by subsequent direct imports that an American pipe tool 
has been sold in Constantinople for double the price it actually cost in Ne\v 
York. Such overcharges are more prejudicial to the manufacturer than to the 
Levantine consumer, for the latter may turn to an English or French firm for 
a good tool, or buy a cheap one of German make, while the American manu- 
facturer loses the trade. At equal prices, numerous American articles excel 
the German, and this may explain why American articles are found on the 
Turkish market at all. 

The local representatives have entered into contracts with the Hamburg 
and Bremen houses not to ijnport direct from the factories, and the German 
jobbers in turn have contracts with the manufacturers. Whether these con- 
tracts include exclusive sales rights in Turkey or some similar clause is not 
known in Constantinople ; such a condition does not appear very likely, for all 
the houses mentioned can furnish articles of the same make, usually from stock 
and very seldom by shipment direct from New York. However, whether such 
an arrangement exists as yet or not is immaterial, in view of existing practices, 
because quotations by the factory direct are often higher than those of Ham- 
burg, besides exacting cash with the order, delivery at the factory or in New 
York, etc. Under such circumstances the most favorable inclination toward 
America is discouraged. Only in late years, since the organization of the 
American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, have a few American factories 
granted representation to local agents. The latter, though perhaps perfectly 
honest, are, in some instances, second-class agents, without means, personal 
influence, or credit, so that they are exposed to all kinds of quibbling on the 
part of a dealer who, knowing their financial position, may refuse to accept his 
order upon arrival of goods on some whimsical pretext or other solely for the 
purpose of obtaining a rebate at the last moment. A first-class agent would 
simply release the documents himself and probably sell the goods to the very 
man who refused them, if the prospective purchaser had dared to attempt any 
such practice with him. 

The local trade, knowing it is paying more in Hamburg, is none the less 
willing to buy the article there rather than direct, for the manufacturer would 
at best agree only to cash against documents, whereas in Hamburg the pur- 
chasers get long credit. Small firms especially are only too eager to buy from 
the Germans, for in the lapse of six or eight months they can dispose of their 
goods and perform another transaction with the money before they have to pay 
the original bill. The latter includes all charges incurred by the goods, which 
are sold c. i. f. 

ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATION OF AGENTS* 

It is thus seen that one of the cardinal requisites for the successful intro- 
duction of hardware, in which line competition is very keen, is the choice of the 
agent. The latter, especially in the Turkish market, should know how to sell 
and to whom to sell that is,. his object should be not merely to secure an order 
by cutting prices or giving away part of his commission, perhaps, but to pro- 
mote among the buyers an appreciation of business relations with his firm and 
to sell its goods to people who will keep the values high and not depreciate them 
on the market by reselling with next to no profit. Such agents may be found 
in Constantinople, but they must be assured of a reasonable and constant sup- 
port in the introduction of the new brands. A factory seeking to conquer a 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 227 

territory at home would not shrink from making various sacrifices in the way 
of advertising, meeting the buyer in regard to terms, special inducements in 
prices, and the like. In this respect the Turkish market is not different from 
the home market. American files of a certain make are sold there not because 
they are skillfully introduced but because German files are dearer. Even Bel- 
gian and French files sell below the German. 

Such few direct representatives as exist are not able, for some reason or other, 
to obtain tangible permanent results. To handle the articles successfully, the 
agent must bring to bear on the situation a good reputation, which means per- 
sonal influence with the customer, and at the same time an understanding of 
the American point of view. The poor success of direct dealings hitherto may 
be partly ascribed to shortcomings in these respects, although the principal 
drawback always remains the flanking competition from Hamburg. 

GENERAL OUTLOOK FOB AMERICAN HARDWARE. 

It can not be urged too strongly that American manufacturers should not 
neglect what may appear to them as a limited or secondary market. In the 
past Turkey has been in a state of industrial depression, but it is regarded as 
certain that this condition will be removed by the present war, and the hardware 
business will inevitably advance \vith any general revival. The demand will 
be both pressing and growing. The United States must be ready to respond. 
Various factors have arisen in favor of America, and the end of the war will 
probably reveal a condition most auspicious for a development of the importa- 
tion into Turkey of American hardware. 

It is true that the steel business, of which the manufacture of tools is a part, 
is the backbone of the German manufacturing industry, and the war has ap- 
parently not shaken it within the boundaries of the Empire. But it is doubtful 
whether Germany will be able to meet foreign competition abroad on the 
same ground as before the war. Local importers appear skeptical on this ques- 
tion and are strengthened in their belief by discouraging advices received from 
the German manufacturers. At present, with export prohibition on nearly 
every article, prices are announced to be from 50 to 150 per cent higher than 
before the war, and when the prohibition is removed a further increase is 
anticipated. 

Although in some hardware lines German goods, before the war, represented 
90 per cent of the total, in general the share of the various countries may be 
indicated as follows : Germany, 60 per cent ; United States, 20 per cent ; Eng- 
land, 10 per cent ; France, 7 per cent ; other countries, 3 per cent. 

There is noticeable a strong tendency for the German and the American share 
to increase, Germany leading with cheap grades, suited to the low standards in 
Turkey, and the United States with improved devices. Belgium had started 
to compete effectively against the German articles when the war broke out. In 
former years England and France dominated the market. Various Sheffield 
factories, the Peugeot Works, and firms in Maubeuge and Lille have still had 
their old-time customers, though their business is shrinking -from year to 
year. Aside from the moral effect the war may have on future commercial re- 
lations between Turkey and its present enemies, the devastation of the northern 
districts of France, the home of this industry, has crippled that country's trade 
for some time to come. The destroyed factories, even if rebuilt immediately, 
will probably not be able to supply on the same price level as before and will 
certainly have to discontinue whatever credit they had been extending. Even 
Germany, it is announced, will not be able to maintain its credit policy when 
peace conditions return. German manufacturers have advised their agents 
that they believe business after the war will be transacted in a manner " not 
unlike the practices ruling before the war." This vague explanation has cre- 
ated the impression that credits will be limited and connected with a corre- 
sponding increase in prices, so that those who can pay cash will have a ma- 
terial advantage over such competitors as do not have command of large funds. 
This certainly is a condition that will bring the Turkish market closer to Ameri- 
can practices. 

This anticipated inability of Germany to extend long-time credit after the 
war, the destruction of the principal hardware factories of France, and the 
complete exhaustion of all hardware stocks, because of requisition for military 
purposes and the long duration of the war, all combine to create exceptional 
conditions favorable to America's entrance into this field on a larger and more 



228 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

substantial basis than ever before. Turkish merchants will look to the Ameri- 
can manufacturer for goods to replenish their stocks because of the prospect 
of immediate delivery and reasonable prices, and the American Chamber of 
Commerce for the Levant offers means whereby American manufacturers and 
dealers can get in touch with reliable agents in Turkey in order to seize and 
maintain this opportunity after the war. 

[Prom " Brazilian Markets for American Hardware," Miscellaneous Series No. 47, prepared 
under the supervision of Lincoln Hutchinson, commercial attache" at Rio de Janeiro. 
1916.] 

MARKETS IN BRAZIL. 

The reason why the Germans met with such success in Braxil will be found 
in the fact that they visited the customer with their samples, and if these were 
not suitable, the customer's suggestions were heard, samples were received from 
him, and these were reproduced exactly. With this system, they were able to 
obtain a footing in almost every case. These agents did not decline an order 
from a new customer, no matter what its size might be. They always reasoned 
that if he could be induced to start business with their firm, he would sooner 
or later develop into a profitable client. 

A case may be cited where a German agent took an order for 200 marks' 
(47.60) worth of pencils, simply for the purpose of getting the good will of a 
Brazilian house that is one of the largest firms dealing in school supplies, sta- 
tionery, books, etc. The result was that the firm became a customer of the 
German house, and the loss that the latter incurred in filling so small an order 
for pencils was more than covered in the profits obtained from subsequent busi- 
ness. 

This same firm of booksellers and editors was approached some time later 
by the representative of an American concern that desired to sell its products 
in Brazil. This representative had with him samples of work done by the 
factory in the United States, but it so happened that these samples were in- 
ferior to the goods to which the market was accustomed. Instead of hearing 
what the customer might have to say in the matter, this representative tried 
to convince him that the American method was the one that should be followed, 
giving this and that reason. The result of this attitude was that the manager 
of the local firm received the impression that the American thought that he was 
ignorant of his own business and that Brazilian methods were all wrong. The 
American neither secured the particular order nor left the ground prepared for 
future business upon his return at a later time. A little more tact on the part 
of one who came to Brazil asking for business might have converted this un- 
favorable impression into an auspicious one. 

[Prom " Markets for American Hardware in Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia," 
Miscellaneous Series No. 48, prepared under the supervision of Erwin W. Thompson, 
commercial attache", 1917.] 

THE NETHERLANDS. 

The Netherlands, although primarily a country of farms, dairies, and fisheries, 
has also important industrial interests of a diversified character, and, with its 
seaport activities and growing urban population affords a valuable market for 
nearly ever branch of the hardware trade. The greater part of the supply 
comes from outside sources, chiefly Germany, America, and England, although 
in some special lines as in articles of woodenware, the trade is supplied by 
domestic manufactures. The wood for these, however, is imported. 

In a general way it may be said that Germany, with which the Netherlands 
has a larger trade than with any other country, is the leading competitor in 
articles for household use, in articles sold in large quantities in bulk, like nails, 
bolts, screws, etc., and in goods of cheaper grade, while America and England 
compete more actively in agricultural implements and in the better grades of 
building tools and building hardware. 

Conditions in the hardware trade differ materially from those in most other 
countries. Owin^ to certain circumstances of soil, climate, custom, and tradi- 
tion, the needs of the Dutch market are peculiar, and the hardware in use, 
excepting certain standard articles like screws, wire nails, bolts, and nuts, 
presents a remarkable variety of patterns and designs, considering the size of 
the country. This fact alone has proved an important factor in competition, 
for in proportion as the foreign manufacturers have consulted the distinctive 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 229 

needs of the Dutch consumer, their trade has expanded at the expense of less 
watchful rivals. Among Dutch dealers the success of Germany in many special 
lines, and particularly in household hardware, is attributed directly to the 
policy of the German manufacturers in studying systematically the peculiarities 
of the Dutch market. 

METHODS OF ENTEBING THE MARKET. 

American manufactures of hardware are bought either by direct order to the 
manufacturers or exporting agents in New York, or through commission agents 
in London and Hamburg. Representatives of the Hamburg agencies pay 
periodical visits to Rotterdam and Amsterdam, taking orders for certain 
special lines, the goods being shipped direct to the Netherlands from New 
York. Only rarely does an American firm send representatives of its own to 
canvass the market. As a consequence, the Dutch buyer, who is within a few 
hours of the exporting houses of England and who receives frequent visits 
from representatives of German firms, is comparatively out of touch with 
American producers. It is suggested by certain Dutch firms which deal in 
American goods that this situation would be improved if American houses 
either made a practice of appointing responsible Dutch firms to act as their 
regular agents and keep a stock of their goods on hand, or sent their own 
representatives to the Netherlands and deal directly with Dutch importers. 
Against the aggressive methods of the German exporters there is apparently no 
active effort to push American goods. Moreover, the inevitable result of order- 
ing American or other foreign goods through Hamburg is to spur the German 
manufacturer to renewed efforts to capture the Dutch market. 

In general, the Dutch dealer, while often preferring certain articles of Ameri- 
can manufacture on account of their superior quality or, as in the case of 
wood screws and machine bolts, on account of the relatively low price at which 
an excellent article is furnished, finds strong inducements to buy from neigh- 
boring countries, partly on account of their propinquity, but even more on 
account of the willingness of their manufacturers to meet special trade re- 
quirements. Even in the larger distributing centers like Rotterdam and Am- 
sterdam, representatives of American houses are rarely seen, and communi- 
cation between American exporters and Dutch importers must be carried on 
almost exclusively through some intermediate agency, usually located in Lon- 
don or Hamburg, or else by means of post or telegraph. 

The result is that, except in the case of some of the larger Dutch firms, the 
hardware merchants of the Netherlands are completely out of touch with the 
American market and receive little or no encouragement to place orders there. 
Instead of having their trade solicited, they themselves must seek the oppor- 
tunity to buy, whether they purchase from the producer direct or from some 
agency or commission merchant in New York. This does not apply to abso- 
lutely all American firms, as certain specialties in builders' and carpenters' 
tools, in farming implements, and in cutlery are well represented in the Dutch 
market. The manufacturers of the nearest European countries, and particu- 
larly Germany, are in constant contact with their Dutch customers. German 
wares, bearing Dutch labels or accompanied by advertising matter printed in 
the Dutch language, are constantly being brought to the attention of both 
retailer and wholesaler, and German traveling agents make frequent visits to 
their customers. 

It is worth noting that, while the more important hardware merchants in 
the larger centers usually speak both English and German, the dealers in the 
smaller cities and in the rural districts, if familiar with any foreign lan- 
guage, it is more likely to be German than English. 

SCANDINAVIAN MARKETS. 

General conditions in the hardware trade of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark 
are similar. As a producing country, however, Sweden predominates, and the 
products of- its hardware industries are in evidence in the markets of both 
Norway and Denmark, whereas but few products distinctive of either Norway 
or Denmark are to be found in the Swedish hardware market. American 
manufacturers of hardware would find a profitable market in all these coun- 
tries if they would take the trouble to cultivate it. 

The first hardware imported from America arrived in Sweden in 1876, and 
consisted of spades, forks, axes, and a line of farming implements. These soon 



230 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

gained a reputation for superiority over the German makes, but in time the 
American quality slightly deteriorated, whereupon the German manufacturers 
improved the quality of their output, and for this reason and because of their 
ability to place goods on the Swedish market at lower prices, eventually sup- 
planted the American trade. By 1884 American axes had been pretty well in- 
troduced in Scandinavia, and the demand for them was quite general, at the 
expense of the domestic makes. This induced a firm in Stockholm to produce 
in that year an especially superior line of axes, with the intention of shutting 
out the American ax. As an inducement it offered to give three new axes for 
every ax purchased from it that proved defective. This offer soon swerved the 
allegiance of purchasers from the American to the Swedish ax, as they saw 
prospects of an extensive free supply of axes. However, it is said that up to 
date these prospects have not been realized ; that few, if any, " bad " axes have 
been returned ; that the firm by this maneuver not only established a reputation 
for its manufacture but created a decided preference, and orders for the 
American product diminished. The manufacture of these axes is still con- 
tinued in Aby, Sweden, and they find extensive and continuing sale. 

This trade could undoubtedly be recovered by American manufacturers, and 
trade in other lines successfully developed and established if they adopted the 
methods used by the German manufacturer to introduce and popularize his 
goods. In the first place, he covers the territory to be canvassed by a trained, 
experienced corps of salesmen, who speak the language of the country, visit 
every city of consequence, and do not neglect the country districts. If a slight 
modification in style or size of an article is desired, he agrees to make the altera- 
tion, if orders are of warrantable quantity ; he then makes quick delivery in 
convenient packages and extends reasonable credit usually three months from 
date of delivery, sometimes more, but seldom, if ever, less. 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN GOODS. 

Expressions of opinion secured in reliable, unbiased, and authoritative hard- 
ware circles in Stockholm and Goteborg fail to indicate any factors that would 
effectively operate toward a restriction of trade in American hardware in 
Sweden. So far as could be ascertained, no prejudice exists in the minds of 
Swedish dealers and consumers against any American hardware product thus 
far placed on the Swedish market. Quite the contrary is true, and if prices 
of domestic manufactures and of articles imported from other competing 
countries could be met, the American quality, finish, and workmanship would 
quickly obtain preference. 

The German manufacturer has succeeded in marketing many of his imple- 
ments and utensils in Sweden, because he first familiarizes the dealer with 
the article by personal explanation and demonstration and then proceeds to 
popularize it among the consumers by inducements in the form of acceptable 
prices and a readiness to meet individual wishes or requirements as to style, 
size, or finish, if the orders are in approximately warrantable quantities. 
These are concessions which it is said the American manufacturer has stead- 
fastly declined to make to the foreign trade, either because of lack of flexi- 
bility or adaptability in organization and mechanical installation, or simply 
because he has not deemed it worth while. 

[From " Markets for American Hardware in Italy, Spain, and Portugal," Miscellaneous 
Series No. 55, prepared under the supervision of C. W. A. Veditz, commercial attache" 
at Paris, 1917.] 

ITALIAN MARKETS. 

In Italy there is an extensive manufacture of hardware, most of the im- 
portant factories being located in the Provinces of Piedmont, Lombardy, Tus- 
cany, and the Marches. Until the outbreak of the European war German manu- 
facturers were the chief competitors of the Italians. Owing to Germany's 
favorable treatment of exports, easy terms, quick transportation, etc., certain 
German articles were sold in the Italian market as cheap as those of Italian 
manufacture, and in some cases cheaper. England supplied a large quantity 
of fine cutlery to Italy, and from France came certain quantities of the better 
grades of tools and other hardware. 

American manufacturers have almost a monopoly in fine safety locks, spring 
hinges, pipe-threading machines, bits, saws, files, metal-polishing machines, meat 
choppers, and other small special machines. However, since these articles are 
purchased only by the high-class trade, imports are not large. In nearly all 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 231 

lines of hardware each dealer shows goods of American manufacture. The 
quality of the materials employed in their manufacture, the perfect adap- 
tability to the purpose for which they are used, and particularly the fine 
finish, make these goods very desirable for window displays and as samples 
of fine hardware. But though the customer may recognize the superiority of 
American hardware, he usually considers it too expensive for everyday use. 

A house at Milan has the agency for many goods of American manufacture, 
and its catalogues, published in Italian with prices in lire, can be found in 
dealers' hands throughout Italy. Among the American goods offered by this 
concern are saws, carpenter kits and tools, grinders' taps and drills, shears 
and scissors, screw drivers, pliers, pincers, vises and wrenches, thread-cutting 
machines, and tap wrenches. 

Before the war a Hamburg firm that handled American hardware and tools 
sent traveling salesmen through Italy every six months. But the market for 
high-class articles has been limited. The Hamburg house sold American hard- 
ware c. i. f. port of arrival in Italy, with payment in three to six months. 
While this house did a fair trade in Italy before the war, the demand for the goods 
that it handled was insignificant as compared with the demand for cheap hard- 
ware of German manufacture. The Italian market demands cheap goods. The 
Italian mechanic receives $0.80 to $1.40 per day, and can not pay high prices. 
Rather than pay for a finished shovel, sledge, or hammer handle, he will make 
his own from any lumber available. He is not particular as to where tools 
are manufactured so long as they are fairly good and are to be obtained at 
prices that suit his purse. German manufacturers of hardware, bearing in 
mind the needs and resources of the average Italian customer, have always 
offered cheap goods at low prices and on liberal credit terms. English manu- 
facturers have been making efforts to get a larger footing in this market, but 
their terms of sale are not acceptable; in fact, dealers are accustomed to the 
methods and prices of the German manufacturers, most of whom established 
headquarters in Italy (chiefly in Milan). 

Many distributing houses, however, are in the hands of energetic Italians, 
who would handle American goods if they were not so difficult to obtain. This 
difficulty should grow less as American manufacturers become better ac- 
quainted with the needs and possibilities of the Italian hardware market, par- 
ticularly if increased American production for export appreciably lowers prices. 
The difficulty should lessen as American houses better their selling organiza- 
tions and methods in Italy and as ocean freight rates and rates of exchange 
return to normal. Conditions that are favorable to American trade in Italy 
after the war are the necessity of replenishing depleted stocks when the do- 
mestic producers and some foreign competitors are occupied, to a great extent, 
with the problems of reorganization and readjustment. 

American manufacturers have shown little disposition to consider the whims 
and habits or even the actual necessities of the Italian customer. Either they have 
not cared to alter their models for the sake of what was regarded as a limited 
market, as with screws, pincers, trowels, etc., or they have not cared to alter 
the prevailing high quality and finish of their goods in order to reduce the price, 
as, for example, with nails, hinges, and pitchforks and other agricultural im- 
plements. It appears that often a slight variation in form or finish would 
have turned an unsalable into a salable article. American manufacturers who 
wish to acquire and hold a large Italian trade shouid consider how they can 
produce for these markets good merchandise somewhat inferior and less highly 
finished than that which they make for home consumption. 

SYSTEM OF CONDUCTING HAEDWARE TRADE. 

The wholesale hardware trade in Italy is in the hands of a number of dif- 
ferent classes of dealers. Cutlery is handled by one class; firearms, fishing 
tackle, etc., by another. General hardware includes builders' hardware, tools, 
and kitchen utensils, though kitchen utensils are handled more and more by 
specialists. Until a few years ago most mechanics' tools also were dealt in by 
general hardware firms, but now they are usually included in the machine 
trade. 

American hardware has not made much progress in Italy. American manu- 
facturers have not sufficiently considered the great variety of sizes and pat- 
terns required there. Moreover, American wares were hard to introduce by 
reason of the almost entire lack of well-organized jobbing houses with staffs 
of trained commercial travelers who could study the markets. 



232 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR, 

Most of the German manufacturers have branch houses and depots in Milan, 
from which they sent their traveling salesmen periodically with samples and 
catalogues, and from which they made the prompt shipments for which they 
were noted. There are also Italians and others who conduct import agencies 
in Milan, Genoa, Rome, and Naples. The Hamburg houses before mentioned 
made a specialty of American hardware and sent its traveling men through 
Italy twice a year, offering goods c. i. f. Italian ports, with payment in three 
to six months. 

Before the war there was a brisk export trade with the eastern Mediter- 
ranean, which was usually carried on by means of commercial travelers work- 
ing in conjunction with local agents, who were often themselves Italians. 
Argentina also bought Italian hardware. Italian hardware exports in other 
directions were negligible. 

SUGGESTIONS TO AMERICAN EXPORTERS. 

By way of summary, it may be said that besides the very obvious considera- 
tion of studying samples, price lists, and catalogues, American manufacturers 
should make a personal visit to Italy or send a trusted representative, if they 
find it possible to do so. They should share with their customers in Italy the 
risks and expenses that accompany the introduction of goods in any market. 
The failure to do this has called forth some of the complaints that have been 
heard from Italian customers. German manufacturers usually printed adver- 
tisements and announcements in the Italian language free of charge, and, 
having assured themselves of the credit of the people they were dealing with, 
sent samples for show and distribution and gave every other possible facility. 
American houses have required payment in advance because they do not know 
the Italian customer. It does not seem to occur to them that the Italian cus- 
tomer knows them and their goods just as little, and that even if he personally 
is convinced that the goods are superior to all others he must show them to 
his customers before he can get or give large orders. 

The German exporting houses have accustomed their former Italian clients 
to long credits, sometimes a number of years. Italian business men freely 
admit that such a practice, though it was often convenient to individuals, in 
the long run was an injury to commerce, and none has been heard to ask for 
more than 90 days. 

PORTUGUESE MARKETS. 

The hardware imported into Portugal may be divided as follows, by countries 
of origin : Germany, 50 per cent ; United Kingdom, 25 per cent ; United States, 
12 per cent; France and Belgium, 6 per cent each. The large imports from 
Germany were due principally to low prices, easy terms, excellent shipping 
facilities and reasonable freight rates, thorough knowledge of the market, and 
adaptability to the market requirements. Credit was granted in many cases for 
one year, and nearly always for three or six months. This practice was made 
possible by the credit information given by Lisbon agencies of German firms. 
In normal times the majority of steamers calling at Lisbon are German and sail 
between South America and Germany via Portugal and France. A thorough 
knowledge of the market's requirements was gathered by traveling salesmen 
equipped with extensive lines of samples. German manufacturers were able 
to produce low-priced goods equal to better goods in appearance, and these 
articles, when properly handled, were extensively sold. Moreover, the German 
manufacturers made what the market wanted ; they were willing to modify any 
features of their products to make them conform to the needs or the wishes of 
the customers whom they were trying to serve. Many special articles produced 
by England, France, and Belgium are sought because they have acquired a 
certain reputation. The German industry is much more recent. Many German 
articles, therefore, are not yet well known, but at the rate at which the Germans 
were spreading their propaganda before the European war they would prac- 
tically have absorbed the Portuguese hardware market in half a dozen years. 

Perhaps the most important reason, however, why Portugal does not buy more 
American hardware is that it costs too much for the Portuguese purse. At pres- 
ent the prices may be paid under the pressure of necessity, but with the return 
of peace and competition the price question will again be of supreme importance. 
In nearly all cases it should be possible for American hardware to meet the 
prices of the English, French, and Belgian products. But lowering the cost of 
production so as to compete with German articles, if possible, is a problem that 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 233 

should engage the serious and immediate attention of the American hardware 
trade. 

In practically no line is the preference of other goods to American determined 
by superior quality, for American hardware is generally considered to be of 
better quality than that of other countries. Portuguese hardware dealers are 
unanimous in the opinion that this is especially true of tools and the finer grades 
of hardware, and that if American manufacturers will come down in their 
prices and will grant easier terms of payment they will obtain a permanent hold 
on the Portuguese market. 

[From " Russian Market for American Hardware," Miscellaneous Series No. 46, prepared 
under the supervision of Henry D. Baker, commercial attache" at Petrograd, 1917.] 

GERMAN TRADE METHODS IN RUSSIA. 

A few German manufacturers, including one or two having their factories in 
Solingen (the latter specializing to a great extent in cutlery, scissors, tweezers, 
razors, etc.), have of late years opened their own branches in Moscow, the 
branch selling the products of the factory by means of travelers. Owing to the 
keen competition, however, the method has been found unprofitable and the 
branches have been closed. Just before the war there were in Moscow only 
two branches of German manufacturers, both of which were in Solingen. Since 
the war started these two branches have been compelled to close. 

German manufacturers, however, owe their success mainly to the fact that 
the majority have sent their own travelers not only to the big cities in Russia, 
but also to the larger provincial towns, and have provided them with elaborate 
collections of samples, and in many cases with catalogues printed in Russian 
and containing values quoted in rubles f. o. b. Russian port or railway station. 
The majority of the Moscow houses are prepared to buy f. o. b. factory and 
pay the freight and duty, remitting in foreign checks, but most of the provin- 
cial dealers and stores insist on prices f. o. b. frontier, duty paid by manufac- 
turer. The willingness of many German manufacturers to do this has helped 
toward their success. Furthermore, German manufacturers have been more 
inclined to give credits, and very extended credits, owing to some extent to the 
support that they have received from the German banks, which have advanced 
money on the strength of orders received by manufacturers from Russian 
dealers. 

It should be remembered that Germany's success was mainly in articles of 
more or less inferior quality ; but in a number of lines the Germans have grad- 
ually been supplanting other countries, even in the better grades of goods, be- 
cause they have worked the market more intensively and have given more 
favorable terms of payment. 

Large quantities of goods before the war were sent to Russia from Germany 
by post. For postal parcels weighing 5 kilos (11 pounds) or less Germany 
introduced a low minimum rate (parcels weighing over 5 kilos had to pay 
extra for overweight, which increased the cost of sending by post), and goods 
ordered for shipment by post were accordingly sent in parcels of 5 kilos. 
Experience has shown that the prices of some articles when received by post 
were lower than those of the same articles when sent in bulk in the ordinary 
manner. With comparatively high-priced goods that are not heavy the for- 
warding and clearing firms at ports or places of shipment and destination 
reckon their charges at a percentage of the value of the corresponding goods ; 
these expenses are saved when sending the goods by post The postal parcels 
are sent direct to the house or store, the levying of the duty being made by the 
authorities at the customhouse. The receiver, therefore, has only the duty to 
pay, various other expenses not being incurred. On this account some goods 
are received exclusively by post (for instance, shipments of 12 to 15 parcels, 
each weighing 5 kilos). Furthermore, the shipment of goods by post is im- 
portant when they are required urgently. Parcels sent from Germany were 
only 10 to 12 days on the way to most cities in Russia, including time for clear- 
ing them at the customhouses. Germany through postal shipments did busi- 
ness amounting to thousands and tens of thousands of marks. 

DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN TRADE AT RIGA. 

Local dealers at Riga point to the following reasons for the remarkable de- 
velopment of the demand for German hardware : 
(a) Good qualities at low prices. 



234 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR. 

(&) Speedy delivery and a willingness to fill small orders, as well as a dis- 
position to make special patterns suited to local requirements. 

(c) Allowance, under proper conditions, of extensive credits, running from 
6 to 9 and even 12 months. It is pointed out that the Russian commercial world 
is so accustomed to these long credits that the average merchant will prefer a 
long credit to a short one with more favorable prices. 

(d) Geographical advantages similar to those of American firms doing busi- 
ness with Canada. . With fairly good railway and postal connections between 
the two empires, the German firms were able to keep in close touch with their 
customers here. The steamship connections in time of peace are excellent. 

(e) The parcel-post agreement between Russia and Germany, which has en- 
abled German hardware manufacturers to fill small orders quickly and at mini- 
mum cost and also to send samples freely. Parcels weighing up to 11 pounds 
could be sent by post, and often fairly large shipments were broken into small 
lots and forwarded in this way. In shipping by post certain small expense items 
are avoided and much time and trouble are saved for the purchaser. Importers 
say that in recent years thousands of dollars' worth of hardware has come to 
Riga by parcel post from Germany. 

American hardware is of excellent quality, but certain factors, some of which 
it is possible to modify, have tended to turn the balance against the American 
manufacturer. Among these factors are the following : 

(a) Stringent conditions of payment, generally cash in advance or settlement 
upon receipt of documents. 

(&) Disinclination to consider temporary local demands and tastes and in- 
sistence upon supplying goods as designed for trade in the United States. 

(c) Unwillingness to supply small orders; this makes it impossible for the 
less-important dealer to buy direct from the American manufacturer. 

(d) Lack of a parcel-post agreement between the United States and Russia. 

(e) The impossibility of quick deliveries, owing to the great distance between 
the two countries. 

In their efforts to overcome some of the foregoing disadvantages American 
manufacturers have allowed much of their trade to fall into the hands of German 
commission houses, some of whom have offices in New York as well as Hamburg. 
These commission houses accept orders of any size or description and allow the 
terms customary in Russia. It is understood, however, that an American com- 
mission house has recently established a branch in Copenhagen to look after the 
hardware business in this part of the world. 

When the war brake out and German commission houses were cut off from their 
Russian market, American hardware manufacturers undoubtedly suffered con- 
siderable loss in this territory. They know little or nothing about the people who 
have been handling their goods in Russia, nor do the Russian merchants know 
how to get into touch with the American manufacturers, although they may 
desire to continue handling American hardware. It has been customary for 
German traveling salesmen to come to Russia twice a year. These salesmen 
bring samples with them, take orders, and at the same time make collections. 
They are very effective in adjusting differences arising from time to time 
that can not well be disposed of through correspondence. In Riga salesmen 
have to guard against offending the wholesale dealers by attempting to do 
business direct with the retailers and small dealers. Trade may also be lost 
at times by attempting to work through commissio .; agents where there are 
well-established wholesale houses desiring to import direct. On the other 
hand, agents of good standing are often very valuable in certain lines. Only 
an experienced salesman can avoid errors of this sort, which may cost h-s house 
dearly. 

In view of the present difficulties of transport, etc., direct relations between 
Russia and the United States can not now be developed to any great extent, 
but it is the general opinion that they should develop rapidly after the war. 

GERMAN SUPEEMACY IN HARDWARE TRADE OF ODESSA. 

Many products of the American hardware trade are well known in this dis- 
trict. In fact, even the youngest apprentice in a hardware store easily 05- 
nizes the American trade-marks, although neither he nor his " boss " seems to 
know the circumstances under which those goods have been imported into 
Russia. The fact is that all the American hardware goods offered for sale in 
Russia came through Hamburg, which was a very important transshipping 
point between the Russian market and foreign manufacturers. 



GERMAN METHODS DESCRIBED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. 235 

The big German jobbing houses began many years ago to study the Conditions 
of the Russian market and the psychology of the Russian dealers. Their sales- 
men used to travel all over this vast territory in order to get an idea of the 
demand and of the various goods needed. They not only came with catalogues 
and price lists printed in the Russian language, but also had boxes full of 
hardware novelties, which they would present to the Russian dealer as sam- 
ples and from which the Russian dealer could select the goods most suitable for 
his clientele. 

Soon, however, the German manufacturers came to the conclusion that this 
trade carried on by the salesmen alone was not sufficient, and they appointed 
commission agents, who were better acquainted with local conditions. Cash 
terms are totally unknown in the wholesale hardware business of Russia. 
Therefore it is very important to know the exact credit situation of the various 
dealers. This knowledge can be acquired only on the spot, because, as a rule, 
banks in Russia do not give credit information, and the existing information 
agencies are not reliable enough to make important business dependent upon 
the information received from them. A system of commission agencies was 
therefore developed. These commission agents were authorized by the Ger- 
man jobbing houses or by the manufacturers themselves to extend credit 
within certain limits to their dealers. The amount of their commission varied 
from 5 to 10 per cent, and depended largely on the kind of goods sold. This 
system enabled the German firms to extend their trade without running any 
great risk. 

To assist the local agents the German firms have sent several of their ex- 
perienced salesmen to Odessa at least twice a year, thoroughly to canvass 
the territory and close the contracts with commission agents. These German 
salesmen sometimes were so energetic in their efforts to capture the trade 
that they not only closed contracts with their wholesale commission agents, 
but competed with them by selling their products direct to the retailers. As 
a rule they came in March to obtain orders for the next winter season, and 
in October or November to make arrangements for the next summer season. 
After the German hardware products were introduced in Russia there was 
no more need for the German salesmen to carry collections of samples with 
them. It was sufficient for them to call on their permanent customers to make 
new contracts. 

No wholesale hardware business is done in Russia on a cash basis; all 
deals are based on credit, usually for six months. Most Russian firms, how- 
ever, have the credit extended for two or three months more. As a rule, the 
German hardware goods were sold c. i. f. Odessa, the invoice to be paid in 
German money. Some of the Russian firms, however, prefer to pay in rubles, 
because in this case they can know in advance the exact amount of the in- 
voice. The loss of the German firms incurred in consequence of the credit 
risk is estimated by local hardware merchants to have been not more than 2 
per cent and there is no doubt that allowance for this loss is made in the 
list price of German products. The prices quoted in the price lists were bind- 
ing neither for the purchaser nor for the seller. There was a great variety 
of reductions, discounts, allowances, etc., the amount of which usually de- 
pended on the volume of the Russian dealer's business with the German 
concern. 

The liberal credit extended by the German firms, which is opposed to the 
principles underlying the trade of England, France, and the United States, 
made it very difficult for these countries to compete successfully with Germany 
on the Russian market. 

It was not only the liberal credit policy of the German dealers that made 
them successful on the Russian market. The German manufacturers were 
equally anxious to meet the views of the Russian dealers, who very often 
insisted on various changes in construction and shape. If the German manu- 
facturer did not see his way clear to satisfy the Russian dealer by making 
the given article of cheaper material, because this would affect the reputation 
of his well-known trade-mark, he would furnish cheap articles not provided 
with his trade-mark, or would create a special trade-mark for the article sup- 
plied to the Russian dealer. 

In consequence of this liberal policy of the German dealers and manufac- 
turers, 75 per cent of the imported hardware goods came from Germany. The 
Germans laid their hold on the Russian market to long credits, low prices, 
and the manufacture of products adapted to Russian demands and tastes. 



236 GERMAN TRADE AND THE WAR, 

Russian dealers conduct their business on purely business principles. Still 
they preferred to buy their goods, even those manufactured in the United 
States, through the big jobbing houses in Hamburg. They admit that the 
quality of American hardware is better and that very often the prices are not 
higher than the prices of German manufactured goods; but up to the out- 
break of the European war they did not care to look for direct connections 
with the United States, because the German suppliers did everything in their 
power to satisfy the Russian dealers and to furnish them with the goods they 
needed. 

Another great advantage for Germany was the direct steamship line between 
Odessa and Hamburg, which made transportation cheap and comparatively 
quick. 



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